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THE  GREAT  WAR 

FOURTH   VOLUME 

THE     WAVERING 
BALANCE    OF    FORCES 


THE 

REAT  WAR 


JRTH    VOLUME 

THE      WAVERING 

ANCE  OF  FORCES 


RAYMOND    POINCARE 

President  of  the  French  Republic. 


I)   AND  PUBLISHED   BT 

)RGE  BARRIE'S  SONS 

PHILADELPHIA 


THE 

GREAT  WAR 


FOU  RTH  VOLUME 
THE  WAVERING 
BALANCE  OF  FORCES 


BY 

GEORGE  H.  ALLEN,  Ph.  D.,  formerly  of  the  University  of  Penn- 
sylvania, History  Department;  now  in  the  Military  Intelligence 
Division  of  the  General  Staff  at  Washington  ;  Fellow  in  Classical 
Archaeology,  American  School  of  Classical  Studies,  Rome,  Etc., 

AND    OTHERS 


PRINTED   AND  PUBLISHED   BY 

GEORGE  BARRIE'S  SONS 

at  PHILADELPHIA 


C  O  P  V  R  I  G  H  T  R  D  ,  1  c>  1  9  ,         BY 

GEORGE    BARRIE'S    SONS 

ALL       RIGHTS       RES  E  R  V  I   I) 
i  in    ii  1 1    rRAi  i"-.-  in    i  hi     Volume  are 

RbPRODUCTIOM  <»>    PHOTOGRAPHS  COPYRIGHTED   BY 

Underwood  amd Underwood,  bt  PaulThi 

AND       BY      THE      INTF  R  N  ATION  A  L      FlLM       SERVICE 

Entered    at    Stationers'    Hall,    I 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGES 

List  of  Illustrations XIII-XVIII 

Preface XIX-XXII 

I  Tentative  Offensive  Efforts  of  the  West- 

ern Allies 1-32 

General  character  of  the  campaign  of  1915.  Probable  numerical  strength 
of  the  chief  combatants  at  the  beginning  of  the  year.  The  situation  in  the 
West.  The  French  offensive  near  Soissons,  January  8-14.  French  offen- 
sive in  Champagne,  February  16-March  11.  Battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
March  11-12.  The  contest  for  Les  Eparges,  April  5-11.  Hill  60.  The 
second  Battle  of  Ypres,  April  22-May  27.  The  poisonous  gas.  Gallantry 
of  the  Canadians.  Restoration  of  the  Allied  front  and  readjustment  of  the 
positions  on  the  Ypres  salient.  The  British  offensive  near  Festubert  and 
the  French  offensive  west  of  Lens. 

II  The   Winter    Operations    in    the    East 

(January-March,  1915) 33-54 

The  situation  in  the  East  at  the  commencement  of  1915.  Motives  and 
plans  of  the  contestants.  Movements  in  Bukovina.  The  renewed  effort 
to  capture  Warsaw  from  the  west,  von  Mackensen's  attack  and  failure  on 
the  front  in  central  Poland,  February  1-8.  The  plan  for  simultaneous 
action  on  the  wings  of  the  Teutonic  front  in  north  and  south.  The  situa- 
tion in  East  Prussia  and  the  German  concentration  there.  The  German 
plan  of  battle ;  a  compound  double  enveloping  maneuver.  The  particular 
concentric  movement  of  each  wing,  in  the  south  on  Lyck,  in  the  north  on 
Wirballen.  East  Prussia  completely  cleared  of  the  invaders  about  Feb- 
ruary 15th.  The  general  converging  movement  of  the  entire  army  and  its 
results.  The  Russian  counter-offensive.  The  German  offensive  on  the 
Narev  and  its  failure.  The  Teutonic  offensive  in  the  south,  the  battles 
for  possession  of  the  Carpathian  passes.  The  importance  of  Peremysl  and 
nature  of  its  defense.     Its  fall  on  March  22d  and  the  results. 

III  The  Great  Teutonic  Drive  in  Galicia     .  55-74 

A  retrospect.  Misleading  convictions  of  the  Entente  Allies.  The  plight 
of  Austria- Hungary  and  the  progress  of  German  control  over  the  armies  of 
the  Dual  Monarchy.  The  Teutonic  leaders.  The  Central  Empires  rise 
to  the  situation  and  design  an  offensive  on  an  unprecedented  scale,  profit- 
ing by  the  experience  already  gained  in  the  course  of  the  war.     Position 

V 


vi  The  Great  War 

CHAPTER  PAOES 

(if  the  armies.      Prodigious  preparations  ""  VOB  Mackensen's  front.      His 

preliminary  attack  on  April  28th.  The  tempest  breaks,  Ma)  2d;  the  !<us 
si. m  Third  Armj  staggers  backwards.  Rapid  advance  <>f  von  Mackeneen*! 
right  wing  snd  perilous  situation  oi  the  Russians  south  of  the  Dukhi  and 
LupkoM  Passes.  Resistance  of  the  Russians  on  the  Besko-Sicsucin  line, 
\i  i\  9  12.  Arrival  of  the  Vustro-Gennan  operative  front  on  the  San  and 
the  cooperation  of  von  Boehm  ErmolU  and  von  Linsingen.  Von  Pflaawi 
repulsed.  Retreat  and  sudden  counter-attack  of  Ewarts's  Russian  army 
north  oi  the  Vistula.  The  conflict  on  the  San  ;  fall  of  Jaroslaw,  May  15th, 
and  of  Peremysl,  June  2d.    The  Gferman  advance  east  of  the  San.     Von 

Linsingen'8  attempts  tO  cross  the  Dniester  and  his  final  success.  The  com 
bats  on  June  12lh  and  13th.  Second  battle  at  Rawaruska,  June  20th,  and 
fall  of  Lemberg,  June  22d.     The  situation  at  the  end  of  June. 

IV  Naval  Operations  at  the  Dardanelles      75-104 

British  naval  protection.  Consideration  of  the  tactics  of  the  Dardanelles 
operations.  Bombardment  of  Dardanelles  forts,  November  3,  1914.  Motives 
for  the  Dardanelles  expedition.  Admiral  Carden's  plan.  Divergence  of 
naval  opinions.  Mr.  Churchill's  expectations.  Earlier  British  passages 
of  the  Dardanelles.  Physical  characteristics  of  the  Strait  and  Gallipoli 
Peninsula;  its  forts.  Bases  seized  by  the  British:  Imbros  and  Lemnos 
islands;  PortMudros.  A  British  submarine  enters  the  Strait.  Operations 
of  February  19,  1915:  Allied  ships;  the  objectives;  the  day's  action; 
renewed  operations,  February  25th,  the  entrance  forced  ;  operations  within 
the  Strait  and  in  the  Gulf  of  Saros.  Bombardment  of  Gallipoli.  Vice- 
admiral  de  Robeck  in  command.  The  disastrous  operations  of  March 
18th.  The  Allied  fleet  out  of  the  Dardanelles.  A  joint  military  and  naval 
attack  ordered.     Losses. 

V  The  Campaign  on  the  Gallipoli  Penin- 

sula      105-126 

Topography  of  the  peninsula.  The  main  purpose  of  the  operations. 
Difficulties  of  access  to  the  peninsula.  Composition  of  the  expeditionary 
forces.  The  landings  of  the  British  on  the  peninsula,  April  25-26,  1915; 
great  difficulties  at  the  beaches.  Descent  of  the  French  on  Kum 
Kale.  The  battle  of  April  27-28  and  consolidation  of  the  Allied  front 
with  the  French  contingent  on  the  right.  Turkish  attack  on  May  1st. 
The  struggle  for  Krithia,  May  6-8.  General  significance  of  the  operations 
on  the  peninsula.  The  battle  of  June  4th.  The  progress  of  the  French, 
June  21-30,  and  of  the  British  on  the  28th.  Need  of  reinforcements.  The 
plan  for  the  supreme  effort  in  August.  The  struggle  for  the  Sari  Bahr 
ridge,  August  6-10.  The  new  landing  at  Suvla  Bay,  August  7th,  and  the 
procrastinating  methods  in  that  quarter.  Failure  of  the  great  effort  and  of 
the  expedition.     Conclusions. 

VI  The  Destruction   of  the  Polish  Sa- 

lient and  the  Great  Retreat  .    .    .     127-156 

The  situation  on  the  eastern  front  at  the  beginning  of  July,  1915.  Second 
battle  of  Krasnik,  July  5-8.  German  plan  for  the  grand  offensive.  Weak- 
ness of  the  Russians.  Disposition  of  the  armies  on  the  opposing  eastern 
fronts.  Resumption  of  the  offensive  by  von  Mackensen.  Ewarts  de- 
feated by  von  Woyrsch.  Von  Gallwitz  breaks  through  the  northern 
side  of  the  Polish  salient.  The  situation  in  front  of  Warsaw.  The 
critical  situation  in  the  Polish  salient  and  the  decision  of  the  Russians 


Contents  VII 

CHAPTER  PAGES 

to  sacrifice  Warsaw  and  Poland.  Passage  of  the  Vistula  forced  by  the 
Germans  between  Ivangorod  and  Warsaw,  July  28th.  Abandonment  of 
Warsaw.  The  supposed  analogy  of  1812  and  1915.  Flight  and  pursuit. 
The  line  of  the  Bug  rendered  untenable.  Capture  of  Kovno  by  the  Ger- 
mans, August  17th.  Fall  of  Novo  Georgievsk,  August  19th.  Attempted 
landing  of  the  Germans  in  the  Gulf  of  Riga.  Evacuation  of  Brest-Litovsk, 
August  25th.  The  Tsar's  resolution  to  command  the  armies  in  person, 
September  5th.  Alexeieff  as  Chief  of  the  General  Staff;  his  previous 
career.  The  final  attempt  to  engulf  the  Russian  armies ;  the  fall  of  Vilna 
and  escape  of  the  Russian  Tenth  Army.  Failure  of  the  Germans  to  achieve 
their  supreme  purpose  and  their  efforts  to  gain  a  suitable  stationary  front 
in  the  East ;  the  Riga-Vilna-Rovno-Lemberg  railway  and  the  coveted  line 
for  the  Teutonic  eastern  front.  The  configuration  of  the  southern  area  of 
the  eastern  theater;  the  Austro-German  offensive  and  the  Russian  counter- 
offensive  in  that  section.  The  German  offensive  along  the  Dvina:  the 
Dvinsk  sector  and  the  failure  of  the  German  attacks ;  the  situation  before 
Riga  and  thwarting  of  the  German  efforts  there.  The  Russian  offensive 
in  the  south  in  the  winter  of  1915-1916. 

VII  The  Welter  in  the  Balkans  and  the 

Submersion  of  Serbia 157-186 

The  Balkan  labyrinth.  Conflicting  tendencies.  The  situation  in  Greece : 
political  revival,  1910-1913;  Venizelos  as  prime  minister ;  the  estrangement 
between  Venizelos  and  the  king ;  problems  left  by  the  Balkan  Wars ;  the 
project  for  Greek  cooperation  with  the  Allies  and  the  resignation  of 
Venizelos ;  Greek  and  Italian  interests  in  the  Near  East ;  the  election 
of  June  13,  1915.  The  attitude  of  Bulgaria :  the  advantage  of  the  Central 
Powers  in  bargaining  with  Bulgaria;  the  powerful  influence  of  military 
events  on  Bulgarian  policy ;  Bulgaria's  decision  and  agreement  with  Tur- 
key. Obligation  of  Greece  with  respect  to  Serbia.  Resignation  of 
Venizelos  on  October  5th  ;  King  Constantine's  attitude.  The  Zaimis  and 
Skouloudis  ministries  and  the  Greek  elections  of  December  19th.  Bul- 
garia casts  her  lot  with  the  Central  Empires.  The  strategical  situation  of 
Serbia.  Commencement  of  the  Serbian  campaign.  Union  of  the  Bul- 
'  garian  and  German  armies  and  the  crushing  of  Serbian  resistance. "  Exodus 
of  Serbian  fugitives.  Flight  by  the  Ibar  valley  and  across  the  Plains  of 
Kossovo.  Escape  of  the  remnants  of  the  Serbian  armies  through  Albania. 
Arrival  and  failure  of  the  Allied  relief  expedition.  The  British  and 
French  establish  a  fortified  base  at  Salonica.  Withdrawal  of  the  Allies 
from  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula.     Reflection  on  the  close  of  the  campaign. 

VIII  Internal  Evolution  of  the  Princi- 

pal Belligerents 187-214 

Importance  of  the  internal  development.  The  chief  internal  problems  of 
Great  Britain.  Difficulties  in  the  way  of  a  national  organization  of  indus- 
try. Munitions  shortage,  the  formation  of  a  coalition  government,  and  the 
creation  of  a  ministry  of  munitions.  The  Munitions  Act  and  the  Welsh 
coal  strike.  The  recruiting  problem  and  the  agitation  for  compulsory 
service.  The  National  Register,  August  15,  1915.  The  Earl  of  Derby's 
recruiting  plan  and  its  results.  The  Military  Service  Act  of  1916,  passed 
in  January  of  that  year.  Nature  of  the  British  financial  problem.  War 
loans.  The  problem  of  foreign  exchanges.  The  Sinn  Fein  rebellion. 
The  fall  of  the  Asquith  ministry.  The  economic  situation  in  France. 
French  ministerial  changes.  French  war  finance.  The  economic  situa- 
tion in  Germany  and  the  official  control  of  the  distribution  of  the  most 


vill  Tin   Great  War 

CHAPTER  PAGES 

iinvss.m  commodities,  sessions  of  the  Reichstag,  votes  <>f  war  credits, 
wai  loans,  the  ittitude  ol  i««>liti<-nl  parties,  and  the  discussion  of  pi 
terms,  l  be  evolution  and  conflict  ol  opinions  In  the  highei  circles. 
Situation  ni  Vustria  Hungary,  death  of  Francis  Joseph  The  ministerial 
changes  in  Russia.  The  crisis  in  September,  1915.  The  Increasing 
antagonism  between  the  government  and  the  Duma. 

I\    Rest  mption  of  Offensive  Operations 

in    i  in-:  West 215-230 

The  defensive  organizations  and  offensive  tactics  in  the  West  The 
Allied  offensive  of  September,   1915:   its  aims.     Subsidiary  attacks  In 

Flanders.  The  principal  effort  of  the  British ;  array  of  the  opposing 
German  and  British  forces  on  the  sector  of  attack;  capture  of  Fosse  8  and 
the  I  [ohenzollern  Redoubt;  capture  of  Loos  and  spectacular  charge  of  the 
Fifteenth  Division:  failure  to  consolidate  the  extreme  positions  won. 
Anion  of  the  Tenth  French  Army  in  Artois;  capture  of  positions  on  the 
Yimy  Heights.  The  supreme  effort  of  the  French  in  Champagne;  the 
local  situation;  initial  assault  on  the  25th;  limit  of  penetration  north  of 
Souain;  desperate  struggle  for  the  heights  north  of  Massiges;  general 
results  of  the  offensive. 

X  The  Struggle  for  Verdun 231-254 

Reasons  for  the  offensive  against  Verdun.  German  preparations.  Four 
stages  of  the  offensive.  The  first  stage,  February  21-March  2  :  opening  of 
the  attack,  steady  advance  of  the  Germans,  the  most  critical  period  for  the 
defenders,  fierce  struggle  for  Douaumont  on  the  25th  ;  General  Pctain,  his 
arrival ;  French  lines  of  communication  ;  the  turning  point.  The  second 
stage,  March  2- April  11  :  extension  of  the  comhat  to  the  left  bank  of  the 
Meuse,  the  attack  on  March  4th.  Successive  attacks  on  Hills  295  and  304, 
general  attack  on  April  9th.  The  third  stage,  April  11 -May  3:  the  waning 
offensive  and  French  counter-attacks.  The  fourth  stage  from  May  3d  until 
the  waning  of  the  offensive  effort  in  the  summer:  advent  of  General 
Nivelle;  renewed  German  attacks  west  of  the  Meuse  and  conquest  of 
Hills  304  and  295;  offensive  east  of  the  Meuse  and  capture  of  Fort  Vaux; 
last  great  attack  on  June  23d.     General  observations  on  the  struggle. 

XI  Operations    on    the    Austro-Italian 

Frontier 255-266 

Physical  difficulties  confronting  the  Italians:  barrier  of  the  Alps  and  the 
threatening  salient  of  the  Trentino,  the  important  strategical  positions  in 
the  hands  of  Austria-Hungary.  General  Cadorna.  The  Italian  plan.  Italian 
progress  on  the  Isonzo  and  in  the  north.  Daring  feats  of  the  Alpini.  The 
Austro-Hungarian  attack  in  the  region  of  the  Isonzo.  Disappointing  results 
of  the  first  campaign.  Italy's  anomalous  position.  Underlying  motives  of 
Teutonic  strategy  in  1916.  Preparations  for  the  great  Austro-Hungarian 
offensive  from  the  Trentino.  The  critical  situation  of  the  Italian  forces. 
The  waning  of  the  attack.     Italian  counter  blows.     The  capture  of  Gorizia. 

XII  The  Battle  of  the  Somme     ....     267-282 

The  difficulties  of  the  Allies  and  the  need  of  closer  cooperation.  First 
joint  war  council  of  the  Allies  in  Paris,  March  27-28,  1916.  Auspicious 
course  of  Allied  operations  in  1916.  The  situation  in  Picardy.  Disposi- 
tions for  the  Allied  offensive  in  the  region  of  the  Somme.     Character  of 


Contents  IX 

CHAPTER  PAGES 

the  German  defensive  organization.  Aims  of  the  British  and  French.  Three 
general  stages  of  the  battle.  The  first  stage,  July  1-13 :  the  initial  attack 
by  the  Fourth  British  and  Sixth  French  Armies  and  its  results ;  further  ad- 
vances of  the  British;  the  progress  of  the  French.  The  second  stage: 
general  attack  on  July  15th  and  the  capture  of  the  second  German  position 
by  the  British ;  the  attack  on  July  23d ;  capture  of  Pozieres ;  French  attack 
north  of  the  Somme ;  the  attack  on  September  3d  and  the  intervention  of 
the  Tenth  French  Army.  The  general  hopeful  situation  for  the  Allies. 
The  third  stage,  September  15-November  18 :  general  attack  on  Septem- 
ber 15th  and  first  appearance  of  the  "tanks";  attack  of  September  25th  and 
occupation  of  Combles ;  disappointing  effect  of  the  weather  on  the  Allied 
plans ;  desultory  offensive  operations ;  closing  of  the  battle  with  the  attack 
of  the  Fifth  British  Army.     Results  of  the  battle. 

XIII  The  Renewed  Russian  Offensive  and 

the  Intervention  and  Collapse  of 
Roumania 283-312 

Dispositions  on  the  eastern  fronts  in  the  spring  of  1916.  Offensive  of  the 
Second  Russian  Army  between  Lakes  Narotch  and  Vishnevsky.  Opening 
of  Brussiloff's  great  offensive  in  the  south  on  June  4th.  Rapid  successes 
on  the  Volhynian  sector.  Anxiety  and  counter-offensive  of  the  Austro- 
Germans.  Attacks  of  Scherbacheff  against  von  Bothmer  and  of  Lechitsky 
against  von  Pflanzer.  Czernowitz  captured,  June  17th,  and  Bukovina 
cleared.  Lesch's  attack  on  the  sector  adjoining  the  Pripet  marshes  on  the 
south.  Von  Boehm-Ermolli  defeated  by  Sakharoff,  and  fall  of  Brody, 
July  28th.  Converging  operations  against  von  Bothmer.  Fall  of  Stanislaw, 
August  10th.  Critical  situation  of  the  Central  Empires,  transference  of 
troops  from  other  fronts,  revision  of  the  command,  von  Hindenburg  as 
supreme  commander  in  the  East.  Attitude  of  Roumania  and  the  causes  of 
her  entry  into  the  war.  Her  military  and  strategical  situation.  Roumanian 
declaration  of  war  and  mobilization.  General  plan  of  cooperation  with 
the  Allies.  Roumanian  invasion  of  Transylvania.  Measures  of  the  Cen- 
tral Powers,  von  Falkenhayn  in  chief  command.  Situation  in  Greece  and 
on  the  Salonica  front.  Capture  of  Monastir.  The  uncertain  condition 
of  Greece.  Von  Mackensen's  invasion  of  the  Dobrudscha.  Culmination 
and  decline  of  Brussiloff's  offensive.  Austro-German  counter-offensive  in 
Transylvania.  Defective  cooperation  of  the  Russians  and  the  Roumanians. 
The  Tchernavoda-Costanza  railway  cut  by  von  Mackensen,  October  20th. 
Carpathian  passes  forced  by  the  Austro-Germans.  Passage  of  the  Danube 
on  the  south.  Collapse  of  the  Roumanians,  and  fall  of  Bucharest  on  De- 
cember 5th.    Roumanian  retirement  to  the  Sereth.    Close  of  the  campaign. 

XIV  The  Operations  in  Asiatic  Turkey   .     313-334 

Strategical  situation  of  Asiatic  Turkey.  British-Indian  expedition  to  Meso- 
potamia ;  occupation  of  Basra,  November  21, 1914,  and  of  Kurna,  December 
9th.  Character  of  the  Mesopotamian  plain  and  difficulties  of  the  offensive 
operations.  British  capture  of  Kut-el-Amara  and  advance  on  Bagdad. 
British  failure  at  Ctesiphon  and  retreat  to  Kut-el-Amara,  which  is  besieged. 
Failure  of  the  British  relieving  expedition  to  break  through  in  time  and 
surrender  of  Kut,  April  29,  1916.  Operations  on  the  Russo-Turkish  front. 
Complete  failure  of  the  Turkish  offensive  in  the  winter  of  1914-1915.  The 
Armenian  massacres.  The  situation  in  Persia.  Capture  of  Erzerum  by 
the  Russians,  February  16,  1916,  and  the  Russian  advance  throughout 
Armenia.  Operations  in  Persia.  Action  on  the  British  front  in  Mesopot- 
amia leading  to  the  capture  of  Kut-el-Amara.     Occupation  of  Bagdad  by 


X  The  Great  War 

CHAPTER  PAGES 

the  British,  March  11,  r»i7,  and  further  operations  northward.  Turkish 
hopes  in  reaped  i<>  Egypt  Turkish  attack  on  the  Suez  ('anal  defeated. 
Februan  .>  l,  1915.  Revolt  against  Turkish  rule  in  Arabia,  Defeat  «>f 
the  i  mkivh  expedition  against  Egypt  <>n  August  4,  1916.  Advance  <>f  the 
tish  ii>  the  border  of  Palestine  Battles  before  Gaza,  March  27ih  and 
April  17  19,  1917. 

XV  The  Allied  Offensives  of  1917  in  the 

West 335-352 

Brilliant  operations  of  the  French  at  Verdun,  October,  November,  and 
December,  1916.  Plans  and  preparations  for  a  great  Allied  offensive  in 
1"I7.  Winter  operations.  Von  Eiindenburg's  strategic  retreat  t<>  the 
"Siegfried"  line.  The  devastation  of  the  relinquished  territory.  The 
revised  plans  of  the  British  and  French.  Battle  of  Arras:  the  attack  of 
\i'iil  (Mli  and  rapid  progress  for  three  days;  increasing  resistance  of  the 
Germans;  the  new  '"Stosstruppen."  Plans  of  General  Nivelle.  Second 
Battle  oi  the  Aisne,  beginning  April  16th:  Aisne  Heights,  Craonne  and 
the  Miette  Valley,  Maronvilliers  Heights;  changes  in  the  French  High 
Command  ;  capture  of  Craonne;  results.  The  capture  of  Messines  Ridge 
by  the  British,  June  7th.  Successful  local  attack  by  the  Germans  near  the 
North  Sea  coast.  Third  Battle  of  Ypres:  great  Allied  attacks  on  July  31st, 
August  10th  and  15th,  and  »n  the  autumn.  Italian  offensives:  situation  on 
the  Ison/o  front;  Cadorna's  plan  in  May,  1917;  struggle  north  of  Gorizia 
for  the  Bainsizza  plateau;  great  attack  between  the  Carso  and  the  sea; 
results  of  the  May  offensive. 

XVI  The  Russian  Revolution  and  Mili- 

tary Collapse 353-366 

Ministerial  changes  in  Russia.  Remarkable  career  and  assassination  of  the 
miracle-worker,  Rasputin.  Allied  conference  in  Petrograd,  February  1, 
1917.  Critical  food  situation.  Popular  demonstrations  in  Petrograd,  result- 
ing in  bloodshed  on  March  11th.  Rodzianko's  telegram  to  the  Tsar.  The 
Duma  refuses  to  disperse  and  is  declared  the  sole  constitutional  authority. 
The  troops  join  the  revolution.  An  Executive  Committee  of  the  Duma  as 
Provisional  Government.  Fall  of  the  Admiralty,  March  13th.  Abdication 
of  the  Tsar  on  the  15th.  The  new  ministry.  Attitude  of  the  Socialists: 
Social  Revolutionary  and  Social  Democratic  Parties;  Maximalists  and 
Minimalists,  Bolsheviki  and  Mensheviki.  The  Soviet  or  Council  of 
Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Delegates.  Neither  Duma  nor  Soviet  truly 
representative  of  the  Russian  people.  Kerensky.  Disintegrating  forces. 
Arrival  of  Lenin.  The  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets.  The  increasing 
power  of  the  Socialists  and  the  reorganization  of  the  cabinet.  The  renewal 
of  the  Russian  offensive  in  Galicia,  July  1,  1917.  Capture  of  Halicz,  July 
10th.    The  sudden  panic  seizing  the  Russians  on  the  19th  and  the  collapse. 

XVII  The  British  Blockade  and  the  Ger- 

man Submarine  Offensive    ....     367-398 

The  struggle  for  command  of  the  sea.  The  naval  strategy  of  Great  Britain 
and  Germany.  The  British  blockade.  Its  standing  in  international  law. 
Its  effect  on  the  United  States  and  other  neutral  powers.  The  German 
submarine  campaign.  Its  legality.  The  submarine  as  an  instrument  of 
warfare.  Frightfulness  on  the  sea.  Methods  of  defense  against  sub- 
marines.    Armed  merchantmen. 


Contents  XI 

CHAPTER  PAGES 

XVIII  The  Battle  of  Jutland  (May  31- 

June  1,  1916) 399-430 

Emperor  William  II  and  the  expansion  of  the  German  navy-  The 
Deutscher  Flotten  Verein.  Premonitions  of  a  German  naval  offensive. 
The  battlefield.  Phases  of  the  day  battle.  The  night  battle.  Losses 
and  results.  Lessons  of  the  battle.  The  loss  of  the  Hampshire  and  the 
death  of  Earl  Kitchener.  The  German  raiders,  the  Mdwe  and  the  Greif. 
The  submarine  Deutschland's  voyages  to  America.  The  treacherous  visit 
of  the  U-53.     Effect  of  her  raids  on  the  spirit  of  Americans. 

XIX  The  United  States  and  the  Euro- 

pean War 431-478 

American  national  traits  and  traditional  foreign  policy.  The  repercussion 
of  the  European  war.  American  beneficence.  The  conflict  of  opinions 
and  the  predominance  of  pro- Ally  sentiment.  The  exportation  of  munitions 
and  Teutonic  intrigues  and  propaganda ;  the  New  York  World  revelation, 
August  15,  1915;  the  Archibald  affair  and  the  recall  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Ambassador,  Dr.  Dumba.  Questions  of  naval  warfare ;  the  under- 
lying principles  of  international  law  axid  the  Declaration  of  London.  The 
conduct  of  the  Allies  in  regard  to  neutral  commerce ;  American  protests. 
The  governmental  control  of  the  distribution  and  consumption  of  cereals 
established  in  Germany,  February  1,  1915.  The  Allies  henceforth  treat 
cereals  as  contraband.  Germany  creates  a  war  zone  in  the  waters  around  the 
British  Isles,  February  18th.  Retaliatory  measures  of  the  Allies  for  the  pur- 
pose of  establishing  a  virtual  blockade  of  Germany,  March  15th.  The  United 
States  contests  the  legality  of  these  measures.  Dangerous  questions  created 
by  the  nature  of  the  submarine  as  a  commerce-destroyer.  Sinking  of  the 
Lusitania,  May  7,  1915,  and  the  subsequent  discussion.  Conflicting  ten- 
dencies in  Germany  and  resignation  of  von  Tirpitz.  The  Channel  steamer 
Sussex  torpedoed,  March  24,  1916.  American  note  to  Germany,  April  18th, 
and  Germany's  promise  to  restrict  submarine  activity,  May  4th.  Transatlan- 
tic voyages  of  submarines.  Ominous  indications  in  Germany.  President 
Wilson's  request  for  statement  of  war  aims  of  the  belligerents,  December 
18th ;  his  speech  in  the  Senate,  January  22,  1917.  Germany  announces 
unrestricted  submarine  warfare,  January  31st ;  severance  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  Germany,  February  3d.  President 
Wilson's  address  to  joint  session  of  Congress  for  declaration  of  war  by 
the  United  States  on  April  2d.  American  military'  preparations.  The 
expansion  of  the  regular  army.  The  National  Guard  taken  into  the  Federal 
service.  The  Selective  Draft  Law.  Registration  and  the  Local  Draft 
Boards.  The  thirty-two  cantonments.  Officers'  training  camps.  Army 
Ordnance  Department.  Military  aeronautics.  Arrival  of  General  Pershing 
and  staff  in  France,  June  13,  1917. 

Chronological  Table 479-490 

Index 491-508 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 

FACING  PAGE 
Raymond  Poincare,  President  of  the  French  Republic  ....      Title 

German  troops  surrendering 4 

Map    showing    the    German    advance    before    the    Battle    of    the 

Marne 8 

A  bayonet  charge  in  the  region  of  the  Heights  of  the  Meuse       .      .  13 

View  showing  the  plateau  of  Les  Eparges 13 

Map  showing  the  Heights  of  the  Meuse 16 

Map  showing  the  territory  west  of  Lens 25 

Plan  showing  the  German  fortification  of  Ablain-Saint-Nazaire  .      .  28 

Plan  of  the  Labyrinth 28 

French  soldiers  on  their  way  to  the  trenches 33 

Commandant's  post  of  observation  in  the  Les  £parges  ravine     .      .  33 

General  Selivanoff 36 

General  von  Mackensen 36 

General  Kusmanek 36 

Prussian  town  after  its  occupation  by  the  Russian  forces  ....  45 

Russian  troops  with  their  transport  wagons 45 

German  Emperor  arriving  in  Lyck 49 

Russian  transport  steamer  on  the  River  Vistula 51 

Russian  town  set  on  fire  by  the  Russians 51 

Ruins  of  Fort  Hurko 52 

Forts  at  Peremysl 52 

General  Lechitsky 61 

General  DmitriefF 61 

General  Russky 61 

Austrian  soldiers  in  camp 62 

XIII 


XIV  The  Great  War 

PACING  PAOl 

Russian  prisoners  taken  by  the  Germans 

Russian  retreat  in  Galicia 64 

German  troops  in  Gorlice 64 

.ins  in  Peremysl  after  the  evacuation  of  the  city  by  the  Rus- 
sians        69 

Austrian  troops  crossing  the  River  San 69 

Admiral  Sir  John  Rushworth  Jellicoe 76 

Lord  Fisher  of  Kilverstone 76 

Vice-admiral  John  Michael  dc  Robeck 81 

Rear-admiral  Guepratte 81 

Vice-admiral  Sackville  S.  Carden 81 

The    British    submarine    E-11    returning    from    the    Sea    of    Mar- 
mora       85 

The  periscope  of  E-11  hit  by  a  Turkish  projectile 85 

Map  showing  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula  and  the  Dardanelles      ...  88 

The  Majestic  after  being  hit  by  a  torpedo 92 

The  bow  of  the  Majestic  as  she  lay  bottom  upwards 92 

Camouflaged  British  cruiser  in  the  Dardanelles 96 

The  British  and  French  squadrons  off  the  Dardanelles       ....  96 

Diagrams  showing  operations  against  the  Dardanelles 10 1 

The  River  Clyde  ashore  at  V  Beach 108 

Troops  in  lifeboats  being  towed  from  the  transports  to  landings  on 

the  Gallipoli  Peninsula 108 

Indian  troops  landing  at  the  Dardanelles 116 

Lowering  dead  into  a  trawler  for  burial  at  sea  outside  the  Darda- 
nelles      116 

Perspective   diagram   of   the    Gallipoli    Peninsula    and    the    Darda- 
nelles      119 

Burning  stores  at  Suvla  Bay 122 

Disembarkation  at  the  Dardanelles 122 

English  bivouac  at  Gallipoli 125 

Australian  artillery  in  operation  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula     .      .      .125 
German    pioneers    repairing    one    of   the    bridges    across    the    Vis- 
tula   129 

Polish  refugees 129 

The  evacuation  of  Warsaw 132 


List  of  Illustrations  XV 

FACING  PAGE 

The  Germans  in  Warsaw 132 

Map  showing  Western  Russia  and  Poland 136 

Russian  prisoners  taken  at  Novo  Georgievsk 141 

Heroic  wooden  statue  of  von  Hindenburg  erected  in  Berlin    .     .     .  141 

An  historic  document 144 

Russian  artillery  retreating 149 

How  the  Russians  kept  valuable  metal  from  falling  into  the  hands 

of  the  Germans 149 

German  gas  used  previous  to  an  attack 156 

Stefanos  Skouloudis 160 

Eleutherios  Venizelos .  160 

Peter  I 164 

General  Sarrail . 164 

Map  showing  the  Balkan  States 168 

The  Serbian  retreat 173 

Occupation  of  Salonica  by  the  Allies 173 

The  Iron  Gate  on  the  Danube 177 

Destroyed  railroad  bridge  over  the  Save  at  Belgrade      .      .      „      .      .177 

Cettinje,  capital  of  Montenegro 180 

The  German  invasion  of  Serbia 180 

French  war  loan  poster 189 

English  recruiting  poster 189 

The  Tsar  at  the  reopening  of  the  Duma 197 

The  Dublin  post  office  after  being  burned  by  the  rebels     .      .      .      .197 

Women  munition  workers'  war  procession  in  London 204 

Lloyd  George  watching  the  parade  of  women  munition  workers  .      .  204 

Map  showing  the  Pan-German  plan  of  a  Greater  Germany   .      .      .  208 

Collection  of  metal  at  the  railroad  station  at  Anizy 213 

Manufacture   of  shells   of  large   caliber   at   the   Creusot   works   in 

France * 213 

French  plan  showing  the  German  positions  called  la  Main      .      .      .  217 

French  soldiers  shooting  jets  of  liquid  fire 220 

An  example  of  camouflage 225 

Commissary  stores 225 

Types  of  gas  masks  used  by  the  English 228 

French  officer  and  dog  protected  from  poison  gas  by  masks    .      .      .  228 


XV]  The  Great  War 

PACING  PAGI 

Map  of  the  territory  upon  which  took  place-  the  German  offensive 

ainst  Verdun  in  1916 233 

A  strict  m  Verdun  after  the-  German  bombardment 237 

Ammunition  in  readiness  to  be  transported  to  the  front      ....  237 

Genera]  Joffre  and  General  Petain 241 

A  piece  of  woods  completely  stripped  by  shell-fire 241 

The  Crown  Prince  of  Germany  distributing  iron  crosses  on  the  Ver- 
dun front 245 

German  heavy  artillery  before  Verdun 245 

View  of  Fort  Douaumont  taken  from  an  aeroplane  before  the  prepa- 
ration for  the  PVench  attack 252 

Fort  Douaumont  under  bombardment  by  the  French  artillery      .      .252 

A  big  Italian  gun  screened  from  aeroplane  observation  ....  256 
A  road  on  the  Italian  Alpine  front  screened  with  matting  .  .  .  .256 
War  Council  of  the  Allies  at  the  French  headquarters      .      .      .      .261 

Map  showing  the  Austro-Italian  frontier 264 

"Le  Cerf  Volant" 268 

Zeppelin  observation  car 268 

Map  showing  the  Somme  territory 272 

A  British  tank 277 

French  observation  balloon  about  to  arise 277 

The  preparation  for  the  offensive  on  the  Somme.      Destruction  of 

the  German  trenches 280 

General  Alcxeieff 284 

General  Brussiloff 284 

Transport  of  Russian  artillery 293 

Russian  field  artillery 293 

Monastir  from  an  aeroplane 300 

Jon  J.  C.  Bratiano 305 

General  Averescu 3°5 

Nicu  Filipescu 305 

Take  Jonescu 305 

The  docks  at  Costanza 309 

Oil  region  of  Roumania 3°9 

Map  showing  the  territory  of  the  Mesopotamian  campaign     .      .      -313 

Lieutenant-general  Sir  John  Nixon 3*^ 


List  of  Illustrations  XVII 

FACING  PAGE 

Lieutenant-general  Sir  Percy  Lake 316 

Major-general  C.  V.  F.  Townshend 316 

Lieutenant-general  Sir  Stanley  Maude .      .316 

The  great  arch  at  Ctesiphon 320 

Kut-el-Amara 320 

The  Sheich-ul-Islam  proclaiming  the  Jihad    ....,,..   325 

Troop  of  Kurds 325 

Map  showing  the  territory  upon  which  took  place  the  operations 

between  the  Russian  and  Turkish  forces 328 

View  of  Erzerum 332 

Street  in  Trebizond 332 

Excavation  to  unearth  an  unexploded  15-inch  German  shell  .      .      .341 

Crater  made  by  the  explosion  of  a  big  shell 341 

Sand  shoes 348 

Apparatus  for  taking  photographs  from  aeroplanes 348 

Alaskan   dogs    used    by  the   French   army   in   the   Vosges    Moun- 
tains       348 

Alexander  Kerensky 357 

Prince  George  Lvoff 357 

An  assembly  of  over  three  thousand  members 364 

Gregory  Novik,  called  Rasputin 364 

Sinking  of  a  torpedoed  steamer 373 

Passengers  and  crew  of  the  torpedoed  French  steamer  Sontay  taking 

to  the  lifeboats 373 

Mine-laying  German  submarine 380 

German    medal    in    commemoration    of   the   sinking   of   the    Lusi- 

tania 380 

Smoke  screen  evolutions 385 

Vice-admiral  Sir  David  Beatty 400 

Grand-admiral  Alfred  Friedrich  von  Tirpitz 405 

Admiral  Eduard  von  Capelle 405 

Six  diagrams  showing  the  various  phases  of  the  action  off  the  Jut- 
land Bank 408 

Diagrams  showing  the  location  of  the  Battle  of  Jutland  and  the 

courses  of  the  fleets 412 

The  German  battle-cruiser  Seydlitz,      .      .      .      .      .      .      .      .      .      .417 


will  The  Great  War 

i  \(  INO  PAOi 

Shell  holes  in  the  side  of  a  British  warship  after  the  Battle  of  Jut- 
land       4' 7 

Diagram  showing  area  in  which  the  Germans  stated  that  they  would 

carry  on  unrestricted  submarine  operations 4.52 

J  John  Joseph  Pershing 440 

President  Wilson  delivering  his  War  Message  in  the  Senate  Cham- 
ber, April  2,  191 7 449 

War  Proclamation  of  the  United  States 464 

General  Pershing  and  Marshal  Joffre,  in  Paris 468 

A  14-inch  shell  and  the  propelling  charge  of  smokeless  powder  .  .  468 
American  troops  in  London  passing  in  review  before  King  George  .  477 
American  troops  after  landing  in  France 477 


PREFACE 

Throughout  the  ages  life  has  been  a  struggle.  From 
the  time  when  primitive  man  beset  by  constant  peril  sought 
with  grovelling  rites  to  propitiate  grotesque  creations  of 
his  own  imagination,  the  human  race  has  groped  its  way, 
blindly  but  instinctively,  through  violence  and  ignorance, 
towards  light  and  freedom.  But  whenever  man,  escaping 
the  malignant  spell  of  superstition,  has  thrown  off  the 
crushing  load  of  fear  and  has  at  last  dared  to  stand  erect 
and  look  Nature  in  the  face,  assurance  nourished,  pride 
usurped  the  place  of  fear,  and  nations,  drunk  with  greed, 
arrogance,  and  lust  of  power,  were  borne  by  their  own 
madness  down  the  path  of  ruin.  The  present  cataclysm 
seemed  but  the  culminating  disaster  of  this  process. 

The  world  war  continually  expanded  since  its  scope  first 
created  amazement;  it  has  been  prolonged  beyond  all  seri- 
ous expectation.  To  and  fro  across  the  tortured  soil  of 
Europe  rolled  the  fiery  tide  of  battle.  The  headlong  fury 
of  the  first  German  onslaught  into  France  was  intercepted 
on  the  eve  of  victory.  The  German  hosts  marshalled  anew 
poured  across  Flanders  towards  the  English  Channel,  but 
their  momentum  was  blocked  at  the  last  moment.  The 
Allies  in  their  turn  assailed  the  vital  region  of  the  Darda- 
nelles, where  success  would  have  opened  immeasurable 
possibilities.  Twice  they  wavered  on  the  very  threshold 
of  victory  and  fell  back.  With  accumulated  strength  the 
Teutonic  armies  burst  the  Russian  lines  along  the  Dunajec 

XIX 


XX  The  Great  War 

and  Biala,  disrupting  the  entire  ( ralician  front.  The  Austro- 
German  offensive,  developing  to  unprecedented  magni- 
tude and  directed  with  masterly  coordination,  crushed  the 
Polish  salient  and  pressed  far  hack  the  western  front  of 
Russia,  but  at  every  critical  juncture  it  fell  just  short  of  a 
decision.  The  prize  pursued  with  such  relentless  energy 
slipped  from  the  hands  outstretched  to  grasp  it.  The 
forces  of  the  Central  Powers  swept  over  Serbia,  levelling 
the  main  obstacle  to  the  establishment  of  their  dominion 
from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Persian  Gulf;  but  their  tri- 
umphant march  was  broken  off  before  the  final  fruits  of 
victory  were  gleaned.  The  Allies  organized  for  common 
action  fell  upon  their  antagonists  on  all  fronts  at  once. 
The  Central  Empires  quivered  beneath  the  awful  strain, 
but  escaped, — though  by  the  narrowest  margin.  Again 
and  again  the  fortunes  of  war  turned  upon  the  slenderest 
chances,  while  the  world  hung  in  agonized  suspense  on 
each  succeeding  crisis,  until  the  very  sense  of  consternation 
had  been  blunted. 

Meanwhile,  millions  perished,  desolation  spread,  and  from 
the  depths  of  their  despair  the  peoples  cried  to  Heaven. 
The  ways  of  Destiny  are  inscrutable  but  from  the  soul's 
passionate  yearning  springs  the  conviction  that  they  are 
not  aimless,  that  in  all  the  harrowing  vicissitudes  Destiny 
with  unfailing  method  elaborates  her  mysterious  design. 
Salvation  depends  on  the  moral  fortitude  which  accepts 
facts  with  candor  and  the  confident  discernment  which 
interprets  them  constructively.  Faith  sees  beyond  the 
misery  and  anguish  and  in  the  process  detects  the  nature 
of  the  accomplishment. 

The  imagination  falters  at  the  vision  of  flaming  passions 
and  frenzied  efforts ;  heroism  and  depravity,  exultation  and 
despair,  tenacity  and  vacillation,  magnanimity  and  ruthless- 
ness.     The  judgment  of  the  moment  defines  the  conflict 


Preface  XXI 

in  precise,  exclusive  terms  as  the  collision  of  right  and 
wickedness.  The  heart  bestows  its  devotion.  The  soul  is 
stirred  to  its  depths  by  hope  and  fear  for  the  party  of  its 
choice.  But  Destiny  with  cool,  inhuman  composure,  un- 
swervingly pursues  her  task.  Her  concern  is  for  the 
human  race  as  one.  She  knows  no  favorites,  recognizes 
no  distinctions.  Armies,  states,  and  empires  are  but  her 
means  and  implements.     Perfection  is  her  aim. 

Ever  fiercer  rage  the  fires  of  battle.  The  hour  of  judg- 
ment has  sounded  and  with  the  roaring  of  a  thousand 
mouths  of  flame  and  the  convulsion  of  earth  and  sky 
Nemesis  executes  the  grim  sentences  of  doom.  Man  and 
his  works  are  tested.  Incompetence  and  corruption,  in- 
justice and  dishonesty  are  consumed  by  the  devouring 
element.  With  special  zest  the  flames  attack  the  deca- 
dent fabric  of  pious  fictions,  sentimental  heirlooms,  and 
unreasonable  conventions  by  which  the  peoples  were  en- 
tangled and  repressed.  Loyalty  quavers.  Thrones  totter. 
Means  and  resources  fail.  The  souls  of  men  are  bared. 
They  survive  or  perish  by  reason  of  their  inherent  worth 
alone.  Unconquerable  perseverance,  self-control,  clear- 
ness of  vision,  constant  determination,  tireless  faith, — these 
are  the  crucial  attributes.  Humanity,  bruised  and  chast- 
ened, is  exalted  through  fortitude  compounded  of  these 
qualities. 

Praise  be  to  those  who  in  whatever  post  cherished  the 
lamp  of  faith  through  the  hours  of  deepest  gloom !  Glory 
to  those  who  with  conscious  purpose  and  unshaken  reso- 
lution labored  to  the  end,  becoming  free  and  willing  agents 
in  the  consummation  of  the  transcendent  plan! 

No  great  earnest  effort  can  be  entirely  lost,  and  in  this 
sense  there  is  victory  without  defeat.  Behind  and  above 
all  broods  the  spirit  of  the  divine  Sculptor  under  whose 
action  humanity  is  plastic. 


XXII  The  Great  War 

Threatening  shadows  still  hover  above  the  gloomy  waste 
of  misery  and  desolation,  but  the  horizon  is  now  bright 

with  the  coming  dawn.  Slowly  from  the  mists  the  shadowy 
outlines  of  the  new  age  appear.  A  time  will  surely  come 
when  the  destruction  of  the  great  conflict  will  seem  small 
in  comparison  with  the  results  obtained,  and  future  genera- 
tions, inspired  by  a  higher  conception  of  life  and  new 
principles  of  justice  and  reason,  shall  learn  to  bless  these 
days  of  suffering  and  terror. 

George  H.  Allen,  Ph.D. 

Washington,  D.  C. 


CHAPTER  I 

Tentative  Offensive  Efforts  of  the  Western  Allies 

General  character  of  the  campaign  of  1915.  Probable  numerical  strength 
of  the  chief  combatants  at  the  beginning  of  the  year.  The  situation  in  the 
West.  The  French  offensive  near  Soissons,  January  8-14.  French  offen- 
sive in  Champagne,  February  16-March  11.  Battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
March  11-12.  The  contest  for  Les  Eparges,  April  5-11.  Hill  60.  The 
second  Battle  of  Ypres,  April  22-May  27.  The  poisonous  gas.  Gallantry 
of  the  Canadians.  Restoration  of  the  Allied  front  and  readjustment  of  the 
positions  on  the  Ypres  salient.  The  British  offensive  near  Festubert  and 
the  French  offensive  west  of  Lens. 

In  former  times  the  ordinary  cessation  of  warlike  opera- 
tions during  the  winter  months  led  to  the  disconnected, 
annalistic  plan  for  military  history.  But  to-day  the  devel- 
opment of  the  physical  appliances  of  war  and  the  increased 
intensity  of  military  effort  tend  to  eliminate  all  periodic 
interruption  in  the  progress  of  hostilities  and  to  destroy, 
therefore,  the  cause  for  such  a  formal  scheme  of  composi- 
tion. The  casual  relationship  of  material  and  space  makes 
the  commencement  of  the  present  volume  coincide  with 
the  beginning  of  the  new  year,  rather  than  with  the  waning 
of  the  great  westward  offensive  of  the  Germans  in  the 
autumn  or  with  the  commencement  of  their  new,  impos- 
ing undertaking  in  the  spring,  or  with  any  particular  occur- 
rence in  the  months  that  intervened  between  these  two 
most  prominent  events.  The  first  winter  of  the  Great  War 
presents  no  striking  turning  point  nor  any  interruption  in 
the  contracted  course  of  operations,  and,  conformably,  it 
is  our  purpose  to  present  a  continuous  narrative  as  of  an 
organic  fabric  of  events. 

l 


2  The  Great  War 

The  declining  measure  of  results  obtained  by  the  tre- 
mendous efforts  of  the  Central  Powers  during  the  autumn, 
and  the  wavering  issue  of  the  subsequent  isolated  en- 
counters in  the  West  led  many  observers  to  believe  that  a 
turning  point  had  been  reached  and  that  with  the  progres- 
sive marshalling  of  Allied  resources  the  limit  of  Teutonic 
strength  must  have  been  surpassed.  The  vanity  of  such 
an  assumption  was  soon  to  be  exposed  by  the  gigantic  de- 
velopment  of  Teutonic  energy  and  strength,  far  exceeding 
all  prevision. 

In  general,  the  initiative  grasped  by  the  Central  Powers 
at  the  beginning  was  retained  by  them  almost  to  the  close 
of  the  second  year  of  the  war.  With  them  rested  the  choice 
of  means,  time,  and  place  for  dealing  with  their  enemies. 
Postponing  the  fulfilment  of  their  original  purpose  in  the 
West  under  pressure  of  an  urgent  situation  on  the  eastern 
front,  the  Germans  devoted  their  attention  as  preeminently 
to  Russia  during  1915  as  they  had  to  France  in  1914. 

The  eastern  theater  now  presents  a  stupendous  spectacle 
of  mammoth  preparations,  bewildering  maneuvers,  the 
execution  of  a  colossal  plan  with  boldness  and  precision, 
dramatic  vicissitudes,  the  frightful  collision  of  immense 
contending  forces. 

The  less  sensational  course  of  operations  in  the  West  is 
marked  by  no  events  of  preeminent  significance.  The 
situation  in  the  early  months  of  1915  preserved  the  general 
features  of  the  closing  weeks  of  1914. 

By  the  end  of  1914  the  Germans  had  probably  added, 
altogether,  thirty-three  Reserve  and  fifteen  Landwehr  corps 
to  the  original  twenty-five  and  one-half  corps  of  the  active 
army.  Four  of  the  active  corps,  the  First,  Eleventh,  Seven- 
teenth, and  Twentieth,  together  with  ten  and  one-half 
Reserve  and  seven  Landwehr  corps  appear  to  have  held 
the  eastern  front,  while  the  remaining  active,  twenty-two 


Tentative  Efforts  of  the  Western  Allies      3 

Reserve  and  seven  Landwehr  corps  were  probably  stationed 
in  the  West.  The  aggregate  strength  of  all  the  German 
forces  at  both  fronts  may  be  reckoned  as  about  3,000,000 
men.  The  Austro-Himgarians  could  scarcely  have  mus- 
tered more  than  1,500,000.  Russia  may  have  had  as  many 
soldiers  under  arms  as  Germany.  But  a  portion  of  her 
strength  had  already  been  drawn  away  to  face  the  Turks 
upon  the  frontier  of  the  Caucasus  and  the  efficiency  of  all 
her  armies,  in  consequence  of  faulty  means  of  transporta- 
tion and  organization,  was  obviously  far  below  the  standard 
of  the  opponents  on  her  western  borders. 

We  may  assume  that  since  the  completion  of  their  origi- 
nal concentration  the  French  had  maintained  their  forces 
in  the  field  at  about  2,000,000  men.  Despite  assiduous 
recruiting  and  the  large  numbers  already  concentrated  in 
the  training  camps  in  England,  the  complement  of  British 
forces  on  the  continent  fell  far  below  the  goal  of  popular 
expectation.  Including  the  Indian  army  they  did  not  yet 
exceed  220,000  men. 

During  the  first  half  of  1915  in  the  West  interest  centers 
on  certain  periods  of  intenser  conflict:  the  struggle  near 
Soissons,  January  8-14;  the  French  offensive  in  Cham- 
pagne, February  16-March  11,  and,  contemporary  with  its 
final  stage,  the  Battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle;  the  contests  for 
Les  Eparges,  April  5-11;  and  the  second  Battle  of  Ypres, 
April  22-May  27,  with  the  Allied  offensive  in  Artois  and 
near  Festubert  which  coincided  with  a  part  of  it. 

In  the  last  volume  it  was  pointed  out  that  certain  condi- 
tions had  created  a  condition  of  relative  stagnation  on  all 
the  fronts ;  but  these  conditions  were  far  more  effective  on 
the  western  front  where  a  state  of  almost  complete  immo- 
bility prevailed. 

The  chief  aggressive  activity  of  the  Germans  was  natu- 
rally transferred  to  other  fields.    Except  in  isolated  instances 


4  THE  ( rRE  IT  War 

the  essential  function  of  their  forces  in  the  West  was,  for 
the  time,  to  hold  what  had  been  already  gained.  There  the 
aggressive  role  was  undertaken  by  the  Allies,  who  haltingly 

essayed  the  gigantic  task  of  ejecting  the  enemy  from  his 

positions  in  Northern  France  and  Belgium,  while  at  the 
same  time  aiming  to  distract  the  prosecution  of  the  Ger- 
man offensive  movements  against  Russia  and  prevent  the 
shifting  of  German  forces  from  the  western  to  the  eastern 
front.  Consequently  a  relationship  exists  between  the 
efforts  of  the  Allies  in  the  West  and  the  periods  of  greatest 
tension  in  the  conflict  on  the  eastern  front. 

The  first  of  the  aggressive  operations  takes  us  back  to 
the  sector  of  the  Aisne,  where,  on  January  8th,  the  French 
successfully  attacked  the  German  outposts  on  a  prominent 
eminence  known  from  its  altitude  in  meters  as  Hill  132. 
East  of  this  height  the  railway  from  Soissons  to  Laon 
ascends  to  the  higher  level  through  a  long  defile.  After 
organizing  the  new  position,  the  French  resumed  their 
attack  in  the  face  of  desperate  resistance,  and  gained  pos- 
session of  the  whole  of  Hill  132  and  of  the  foremost  line 
of  German  trenches  on  the  plateau  of  Perriere,  beyond  the 
railway,  on  the  10th.  But  in  consequence,  probably,  of 
insufficient  artillery  preparation  and  support,  and  of  delay 
in  the  transport  of  ammunition  and  supplies,  the  French 
suffered  a  fatal  loss  of  time  and  did  not  push  the  onslaught 
home  at  the  critical  moment  of  surprise  and  confusion. 
The  Germans  quickly  recovered  their  equilibrium,  brought 
together  reinforcements,  and  counter-attacked  with  great 
violence  on  the  12th,  driving  the  French  from  all  their 
positions  on  the  higher  ground  and  eventually  compelling 
them  to  withdraw  entirely  from  the  north  bank  of  the 
Aisne  throughout  the  contested  section  on  the  night  of 
the  13th-14th.  The  presence  of  the  Kaiser  lent  a  specious 
impressiveness  to  the  final  stage  of  this  series  of  encounters. 


■3  s 


&  .5 

£    c 
■5    £ 


U    5 


Tentative  Efforts  of  the  Western  Allies      5 

A  spirited  controversy  regarding  these  events  grew  out 
of  the  comments  of  the  press  in  the  two  countries.  The 
French  admitted  a  local  success  of  the  enemy  and  the 
withdrawal  of  their  own  forces  to  the  south  bank  of 
the  Aisne,  but  they  ascribed  the  misfortune  to  the  flooded 
condition  of  the  river,  which  swept  away  most  of  the 
available  bridges  and  hindered  the  transport  of  muni- 
tions and  supplies  to  the  forces  on  the  north  bank. 
They  represented  the  consequences  of  the  episode  as 
inconsiderable. 

In  Germany,  however,  these  occurrences  were  treated 
with  the  effusive  exultation  of  a  conspicuous  victory.  It 
was  reported  that  the  Germans  had  taken  5,200  prisoners  and 
that  the  bodies  of  4,000  to  5,000  French  soldiers  were  found 
upon  the  field,  which  seemed  to  indicate  that  the  futile 
operation  could  scarcely  have  cost  the  French  an  aggre- 
gate loss  of  much  less  than  20,000  men.  Recalling  General 
Joffre's  order  of  the  day  of  December  17th,  already  alluded 
to  in  the  last  volume,  to  indicate  the  comprehensive  nature 
of  the  French  intentions,  the  Germans  complacently  ob- 
served that  they  had  not  only  frustrated  the  enemy's  great 
offensive,  but  had  gained  a  position  which  would  open  the 
way  for  the  decisive  resumption  of  their  own  offensive 
towards  Paris,  when  the  proper  moment  came.  A  dis- 
patch from  Berlin  declared  that  the  French  wall  of  iron 
had  given  way  at  a  point  where  the  French  had  believed, 
and  had  seemed  justified  in  believing,  in  its  solidity,  and' 
that  von  Kluck  had  again  given  brilliant  proof  of  his 
genius  as  a  commander,  appearing  more  and  more  as  "the 
von  Hindenburg  of  the  West." 

It  was  natural  that  after  the  radiant  dawn  of  early  tri- 
umphant expectations  had  faded  into  a  gloomy  noonday 
of  wearisome  trench-warfare,  such  a  seemingly  auspicious 
incident  should  have  been  seized  upon  with  eagerness  in 


6  Th     i  I        i   War 

Germany  as  a  means  to  counteract  impatience  and  reinforce 
the  sense  of  confidence. 

We  should  observe,  however,  that  the  Germans  made 
no  serious  effort  to  cross  the  Aisne  in  this  region  and  never 
employed  their  new  position  as  a  base  from  which  to 
renew  the  attack  towards  Paris.  The  advantage  gained 
was  purely  local. 

The  winter  of  1914-1915  in  France  and  Belgium  was 
unusually  mild,  and  at  the  same  time  exceptionally  rainy. 
The  plains  of  Flanders,  Picardy,  and  Champagne  became 
veritable  marshes,  as  the  saturated  earth  was  unable  to 
absorb  the  superfluous  moisture.  The  trenches  were  fre- 
quently converted  into  ditches  or  canals.  Offensive  opera- 
tions were  seriously  embarrassed.  Often  batteries  moving 
in  accordance  with  the  plans  for  offensive  operations  were 
imprisoned  in  the  soft,  adhesive  clay,  so  that  the  artillery 
support,  upon  which  the  infantry  attacks  depended  for 
success,  was  fatally  impaired. 

In  December,  as  was  noted  in  the  last  volume,  the 
French  made  a  slight  advance  during  a  brief  offensive  in 
Champagne,  where  their  front  between  Reims  and  the 
Meuse  formed  a  concave  depression  towards  the  south. 
The  operations  took  place  at  that  time  on  the  sector 
Perthes-Le  Mesnil-Massiges. 

The  French  profited  by  an  interval  of  clear  weather  on 
February  16th  to  renew  their  attack  with  much  greater 
energy  in  this  same  region,  on  a  sector  extending  from  a 
point  500  yards  northwest  of  Perthes  eastward  to  the  farm 
of  Beausejour,  a  distance  of  about  four  miles,  and  were 
successful  in  capturing  German  trenches  along  a  front  of 
about  two  miles  on  the  same  day,  and  about  800  yards  in 
addition  on  the  17th. 

They  added  to  their  successes  on  the  20th  after  many 
counter-attacks,  until  by  March  3d  they  were  in  possession 


Tentative  Efforts  of  the  Western  Allies      7 

of  all  the  first  line  trenches  of  the  Germans  from  a  point 
northwest  of  Perthes  to  one  northeast  of  Beausejour,  had 
secured  with  them  an  important  ridge  running  parallel 
with  the  original  front  of  attack,  and  had  even  penetrated 
into  places  beyond  the  summit  of  this  ridge. 

The  seriousness  of  the  situation  for  the  Germans  is  now 
indicated  by  the  presence  of  two  regiments  of  the  Guard, 
transferred  from  Flanders,  where  a  British  offensive  was 
generally  expected.  But  not  even  this  reinforcement 
could  check  the  ardor  or  advance  of  the  French,  who 
did  not  discontinue  their  offensive  in  this  section  until 
the  11th. 

The  official  communiques  were  once  more  contradic- 
tory. The  German  press  weakly  sought  to  indicate  a 
disastrous  repulse  of  the  enemy;  thus  the  Press  Bureau 
issued  a  commentary  on  the  entire  operations  in  Cham- 
pagne in  which  it  was  claimed  that  the  French  purpose 
had  been  to  advance  with  Vouziers  as  the  objective,  to 
break  the  German  lines,  and  by  creating  a  diversion  in 
the  West,  relieve  the  pressure  on  the  Russians  at  the  time 
of  their  defeat  at  the  Masurian  Lakes  in  February.  It  was 
insisted  that  the  Russian  disaster  and  the  integrity  of  the 
German  lines  proved  the  French  offensive  to  have  been  a 
complete  and  disappointing  failure.  Extolling  German 
skill  and  heroism  it  was  said  that  the  great  effort  of  the 
French,  with  six  army  corps,  had  been  unable  to  make 
any  impression  on  a  front  of  eight  kilometers  held  by  two 
feeble  divisions  of  Rhenish  troops,  which  with  the  support 
of  the  battalions  of  the  Guard  and  those  of  other  forma- 
tions had  repelled  the  assaults  of  six  times  their  own  num- 
ber. While  it  was  admitted  that  the  German  losses  were 
heavier  than  in  the  victorious  operations  at  the  Masurian 
Lakes,  those  of  the  French  were  represented  as  three 
times  as  oreat  as  those  of  the  Germans. 


8  The  Great  War 

The  French  response,  two  days  later,  claimed  a  gain  <>f 
from  two  to  three  kilometers  in  depth  on  a  front  of  seven 
kilometers,  and  notably  the  capture  of  an  important  series  of 
ridges,  and  the  infliction  of  heavy  losses  on  the  enemy,  and 
asserted  that  in  consequence  the  German  army  in  Cham- 
pagne had  been  immobilized.  It  further  pointed  out  that 
the  operations  had  largely  contributed  to  the  brilliant  Rus- 
sian victory  in  Northern  Poland  on  February  25-March  3, 
which  offset  the  Russian  discomfiture  near  the  Masurian 
Lakes.  It  also  refuted  the  German  boast  of  the  two  Rhen- 
ish divisions  having  repulsed  the  repeated  attacks  of  six 
French  army  corps  by  recalling  the  German  statement  that 
two  corps  of  General  von  Einem's  army  and  some  bat- 
talions of  the  Guard  and  of  other  formations  had  been 
summoned  as  reinforcements. 

It  would  probably  be  approximately  correct  to  estimate 
the  forces  engaged  in  this  French  offensive  as  six  army 
corps  for  the  French  and  five  for  the  Germans. 

The  apparent  exactitude  in  detail  and  relatively  moderate 
tone  of  the  French  communiques  as  compared  with  the 
vagueness  and  uniformly  dogmatic  assurance  of  the  Ger- 
man convey  an  impression  of  trustworthiness  respecting 
the  indications  of  local  gains.  But  even  so,  the  visible 
results  would  seem  to  have  been  insignificant  in  compari- 
son with  the  greatness  of  the  effort  and  the  heavy  losses 
undoubtedly  sustained  by  the  French.  As  regards  the 
supposed  chief  purpose  of  relieving  the  pressure  upon 
the  Russians  at  a  critical  moment  by  creating  a  diversion 
in  the  West,  the  French  authorities  may  very  likely  have 
been  justified  in  the  belief  that  their  offensive  was  a  com- 
plete success. 

If  all  the  French  attacks  during  three  weeks  had  termi- 
nated as  disastrously  as  was  claimed,  the  apathy  of  the  Ger- 
mans in  confining  themselves  to  a  passive   offensive  and 


Tentative  Efforts  of  the  Western  Allies      9 

not  seizing  the  opportunity  of  their  opponents'  discom- 
fiture to  assail  the  opposing  lines  with  crushing  violence, 
in  accordance  with  the  fundamental  principle  of  their  doc- 
trine of  strategy,  would  be  incomprehensible. 

Xo  the  observers  in  the  western  Allied  countries  it 
seemed  that  with  the  advent  of  March  a  new  and  decisive 
stage  of  the  war  would  be  entered  on,  possibly  a  pro- 
tracted one,  but  certainly  to  end  in  the  victory  they  stead- 
fastly held  to  be  inevitable.  They  noted  the  increasing 
frequency  and  greater  vigor  of  Allied  attacks  in  the  western 
theater  and  they  confidently  expected  the  speedy  coming 
of  the  new  British  hosts  as  the  overwhelming  factor  in  the 
final  period  of  the  conflict. 

Already  in  November  the  Eighth  British  Division  had 
arrived  upon  the  continent  completing  the  Fourth  Corps. 
In  January  the  Fifth  British  Corps  had  been  constituted 
under  the  command  of  Major-general  Sir  Herbert  Plumer. 
The  Canadian  Division  under  Major-general  Alderson, 
destined  soon  to  win  splendid  fame,  arrived  in  Flanders  in 
February,  and  in  the  same  month  two  complete  divisions 
of  British  Territorials  were  conveyed  across  the  Channel. 
The  total  British  forces  were  approaching  the  half  million 
mark.  The  disposition  of  British  forces  had  been  some- 
what altered  since  the  furious  contests  which  raged  around 
the  Ypres  salient  in  the  autumn.  The  length  of  the  British 
front,  now  extending  from  the  crest  of  the  salient  east  of 
Ypres  to  the  vicinity  of  La  Bassee,  was  still  the  same  as 
then.  The  southern  reentrant  of  the  salient  was  held  by 
the  new  Fifth  Corps.  On  their  right  followed  the  Second 
Corps  along  the  sector  facing  Wytschaete  and  Messines. 
General  Pulteney's  Third  Corps  still  lay  astride  the  Lys. 
Sir  Henry  Rawlinson's  Fourth  Corps  stretched  from  Es- 
taires  to  west  of  Neuve  Chapelle,  the  Indians  continuing 
the  line  to  Givenchy,  whence  the  First  Corps  extended 


10  The  Great  War 

across  the  canal  and  were  [inked  with  the  left  wing  of  the 
Tenth  French  Army  of  Genera]  Maud'huy. 

The  British  forces  were  now  grouped  in  two  armies  to 
the  command  of  which  the  original  corps  commanders  of 
the  Expeditionary  Force  had  been  promoted.  The  First 
Army  under  Sir  Douglas  Haig  comprised  the  First,  Indian, 
and  Fourth  Corps,  the  Second  under  Sir  Horace  Smith- 
Dorrien,  the  Third,  Second,  and  Fifth. 

The  isolated  offensive  efforts  of  the  French  thus  far 
recorded  served  chiefly  as  experiments  to  test  the  nature  of 
the  problem  of  breaking  the  elaborate  system  of  hostile 
intrenchments,  of  blasting  an  opening  in  the  adamantine 
barrier  which  faced  the  Allies  in  the  West.  They  demon- 
strated that  success  could  be  attained  with  adequate  means 
and  management,  a  heavy  cost  in  men  and  ammunition; 
by  the  concentration,  in  fact,  of  overwhelming  forces  of 
men  and  material  upon  the  section  proposed  for  the  attack 
and  absolute  secrecy  as  to  the  preparations. 

The  attack  must  be  so  coordinated  in  the  staff-work, 
maintenance  of  gun  control  communications  and  every 
other  detail,  that  immediately  the  first-line  trenches  had 
been  destroyed,  and  while  the  crushing  effect  of  the  bom- 
bardment remained,  the  artillery  should  advance  its  curtain 
of  fire  to  intercept  the  enemy's  reinforcements.  Above  all, 
to  overwhelm  his  successive  lines  of  trenches,  an  abundant 
and  uninterrupted  stream  of  ammunition  was  necessary, 
and  the  most  careful  provision  had  to  be  made  against  all 
contingencies. 

Among  the  considerations  that  led  Field-marshal  Sir 
John  French,  about  the  end  of  February,  to  decide  upon 
a  vigorous  aggressive  movement  on  the  British  front 
may  be  assumed  the  need  of  fostering  the  offensive  spirit 
of  his  troops.  The  section  chosen  for  the  enterprise 
lay   opposite   the    village    of   Neuve   Chapelle,   northwest 


Tentative  Efforts  of  the  Western  Allies     11 

of  La  Bassee,  where  there  was  a  slight  depression  in  the 
British  front. 

East  of  the  German  lines  and  parallel  with  the  opposing 
fronts  there  stretched  a  range  of  hills  which  commanded 
the  approaches  to  Lille  and  the  industrial  region  in  the 
valley  of  the  Scheldt.  Between  the  British  lines  and  these 
important  heights  lay  Neuve  Chapelle,  covered  in  front  by 
the  German  first-line  trenches,  supported  in  the  rear  by  the 
defenses  of  the  second  line,  which  in  this  section  followed 
the  course  of  the  Des  Lays  River.  The  German  Second 
Corps  held  this  part  of  the  front. 

The  long  period  of  scarcely  interrupted  quiet  in  this 
region  and  the  tactical  superiority  of  the  British  aerial 
service  favored  the  concealment  of  all  the  preparations.  A 
powerful  mass  of  artillery  was  collected  on  March  8-9,  the 
field-pieces  congregated  about  a  mile  and  a  half  behind 
the  British  front,  the  heavy  guns  at  Lacouture  and  Vielle 
Chapelle,  about  twice  as  far  away. 

The  assault  of  Neuve  Chapelle  was  entrusted  to  the 
Fourth  and  Indian  Corps,  operating  on  the  north  and 
south  respectively.  The  infantry  was  concentrated  on  the 
evening  of  the  9th  under  cover  of  the  darkness,  and  on 
the  morning  of  the  10th  the  British  first-line  trenches  were 
crowded  with  troops  in  tense  expectancy,  awaiting  with 
eagerness  the  signal  which  should  terminate  the  irksome 
months  of  monotony  and  delay. 

Suddenly  at  7.30  the  air  was  rent  by  the  deafening  roar 
of  the  British  artillery  and  the  earth  trembled  beneath  the 
terrible  concussion.  Clouds  of  smoke  arose  from  the  Ger- 
man trenches  and  great  masses  of  earth  were  hurled  into 
the  air.  Four  shells  to*the  yard  was  the  rule  for  the  British 
gunners.  Barbed-wire  entanglements  were  torn  to  bits 
and  parapets  were  pounded  into  a  chaos  of  hollows  and 
furrows. 


12  The  Great  War 

Thirty-five  minutes  later  the  gunners  lengthened  their 
range  so  as  to  interpose  an  impassable  barrier  of  fire  behind 
the  welter  of  carnage  and  devastation  which  had  been  the 
( rerman  first-line  defenses.  Instantly  the  stream  of  burst- 
ing shells,  levelling  every  obstacle,  tearing  up  threat  trees, 
began  to  blow  the  houses  of  Neuve  Chapelle  into  bits  as 
readily  as  a  child's  destructive  whim  disperses  the  toy  village 
in  a  nursery. 

Whistles  sounded  along  the  British  front.  It  was  a 
solemn,  thrilling  moment.  The  soldiers  leaped  from  the 
trenches  and  dashed  forward  with  reckless,  headlong  vehe- 
mence. The  23d  and  25th  brigades  of  the  Eighth  Division 
advanced  towards  the  northeastern  corner  and  the  center 
of  the  village  respectively,  and  the  Garhwal  brigade  of  the 
Meerut  Division  towards  the  southeastern  corner.  Then, 
half  an  hour  later,  the  curtain  fire  was  lengthened  so  that 
Neuve  Chapelle  was  completely  shut  off  from  German 
reinforcements,  and  the  25th  brigade  swept  into  the  streets 
of  the  demolished  village,  where  most  of  the  Germans  had 
either  been  killed  or  wounded  or  were  overcome  with 
terror.  The  Indian  brigade  had  easily  carried  the  first-line 
trenches  opposite  the  British  right.  But  on  the  left  the 
artillery  preparation  had  been  deficient  and  the  23d  brigade 
was  held  up  in  front  of  some  remaining  wire-entangle- 
ments, suffering  heavy  loss,  and  was  forced  to  submit  to  a 
serious  delay  before  resistance  could  be  overcome. 

Thus  the  British  by  lack  of  precision  in  executing  the 
plan  of  action  were  deprived  of  the  unique  but  transitory 
chance  of  pressing  forward  to  the  complete  realization 
of  their  hopes  while  they  themselves  were  flushed  with 
the  enthusiasm  of  success  and  the  Germans  were  still 
demoralized. 

Considerable  time  was  now  required  to  reform  the  British 
front  before  a  further  advance  could  be  undertaken.    The 


.:  - 


Tentative  Efforts  of  the  Western  Allies     13 

remaining  brigades  of  the  two  corps  which  were  to  take 
part  in  the  further  attack  did  not  arrive  until  3.30  P.  M. 

Finally  the  attack  was  resumed  on  lines  converging 
towards  the  important  elevations  east  of  Neuve  Chapelle. 
But  here  again  the  artillery  preparation  had  not  been 
thorough.  The  Germans  resisted  stubbornly  in  a  large 
number  of  houses  which  had  been  converted  into  little 
fortresses  and  other  intrenched  redoubts  and  at  the  forti- 
fied bridge-heads  along  the  river,  supported  by  a  great 
quantity  of  machine-guns,  until  the  British  attack  was  dis- 
continued at  nightfall. 

The  Germans,  who  had  now  completely  rallied,  held 
their  ground  on  the  11th,  and,  after  receiving  reinforce- 
ments during  the  night,  counter-attacked  the  next  morn- 
ing with  great  violence.  The  struggle  continued  furiously 
throughout  the  12th  without  appreciable  gains  for  either 
side.  But  by  evening  Sir  John  French  directed  Sir  Douglas 
Haig,  the  commanding  general  of  the  First  Army,  to  hold 
and  consolidate  the  ground  already  won  and  to  suspend 
further  offensive  operations  for  the  present.  The  British  ac- 
cordingly intrenched  themselves  along  the  River  Des  Lays. 

The  ground  gained  by  the  British  in  the  three  days' 
Battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle  was  somewhat  more  than  a  mile 
in  depth  on  a  front  of  three  miles,  converting  a  depression 
into  a  rounding  projection  in  the  contour  of  their  lines. 
The  cost  of  this  advance  had  been  heavy:  190  officers  and 
2,337  men  killed,  359  officers  and  8,174  men  wounded,  and 
23  officers  and  1,728  men  missing;  but  the  British  were 
convinced  that  the  losses  of  the  enemy  had  been  heavier, — 
they  themselves  had  taken  1,687  prisoners.  In  his  subse- 
quent report  Sir  John  French  declared  that  the  principal 
aim  of  the  British  attack  had  been  attained.  Yet  it  is  prob- 
able that  the  intended  goal  had  not  been  defined  in  precise 
terms,  that   the  British  leaders   had  really  contemplated 


14  The  Great  War 

much  more  extensive  results,  and  that  the  outcome  of  the 
Battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle  was  a  disappointment,  though  a 
salutary  lesson. 

Early  in  April  the  French  brought  to  a  successful  con- 
clusion the  gradual  operation  of  ejecting  their  opponents 
from  a  prominent  position  in  the  broken,  wooded  country 
between  the  Moselle  and  the  Meuse,  where  the  Germans 
had  pushed  forward  their  narrow  wedge  until  it  penetrated 
at  St.  Mihiel  the  great  fortified  barrier  that  ran  from  Toul 
to  Verdun.  The  French  plan  was  not  to  attack  directly 
the  apex  of  this  salient,  where  the  Germans  had  repaired 
the  captured  fort  of  Camp  des  Romains,  installing  guns 
which  commanded  the  whole  region  within  a  radius  of 
many  miles,  but  step  by  step  to  crush  in  its  sides  so  as 
eventually  to  throttle  the  position  at  the  extremity. 

The  eastern  bank  of  the  Meuse  is  here  confined  by  an 
extensive  hilly  zone,  known  as  the  Heights  of  the  Meuse, 
which  form  the  western  border  of  the  undulating  plain  of 
the  Woevre;  and  near  the  eastern  margin  of  this  elevated 
belt  rises  the  isolated  plateau  of  Les  Eparges,  about  1,000 
feet  above  the  sea,  or  about  250  feet  above  the  adjacent 
valleys.  This  was  a  place  of  great  importance  in  the  Ger- 
man salient  and  served  as  a  bulwark  for  the  Germans  in 
warding  off  French  operations  in  the  southwestern  section 
of  the  Woevre.  In  the  hands  of  the  French  it  would 
dominate  a  large  portion  of  the  interior  of  the  enemy 
salient.  The  village  of  Les  Eparges  northwest  of  the 
plateau  was  held  by  the  French.  The  plateau  was  strongly 
fortified,  especially  on  the  northern  and  western  slopes. 
Two  bastions  occupied  the  western  and  eastern' extremities 
of  the  hill,  connected  by  double  lines  of  trenches. 

The  first  objective  of  the  French  was  the  western  bas- 
tion, which  they  began  to  attack  on  February  17th  by 
exploding  several  mines;  then  they  fought  their  way  up 


Tentative  Efforts  of  the  Western  Allies     15 

the  acclivity,  and  gained  their  initial  goal.  But  the  attempt 
to  storm  the  eastern  bastion  on  the  20th  was  unsuccessful. 
For  weeks  the  opposing  forces  eyed  each  other  with  the 
closest  vigilance  across  a  narrow  interval  on  these  heights. 
A  fresh  attempt  made  by  three  French  battalions  to  take 
the  eastern  bastion  on  March  18-21  produced  no  important 
change  in  the  situation. 

A  violent  tempest  raged  throughout  the  decisive  opera- 
tions which  were  begun  on  April  5th  at  4  P.M.  by  two 
regiments.  Torrents  of  rain  covered  the  heights  with  a 
thick  layer  of  mud  through  which  the  French  soldiers  had 
to  struggle  for  a  precarious  foothold  while  exposed  to  the 
pitiless  rain  of  shells  and  sweeping  blasts  from  the  German 
machine-guns. 

At  first  the  French  made  scarcely  any  permanent  prog- 
ress; but  in  a  struggle  lasting  all  night  on  the  6th-7th,  they 
captured  500  yards  of  German  trenches.  The  curtain  fire 
of  the  artillery  on  both  sides  prevented  for  a  time  the 
arrival  of  reinforcements  for  either  party  and  the  battle 
waned  throughout  the  day.  On  the  morning  of  the  8th, 
however,  two  French  regiments  and  a  battalion  of  chas- 
seurs by  a  determined  effort  won  the  summit  after  an 
hour's  struggle  and  forced  the  Germans  to  retire  to  the 
section  of  the  ridge  lying  further  east.  The  conflict  was 
continued  with  great  violence  all  day  and  by  midnight 
nearly  the  whole  of  the  elevation  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
French,  who  had  captured  1,500  yards  of  trenches,  includ- 
ing the  bastion  at  the  summit,  the  key  to  the  whole  posi- 
tion. The  Germans  were  now  reduced  to  a  small  triangle 
at  the  eastern  extremity. 

A  fresh  regiment  was  added  to  the  French  forces  on 
the  9th  and  at  3  P.  M.  began  the  final  attack  by  which  the 
Germans  were  driven  from  the  eastern  triangle.  They 
counter-attacked  under  cover  of  a  fog  and  for  a  moment 


16  The  Great  War 

the  French  fell  back.  But  as  soon  as  the  fog  lifted,  the 
fire  of  the  French  artillery  was  resumed,  the  fresh  regi- 
ment charged  with  the  bayonet,  and  by  10  I'.  M.  the  French 
were  finally  in  complete  possession  of  the  heights  of  Les 
Kpar<j;es.  The  Germans  still  held  the  lesser  spur  of  Com- 
bres  next  to  the  south. 

The  capture  of  the  elaborately  fortified  position  of  Les 
Eparges  in  the  face  of  almost  insurmountable  obstacles 
was  a  remarkable  achievement.  The  extensive  works 
on  this  eminence  were  a  striking  illustration  of  German 
thoroughness  and  of  the  absolute  confidence  of  the 
defenders  in  their  ability  to  hold  the  place.  Under  the 
surface  of  the  plateau  there  was  a  system  of  subterra- 
nean galleries  traversed  by  a  narrow-gauge  railway,  with 
chambers  where  the  reserves  could  repose  in  safety  while 
the  French  were  constantly  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the 
German  guns. 

The  possession  of  Hill  60,  opposite  the  northern  ex- 
tremity of  the  line  held  by  the  Second  British  Corps,  less 
than  three  miles  southwest  of  Ypres,  was  stubbornly  con- 
tested because  of  its  importance  as  an  observation  point 
for  artillery  operations  over  the  low  plains  north  and  north- 
west. On  the  evening  of  April  17th  the  British  success- 
fully exploded  seven  mines,  blowing  up  the  German  trench 
and  150  soldiers,  and  thus  opening  the  way  for  the  infan- 
try attack  that  quickly  secured  possession  of  the  entire 
hill,  in  spite  of  fierce  hand-to-hand  fighting.  The  next 
morning  a  German  attack  forced  the  British  to  the  reverse 
slope  of  the  hill  until  with  the  arrival  of  reinforcements 
they  succeeded  in  driving  the  Germans  once  more  from 
the  summit  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  Nor  could  for- 
midable artillery  fire  and  repeated  infantry  charges  loosen 
the  British  hold  until  on  May  15th  the  Germans,  using 
poisonous  gases,  regained  possession. 


Tentative  Efforts  of  the  Western  Allies     17 

All  the  appearances  about  the  middle  of  April  seemed 
to  indicate  a  situation  distinctly  auspicious  for  the  cause 
of  the  Allies.  The  Russian  Colossus  was  believed  to  be 
advancing,  slowly  but  inevitably,  towards  the  plains  of 
Hungary  and  the  vital  parts  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  Con- 
spicuous local  successes  had  animated  the  enthusiasm  and 
confirmed  the  confidence  of  the  French,  who  were  now 
completing  preparations  for  a  new  offensive  on  an  un- 
precedented scale;  while  with  deliberate  and  systematic 
energy  the  British  were  collecting  their  resources  for  the 
final,  overwhelming  effort.  At  the  same  time  the  fortunes 
of  the  expedition  at  the  Dardanelles  did  not  exclude  the 
hope  that  results  of  stupendous  importance  might  at  any 
moment  be  obtained.  The  attitude  of  Italy,  Greece,  and 
Roumania  swayed  in  the  balance,  likely  to  be  influenced 
decisively  by  a  victory  of  the  Allies  at  any  time. 

A  sudden  shift  of  fortune  changed  these  radiant  expecta- 
tions to  bitter  disappointment  and  anxiety.  The  Germans 
forestalled  the  British  in  a  vigorous  onslaught  in  the  West, 
and  less  than  two  weeks  later  punctured  the  vast  but  in- 
flated surface  of  the  Russian  leviathan,  razing  at  once  the 
shining  fabric  of  enticing  hopes  that  had  been  reared  upon 
it.  With  the  impressive  candor  that  bespeaks  deep-seated 
confidence,  Earl  Kitchener  is  said  to  have  declared  that 
he  did  not  know  when  the  war  would  end,  but  that  it 
would  begin  in  May.  There  was  some  truth  in  this 
remark,  but  the  beginning  made  in  May  was  chiefly  a 
German  one.  May  found  the  British  in  the  throes  of  a 
Cabinet  crisis  and  in  a  bitter  controversy  over  lack  of 
ammunition,  while  the  British  army,  despite  the  most  in- 
tense exertion,  scarcely  held  its  own  against  the  formidable 
assaults  of  the  enemy. 

The  salient  covering  Ypres  again  became  the  theater 
for  a  furious  contest  in  which  the  German  offensive  was 


18  The  Great  War 

supported  by  a  mass  of  heavy  guns  probably  superior  in 
caliber  and  number  to  any  that  had  yet  been  concentrated 

on  that  section  of  the  front.  A  violent  bombardment  of 
Ypres  at  long  range  continuing  several  days  preceded  the 
attack.  This  radiating  point  on  the  base  of  the  salient 
projecting  eastward  from  the  Ypres-Yser  Canal  was  less 
than  three  miles  from  the  nearest  section  of  the  German 
front.  The  destructive  bombardment  of  Ypres,  facilitated 
by  this  proximity,  had  the  effect  of  a  curtain  fire  in  im- 
peding the  movement  of  supplies  to  the  Allied  troops  in 
position  on  the  margin  of  the  salient. 

The  Allied  forces  holding  this  salient  comprised  the 
Forty-fifth  Division  of  the  Ninth  French  Army  Corps  and 
on  its  right  the  Canadian  Division,  followed  by  the  two 
divisions  of  the  British  Fifth  Army  Corps  whose  position 
extended  to  the  point  where  the  Second  British  Corps 
took  up  the  line.  On  the  left  of  the  French  was  the  Bel- 
gian Army,  stretching  out  northward  to  Nieuport  and  the 
North  Sea. 

Opposite  this  part  of  the  Allied  front  there  was  ranged 
the  left  flank  of  the  Duke  of  Wiirttemberg's  army,  in  partic- 
ular the  Twenty-sixth  and  Twenty-seventh  Reserve  Corps 
and  the  right  wing  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps  from  Alsace. 

The  Germans  chose  to  direct  their  attack  against  a  sec- 
tion of  the  hostile  front  where  the  conjunction  of  forces  of 
the  three  Allies  supposedly  impaired  coherence,  one  from 
which  men  and  guns  had  been  recently  withdrawn  for  the 
proposed  offensive  effort  in  another  quarter,  and  where 
success  would  straightway  endanger  all  the  Allied  forces 
on  the  salient. 

About  5  P.  M.  on  April  22d,  after  a  violent  cannonading 
of  the  Allied  front,  a  dense  cloud  of  yellow  vapor  issued 
from  the  German  trenches  between  Bixschoote  and  Lange- 
marck  and  was  wafted  by  a  gentle  wind  across  the  space. 


Tentative  Efforts  of  the  Western  Allies     19 

between  the  hostile  lines.  This  was  a  terrible  device  of 
German  science,  a  poisonous  vapor  composed  of  chlorine 
gas,  by  means  of  which  the  Germans  almost  succeeded  in 
inflicting  a  disastrous  defeat  upon  their  enemies.  Projec- 
tiles charged  with  the  identical  destructive  element  were 
employed  at  the  same  time,  but  their  effect  has  been  ob- 
scured by  the  sweeping  excution  wrought  by  the  gently- 
moving  venomous  clouds. 

Preparations  had  been  carefully  perfected  in  advance  for 
this  baneful  attack.  Special  receptacles  of  metal  in  the  form 
of  tubes  with  faucets  had  been  distributed  along  the  Ger- 
man front.  From  these  the  malignant  gases  were  to  be 
released  when  the  direction  of  the  wind  was  favorable. 
As  protection  against  a  reverse  effect  the  Germans  wore 
masks  or  rubber  muzzles,  covering  the  nose  and  mouth, 
which  enabled  the  wearer  to  inhale  the  air  through  a 
perforated  plate  covering  a  pad  which  was  saturated  with 
a  liquid  that  neutralized  the  effect  of  the  deadly  emanations. 

The  gases  were  released  along  a  front  of  about  five  miles. 
The  dense  cloud  enveloped  the  French  division,  pouring 
over  the  parapets  and  penetrating  the  trenches,  hiding 
everything  from  sight.  The  soldiers  were  seized  with 
violent  suffocation  and  excruciating  pains  in  throat  and 
lungs.  Some  were  blinded.  Some  fell  into  a  deathlike 
stupor.  The  greater  number,  dazed^  and  gasping,  their 
faces  blue  and  swollen,  struggled  to  escape.  A  lingering, 
agonizing  death  from  acute  bronchitis  awaited  many  who 
survived  the  first  encounter. 

With  poisoned  atmosphere  added  to  the  no  less  terrible, 
though  more  familiar,  bursting  of  the  high-explosive  shells 
and  cutting  blasts  of  fire  from  the  machine-guns,  the 
French  troops  found  themselves  engulfed  in  an  inferno 
which  surpassed  the  most  hideous  creations  of  poetic  fancy. 
Man's  demoniacal  fury  had  enlisted  the  very  elements  to 


20  The  Great  War 

serve   his   murderous   purposes.     The  battle-lines  which 

had  stood  firm  against  the  most  furious  attacks  so  many 
months  withered  at  once  under  the  venomous  breath  of 
the  strange  and  awful  monster. 

The  whole  line  of  the  French  division  was  immediately 
rendered  incapable  of  action.  The  Germans,  following 
close  behind  the  fatal  fumes,  quickly  occupied  several  lines 
of  trenches,  seized  the  villages  of  Langemarck,  Pilkem, 
Het  Sas,  and  Steenstraate,  advancing  about  two  miles  on  a 
front  of  at  least  four,  and  captured  1,600  prisoners  and 
about  thirty-five  guns,  including  a  British  battery  of  four 
heavy  pieces.  The  French  were,  for  the  most  part,  rolled 
back  upon  the  section  of  the  canal  near  Boesinghe.  On 
their  own  right  the  Germans  seized  the  bridge  at  Steen- 
straate and  captured  some  works  upon  the  west  side  of  the 
canal  south  of  Lizerne. 

There  was  now  the  obvious  danger  that  the  Germans 
would  drive  a  wedge  between  the  French  and  Belgians 
west  of  the  canal  and  make  the  entire  line  in  Flanders  un- 
tenable. The  left  wing  of  the  Canadian  Division  was 
uncovered  and  exposed  to  a  flank  attack  in  consequence 
of  the  dispersal  of  the  French.  The  Germans  were  pour- 
ing through  a  four-mile  crevice  in  the  Allied  dike,  threat- 
ening to  cut  off  all  the  British  forces  eastward  on  the  salient. 

A  catastrophe  was  averted  only  by  the  most  strenuous 
exertion,  and  mainly  through  the  splendid  tenacity  and 
courage  of  the  Canadians,  whose  left  wing  was  bent  but 
did  not  break  before  the  surging  torrent.  All  night  the 
conflict  raged  while  the  very  existence  of  the  Allied  forces 
was  in  peril.  Reserve  units  were  hurried  forward  with 
frenzied  haste  and  flung  into  the  fiery  breach  as  soon  as 
they  arrived  without  regard  to  their  customary  relation- 
ship. Unflinchingly  the  Canadians,  assailed  by  poisonous 
gases,  torn  by  a  fearful  cannonading,  unsupported  by  heavy 


Tentative  Efforts  of  the  Western  Allies     21 

guns,  struggled  on  against  appalling  odds.  By  the  morn- 
ing of  the  23d  a  precarious  line  of  mixed  detachments  had 
been  thrown  across  the  opening,  about  two  miles  behind 
the  original  position,  and  connection  between  the  French 
and  British  had  been  reestablished  about  800  yards  east  of 
the  canal. 

But  the  situation  was  still  very  serious  for  the  Allies. 
The  position  of  the  3d  brigade,  which  formed  the  left 
wing  of  the  Canadians,  was  especially  trying.  The  troops 
of  this  brigade  were  assailed  from  three  directions  at  the 
same  time  and  almost  cut  off  from  their  supplies.  Forced 
to  yield  ground  upon  their  left  they  swung  back  gradually, 
pivoting  on  the  left  flank  of  the  2d  brigade,  until  their  front 
passed  through  the  village  of  St.  Julien. 

Another  great  gas  attack  began  at  3.30  A.  M.  on  the  24th. 
The  Canadian  3d  brigade,  assailed  with  great  violence,  was 
compelled  to  relinquish  St.  Julien  and  the  2d  was  forced 
to  swing  back  also  in  order  to  conform  with  the  new  line 
of  the  3d,  its  extreme  right  remaining  stationary  at  Grafen- 
stafel.  The  Germans,  extending  eastward  the  range  of 
their  offensive,  attacked  heavily  the  protruding  angle  of 
the  Allied  line  near  Grafenstafel.  But  the  Canadians  held 
their  ground  at  this  critical  point,  where  they  were  respon- 
sible for  the  safety  of  the  Twenty-eighth  British  Division, 
which  stood  next  on  the  right  and  was  facing  eastward. 

Substantial  reinforcements  were  now  arriving  for  the 
British,  principally  the  Northumbrian  Territorial  Division, 
which  had  crossed  from  England  only  three  days  before, 
the  Lahore  Division  of  Indians,  and  parts  of  the  Fourth 
Division.  These  formations  gradually  took  over  the  most 
exposed  sections  of  the  front  between  the  canal  and 
Grafenstafel. 

After  performing  miracles  of  heroism  and  maintaining 
a  defense  which  was  vital  to  the  safety  of  the  Allies,  the 


22  Thi    GREA1    War 

Canadians  received  a  well-earned  and  needed  respite,  the 
3d  brigade  being  withdrawn  on  the  24th  and  the  2d  on 
the  23th.  But  it  became  necessary  for  the  2d,  although 
reduced  to  less  than  1,000  effectives,  to  return  temporarily 

to  the  battle-front  on  the  26th,  traversing  a  shell-swept 
zone  by  daylight 

The  Germans  had  been  unable  to  make  any  further 
■ess  west  of  the  canal.  During  a  general  counter- 
attack delivered  by  the  Allies  on  the  26th  the  French 
retook  Lizerne  and  some  trenches  near  Het  Sas.  But  the 
British  failed  in  their  attempt  to  recover  St.  Julien  or  to 
make  any  appreciable  progress  in  that  quarter. 

On  May  1st  the  British  general  began  to  withdraw  his 
forces  from  the  front  which  they  were  then  holding  in 
consequence  of  its  exposed  situation.  This  movement  was 
in  accordance  with  an  earlier  agreement  between  Generals 
Foch  and  French  by  which  the  latter  promised  to  maintain 
the  outer  line  only  on  condition  that  the  French  should  by 
reinforcements  reestablish  their  original  position.  The 
new  British  position  was  a  much  reduced  one  forming  a 
semicircle  on  a  radius  of  about  three  miles  from  Ypres. 

This  withdrawal  was  effected  systematically  and  with 
great  success,  the  units  being  in  their  new  positions  by  the 
morning  of  May  4th,  without  the  Germans  knowing  that 
the  British  had  evacuated  their  trenches.  On  discovering 
this  the  enemy  occupied  Zonnebeke  and  other  places 
that  bad  been  bitterly  contested  for  months  and  began  to 
entrench  and  move  forward  his  guns. 

This  contracted  section  of  the  British  front,  stretching 
southward  from  the  Ninth  French  Army  Corps,  was  held 
from  left  to  right  by  the  Fourth,  Twenty-eighth,  and 
Twenty-seventh  British  Divisions,  the  Lahore  Division 
having  been  withdrawn.  Under  the  ceaseless  fire  of  the 
superior  German  artillery  the  work  of  fortifying  the  new 


Tentative  Efforts  of  the  Western  Allies     23 

British  line  was  found  very  difficult.  After  a  general  bom- 
bardment on  the  morning  of  the  8th,  the  section  of  British 
trenches  east  of  Frezenberg,  on  which  the  German  fire  was 
gradually  concentrated,  was  soon  completely  obliterated  and 
heavy  loss  was  suffered  by  the  defenders.  After  desperate 
efforts  the  front  was  reestablished  further  west  on  a  line 
running  through  Verlorenhoek. 

But  no  rest  was  given  by  the  Germans.  The  heaviest 
bombardment  yet  experienced  was  sustained  by  the  new 
British  line  on  the  13th;  in  some  places  trenches  were 
again  destroyed  and  the  front  was  broken ;  but  the  heroic 
efforts  of  the  British  limited  the  results  of  the  day's  ter- 
rific attacks  to  a  very  slight  displacement  of  the  battle-lines 
toward  Ypres. 

Meanwhile  the  Belgians  and  French  were  striving  to 
eject  the  Germans  from  the  vicinity  of  Steenstraate  and 
Het  Sas,  where  they  still  held  the  bridge-heads  on  the 
west  side  of  the  canal.  After  repeated  efforts  the  Allies 
regained  Steenstraate  and  the  trenches  near  Het  Sas  on  the 
15th  and  compelled  the  Germans  to  evacuate  all  their 
remaining  positions  west  of  the  canal  during  the  night  of 
the  17th-18th. 

After  desultory  and  not  remarkable  operations,  the  Ger- 
mans again  attacked  the  British  on  the  24th,  at  2.45  A.  M., 
with  heavy  shell-fire  and  poisonous  vapor,  so  suddenly  that 
their  opponents,  many  of  whom  were  asleep,  had  not  time 
to  put  on  the  masks  with  which  by  this  time  they  were 
provided.  The  British  were  forced  to  yield  some  ground 
on  their  left  wing,  where  they  only  reestablished  connec- 
tion with  the  French  on  the  former  line  on  the  26th. 

Although  the  Germans  had  gained  a  conspicuous  tactical 
success  and  had  overrun  most  of  the  Ypres  salient,  their 
efforts  fell  short  of  the  great  strategic  victory  that  seemed 
almost  within  their  reach,  and  after  five  weeks'  continuous 


24  The  Great  War 

fighting  they  did  not  even  retain  the  entire  area  seized  in 
the  fiery  onrush  of  their  first  attacks.  Tremendous  as  was 
the  impression  at  first  made  by  the  use  of  poisonous  gases 
they  gradually  lost  importance  as  counteracting  devices 
were  introduced. 

To  characteristic  German  vigilance  and  foresight  should 
be  accredited  this  aggressive  movement,  which  was  in- 
tended to  forestall  and  foil  the  long  predicted  British  offen- 
sive rather  than  to  wrest  a  decisive  victory.  No  important 
drafts  were  made  from  other  sections  for  the  attack  in 
Flanders,  for  at  the  very  moment  there  was  a  gigantic  con- 
centration of  Teutonic  forces  in  Galicia.  The  action  was 
a  local  application  of  the  offensive-defensive  principle,  re- 
sistance through  aggression.  Probably  the  Germans  did  not 
expect  to  gain  more  than  the  salient  and  some  permanent 
crossing  points  upon  the  canal  for  future  use,  though  even 
in  these  modest  aims  they  failed.  But  they  doubtless  hoped 
that  the  forcible  attack  in  Flanders  would  divert  attention 
from  Galicia,  put  the  Russians  off  their  guard,  and  help  to 
conceal  the  shifting  of  forces  from  the  western  to  the 
eastern  front,  and  that  a  sensational  demonstration  of  Ger- 
many's vitality  might  influence  at  a  critical  juncture  the 
doubtful  course  of  Italian  deliberations. 

The  contemplated  offensive  of  the  Allies  in  the  West, 
rendered  doubly  urgent  by  the  rout  of  the  Russian  Armies 
in  Galicia,  was  not  deterred  by  the  fierce  onslaught  in 
Flanders.  To  divert  the  Teutonic  forces  from  the  pur- 
suit of  their  amazing  advantages  in  the  East  demanded  a 
very  formidable  menace  on  the  West,  but  it  was  not  yet 
evident  that  the  Allies  possessed  the  resourcefulness  and 
strength  needed  to  jeopardize  a  truly  vital  interest  of  their 
enemy. 

The  French  and  British  launched  their  offensive  simul- 
taneously on  a  combined  front  of  about  twenty-five  miles 


\       Mazinqarber   ,'      ■.'     v-^ 


■fA'Ssfns      ',''■  "f&J  9r.ena^ 


wmm 


%  ^%^     ;  A  I 


or  Lens  where  the  French  offensii 


Tentative  Efforts  of  the  Western  Allies     25 

between  Arras  and  Armentieres,  the  former  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Douai  and  Valenciennes,  the  latter  in  that  of  Lille. 
There  they  expected  to  drive  their  fangs  deep  into  the 
most  sensitive  portions  of  the  German  front. 

In  particular  it  was  hoped  that  the  advance  of  General 
d'Urbal's  Tenth  French  Army  across  the  plains  of  the 
Scheldt  would  destroy  communications  along  the  German 
front  from  Lille  to  Soissons  and  imperil  the  lines  of  supply 
of  three  different  German  armies.  The  French  attack  was 
chiefly  concentrated  against  the  German  salient  north  of 
Arras  and  its  immediate  objective  was  Lens,  situated  directly 
behind  this  section  of  the  German  front,  the  leading  coal- 
producing  center  of  France. 

An  undulating  plateau  of  chalky  formation  lies  between 
Arras  and  the  valley  of  the  Lys  and  extends  westward  from 
the  flat  country  east  of  Lens.  Its  highest  part  is  formed 
by  the  crest  of  Notre  Dame  de  Lorette,  running  east  and 
west.  From  this  central  elevation  a  number  of  very  rug- 
ged spurs  project  towards  the  south,  while  less  precipitous 
ridges  descending  gradually  on  the  north  sink  into  the 
valley  of  the  Lys.  On  the  solitary  eastern  extremity  of 
the  crest  stood  the  Chapel  of  Notre  Dame  de  Lorette.  In 
the  valley  southward  lay  the  village  of  Ablain-St.  Nazaire 
and,  beyond  the  next  parallel  ridge,  Carency.  The  main 
highway  from  Arras  to  Bethune  passed  through  Souchez 
and  traversed  the  more  elevated  region  of  Notre  Dame  de 
Lorette  by  a  depression  east  of  the  chapel. 

The  German  lines  formed  a  prominent  salient  westward 
embracing  Ablain-St.  Nazaire  and  Carency  on  the  higher 
ground,  so  as  to  insure  possession  of  Lens,  the  important 
center  of  communications.  The  positions  had  been  care- 
fully fortified  with  elaborate  trench  systems,  powerful  de- 
fensive works,  such  as  the  "  Labyrinth,"  which  have  become 
famous,  and  many  isolated  posts  and  redoubts  commanding 


The  Great  War 

the  approaches  with  innumerable  machine-guns.  The 
Germans  showed  their  appreciation  of  the  importance  of 
the  ridge  of  Notre  Dame  de  Lorette  by  their  multiplied 
trench  system  running  across  it  protected  by  wire-entan- 
glements, the  numerous  machine-gun  emplacements,  and 
the  many  hidden  batteries.  The  whole  district,  ravines  and 
villages,  was  fully  utilized  for  defensive  purposes,  while 
artillery  covered  the  eastern  extremity  of  the  ridge  from 
strong  positions  at  Angres,  Souchez,  Ablain-St.  Nazaire, 
and  several  other  nearby  places. 

General  Foch  personally  directed  the  French  offensive 
operations  in  this  section.  The  French  army,  comprising 
probably  seven  army  corps,  with  1,100  pieces  of  artillery 
of  varying  calibers,  surpassed  in  men  and  guns  the  opposing 
army  of  von  Biilow.  But  the  Germans  held  stronger  posi- 
tions and  apparently  were  not  ignorant  of  the  proposed 
attack  against  them. 

The  French  operations  ranged  on  a  front  of  about  fifteen 
miles,  but  the  chief  action  centered  at  a  point  about  two 
miles  north  of  Arras,  opposite  the  so-called  Labyrinth,  and 
at  the  plateau  of  Notre  Dame  de  Lorette.  A  furious  bom- 
bardment was  opened  on  May  9th  at  6  A.  M.  against  the  Ger- 
man position,  and  during  the  day  300,000  shells  were  fired. 

By  ten  o'clock  the  German  trenches  had  been  sufficiently 
pulverized  and  the  ground  prepared  for  the  attack.  The 
infantry  sprang  forward  in  a  delirium  of  excitement,  their 
spirits  attuned  to  the  roar  of  the  heavy  guns  and  the 
screeching  of  the  shrapnel.  Their  fury  bore  them  through 
clouds  of  suffocating  vapors,  where  the  high-explosive 
shells  had  burst  at  close  intervals,  and  over  ground  that 
had  been  pitted,  scarred,  and  furrowed  in  the  most  be- 
wildering manner.  The  German  shells  tearing  ugly  gaps 
in  the  advancing  lines  served  only  to  spur  the  French  to 
more  impetuous  momentum  as  the  surest  means  of  safety. 


Tentative  Efforts  of  the  Western  Allies     27 

On  the  extreme  right  the  attack  encountered  the  almost 
inexpugnable  "  Labyrinth  "  and  made  but  little  progress.  In 
the  next  section  towards  the  northwest  the  French  troops 
gained  the  foremost  hostile  trenches,  threw  themselves 
upon  the  Germans  in  La  Targette,  situated  on  the  Arras- 
Bethune  highway,  which  they  quickly  mastered,  and 
pushed  on  into  Neuville-St.  Vaast.  Further  to  the  left  the 
French  poured  over  the  remains  of  the  famous  intrench- 
ments  known  from  the  appearance  of  the  soil  as  the  White 
Works  and  penetrated  beyond  the  Arras-Bethune  highway. 

The  attack  on  Carency  was  the  beginning  of  an  opera- 
tion of  intense  exertion  which  lasted  several  days.  The 
village  itself  was  riddled  by  20,000  shells,  and  during  the 
artillery  preparation  the  French  exploded  simultaneously 
seventeen  mines  beneath  the  German  positions,  destroying 
almost  completely  the  entanglements  and  abattis  and  long 
sections  of  the  trenches,  and  making  unavailable  the  mines 
which  the  Germans  themselves  had  planted.  The  French 
infantry  advanced  with  reckless  vehemence  in  spite  of  the 
broken  character  of  the  ground  and  pushed  northward  on 
the  eastern  side  of  Carency. 

On  the  front  between  the  Labyrinth  and  Carency  the 
first  attack  had  resulted  in  the  capture  of  two,  and  in  places 
three,  lines  of  German  trenches,  and  in  an  extreme  advance 
of  about  two  miles  and  a  half.  This  was  the  beginning  of 
a  period  of  unusual  warfare  in  the  Labyrinth.  In  the  dark 
subterranean  passages  with  which  the  chalky  ground  was 
honeycombed,  in  some  places  fifty  feet  below  the  surface, 
men  fought  with  knives  and  picks,  or  bayonets,  or  teeth 
and  hands.  Every  yard  was  contested  with  the  most  stub- 
born determination,  and  the  French  advanced  by  almost 
imperceptible  degrees,  but  by  the  middle  of  June  the 
Labyrinth  was  almost  entirely  in  their  hands.  At  Neuville- 
St.  Vaast  the  opening  onslaught  was  the  prelude  to  a  tedious 


28  The  Great  War 

struggle  in  which  the  French  had  to  fight  their  way  from 
house  to  house, — each  a  little  fortress  bristling  with  ma- 
chine-guns,— and  street  to  street,  gaining  almost  complete 

possession  of  the  town  after  a  week  of  incessant  conflict. 
But  the  Germans  were  not  entirely  expelled  until  the  night 
of  June  8-9. 

Carency,  still  a  strong  position,  was  taken  by  an  envelop- 
ing movement  on  the  east  and  west.  On  May  11th  the 
French  on  the  eastern  side  cut  the  communications  with 
Souchez,  but  were  halted  in  their  advance  at  a  strongly 
fortified  hill.  The  force  on  the  western  side  was  checked 
by  a  defensive  position  in  a  quarry.  The  next  day  a  very 
energetic  attack  carried  the  town  on  both  sides.  Over  a 
thousand  Germans  threw  down  their  weapons,  advanced 
from  the  trenches  crying,  "Kamerade,  Kamerade  (Comrade, 
Comrade)"  and  surrendered.  The  French  pressed  on 
and  during  the  ensuing  night  captured  most  of  Ablain- 
St.  Nazaire,  the  Germans  retaining  a  foothold  only  on  the 
eastern  side  of  the  place. 

The  struggle  for  the  heights  of  Notre  Dame  de  Lorette 
is  a  striking  example  of  the  character  and  tremendous  diffi- 
culty of  an  attack  on  positions  patiently  and  ingeniously 
fortified  in  the  most  approved  and  latest  methods.  But  it 
is  equally  impressive  by  reason  of  the  heroism,  determina- 
tion, and  inconceivable  endurance  exhibited  in  the  attacks. 
The  defense  was  made  by  Bavarian  troops.  In  previous 
attacks,  on  March  15th  and  April  15th,  the  French  had 
already  gained  a  foothold  on  this  ridge  by  capturing  the 
Grand  Eperon  and  other  spurs  debouching  from  the  west- 
ern part  of  the  plateau  and  overlooking  Ablain-St.  Nazaire. 
On  the  present  occasion  the  French,  taught  by  experience, 
gathered  vast  quantities  of  ammunition  and  provisions 
nearby,  they  even  laid  a  narrow-gauge  railway  to  distribute 
material  and  supplies.     Three  regiments  of  infantry  and 


Tentative  Efforts  of  the  Western  Allies     29 

three  battalions  of  chasseurs  chosen  for  the  enterprise 
launched  on  the  9th  awaited  the  termination  of  the  indis- 
pensable artillery  preparation  to  dash  forward  with  all  the 
force  of  their  repressed  ardor  in  an  impetuous  charge. 
Within  two  hours  three  lines  of  defense  were  carried, 
although  at  heavy  loss,  and  the  French  were  checked  at 
the  fourth  only  by  the  formidable  fort  erected  by  the 
Germans  at  the  chapel. 

Unsupported  by  the  French  artillery,  whose  fire  could 
not  now  be  directed,  owing  to  the  severance  of  the  tele- 
phone wires  to  the  rear  by  the  enemy's  shells,  the  attacking 
troops  threw  themselves  upon  the  ground  or  sought  shelter 
in  the  pits  formed  by  the  exploding  shells,  and  passed  the 
night  in  improvised  intrenchments  on  the  field  of  battle, 
constantly  bombarded  by  the  enemy's  artillery.  For  more 
than  three  days  they  remained  in  the  same  precarious  posi- 
tion, merely  marking  time,  holding  the  ground  already 
gained,  but  subjected  to  the  concentrated  fire  of  hostile 
guns  from  several  points.  The  unusual  heat  accelerated 
the  decomposition  of  the  corpses  lying  all  about,  con- 
taminating the  air  with  the  repulsive  odor,  and  bodies 
were  even  torn  from  the  shallow  graves  by  the  explod- 
ing shells. 

The  decisive  assault  on  the  German  fort  was  executed 
on  the  night  of  the  12th-13th.  The  chasseurs  crawled 
forward  on  all-fours,  while  deadly  gusts  of  fire  from  the 
enemy's  machine-guns  swept  the  field  a  few  inches  above 
their  heads.  Reaching  the  foot  of  the  hostile  parapet,  the 
foremost  soldiers  grasped  the  sandbags  and  actually  stuffed 
them  into  the  embrasures,  stopping  for  a  moment  the  con- 
tinuous streams  of  lead  that  poured  from  the  mouths  of 
the  machine-guns.  In  an  instant  the  French  were  over 
the  parapet  and  engaged  in  a  death-grapple  with  their 
adversaries  in  the  dark  interior  of  the  fort.    Nothing  could 


30  The  Great  War 

resist  the  desperate  fury  of  the  French,  who  were  quickly 
masters  of  the  situation. 

The  Germans  still  retained  possession  of  their  foothold 
in  the  eastern  part  of  Ablain-St.  Nazaire  and  held  an 
important  position  on  one  of  the  southern  spurs  of  the 
heights  of  Notre  Dame  de  Lorette,  known  as  the  "White 
Way  (la  Blanche  Voie)."  The  French  attacked  this  spur 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  21st  and  cleared  the  German 
trenches  in  the  ensuing  night.  During  the  struggle  last- 
ing thirteen  days  for  possession  of  the  heights  of  Notre 
Dame  de  Lorette,  the  French  had  counted  more  than  3,000 
German  corpses  and  taken  more  than  1,000  prisoners  on 
the  ridge  and  its  immediate  offshoots.  But  their  own  losses 
had  been  heavy. 

The  German  position  at  Ablain-St.  Nazaire  was  now  most 
precarious.  The  line  of  communication  from  Souchez  was 
everywhere  exposed  to  the  French  artillery,  so  that  it  was 
perilous  to  relieve  the  detachments  or  even  to  bring  up  sup- 
plies. Superhuman  demands  upon  the  German  troops  had 
reduced  them  to  a  state  verging  on  complete  exhaustion. 
Subjected  to  fire  from  nearly  every  direction,  they  could 
scarcely  expose  themselves  a  moment  from  behind  their 
cover,  while  the  great  projectiles  threatened  to  bury  them 
alive  beneath  the  fragments  of  their  own  defenses.  During 
a  vigorous  French  attack  on  the  night  of  the  28th-29th  the 
Germans,  yielding  to  the  inevitable,  relinquished  their  hold 
on  Ablain-St.  Nazaire.  The  French  were  now  in  posses- 
sion of  the  entire  front  of  the  German  salient. 

The  Germans  had  strongly  intrenched  themselves  in  the 
ruins  of  an  extensive  sugar-refinery  a  short  distance  west 
of  Souchez  on  the  road  to  Ablain-St.  Nazaire.  The  French, 
attacked  this  position  both  from  the  west  and  south,  hurl- 
ing hand-grenades  into  the  enemy's  trenches  and  dispersing 
the  Germans  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.    These  were  the 


Tentative  Efforts  of  the  Western  Allies     31 

same  French  troops  who  had  stormed  Carency  and  reduced 
Ablain-St.  Nazaire,  and  it  was  reported  that  during  the 
course  of  their  offensive,  from  the  initial  onslaught  on 
May  9th  to  the  capture  of  the  sugar-refinery  on  May  31st, 
they  had  buried  nearly  3,000  German  slain  and  taken  more 
than  3,000  prisoners. 

The  French  offensive  now  gradually  waned.  Either  its 
accumulated  energy  had  been  spent,  or  the  concentration 
of  men  and  guns  on  the  German  side  had  restored  the 
equilibrium.  On  the  night  of  June  12-13  the  French 
captured  the  railway  station  of  Souchez;  but  this  achieve- 
ment practically  marks  the  limit  to  which  they  succeeded 
in  hacking  off  the  protruding  angle  in  the  German  front. 
Persistent  efforts  failed  to  drive  the  Germans  from  Souchez 
where  they  blocked  the  Arras-Bethune  highway.  The 
exertions  of  the  French  were  chiefly  confined  henceforth 
to  the  lesser  tasks  of  consolidating  and  organizing  their 
new  front  in  the  conquered  positions. 

The  British  had  meanwhile  cooperated  with  the  French, 
in  accordance  with  the  common  plan,  by  taking  up  the 
offensive  north  of  La  Bassee.  On  the  same  day  that  the 
French  onslaught  burst  with  such  overwhelming  fury  on 
the  foremost  German  trenches  in  front  of  La  Targette, 
Carency,  Ablain-St.  Nazaire,  and  Notre  Dame  de  Lorette, 
May  9th,  the  British  assailed  the  German  lines  at  different 
places  between  Festubert  and  Armentieres  for  the  purpose 
of  detaining  the  forces  posted  opposite  them,  chiefly  the 
Seventh  Corps,  and  of  winning,  if  possible,  the  ridge  which 
had  been  their  ultimate  objective  in  the  Battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle  in  March. 

The  Eighth  Division  (of  the  British  Fourth  Corps) 
attacked  the  German  trenches  about  three  miles  northeast 
of  Neuve  Chapelle,  but  could  make  no  permanent  prog- 
ress against  the   enemy's  strong  position  and  the  violent 


32  The  Great  War 

enfilading  fire  of  the  machine-guns.  The  First  and  Indian 
Divisions  attacking  south  of  Neuve  Chapelle  met  with  no 
greater  success,  so  that  Sir  John  French  sanctioned  the 
proposal  of  Sir  Douglas  Haig  to  concentrate  their  effort  at 
the  most  southern  point.  But  unfavorable  weather  delayed 
the  resumption  of  aggressive  operations  until  the  night  of 
May  15-16. 

Then  the  Indian  Division,  the  Second  Division  (of  the 
First  Corps),  and  the  Seventh  Division  (of  the  Fourth 
Corps),  which  had  been  transferred  to  the  First  Corps  area 
for  this  particular  purpose,  attacked  the  slightly  rounding 
section  of  the  German  front  which  extended  from  the 
vicinity  of  Richebourg-l'Avoue  southwestwards  in  the 
direction  of  Festubert.  The  ensuing  battle  took  its  name 
from  Festubert. 

The  Indian  Corps  on  the  left  was  unable  to  advance,  but 
the  Second  quickly  captured  two  lines  of  trenches,  and  the 
Seventh  on  the  right  made  still  greater  progress.  The 
British  experienced  considerable  difficulty  in  consolidating 
their  attacking  front  by  uniting  the  inner  flanks  of  the 
Second  and  Seventh  Divisions;  but  even  after  this  had 
been  accomplished,  about  noon  on  the  17th,  progress  was 
very  difficult  and  slow,  because  the  country  swarmed  with 
the  enemy's  isolated  fortified  posts  which  were  abundantly 
supplied  with  machine-guns.  The  Fifty-first  (Highland) 
and  Canadian  Divisions  took  the  place  of  the  Second  and 
Seventh  on  the  19th,  and  gradual  progress  continued  until 
the  25th  when  the  British  offensive  was  discontinued. 

The  British  had  driven  the  Germans  from  strongly  in- 
trenched positions,  winning  ground  along  a  front  of  about 
four  miles,  but  had  only  penetrated  to  an  average  depth  of 
600  yards.  The  chief  service  rendered  by  the  British  in 
this  Battle  of  Festubert  was  the  support  lent  to  the  French 
during  the  great  offensive  of  the  latter  in  Artois. 


*...''        "    \  .vl    .  '      .  >  kl. 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Winter  Operations  in  the  East 
Uanuary-March,  1915) 

The  situation  in  the  East  at  the  commencement  of  1915.  Motives  and 
plans  of  the  contestants.  Movements  in  Bukovina.  The  renewed  effort 
to  capture  Warsaw  from  the  west,  von  Mackensen's  attack  and  failure  on 
the  front  in  central  Poland,  February  1-8.  The  plan  for  simultaneous 
action  on  the  wings  of  the  Teutonic  front  in  north  and  south.  The  situa- 
tion in  East  Prussia  and  the  German  concentration  there.  The  German 
plan  of  battle ;  a  compound  double  enveloping  maneuver.  The  particular 
concentric  movement  of  each  wing,  in  the  south  on  Lyck,  in  the  north  on 
Wirballen.  East  Prussia  completely  cleared  of  the  invaders  about  Feb- 
ruary 15th.  The  general  converging  movement  of  the  entire  army  and  its 
results.  The  Russian  counter-offensive.  The  German  offensive  on  the 
Narev  and  its  failure.  The  Teutonic  offensive  in  the  south,  the  battles 
for  possession  of  the  Carpathian  passes.  The  importance  of  Peremysl  and 
nature  of  its  defense.     Its  fall  on  March  22d  and  the  results. 

After  the  rapid  vicissitudes  that  marked  the  earlier 
operations  in  the  East,  the  oscillating  line  of  hostile  con- 
tact reduced  its  speed  and  range  of  fluctuation  and  finally 
rested  for  a  time  upon  a  winding  course  that  kept  the 
distinctive  westward  swelling  of  the  Russian  front,  though 
shorn  of  its  vertex,  broadened  at  the  base,  and  thereby 
made  much  less  conspicuous.  Starting  on  the  Russo- 
German  boundary  near  the  Baltic  Sea,  the  line  of  the 
opposing  fronts  swung  southward,  lopping  off  an  eastern 
slice  of  Prussian  territory,  regained  the  Russian  frontier 
north  of  the  Narev,  veered  to  the  southwest  and  crossed 
the  Vistula  at  Vysogrod,  then  bearing  southward  followed 
the  Bzura,  the  Ravka,  and  the  Nida,  traversed  the  Vistula 
a  second  time,  ascended  the  valleys  of  the  Dunajec  and 
the  Biala   to  the   Carpathian  range,  passed  south  of  the 

33 


34  The  Great  War 

summits  in  the  region  of  the  Dukla  Pass,  then  swerving 
to  the  left,  kept  to  the  northeastern  slopes  as  far  as  the 
Roumanian  border. 

The  Russian  armies  were  now  associated  in  two  groups, 
a  northern  under  General  Russky  and  a  southern  under 
General  IvanorT.  The  former  embraced  an  army  on  the 
East  Prussian  border,  another  on  the  Narev,  the  forces 
defending  Warsaw  along  the  Bzura  and  the  Ravka,  and 
the  army  operating  in  the  region  of  the  Pilica.  The  latter 
group  comprised  the  army  of  the  Nida  under  General 
Ewarts,  the  army  of  the  Dunajec  under  General  DmitriefT, 
the  forces  investing  Peremysl  under  General  SelivanofT, 
General  BrussilofT's  army  of  the  Carpathians,  and  the  small 
Ninth  Army  of  General  AlexeiefT,  in  Bukovina.  The 
Grand-duke  Nicholas  with  mobile  chief  headquarters 
flitted  back  and  forth  as  occasion  demanded  at  a  con- 
venient distance  behind  the  lines. 

A  portion  of  the  German  forces  was  deployed  along  the 
bending  front  of  East  Prussia,  but  the  main  part  with 
von  Mackensen  was  stationed  on  the  Bzura  and  the  Ravka 
facing  Warsaw.  A  German  element,  probably  four  corps, 
was  present  with  the  Austro-Hungarian  forces.  Five 
armies  of  the  latter  faced  the  Russians.  General  Dankl's 
army  on  the  Nida,  now  reduced  to  only  a  corps  and  a  half, 
formed  the  contact  with  the  German  right.  Ranged  against 
DmitriefT  along  the  Dunajec  and  the  Biala  lay  General 
Woyrsch's  army.  The  Third,  Fourth,  and  Fifth  Armies 
were  operating  in  the  zone  of  the  Carpathians,  under  the 
general  command  of  the  Archduke  Eugene,  who  had 
come  to  this  section  with  the  Fifth  Army  from  the  south- 
ern frontier  after  the  abandonment  of  the  disastrous  Serbian 
campaign. 

The  Russians  had  held  all  the  important  Carpathian  passes 
in  October,  when  a  serious  invasion  of  the  Hungarian  plains 


The  Winter  Operations  in  the  East         35 

was  imminent.  Later  the  Austro-Hungarian  armies  took 
the  offensive,  with  the  assistance  of  the  Germans,  and 
drove  the  Russians  from  the  passes.  But  just  before  the 
close  of  the  year  there  was  another  turning  of  the  tide  and 
by  the  first  of  January  the  Russians  had  carried  the  water- 
shed west  of  the  Uszok  Pass  while  their  cavalry  ranged 
the  valleys  leading  down  to  Hungary. 

Partly  to  distract  the  Central  Powers,  and  to  prevent  the 
removal  of  German  forces  to  the  West,  where  the  new 
resources  of  France  and  Great  Britain  were  not  yet  avail- 
able, the  Russians  took  the  offensive  on  an  extensive  scale 
in  the  latter  part  of  January.  In  Bukovina,  the  principal 
part  of  which  had  been  in  their  hands  since  September, 
the  comparatively  small  Russian  forces  pressed  forwards 
towards  the  divide  and  took  the  Kirlibaba  Pass,  leading 
into  Hungary,  on  the  17th.  There  was  a  simultaneous 
movement  along  the  right  bank  of  the  Vistula  towards 
Thorn,  and  a  general  forward  movement  in  East  Prussia, 
with  which  we  shall  soon  have  occasion  to  deal  more  fully. 

In  the  meantime  von  Hindenburg  resolved  to  attempt 
once  more  the  capture  of  Warsaw  by  a  frontal  attack. 
Von  Mackensen  assembled  powerful  masses  of  artillery 
along  the  Ravka  and  down  the  Bzura  as  far  as  Sochaczef ; 
but  concentrated  his  attacking  columns,  no  less  than  seven 
divisions,  within  the  narrow  space  of  seven  miles  in  which 
the  Germans  controlled  both  banks  of  the  Ravka.  The 
German  artillery  commenced  a  terrific  bombardment  of 
the  Russian  position  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Ravka  from 
the  slopes  west  of  that  river  on  the  night  of  February  1-2. 
Under  cover  of  the  guns  and  of  a  heavy  snowstorm  the 
German  infantry  advanced  in  deep  formation  up  the  oppo- 
site slopes.  Their  initial  fervor  and  the  impetus  of  num- 
bers quickly  bore  them  across  the  first  line  of  Russian 
trenches,  and  by  the  close  of  the  following  day  the  second 


36  The  Great  War 

and  third  lines  were  also  captured  and  the  Russians  had 
been  driven  hack  to  the  crest  of  the  hills  three  miles  from 
the  river,  and  in  some  places  beyond  the  ridi^e.  The  battle 
continued  with  great  violence  throughout  the  3d  while  the 
Germans  gradually  neared  their  goal.  But  the  vigor  of 
the  German  onslaught  waned,  while  reinforcements  stif- 
fened the  resistance  of  the  Russian  lines,  and  a  Russian 
counter-attack  was  made  on  the  4th.  The  Germans  were 
slowly  pushed  back  into  the  valley  and  by  the  8th  the  Rus- 
sians were  even  attempting  a  thrust  beyond  the  Bzura. 

This  failure  in  a  frontal  attack  on  Warsaw  was  added 
proof  that  offensive  operations  against  the  Russian  front 
could  only  be  successful  where  the  forces  of  the  Central 
Powers  would  be  directly  based  upon  their  incomparable 
systems  of  strategic  railways. 

When  von  Hindenburg  saw  that  the  Russian  counter- 
attack might  succeed  he  adopted  the  plan  of  simultaneous 
action  in  smiting  the  Russian  front  on  both  its  wings,  by 
following  up  with  vigor  the  offensive  already  started  in  the 
south  and  launching  a  new  and  overpowering  onslaught 
in  the  north. 

The  efforts  of  the  Teutonic  Allies  to  cut  the  essential 
arteries  of  Russian  communications  in  Poland  had  thus  far 
been  frustrated.  General  Dankl's  sudden  incursion  into 
Poland  in  August,  1914,  which  aimed  to  intercept  the 
Kieff- Warsaw  railway  near  Lublin  had  been  speedily  re- 
pelled, while  von  Hindenburg  had  been  thwarted  in  his 
probable  expectation  of  severing  the  Petrograd- Warsaw 
line  after  the  Russian  catastrophe  in  East  Prussia.  The 
latter  line  ran  parallel  to  the  German  boundary  in  the 
region  of  Grodno  and  Bialystok  and  hardly  forty  miles 
distant;  here  a  German  menace  was  especially  serious, 
hence  the  Russians'  anxiety  to  press  the  Germans  westward 
in  East  Prussia.    The  obvious  highway  for  the  penetration 


The  Winter  Operations  in  the  East         37 

of  this  vital  region  by  a  German  army  is  the  railway 
from  Konigsberg  through  Lyck  to  Bialystok  and  Brest- 
Litovsk,  but  von  Hindenburg  had  vainly  attempted  this 
route.  The  operations  of  Germany  in  East  Prussia  were 
quite  insignificant  from  September,  1914,  till  February,  the 
greater  part  of  the  forces  there  having  been  transferred  to 
central  Poland,  and  the  troops  remaining  under  General 
von  Below  withdrawn  some  distance  west  of  the  bound- 
ary to  naturally  protected  positions,  thus  leaving  a  consider- 
able segment  of  the  province  to  the  Russians. 

Weighty  considerations  disposed  the  Russians  to  under- 
take another  considerable  effort  in  East  Prussia.  Advancing 
mainly  along  the  communicating  lines  of  railway,  the  one 
running  from  Kovno  westward  through  Eydtkuhnen  and 
Gumbinnen,  the  other  from  Bialystok  and  Osovietz  north- 
westward through  Lyck  and  Lotzen,  the  Tenth  Russian 
Army,  probably  eleven  infantry  and  several  cavalry  divi- 
sions, about  200,000  men,  under  General  Sievers,  had 
overrun  East  Prussia  almost  to  the  line  of  the  Angerapp 
River  and  the  principal  chain  of  the  Masurian  Lakes. 
The  new  invasion  was  pushed  forward  more  vigorously  in 
the  north  with  the  evident  intention  of  outflanking  the 
Germans  and  rolling  back  their  front.  By  February  6th 
the  right  wing  of  the  Russians  had  reached  the  Inster, 
while  the  left  rested  on  Johannisburg,  and  the  center 
threatened  Darkehmen  and  Lotzen. 

But  suddenly,  after  so  many  months  of  quiet  the  Ger- 
mans took  the  offensive  on  the  old  battle-ground  of  the 
Masurian  Lakes  with  overwhelming  force,  and  dealt  their 
antagonists  a  staggering  blow  that  proved  to  be  the  most 
sensational  occurrence  of  the  winter. 

The  violence  of  the  struggle  in  central  Poland  had 
helped  to  screen  an  enormous  concentration  of  German 
forces  behind  the  front  in  East  Prussia,  performed  with 


38  The  Great  War 

the  usual  unobtrusive  swiftness  of  the  Prussian  railways. 
The  total  forces  available  on  the  eastern  frontier  of  East 
Prussia  numbered  about  400,000  men. 

Field-marshal  von  Hiiidenburg  going  to  Insterburg 
assumed  general  supervision  of  the  ensuing  operations. 
Once  more  a  Russian  army  had  exposed  itself  in  the  fateful 
zone  of  the  Masurian  Lakes  and  with  acute  discernment 
von  Hindenburg  dashed  upon  the  prospective  prey. 

A  repetition  of  the  famous  double  enveloping  maneuver 
of  Tannenberg  was  planned  upon  a  vastly  more  extensive 
scale,  covering  a  front  of  about  125  miles.  The  German 
forces  were  divided  into  two  general  groups,  one  extend- 
ing from  Tilsit  to  Lotzen,  the  other  from  Lotzen  to  the 
vicinity  of  Johannisburg.  The  first  was  commanded  by 
Colonel-general  von  Eichhorn,  who  had  been  inspector  of 
the  Sixteenth,  Eighteenth,  and  Twenty-first  Army  Corps 
in  time  of  peace,  the  second  by  General  of  the  Infantry 
von  Below,  who  had  been  commander  of  the  Twenty-first 
Corps  at  Saarburg  before  the  war. 

The  German  offensive  might  appropriately  be  called  a 
compound  double  enveloping  movement.  For  each  wing 
of  the  German  army,  advancing  with  concave  front,  con- 
verged upon  its  own  immediate  objective  before  the  two 
parts  drew  together  to  crush  the  foe  entrapped  between 
them,  so  that  in  each  case  a  lesser  Canna?  was  enacted 
within  the  framework  of  the  greater  one,  and  the  entire 
maneuver  was  not  unlike  the  onset  of  the  lobster  with  its 
enveloping  claws,  each  operating  with  incisive  nippers. 
The  units  in  the  south  converged  on  Lyck,  those  in  the 
north  on  the  district  of  Wirballen. 

The  forward  movement  was  inaugurated  by  the  forces 
at  the  extremities  of  the  German  front.  On  the  extreme 
right  General  of  the  Infantry  von  Litzmann,  on  February 
7th,  marched  the  Fortieth  Reserve  Corps  twenty-five  miles 


The  Winter  Operations  in  the  East  39 

through  forests  choked  with  snow,  and  surprised  the  Rus- 
sians, forcing  at  Wrobeln  the  passage  of  the  Pisseck  River, 
the  outlet  of  Lake  Spirding.  Repulsing  the  flank  attack 
of  a  Russian  column,  which  had  come  up  from  the  fortress 
of  Kolno,  on  the  8th,  he  swept  along  the  curve  of  the  inter- 
national border,  captured  Bialla  and  Grajevo,  and  severed 
the  railway  line  between  Lyck  and  Bialystok. 

General  von  Falck,  leading  the  next  corps  to  the  north, 
advanced  on  a  line  parallel  with  the  route  of  von  Litz- 
mann,  took  Johannisburg  by  storm  on  the  8th,  and  later 
cooperated  in  driving  the  enemy  from  the  defiles  com- 
manding Lyck. 

General  von  Lauenstein's  forces  on  the  extreme  left 
near  Tilsit  advanced  on  the  8th  through  Spullen,  Pilkallen, 
and  Schirvindt.  They  outflanked  the  Russians,  compelling 
them  to  evacuate  each  successive  position,  and  finally  cut 
off  their  natural  line  of  retreat  by  the  railway  eastward  to 
Kovno.  Other  German  forces  to  the  right  of  these  ad- 
vanced from  the  vicinity  of  Insterburg  along  the  main 
railway  line  directly  eastward  towards  Gumbinnen  and 
Stalluponen,  attacking  the  Russians  in  front.  The  prompt- 
ness and  vigor  of  the  German  forces,  exceeding  every 
expectation,  surprised  and  disconcerted  their  opponents. 
In  their  flight  a  division  and  a  half,  reaching  the  vicinity 
of  Eydtkuhnen  and  Wirballen,  late  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
10th,  sought  respite  for  the  night,  but  neglected  the  most 
necessary  precautions.  Suddenly  in  the  evening  the  Ger- 
mans burst  upon  them  and  after  sharp  street-fighting  cap- 
tured these  towns  together  with  extensive  booty  and  10,000 
prisoners,  whose  very  number  embarrassed  their  captors. 

But  in  spite  of  the  brilliance  of  this  partial  success,  the 
larger  part  of  the  forces  which  composed  the  Russian  right 
wing  seem  to  have  effected  their  escape  towards  Kovno 
before  the  railway  was  intercepted  by  the  Germans. 


40  The  Great  War 

The  conflict  in  the  right  center  did  not  become  intense 
until  the  12th,  when  the  Russians  yielded  their  foremost 
lines.  The  Kaiser  arrived  in  Lotzen  on  the  13th  so  as  to 
he  present  at  the  culminating  action.  The  Russians  had 
in  their  turn  intrenched  the  defiles  between  the  Masurian 
Lakes  and  had  posted  their  staunchest  troops,  Siberians,  in 
this  section.  The  road  from  Lotzen  to  Lyck  passed  be- 
tween Lakes  Laszmiaden  and  Lyck.  Here  the  Russians 
fought  with  desperate  courage;  but  the  vastly  superior 
number  of  the  Germans  and  the  issue  of  the  conflict  on 
the  wings  had  already  made  a  general  retreat  inevitable. 
The  battle  in  the  narrows  was  merely  a  delaying  action  to 
secure  for  the  Russian  forces  an  opportunity  for  retire- 
ment eastward. 

Finally,  on  the  14th,  the  First  German  Army  Corps, 
commanded  by  General  Kosch,  with  the  Eleventh  Land- 
wehr  Division,  overcame  the  resistance  of  the  Russians  in 
a  violent  contest  at  the  defile,  under  the  eyes  of  the  Kaiser, 
while  the  converging  corps  of  General  von  Butlar  and 
General  von  Falck  cooperated  further  south,  and  on  the 
same  afternoon  the  Germans  entered  Lyck  in  triumph. 

The  capture  of  this  town  had  practically  completed  the 
redemption  of  the  sacred  soil  of  this  very  loyal  province  so 
long  polluted  by  the  presence  of  the  enemy,  and  the  troops 
were  thrilled  with  the  consciousness  of  having  accomplished 
a  difficult  and  memorable  achievement.  Suddenly  the 
Kaiser  appeared  in  his  motor-car  upon  the  market-place, 
where  the  victorious  columns  and  the  dejected  throngs  of 
prisoners,  moving  in  opposite  directions,  offered  a  curious 
contrast.  Frenzied  acclamations  burst  from  the  throats  of 
the  delighted  soldiers  and  v/ere  merged  in  the  swelling 
notes  of  the  national  anthems,  and  the  Kaiser  before  a 
background  of  grim,  blackened  ruins,  addressed  the  multi- 
tude in  a  few  short,  stirring  sentences. 


The  Winter  Operations  in  the  East  41 

The  right  and  left  wings  of  the  German  army  now 
sought  to  approach  and  entrap  a  large  part  of  the  Russian 
army  by  converging  respectively  on  Augustof  and  Suwalki. 
The  Twentieth  Russian  Corps,  under  General  BulgakofT, 
was  thereby  threatened  with  annihilation  and  sought  refuge 
in  flight  towards  the  Russian  frontier  railway  which  passes 
through  Augustof  and  Suwalki.  After  over  a  week  of  heroic 
struggling,  it  became  disorganized.  Nevertheless,  two  regi- 
ments cut  through  the  hostile  ring  on  the  22d  and  joined  the 
Russian  counter-attack  then  beginning  northwest  of  Grodno. 

The  Germans  claim  to  have  taken  more  than  100,000 
prisoners,  including  General  BulgakofT  and  six  other  gen- 
erals, and  to  have  captured  about  300  guns  during  the 
winter  conflict  of  the  Masurian  Lakes  and  the  ensuing 
pursuit  of  the  Russians.  The  practical  destruction  of  the 
Russian  Tenth  Army  was  exultantly  proclaimed  in  Ger- 
many, but  it  soon  became  evident  that  this  announcement 
was  an  exaggeration.  The  Third  Russian  Corps  suffered 
heavy  losses  around  Wirballen  and  most  of  the  Twentieth 
Corps  was  wiped  out,  but  the  forces  in  the  region  of  Lyck 
retreated  in  good  order,  contesting  almost  every  foot  of  the 
way.  In  fact,  the  escape  of  so  large  a  portion  of  General 
Sievers's  army  with  scarcely  any  help  from  the  railways, 
through  forests  choked  with  snowdrifts,  before  an  enemy 
greatly  superior  in  numbers  and  equipment,  was  a  very 
remarkable  performance. 

The  principal  part  of  the  German  forces  pressed  forward 
towards  the  Niemen.  General  von  Eichhorn  gained  a 
foothold  beyond  that  river  near  Sventoyansk,  a  short  dis- 
tance below  Grodno,  but  was  unable  to  crown  this  achieve- 
ment by  cutting  the  Warsaw-Petrograd  railway,  only  about 
ten  miles  away. 

German  forces  advanced  on  the  right  from  Grajevo 
along  the  railway  against  Osovietz  on  the  Bobr.     The 


42  The  Great  War 

heavy  German  siege  artillery  was  installed  within  range  of 
the  fortress  on  the  25th,  and  an  artillery  combat  was  car- 
ried on  intermittently  for  several  weeks,  until  finally  the 
Germans  abandoned  their  attempt  to  break  through  the 
line  of  the  Bobr. 

The  Russian  counter-offensive  based  upon  Grodno  and 
the  other  Niemen  fortresses  was  already  making  progress 
by  the  23d,  and  on  the  26th  the  Germans  were  forced  to 
evacuate  their  position  on  the  right,  or  eastern,  bank  of 
the  Niemen. 

In  retreating  the  wings  of  the  German  army  drew  apart 
again  like  jaws  warily  distended  to  snap  their  victim  in  an 
unguarded  moment.  Scarcely  had  the  Germans  reached 
the  front  Simno-Augustof  on  March  8th  when  they  sud- 
denly turned  upon  the  Russians.  While  the  German  right 
wing  held  the  enemy,  the  left  attempted  to  outflank  them 
by  a  rapid  maneuver  towards  Sejny.  The  Russians  eluded 
the  trap  and  after  violent  combats  for  three  days  withdrew. 
The  battle  was  in  effect  a  delaying  action.  Before  the  end 
of  the  month  the  Germans  had  installed  themselves  upon 
Russian  territory  passing  just  east  of  Pilviszki,  Marjampol, 
Suwalki,  and  Augustof. 

Von  Hindenburg's  great  effort  on  the  East  Prussian 
front  was  probably  regarded  as  the  necessary  prelude  to  a 
decisive  thrust  at  Warsaw  from  the  north.  With  this  pur- 
pose was  connected  the  simultaneous  desultory  conflicts 
along  the  line  from  Johannisburg  to  the  Vistula,  to  which 
section  the  center  of  gravity  of  the  German  forces  was  to 
be  shifted  on  completion  of  the  operation  further  east. 
Before  undertaking  the  project  indicated  it  was  necessary 
to  secure  the  German  left  wing  on  the  Niemen  from  attack 
on  flank  and  rear  and  also  to  enfeeble  the  Russian  Narev 
line  by  cutting  the  Warsaw-Petrograd  railway  at  some  point 
east  of  it.     After  this  the  Polish  capital  could  be  attacked 


The  Winter  Operations  in  the  East         43 

by  columns  converging  from  various  points  along  the  Ger- 
man front  from  the  west  around  to  the  northeast. 

A  misapprehension  of  his  ultimate  aims  by  the  Russians 
led  von  Hindenburg  to  plan  the  swift  and  secret  trans- 
portation of  his  army  by  the  Prussian  railways  to  the  fron- 
tier north  of  Warsaw  whence  he  would  strike  southwards 
with  sudden  energy  before  the  enemy  could  readjust  his 
forces.  Although  the  full  realization  of  the  first  part  of  the 
plan  proved  impracticable,  the  second  phase  was,  neverthe- 
less, undertaken. 

The  Narev  was  the  chief  Russian  defensive  barrier  in 
northern  Poland.  It  empties  into  the  Bug  about  fifteen 
miles  northeast  of  Novo  Georgievsk.  Fortified  towns 
command  its  chief  crossing  points,  one  of  which,  Ostro- 
leka,  is  a  convenient  base  of  reinforcement  for  threatened 
points  in  this  section,  as  three  branch  railways  from  the 
Warsaw-Petrograd  line  there  converge.  Przasnysz,  mid- 
way between  Ostroleka  and  Mlava,  and  about  fifty  or 
sixty  miles  north  of  Warsaw,  lies  between  the  Narev  and 
the  Prussian  frontier  and  is  an  important  strategical  point, 
mainly  because  from  it  radiate  eight  important  highways. 

The  line  of  the  Narev  was  held  by  the  Twelfth  Russian 
Army,  commanded  by  General  Plehve,  stretched  along  an 
extended  front.  Przasnysz  was  covered  by  a  single  brigade 
and  a  division  was  stationed  on  elevated  ground  westward, 
between  the  town  and  the  railway  that  runs  from  Warsaw 
through  Mlava  and  Soldau  to  Danzig. 

On  the  20th  two  German  corps  that  had  been  concen- 
trated two  days  earlier  between  Mlava  and  Chorzele,  with 
their  right  wing  resting  on  the  railway,  began  operations 
to  encircle  the  opposing  Russian  forces.  Przasnysz  was 
captured  on  the  24th  from  the  east  and  encircled  on  the 
south  and  the  Russians  were  attacked  on  their  right  flank 
and  rear.    The  division  thus  menaced  fought  with  stubborn 


44  The  Great  War 

heroism  for  thirty-six  hours  and  resisted  the  fiery  tempest 
of  assault  by  a  vastly  superior  force  until  the  pressure  was 
removed  on  the  26th  by  a  counter-attack. 

Strong  Russian  columns  converged  upon  the  disputed 
area  from  the  fortresses  along  the  Narev.  The  Thirty- 
sixth  German  Reserve  Division  was  overpowered  and 
roughly  handled  at  the  crossings  of  the  Orzec.  The  Rus- 
sians reentered  Przasnysz  on  the  evening  of  the  26th  but 
did  not  secure  definite  possession  until  the  next  night.  By 
the  28th  the  wavering  tide  of  battle  turned  decidedly  against 
the  Germans,  who  sustained  heavy  losses  and  were  com- 
pelled to  retreat  in  haste  to  the  prepared  positions  from 
which  they  had  set  out. 

The  Germans  did  not  at  once  relinquish  a  project  upon 
which  such  far-reaching  hopes  had  undoubtedly  been 
based.  Fresh  troops  were  brought  up  and  there  were 
violent  conflicts  on  the  four  days,  March  8-11,  when  the 
Germans  gained  some  advantage  and  pushed  their  front 
almost  to  Przasnysz.  But  the  general  thawing  of  the 
streams  about  the  15th  interrupted  all  further  operations 
on  an  extensive  scale. 

The  situation  on  the  Carpathian  front  profoundly  con- 
cerned the  Teutonic  leaders.  Hungary  was  becoming 
restive  under  the  prolonged  menace  of  the  invasion  of  her 
rich  plains,  the  harvests  of  which  were  counted  upon  by 
Germany  to  replenish  her  own  insufficient  food  supply.  A 
hostile  blow  for  Hungary  would  certainly  decide  wavering 
Roumania,  which  coveted  Bukovina  and  Transylvania,  to 
throw  in  her  lot  with  the  Entente  Allies.  Count  Berch- 
told,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Foreign  Minister,  had  been 
replaced  on  January  13th  by  Count  Stephen  Burian,  a 
Hungarian  nobleman  and  friend  of  Count  Tisza,  and  it 
appeared  manifest  that  the  claims  of  Hungary  were  not  to 
be  ignored. 


Prussian  town  after  its  occupation  by  the  Russian  forces. 


m  a*     KB 

I-  * 


Russian  troops  with  their  transport  wagons  marcning 


The  Winter  Operations  in  the  East  45 

After  the  failure  of  von  Mackensen's  frontal  drive  on 
Warsaw  early  in  February,  the  vigorous  offensive  in  the 
Carpathians  then  already^  under  way  became  the  counter- 
part of  the  furious  German  onslaught  on  the  East  Prussian 
border  in  the  common  Austro-German  plan  for  operations 
on  the  eastern  front. 

The  natural  barrier  of  Hungary  protecting  her  plains 
are  the  vast  mountain  masses  on  the  north  and  east.  The 
High  Tatra  range  in  the  northern  region  has  a  diameter  of 
more  than  a  hundred  miles  and  its  bare  summits  have  an 
altitude  of  9,000  feet.  On  the  east  the  elevated  tract  of 
Bukovina  and  Transylvania  is  even  broader,  but  its  highest 
crests  do  not  exceed  an  altitude  of  6,000  feet.  Between 
these  bastion-like  masses  stretches  the  central  chain  of  the 
Carpathians  for  a  distance  of  about  200  miles  around  the 
northeastern  border  and  is  pierced  by  the  principal  passes 
connecting  Hungary  and  Galicia.  The  entire  system  is 
heavily  wooded. 

The  lowest  passes  are  in  the  northwest.  In  general  they 
become  gradually  higher  and  longer  towards  the  southeast. 
The  summit  of  the  Dukla  Pass  in  the  extreme  northwest- 
ern section  is  hardly  more  than  1,500  feet  above  the  level 
of  the  sea  and  500  feet  above  the  plains  which  it  connects. 
The  Lupkow  Pass,  a  little  to  the  east,  is  somewhat  higher. 
Through  it  runs  the  railway  from  Buda-Pesth  to  Peremysl. 
Beyond  the  Rostoki,  a  highway  pass,  opens  the  Uszok, 
considerably  higher  and  longer  than  the  preceding,  which 
is  traversed  by  a  light  railway.  Another  road  pass,  variously 
called  the  Vereczke  and  the  Tucholka,  flanks  on  the  west' 
the  important  Beskid  or  Volocz  Pass,  still  longer  and  more 
difficult,  by  which  the  main  railway  from  Buda-Pesth  to 
Stryj  and  Lemberg  reaches  the  Galician  plain.  Some  dis- 
tance further  east  the  Wyskow,  another  road  pass,  became 
prominent  in  the  Austro-German  operations.     Near  the 


46  The  Great  War 

southeastern  extremity  of  the  common  boundary  of  Hun- 
gary and  Galicia  the  Jablonica  Pass  gives  access  to  the 
upper  valley  of  the  Priith  for  the  main  railway  from  Buda- 
Pesth  to  Stanislaw,  Kolomea,  and  Czernowitz. 

Besides  the  railway  lines  which  crossed  the  central  Car- 
pathian  chain,  there  were  useful  lines  of  lateral  communi- 
cation connecting  the  mouths  of  the  different  valleys  on 
both  sides  of  the  mountains,  the  railway  from  Neu  Sandez 
through  Stryj  to  Stanislaw  in  Galicia,  and  the  main  line 
from  Pressburg  through  Buda-Pesth  to  Miskolcz  and 
Munkacs  in  Hungary. 

The  topography  of  the  region  was  more  favorable  to  a 
descent  of  the  Russians  into  Hungary  than  to  an  advance  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  armies  from  Hungary  into  Galicia. 
The  reason  is  that  the  glens  descending  on  the  Hungarian 
side  converge  upon  the  valley  of  the  Theiss,  so  that  an 
invader  from  the  northeast  reaching  the  junction-point 
by  any  one  of  them  would  cut  off  the  defenders  in  all 
the  others,  while  on  the  Galician  side  the  valleys  for  the 
most  part  either  run  parallel  for  a  considerable  distance 
or  bear  apart,  and  are  flanked  by  strong  positions  in  the 
outlying  spurs,  so  that  the  success  of  an  invading  force 
in  any  one  defile  would  not  necessarily  imperil  the  de- 
fenders in  the  others,  while  on  the  other  hand  the  junc- 
tion of  columns  descending  by  several  routes  could  easily 
be  impeded. 

About  the  end  of  the  third  week  in  January,  Brussiloff 
held  the  summits  of  the  Carpathians  at  the  Dukla  Pass 
and  practically  at  the  Lupkow,  while  further  east  the 
Russian  line  followed  the  Galician  slope  along  the  foot- 
hills. The  Russians  had  reached  the  crests  at  Kirlibaba 
and  occupied  all  of  Bukovina  except  a  small  corner  cov- 
ering the  approaches  to  the  Borgo  Pass  in  the  extreme 
southwest. 


The  Winter  Operations  in  the  East         47 

After  the  abandonment  of  the  disastrous  offensive  against 
Serbia  in  December  the  greater  part  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  forces  on  the  southern  frontier  had  been  transferred 
to  the  northeastern  border. 

Within  the  bending  contour  of  the  Russian  front  the 
Austro-Hungarian  army  shut  up  in  Peremysl  still  held 
out.  Peremysl  was  too  far  from  the  Carpathian  range  to 
actually  command  the  northern  outlet  from  any  of  the 
passes.  But  its  position  in  the  rear  of  an  operative  section 
of  the  Russian  front  was  a  constantly  disturbing  factor 
which  undoubtedly  delayed  the  Russian  offensive  in  the 
western  section  of  the  Carpathian  line,  precisely  where  the 
conditions  were  otherwise  most  auspicious. 

The  movement  of  powerful  German  forces  in  anticipa- 
tion of  a  gigantic  undertaking  on  the  front  in  northeastern 
Hungary  was  cleverly  disguised.  Rumors  were  set  afloat 
that  the  offensive  against  Serbia  would  straightway  be 
resumed  and  that  as  reinforcement  for  this  enterprise  four 
German  army  corps  were  being  transported  southward, 
and  to  add  to  the  effect  of  this  deception  a  few  rounds 
of  shell  were  fired  at  Belgrade.  But  in  reality  these 
German  troops,  upon  reaching  the  junction  at  Miskolcz, 
were  hastily  conveyed  northeastward  towards  the  ap- 
proaches of  the  Carpathian  passes.  A  new  army,  with 
German  units  as  the  essential  elements,  was  thus  con- 
stituted in  the  latter  part  of  January  on  a  central  section 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  front  and  placed  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  of  the  Infantry  von  Linsingen,  himself 
a  German. 

Three  armies  of  the  Central  Powers  under  the  general 
supervision  of  Archduke  Eugene  now  confronted  the 
Russians  on  the  Carpathian  front.  Probably  as  many  as 
600,000  men  in  all  were  deployed  from  the  Dukla  to  the 
Kirlibaba  Pass  along  the  Austro-Hungarian  front. 


48  The  Great  War 

The  efforts  of  the  Germanic  Allies  were  focussed  pri- 
marily upon  two  objectives,  the  recovery  of  Lemberg,  with 
the  consequent  isolation  of  the  Russian  forces  in  western 
Galicia,  and  the  relief  of  Peremysl.  The  first  of  these 
two  tasks  was  committed  to  the  cooperative  efforts  of  the 
armies  of  Generals  von  Pflanzer  and  von  Linsingen,  the 
second  to  that  of  General  von  Boehm-Ermolli.  The  first 
two  were  to  drive  into  the  Russian  front,  closing  like  tongs 
upon  the  vital  spot. 

The  offensive  on  the  right,  where  von  Pflanzer's  army 
advanced  by  two  general  routes,  progressed  at  first  with 
gratifying  expedition.  Entering  Bukovina  by  the  Jako- 
beny  and  Kirlibaba  Passes  in  the  extreme  southeast,  the 
right  wing  of  this  eastern  army  drove  the  Russians  from 
the  town  of  Kirlibaba  on  January  22d,  concentrated  in  the 
upper  valley  of  the  Moldava,  where  they  recaptured  Kim- 
polung  on  February  7th,  and,  debouching  into  the  plain, 
advanced  northeastward  on  a  sweeping  front. 

The  Russians,  greatly  outnumbered  and  threatened  with 
envelopment,  retreated  systematically,  turning  wherever  a 
good  chance  was  offered  to  engage  in  a  delaying  action. 
By  the  16th  the  Austro-Hungarian  forces  in  Bukovina  were 
crossing  the  Sereth.  Late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day 
the  left  wing  of  von  Pflanzer's  army,  which  had  gone  through 
the  Jablonica  Pass,  put  the  Russians  to  flight  in  a  two  days' 
battle  before  Kolomea  and  entered  the  town  on  the  heels 
of  the  fugitives  in  time  to  prevent  the  destruction  of  the 
bridge  spanning  the  Pruth.  Czernowitz  was  taken  on  the 
17th  and  on  the  next  day  the  Russians  withdrew  entirely 
from  the  right  bank  of  the  Pruth.  Von  Pflanzer's  columns 
turning  northwestward  now  converged  on  Stanislaw,  which 
the  Russians  were  compelled  to  evacuate  on  March  3d. 

The  Austro-German  army  of  General  von  Linsingen  was 
confronted  by  a  much  more  arduous  task.    For  the  Russians 


The  Winter  Operations  in  the  East         49 

had  gained  a  far  stronger  foothold  in  the  higher  regions  of 
the  central  Carpathians,  where  the  rugged  character  of  the 
country  and  the  harshness  of  the  winter  climate  made  the 
difficulties  of  dislodging  them  almost  insurmountable. 

General  von  Linsingen's  right  wing  advanced  by  the 
Wyskow  Pass;  his  main  attack  was  directed  through  the 
Beskid  and  Vereczke  Passes.  One  German  division,  start- 
ing from  the  Uszok  Pass  behind  the  right  wing  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  army  on  the  west,  struck  eastward 
below  the  main  crest  of  the  Carpathians  on  the  Galician 
side,  attacked  the  flank  of  the  Russian  forces  opposite  the 
Vereczke  and  Beskid  Passes  threatening  their  communica- 
tions, and  forced  them  to  retreat. 

The  main  forces  of  von  Linsingen's  army  advanced  in 
parallel  columns  through  the  Beskid  and  Vereczke  Passes. 
The  road  descending  from  the  latter  towards  Galicia 
crosses  a  minor  ridge  and  follows  the  tributary  glen  of  the 
Arava  to  its  junction  with  the  Opor,  where  both  routes 
unite.  Between  these  two  defiles  rises  a  steep  and  deeply- 
wooded  ridge,  which  takes  its  name  from  the  village  of 
Koziowa.  Here  the  Russians  were  entrenched  in  a  strong 
position  known  from  its  altitude  in  meters  as  Hill  992. 
The  ridge  of  Koziowa  turned  out  to  be  the  main  strategic 
point  of  the  whole  central  Carpathian  range.  The  stub- 
born resistance  of  the  Russians  at  this  point  prevented  the 
cooperation  of  von  Linsingen's  main  columns  and  their 
debouchment  into  the  plain,  destroyed  the  hope  of  reach- 
ing Stryj  and  Lemberg,  and  left  von  Pflanzer  isolated  in 
an  exposed  position  without  support. 

The  Austro-German  army  began  to  attack  Koziowa  on 
February  8th  and  during  the  following  two  days  no  less 
than  twenty-two  assaults  were  launched  in  vain  against 
the  Russian  trenches.  Week  after  week  the  repeated 
attacks  were  drowned  in  blood  and  the   greater  part  of 


50  The  Great  War 

von  Linsingen's  army  was  hopelessly  locked  in  the  foothills 
on  the  northern  side  of  the  Carpathians. 

Von  Prlanzer's  advance  reached  highwater  mark  at  Stan- 
islaw,  which  he  was  compelled  to  evacuate  on  March  4th, 
withdrawing  hastily  to  a  line  resting  on  Kolomea  and 
Czernowitz. 

It  had  been  planned  that  General  von  Boehm-Ermolli 
with  the  western  army  should  drive  a  wedge  straight 
through  the  Russian  front  to  Peremysl.  A  union  with  the 
liberated  garrison  of  the  great  fortress  would  have  meant 
disaster  for  the  Russian  army  westwards  on  the  Dunajec. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  forces  advanced  from  the  Lup- 
kow  and  Uszok  Passes  towards  the  upper  valley  of  the 
San.  Violent  conflicts  occurred  between  the  Ondava  and 
the  San,  but  in  spite  of  desperate  efforts  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian army  was  unable  to  dislodge  the  Russians  from  the 
Dukla  Pass  or  push  their  own  advance  very  far  beyond 
the  summit  of  the  Lupkow  Pass. 

While  from  without  the  efforts  to  relieve  Peremysl  thus 
failed  completely,  the  situation  within  the  fortress  was  daily 
becoming  more  serious  from  the  depletion  of  provisions. 

Peremysl  is  situated  on  both  sides  of  the  River  San  which 
flows  down  in  a  wide  circuit  westward  from  the  region  of 
the  Uszok  Pass.  The  railway  running  south  from  Peremysl 
branches  to  connect  with  the  lines  that  cross  the  Lupkow 
and  the  Uszok  Passes.  The  city  itself  lies  at  the  center  of 
a  low  rim  of  hills.  Like  Antwerp,  its  defenses  formed  a 
series  of  concentric  rings.  The  fortress  had  been  rebuilt 
in  1896  and  thoroughly  modernized  in  1909  and  it  was 
regarded  as  one  of  the  strongest  in  Europe. 

There  was  an  interior  fortified  girdle  close  to  the  city. 
Beyond  this  stretched  an  intermediate  line  of  forts,  mostly 
rather  small.  But  upon  the  outer  circle,  consisting  of  nine 
powerful  works  and  many  smaller  redoubts,  about  six  miles 


Russian  transport  steamer  on  the  River  Vistula 


Russian  town  set  on  fire  by  the  Russians  as  they  retreated.  Many  square  miles  of 
territory  were  devastated  by  the  Russians  as  they  retreated  in  efforts  to  increase  the  difficulties 
of  the  invading  German  army. 


The  Winter  Operations  in  the  East         51 

from  the  city,  the  reliance  of  the  defenders  was  chiefly 
placed.  The  line  of  the  outer  forts  had  been  covered  and 
consolidated  by  intricate  wire  entanglements  and  a  net- 
work of  trenches. 

Peremysl  was  first  invested  by  the  Russians  on  Septem- 
ber 27th,  after  a  considerable  remnant  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  army  defeated  on  the  Rawaruska-Grodek  line  had 
taken  refuge  within  its  walls.  General  von  Kusmanek,  the 
commander  of  the  fortress,  disposed  of  more  than  100,000 
men  and  1,000  guns  including  two  batteries  of  the  big 
Austrian  Skoda  howitzers. 

The  retirement  of  the  Russian  forces  during  October 
enabled  the  defenders  to  replenish  the  supply  of  food  and 
ammunition,  but  a  portion  of  the  civil  population  was  still 
permitted  to  remain  as  a  useless  tax  upon  the  common 
stores.  After  the  collapse  of  von  Hindenburg's  first  attack 
on  Warsaw  and  the  hasty  retreat  of  the  Austro-German 
armies,  the  hostile  ring  closed  again  around  Peremysl  and 
the  second  and  longer  investment  began  on  November  12th, 

At  one  time  the  relief  of  the  fortress  seemed  imminent. 
During  the  Teutonic  offensive  in  December  an  Austro- 
Hungarian  army  crossed  the  Dukla  and  Lupkow  Passes  and 
advanced  as  far  as  Sanok  and  their  efforts  were  supported 
by  a  vigorous  sortie  of  the  besieged.  Five  regiments  broke 
through  the  lines  of  contravallation  and  forced  their  way 
as  far  as  Bircza  on  the  road  to  Sanok.  For  four  days  the 
issue  was  doubtful;  then  General  Selivanoff,  commander, 
of  the  army  of  investment,  concentrated  reinforcements  at 
the  critical  point  and  drove  back  the  Austro-Hungarian 
forces  with  heavy  loss. 

Soon  after  this  the  danger  from  the  south  was  removed 
and  the  Russian  front  in  the  Carpathians  was  restored  by 
General  Brussiloff.  The  shortage  of  provisions  in  Peremysl 
and  the  arrival  of  additional  heavy  artillery  for  the  Russians 


52  The  Great  War 

hastened  the  termination  of  the  siege.  By  March  the  cav- 
alry mounts  were  slaughtered  for  meat  and  dogs  were  sold 
for  about  twelve  dollars  apiece.  On  the  night  of  March 
13th  the  Russians  carried  by  storm  the  village  of  Mal- 
kovice  northeast  of  Peremysl,  opening  thereby  a  breach 
in  the  outer  line  of  defenses.  Fortifying  the  ground  thus 
gained,  the  Russians  commenced  the  bombardment  of  the 
second  line. 

The  fortress  was  now  in  desperate  straits  and  another 
sortie  was  undertaken  as  a  final  effort  on  the  18th.  Thirty 
thousand  troops  struck  out  eastward  along  the  Lemberg 
railway  towards  Mosciska,  where  it  was  believed  that  the 
Russians  had  extensive  stores  of  provisions,  since  it  was  im- 
perative to  capture  fresh  supplies  before  the  besieged  tried 
to  cut  their  way  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  positions  in  the 
Carpathians.  But  an  overwhelming  force  of  artillery  was 
brought  to  bear  against  them  and  after  fighting  with  des- 
perate determination  for  seven  hours  they  were  compelled 
to  retreat  with  severe  losses  to  the  cover  of  the  forts. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  22d  innumerable  heavy 
detonations  heard  within  the  Russian  lines  told  of  the 
feverish  destruction  of  munitions  preparatory  to  the  sur- 
render of  the  fortress.  Vast  quantities  of  explosives  were 
sunk  in  the  river,  guns  were  systematically  destroyed,  and 
the  bridges  over  the  San  were  blown  up.  About  nine,  the 
chief-of-staff  of  the  besieged  forces  appeared  in  the  Rus- 
sian headquarters  bearing  General  von  Kusmanek's  tender 
of  capitulation. 

Nine  Austro-Hungarian  generals,  ninety-three  superior 
officers,  about  2,500  subalterns  and  functionaries,  and 
117,000  soldiers  became  prisoners  of  war  and  were  sent  as 
rapidly  as  possible  to  internment  camps  in  the  interior  of 
Russia.  The  fall  of  Peremysl  freed  the  Russians  from  a 
standing  menace  and  removed  the  great  obstruction  from 


Ruins  of  Fort  Hurko. 


Showing  the  state  of  destruction  of  the  forts  of  Peremysl  after  the  surrender  of  the  At 


The  Winter  Operations  in  the  East         53 

their  lines  of  communication.  Its  surrender  released  a 
veteran  Russian  army  which  was  now  available  for  active 
operations  at  the  front.  A  portion  were  retained  in  re- 
serve and  the  remainder  strengthened  the  forces  on  the 
western  section  of  the  Carpathian  front.  In  a  vigorous 
offensive  between  Bartfeld  and  the  Uszok  Pass,  the  Rus- 
sians captured  strongly  fortified  points  around  the  Lupkow 
Pass,  swarmed  into  the  valleys  of  the  Ondava  and  Lahore, 
and  by  April  25th  had  almost  reached  Homonna  near  the 
border  of  the  plain.  This  counter-blow  completely  arrested 
the  offensive  of  the  Germanic  Allies  further  east. 

To  clear  the  crest  of  the  Carpathians  was  the  necessary 
preliminary  for  a  resumption  of  the  Russian  attack  on 
Cracow  as  well  as  for  a  Russian  invasion  of  the  plains  of 
Hungary.  As  long  as  the  Austro-German  forces  held  their 
positions  in  Poland  and  along  the  western  summits  of  the 
Carpathians,  the  approach  to  Cracow  was  like  a  funnel 
and  Russia  would  have  exposed  her  army  corps  to  certain 
ruin  if  she  had  driven  them  westward  into  the  narrowing 
space  between  the  mountains  and  the  Vistula.  The  pros- 
pective significance  of  the  action  of  the  Russians  in  the  Car- 
pathians remains,  therefore,  uncertain;  whether,  in  other 
words,  these  operations  were  regarded  as  the  beginning  of 
a  decisive  invasion  of  Hungary,  and  therefore  as  an  integral 
part  of  a  major  enterprise,  or  as  an  effort  to  secure  the 
position  of  the  left  flank  preparatory  to  a  supreme  offensive 
westward,  and  therefore  only  a  subsidiary  undertaking. 

Perhaps  the  high  command  of  the  Russian  armies  re- 
served its  decision  as  to  the  ultimate  direction  of  the 
offensive.  A  grand  attack  on  Cracow  might  not  preclude 
incursions  into  Hungary  for  the  purpose  of  scattering 
terror  and  creating  a  spirit  of  disloyalty.  Important  as 
such  lesser  aims  might  be,  Cracow  remained  the  really 
vital   spot.      With  Cracow  in   Russian   hands  the  whole 


54  Thi   Great  War 

Austro-German  front  in  Poland  would  collapse.     Cracow 
till  the  gateway  to  Vienna  and  Berlin.     Only  com- 
plete success  in  a  crushing  onslaught  westward  would  lead 
with  certainty  to  a  decisive  issue. 

After  the  failure  of  von  Mackensen's  great  effort  the 
Germans  had  seized  the  apparent  opportunity  to  carry  on 
in  the  Carpathians  a  warfare  of  rapid  maneuvers  with  the 
promise  of  tangible  and  far-reaching  consequences.  The 
people  of  the  Central  Empires  had  cherished  the  expecta- 
tion that  their  armies  would  forthwith  roll  together  from 
the  Carpathian  summits  and  the  forests  of  East  Prussia,  like 
the  fabled  cliffs  of  the  Symplegades,  crushing  the  Russian 
hosts  between  them. 

But  this  attractive  vision  faded  with  the  failure  of  the 
German  efforts  north  of  Warsaw,  the  plan  of  retaking 
Lemberg  sank  before  the  stubborn  resistance  at  the  ridge 
of  Koziowa,  Peremysl  surrendered  after  fruitless  efforts  to 
relieve  it,  and  the  offensive  campaign  of  the  Germanic 
armies  in  the  Carpathians  lapsed  by  gradual  degrees  from  a 
major  enterprise  to  a  mere  ruse  to  cover  the  stupendous 
preparations  for  the  really  crucial  operations  elsewhere. 


CHAPTER  III 

The  Great  Teutonic  Drive  in  Galicia 

A  retrospect.  Misleading  convictions  of  the  Entente  Allies.  The  plight 
of  Austria-Hungary  and  the  progress  of  German  control  over  the  armies  of 
the  Dual  Monarchy.  The  Teutonic  leaders.  The  Central  Empires  rise 
to  the  situation  and  design  an  offensive  on  an  unprecedented  scale,  profit- 
ing by  the  experience  already  gained  in  the  course  of  the  war.  Position 
of  the  armies.  Prodigious  preparations  on  von  Mackensen's  front.  His 
preliminary  attack  on  April  28th.  The  tempest  breaks,  May  2d ;  the  Rus- 
sian Third  Army  staggers  backwards.  Rapid  advance  of  von  Mackensen's 
right  wing  and  perilous  situation  of  the  Russians  south  of  the  Dukla  and 
Lupkow  Passes.  Resistance  of  the  Russians  on  the  Besko-Szczucin  line, 
May  9-12.  Arrival  of  the  Austro-German  operative  front  on  the  San  and 
the  cooperation  of  von  Boehm-Ermolli  and  von  Linsingen.  Von  Pflanzer 
repulsed.  Retreat  and  sudden  counter-attack  of  Ewarts's  Russian  army 
north  of  the  Vistula.  The  conflict  on  the  San ;  fall  of  Jaroslaw,  May  15th, 
and  of  Peremysl,  June  2d.  The  German  advance  east  of  the  San.  Von 
Linsingen's  attempts  to  cross  the  Dniester  and  his  final  success.  The  com- 
bats on  June  12th  and  13th.  Second  battle  at  Rawaruska,  June  20th,  and 
fall  of  Lemberg,  June  22d.     The  situation  at  the  end  of  June. 

On  the  eve  of  the  most  sensational  revolution  in  the 
whole  course  of  the  war  a  rapid  recapitulation  of  the  actual 
situation  may  not  be  out  of  place.  We  shall  have  occasion 
several  times  to  note  the  rivalry  of  two  antagonistic  policies 
in  German  military  circles,  one  looking  for  expansion  in  the 
West,  the  other  in  the  East.  But  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war  the  western  policy  seems  to  have  held  undisputed 
supremacy.  Von  Moltke,  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  sup- 
ported it;  von  Falkenhayn,  his  successor,  was  its  deter- 
mined advocate ;  and  Germany  was  committed  to  the  plan 
of  quickly  crushing  France  while  Russia  was  held  at  bay 
within  her  own  boundaries.  The  civil  authorities  acqui- 
esced in  the  fateful  program  that  involved  the  violation  of 

55 


56  The  Great  War 

Belgium.  A  sudden  stroke  was  levelled  with  tremendous 
fury  at  Germany's  most  persistent  enemy.  Belgium  was 
overrun,  the  French  recoiled  before  the  shock.  Hut  at 
length  the  deluge  rushed  in  vain  against  the  human  ram- 
part reared  by  the  steady  self-possession  of  the  French 
commanders  and  the  unwavering  courage  of  the  opposing 
troops.  The  desperate  efforts  to  retrieve  the  failure  on 
the  Marne  were  powerless  to  break  the  determination  of 
the  British  and  their  allies  on  the  fields  of  Flanders.  The 
Germans  raised  a  barrier  in  the  West  which  in  general 
held  the  tide  of  warfare  far  from  their  own  borders.  But 
the  invaders  of  Belgium  and  France  gained  no  decisive 
advantage  and  for  more  than  a  year  they  made  no  para- 
mount effort  on  this  front. 

Russia's  unexpected  promptness  had  meanwhile  created 
a  dangerous  situation  for  the  Central  Empires  in  the  East. 
Von  Hindenburg's  sweeping  campaign  in  East  Prussia 
removed  the  incubus  of  immediate  peril  from  Germany 
herself,  but  there  remained  the  incompetence  of  Austria- 
Hungary  to  support  alone  the  weight  of  Russia's  onslaught 
as  the  chief  disquieting  factor.  Beginning  in  September, 
1914,  German  troops  were  repeatedly  transferred  from  the 
western  to  the  eastern  front,  until  finally  the  center  of 
gravity  itself  was  shifted,  and  this  inaugurated  the  second 
phase  of  the  great  struggle.  The  general  purpose  of  the 
Central  Powers  remained  the  same,  to  beat  down  one  of 
their  opponents,  but  the  direction  of  the  principal  effort 
was  reversed. 

The  Russians  had  overrun  most  of  Galicia,  widening 
their  western  salient.  The  German  attacks  in  Poland  and 
the  northeast  had  in  most  cases  failed  in  their  objects,  and 
the  offensive  in  the  central  Carpathians  was  brought  to  an 
ignominious  deadlock  in  the  northern  foothills.  East 
Prussia  had  been  delivered  from  her  invaders,  Bukovina 


The  Great  Teutonic  Drive  in  Galicia        57 

had  been  reconquered,  the  apprehensions  regarding  Rou- 
mania's  conduct  had  for  the  time  subsided,  and  Hungary 
and  Cracow  were  not  immediately  threatened.  But  the 
conquest  of  the  greater  part  of  Galicia  by  the  Russians 
more  than  outweighed  in  strategical  importance  the  sub- 
jugation of  western  Poland  by  the  Austro-Germans.  The 
balance  of  results  at  the  conclusion  of  the  winter's  opera- 
tions could  scarcely  be  regarded  as  favorable  to  the  Central 
Powers. 

The  surrender  of  Peremysl  brought  deep  humiliation  to 
the  Dual  Monarchy.  The  German  shoring-props,  which 
had  helped  to  stay  the  structure  for  a  time,  were  quivering 
beneath  the  unequal  strain  and  Austria-Hungary  seemed 
once  again  to  be  verging  on  prostration.  Flushed  with 
success  the  Russian  forces  were  pouring  over  the  crest  of 
the  Carpathians  into  the  valleys  that  lead  from  the  Dukla 
and  Lupkow  Passes  down  into  the  Hungarian  plain,  while 
Italy  and  Roumania  voraciously  surveyed  their  eventual 
portions  of  the  spoil. 

The  situation  at  the  close  of  April  called  for  immediate 
and  strenuous  action  by  the  Central  Empires.  It  was  neces- 
sary by  a  supreme  exertion  to  rescue  the  Dual  Monarchy 
once  for  all  from  the  agony  of  its  recurrent  crises.  The 
Central  Empires  rose  to  the  emergency  and  by  applica- 
tion of  their  extraordinary  powers  of  organization  made 
preparations  commensurate  with  the  magnitude  of  the 
task.  Germany  responded  to  the  heaviest  demands  made 
upon  any  belligerent  without  displaying  any  symptom  of 
exhaustion. 

Opinion  in  the  West  still  clung  to  the  fatuous  assumption 
that  Germany  had  entered  the  conflict  with  all  her  forces 
at  the  highest  point  and  that  she  therefore  had  no  means 
for  replenishing  the  steady  drain  of  time.  But  in  reality 
no  error  could  have  been  more  fundamental.    All  through 


58  The  Great  War 

the  autumn  and  winter  the  level  of  her  effective  energy 
had  been  rising.  She  even  seems  to  have  increased  con- 
siderably her  initial  lead  in  equipment  and  preparedness 
during  the  first  nine  months  of  the  great  struggle. 

Only  the  leaders  of  Germany  had  appreciated  from  the 
first  the  nature  of  the  elements  and  means  upon  which  vic- 
tory depended.  Germany  alone  was  abundantly  equipped 
for  the  kind  of  warfare  in  which  preponderance  of  shell- 
tire  was  destined  to  be  the  most  decisive  factor  of  success. 
And  yet  Germany's  original  superior  preparation  for  the 
prevailing  kind  of  fighting  was  partly  accidental,  since 
her  mobile  high-powered  artillery  had  been  prepared  for 
the  prompt  reduction  of  fortresses,  and  not  for  trench- 
warfare,  in  which  she  had  not  expected  to  be  compelled 
to  engage. 

Under  the  gruelling  preceptorship  of  Mars  the  French 
had  been  reluctantly  disabused  of  their  inordinate  faith  in 
shrapnel  and  light  field-artillery  and  were  striving  man- 
fully to  redress  their  original  lack  of  heavy  ordnance.  But 
their  manufacturing  capacity,  especially  after  the  loss  of 
leading  industrial  sections,  was  limited.  The  British  had 
made  relatively  great  progress,  if  we  consider  their  very 
meager  state  of  preparation  at  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
and  yet,  untouched  as  they  were  by  the  sharper  spur  of 
instant  peril,  only  a  few  of  the  most  discerning  minds 
among  them  grasped  the  true  measure  of  the  vital  problems, 
while  Russia  had  scarcely  begun  to  rectify  her  serious 
technical  deficiencies. 

Under  the  relentless  exigencies  of  the  war  it  was  inevit- 
able that  the  superior  talent  and  efficiency  and  the  over- 
whelming prestige  of  the  German  General  Staff  should 
give  this  body  superior  authority  in  the  league  of  the  Cen- 
tral Powers.  As  was  to  be  expected,  German  control  fol- 
lowed German  reinforcements,  for  the  German  authorities 


The  Great  Teutonic  Drive  in  Galicia        59 

would  not  expose  the  safety  of  their  own  troops  to  com- 
paratively indifferent  Austro-Hungarian  management. 

With  the  consolidation  of  German  influence  in  the 
Austro-Hungarian  armies,  rivalry  and  intrigue  were  effec- 
tively repressed,  sanitary  and  medical  shortcomings  were 
corrected,  incompetence  was  replaced  by  efficiency,  and 
the  higher  aims  of  strategy  were  no  longer  sacrificed  to 
intrigue  or  selfish  egotism.  The  conspicuous  martial  quali- 
ties of  many  of  the  races  comprised  in  the  Dual  Monarchy 
now  found  untrammelled  scope. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  generals  appear  for  the  most  part 
as  rather  shadowy  characters.  They  do  not  stand  out  in  the 
imagination  with  the  sharp,  incisive  features  of  the  more 
prominent  German  leaders.  We  have  even  overlooked 
thus  far  the  Austro-Hungarian  generalissimo,  the  Arch- 
duke Frederick,  who  was  born  in  1856,  the  son  of  the 
Archduke  Charles  Ferdinand  and  brother  of  the  Dowager 
Queen  Maria  Christina,  widow  of  Alfonso  XII  and  mother 
of  Alfonso  XIII,  the  present  King  of  Spain.  He  had 
received  an  essentially  military  training  and  was  regarded 
as  a  conscientious  officer,  became  general  of  the  infantry 
and  army  inspector  in  1905  and  commander  of  the  Land- 
wehr  in  1907,  and  was  the  natural  successor  of  the  mur- 
dered Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand  as  chief  commander. 
We  shall  soon  record  his  presence  at  the  operative  front. 

General  von  Mackensen  was  appointed  as  group  com- 
mander of  all  the  Teutonic  armies  from  the  Nida  to  Buko- 
vina,  and  now  for  the  first  time  a  comprehensive  operation 
carried  on  by  armies  of  both  the  Central  Powers  was 
placed  under  the  direction  of  a  single  chief.  In  this  way 
nearly  all  the  Austro-Hungarian  field-forces  now  passed 
under  the  superior  command  of  a  German  general. 

General  von  Mackensen  sprang  from  a  family  of  the 
merchant  class.    The  Kaiser's  friendship  for  him  went  back 


60  The  Great  War 

to  the  time  when  as  crown  prince  the  former  served  in  the 
same  regiment  It  is  reported  that  the  subsequent  appoint- 
ment of  this  plebeian  officer  as  the  Kaiser's  aide-de-camp 
produced  a  scandal,  which  resulted  in  the  conferment  of 
nobility  upon  him.  He  was  colonel  in  1901  and  commanded 
an  army  corps  in  1913.  As  general  of  infantry  and  com- 
mander of  the  Ninth  German  Army  he  played  the  chief 
part  in  pushing  the  German  front  to  the  line  of  the  Bzura 
and  the  Ravka  in  the  autumn  of  1914,  and  his  brilliant 
leadership  in  Poland  won  for  him  the  much-coveted  dis- 
tinction of  the  Order  pour  le  merite  and  promotion  to  the 
rank  of  colonel-general.  The  quality  of  von  Mackensen's 
talent  seems  subtler,  more  flexible,  than  that  of  von  Hin- 
denburg,  although  the  latter  was  now  more  than  ever 
idolized  by  the  German  people. 

Von  Hindenburg's  titles  to  the  possession  of  genius  have 
already  been  discussed.  He  was  the  masterly  exponent  of 
a  system.  The  brilliant  improvisations  of  a  Napoleon  were 
absolutely  foreign  to  his  nature.  His  reputation  still  rested 
mainly  on  his  two  spectacular  victories  in  East  Prussia, 
which  in  reality  were  only  the  execution  of  long  and 
laboriously  meditated  plans.  Separated  from  the  setting 
of  his  lifelong  preparation,  von  Hindenburg's  combina- 
tions did  not  work  out  with  quite  the  marvellous  precision 
of  his  maneuvers  in  the  region  of  the  Masurian  Lakes. 
Only  the  wonderful  superiority  of  the  German  military 
machine  saved  the  armies  from  disaster  after  the  first  attack 
on  Warsaw  and  made  it  possible  for  the  retreat  to  become 
the  prelude  of  a  renewed  offensive.  But  von  Hindenburg's 
character  and  appearance  satisfied  the  popular  craving  for 
a  hero.  In  him  the  German  nation  saw  the  embodiment 
of  its  favorite  and  most  effective  traits.  It  instinctively 
exalted  its  own  ideals  and  predilections  in  adoring  his 
personality  and  achievements. 


S  :2 

c 
O 


The  Great  Teutonic  Drive  in  Galicia        61 

Von  Hindenburg's  merit  is  scarcely  distinguishable  from 
that  of  his  counterpart  and  chief  of  staff,  von  Ludendorff, 
who,  by  his  principal's  own  assertion  at  least,  deserves  to 
be  regarded  as  a  genius.  The  contrast  between  the  two 
men  could  scarcely  have  been  greater.  The  former  was 
abrupt,  obstinate,  and  often  tactless ;  the  latter  was  polished, 
affable,  and  deferential. 

Erich  von  Ludendorff  was  born  into  the  middle  class. 
He  entered  the  army  from  the  cadet  school  at  Gross- 
Lichterfelde  in  1881.  At  the  War  College,  to  which  he 
went  in  1890,  his  attention  was  mainly  devoted  to  Russian 
studies,  and  the  completion  of  his  course  was  followed  by  a 
visit  of  a  year  in  Russia.  He  was  appointed  to  the  Great 
General  Staff  in  1895  as  captain.  Advanced  to  the  rank  of 
major  in  1902,  and  to  the  colonelcy  in  1911,  he  was  sum- 
moned just  before  the  war  to  the  85th  brigade,  and  led 
these  troops  across  the  Belgian  frontier  on  August  4, 1914, 
and  three  days  later,  after  hand-to-hand  engagements,  into 
Liege.  Von  Ludendorff  remained  with  the  army  in  Bel- 
gium until  called  with  von  Hindenburg  on  August  22d  to 
face  the  great  crisis  in  the  northeast. 

General  Erich  von  Falkenhayn,  as  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff, — having  succeeded  von  Moltke  in  name  as  well  as 
fact  in  December,  1914, — was  probably  the  chief  designer 
of  the  plan  for  the  gigantic  offensive  movement  which 
swept  away  the  Polish  salient  and  carried  the  Austro- 
German  eastern  front  from  the  Dunajec  and  the  Bzura  to 
the  Pripet  Marshes.  Born  in  1861,  he  was  at  one  time 
military  instructor  of  the  Crown  Prince,  whose  favor  he 
enjoyed.  He  served  as  major  in  the  East  Asiatic  occupation 
brigade  and  took  part  in  the  expedition  against  the  Boxers. 
Later  he  was  at  different  times  chief  of  staff  of  the  Sixteenth 
and  the  Fourth  Army  Corps.  As  Prussian  Minister  of  War 
in  1914  he  earned  the  antipathy  of  the  more  democratic 


62  The  Great  War 

nations  by  his  support  of  the  German  officers  whose  arro- 
gant behavior  in  Alsace  resulted  in  the  unfortunate  affair  at 
Zabern.  I  [e  was  raised  to  the  rank  of  genera]  of  infantry 
upon  being  relieved,  at  his  own  request,  of  the  duties  of 
minister  of  war  on  January  20,  1915.  Major-general  Wild 
von  I  [ohenborn  was  appointed  as  his  successor  in  the  latter 
office  and  was  at  the  same  time  made  lieutenant-general. 

During  the  last  week  in  April  some  fundamental  changes 
were  made  in  the  command  of  the  Russian  forces.  Gen- 
eral Alexeieff  succeeded  General  Russky  as  commander  of 
the  northern  Russian  army  group  and  General  Lechitsky 
took  Alexeieff's  place  as  head  of  the  Russian  forces  in 
Bukovina. 

The  southern  Russian  army  group  under  General  Ivanoff, 
comprising  the  Third,  Eighth,  and  Ninth  Armies,  con- 
tained fourteen  army  corps  with  a  total  effective  strength 
of  about  600,000  men.  The  forces  concentrated  on  the 
corresponding  section  of  the  Austro-German  front,  from 
the  Vistula  to  the  border  of  Roumania,  numbered  about 
1,000,000  men. 

In  planning  the  gigantic  operation  which  will  presently 
be  described,  the  leaders  of  the  Teutonic  alliance  were 
guided  by  their  own  experience  and  especially  by  attentive 
observation  of  the  mistakes  made  by  their  opponents  in 
the  West.  In  general  the  attacks  of  the  western  Allies 
penetrated  the  foremost  German  trench  or  line  of  trenches 
only  to  bring  up  before  a  second,  third,  or  remoter  line 
with  forces  too  far  spent  for  further  effort.  The  problem 
of  sustaining  the  attack  until  complete  success  had  been 
achieved  demanded  the  absolute  concealment  of  the  prepa- 
rations and  rapidity  of  execution,  so  as  to  forestall  the 
concentration  of  reinforcements  for  the  enemy,  the  prev- 
ious accumulation  of  abundant  stores  of  ammunition,  the 
accurate  cooperation   of  the   artillery  with  the   attacking 


mi 


Austrian  soldiers  in  camp  during  the  offensive  against  the  Russians. 


Russian  prisoners  taken  by  the  Germans  waiting  in  line  at  Augustovo  to  receive  rati 


The  Great  Teutonic  Drive  in  Galicia        63 

masses  of  infantry,  especially  in  the  matter  of  adjusting  the 
range  of  gunfire  to  the  progress  of  the  battle,  and  the 
intervention  of  the  reserves  at  the  right  moment. 

The  western  Allies  had  made  all  their  attacks  upon  com- 
paratively short  sections  of  the  front,  and  consequently, 
when  they  pushed  back  a  corresponding  section  of  the 
German  lines  and  advanced  into  the  breach,  they  were 
enfiladed  from  the  sides.  The  remedy  was  to  choose  a 
section  of  attack  confined  by  impenetrable  barriers  on 
both  sides,  or  else  to  make  the  operative  front  so  broad 
that  an  effective  nucleus  would  be  sufficiently  covered 
until  decisive  results  had  been  obtained. 

With  the  proper  dispositions  and  the  harmonious  action 
of  all  the  forces  success  was  simply  a  question  of  intensity 
of  fire.  A  sufficient  weight  of  shell  would  pulverize  the 
strongest  intrenchments  and  render  any  position  untenable. 

The  German  leaders  chose  as  operative  sector  the  front 
in  western  Galicia  between  the  Vistula  and  the  mountains, 
where  the  line  passed  up  the  left  or  western  bank  of  the 
Dunajec  to  its  junction  with  the  Biala  and  then  along  the 
left  bank  of  the  latter  to  the  region  of  the  foothills,  where 
it  crossed  to  the  right  bank  and  bore  off  eastward.  This 
sector  offered  the  essential  conditions  which  have  been 
described.  It  happened,  moreover,  to  be  the  only  section 
of  the  eastern  front  where  the  Teutonic  Allies  had  made 
no  considerable  effort  since  the  beginning  of  the  year. 

Two  main  railways  afforded  communication  with  the 
Austro-German  ■  bases  of  supplies  and  in  their  further 
course  eastward  corresponded  with  the  future  lines  of 
operations. 

Within  this  space  of  about  fifty  miles  were  drawn  up 
the  Austro-Hungarian  army  of  the  Archduke  Joseph 
Ferdinand  on  the  left  and  von  Mackensen's  own  army 
on  the  right.     North  of  the  operative  center  thus  formed 


m  The  Great  War 

stretched  the  A.ustro-1  [ungarian  army  of  four  corps  under 
von  Woyrsch  along  the  Nida  in  southern  Poland.  On 
the  right  the  armies  of  Boroevic  von  Bojna,  von  Boehm- 
Ermolli,  von  Linsingen,  and  von  Pflanzer  extended  along 
the  Carpathians  and  the  Pruth  down  to  the  Roumanian 
frontier,  in  the  order  mentioned.  Except  in  Bukovina 
these  had  scarcely  accomplished  any  tangible  results,  but 
now  the  stupendous  Austro-German  victory  in  western 
Galicia  was  about  to  bestow  upon  them  a  sort  of  unearned 
increment  of  effectiveness. 

The  chief  dynamic  force  resided  in  von  Mackensen's 
army,  and  preparations  for  the  most  intense  aggressive 
operations  were  made  on  the  section  of  about  twenty-five 
miles  along  the  Biala  which  corresponded  with  his  front. 
The  lower  Dunajec  was  a  less  suitable  theater  for  a  forcible 
attack  on  account  of  the  extensive  marshes  bordering  the 
stream.  The  mountains  covered  von  Mackensen's  right 
flank,  while  the  extent  of  the  Austro-German  operative 
front  towards  the  north  would  have  secured  his  left  against 
attack  by  even  a  much  more  numerous  enemy. 

The  Fourth  Austro-Hungarian  Army  under  the  Arch- 
duke Joseph  Ferdinand  and  the  Eleventh  German  Army 
of  von  Mackensen  formed  together  a  striking  force  of 
about  500,000  along  the  Dunajec  and  the  Biala.  The  Third 
Russian  Army  under  General  Dmitrieff  faced  them  with 
only  200,000  men.  The  Teutonic  leaders  had  realized  the 
most  fundamental  condition  of  success,  a  decisive  numerical 
superiority  at  the  crucial  point.  Nor  was  this  all.  The 
development  of  Russian  industry  was  far  from  adequate  to 
replenish  by  current  production  the  constant  wastage  of 
munitions  in  a  great  war.  Thanks  to  the  accumulations 
made  in  recent  years,  the  Russians  had  taken  the  offensive 
with  an  unexpected  energy  which  had  disconcerted  the 
plans  of  their  opponents  and  aroused  exaggerated  hopes 


Russian  retreat  in  Galicia.      German  forces  in  pursuit  advancing  on  one  of  the  especially 
constructed  military  roads. 


German  troops  in  Gorlice. 


The  Great  Teutonic  Drive  in  Galicia        65 

among  their  friends.  But  the  accumulated  stores  were 
now  exhausted  and  the  hostility  of  Turkey  had  months 
before  closed  the  only  convenient  route  for  the  importa- 
tion of  supplies  from  western  Europe.  At  the  most  critical 
moment  Russia  faced  a  munition  famine.  Soon  there  were 
accounts  of  batteries  calling  in  vain  for  shell,  units  going 
into  battle  without  rifles,  armies  subjected  to  the  most 
terrible  bombardments  without  any  support  from  their 
own  artillery. 

The  nucleus  of  von  Mackensen's  army  of  six  corps  had 
been  brought  from  central  Poland  where  he  had  conducted 
the  frontal  attacks  on  Warsaw.  A  large  contingent  from 
the  western  front  included  the  Tenth  Army  Corps  which 
had  shared  in  the  operations  against  Liege  and  had  formed 
part  of  von  Billow's  army  in  the  Battle  of  the  Marne. 
Added  to  these  were  other  detachments  from  various  sec- 
tions of  the  eastern  front  as  well  as  units  newly-formed. 
Most  of  the  forces  transferred  at  this  time  to  the  theater  of 
the  impending  action  were  brought  up  in  the  night  pre- 
ceding the  commencement  of  the  attack  and  distributed 
along  the  front  under  cover  of  the  darkness.  A  division  of 
the  Guards  was  first  shifted  from  its  position  on  the  western 
front  to  Alsace  and  then,  a  little  later,  appeared  at  Neu- 
Sandez,  just  behind  the  battle-line  on  the  Biala. 

About  2,000  pieces  of  artillery,  a  half  at  least  of  heavy 
caliber,  had  been  concentrated  on  the  principal  operative 
section  of  the  front  and  vast  magazines  of  ammunition 
and  supplies  were  formed  at  convenient  intervals  at  the 
rear.  Three-fourths  of  the  entire  winter's  accumulation 
of  shell  are  said  to  have  been  brought  to  Cracow  and 
from  there  distributed  along  the  western  Galician  front  by 
night.  A  vast  number  of  motor-vehicles  was  collected. 
Taken  as  a  whole  the  aggregation  of  men  and  material 
for  the  great  offensive  in  Galicia  was  without  a  parallel 


66  The  Great  War 

in  history  and  no  great  movement  of  this  kind  had  ever 
been  so  swiftly  and  silently  accomplished. 

Two  successive  objectives  were  envisaged  from  the  first 
in  the  Teutonic  plan  for  offensive  operations  in  the  East, 
the  expulsion  of  the  Russians  from  the  greater  part  of 
Galicia  and  the  destruction  of  the  Russian  salient  in  Poland. 
The  attainment  of  the  first  of  these  will  be  the  subject  of 
the  present  chapter. 

Renewed  activity  on  the  part  of  the  Austro-German 
forces  from  Koziowa  to  the  Jablonica  Pass  for  about  a 
week  beginning  April  25th  and  a  sudden  German  inroad 
into  Courland  about  the  same  time  engaged  the  attention 
of  the  Russians  and  attracted  reinforcements  which  might 
otherwise  have  been  available  where  the  greatest  danger 
really  threatened.  Furthermore,  the  great  assault  itself 
was  preceded  by  minor  attacks  near  the  Biala  so  that  its 
real  character  was  not  immediately  recognized. 

The  execution  of  the  great  plan  began  on  April  28th  with 
an  attack  from  Ropa  on  the  upper  Biala  in  the  direction  of 
Gorlice.  This  was  carried  on  for  three  days  as  an  isolated 
operation.  Besides  disturbing  Dmitrieff's  left  wing  and 
drawing  reinforcements  thither  from  the  Russian  center, 
where  the  chief  attack  impended,  this  operation  threatened 
the  communications  of  the  Russian  forces  which  had  pene- 
trated into  the  region  south  of  the  Dukla  Pass. 

German  aircraft  had  already  thoroughly  investigated 
the  Russian  position  and  discovered  the  most  available 
approaches. 

The  inauguration  of  the  grand  attack,  in  the  presence  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Generalissimo  and  Field-marshal, 
Archduke  Frederick,  and  of  Colonel-general  von  Macken- 
sen,  was  a  solemn  moment.  There  were  involved  the  exist- 
ence of  the  Dual  Monarchy,  the  survival  of  the  Teutonic 
Alliance,  and  the  safety  of  Germany  herself. 


The  Great  Teutonic  Drive  in  Galicia        67 

The  preliminary  bombardment  lasting  about  three  days 
reached  its  final  stage  with  a  fire  of  unprecedented  violence 
during  four  hours  on  the  morning  of  May  2d.  The  crash- 
ing reverberations  seemed  to  rend  the  firmament,  shake 
the  earth,  and  pound  human  consciousness  into  a  delirious 
madness  or  stunned  and  helpless  lethargy.  In  words  of 
thunder  launched  from  tongues  of  flame  a  terrible  Nemesis 
summoned  Russia  to  justify  her  conduct  under  suspension 
of  the  sentence  for  sloth,  incompetence,  and  corruption 
pronounced  against  her  ten  years  before. 

More  than  700,000  shells  were  hurled  into  the  Russian 
positions  during  the  last  stage  of  the  bombardment.  The 
Russian  intrenchments  were  obliterated  and  at  once  the 
Austro-German  infantry  sprang  to  the  attack.  A  large 
number  of  pontoons  had  been  brought  to  the  left  bank  of 
the  river  on  the  offensive  front  and  concealed  behind  a 
dyke,  where  they  were  in  readiness  to  be  drawn,  at  the 
proper  moment,  through  openings,  temporarily  concealed 
by  sand-bags  and  grass,  down  to  the  water's  edge  on 
rails.  Thus  pontoon-bridges  were  quickly  pushed  across 
the  Biala. 

While  the  Russian  line  was  pierced  at  several  points,  the 
chief  attack  was  made  against  the  village  of  Ciezkowice. 
The  columns  moving  forward  by  this  route,  cooperating 
with  those  which  were  already  advancing  from  Ropa  further 
up,  captured  Gorlice  and  turned  DmitriefFs  whole  front. 

On  the  next  day,  while  the  right  wing  of  the  Russian 
army  still  held  out  against  the  Archduke  Joseph  Ferdi- 
nand's Austrian  army,  the  left  fled  precipitately  towards 
the  Visloka.  Confident  in  the  ability  of  his  army  to  defend 
its  strong  intrenchments  on  the  western  line,  DmitriefT  had 
prepared  no  alternative  positions  in  the  rear  to  serve  as  a 
refuge  in  adversity.  His  lack  of  foresight  all  but  involved 
the  total  destruction  of  the  Russian  forces  in  the  Carpathians 


68  The  Great  War 

as  well  his  own  Third  Army.  If  the  Russians  had  been 
able  to  hold  out  on  the  line  of  the  Visloka,  they  might 
have  saved  the  positions  already  conquered  in  the  region 
of  the  Carpathians,  because  this  line  covers  on  the  west 
the  entrance  to  the  Dukla  Pass. 

But  von  Mackensen  pushed  forward  von  Emmich's 
Tenth  Corps  as  rapidly  as  possible  on  his  right  so  as  to  bar 
the  outlets  of  the  passes  and  entrap  Brussiloff's  right  wing. 
The  forward  movement  of  the  main  forces  was  retarded 
by  the  difficulty  of  transporting  the  heavy  artillery. 

On  the  5th  the  advanced  column,  moving  along  the 
railway,  effected  the  passage  of  the  Visloka  and  commanded 
with  its  artillery  the  highway  descending  from  the  Dukla 
Pass.  The  Russian  forces  that  had  been  successfully  resist- 
ing the  attacks  of  von  Boehm-Ermolli's  army  in  the  Ondava 
and  Laborcz  valleys  south  of  the  Dukla  and  Lupkow 
Passes,  realizing  the  menace  to  their  communications  in 
Galicia,  sought  safety  by  sudden  flight.  General  of  Cavalry 
von  Marwitz  led  the  right  wing  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
army  over  the  Lupkow  Pass.  By  the  9th  Hungary  was 
completely  cleared  of  the  invaders.  Although  a  great 
many  prisoners  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  German  forces 
in  Galicia  during  the  struggles  of  the  Russian  forces  in 
extricating  themselves,  Brussiloff's  right  wing  was  not  de- 
stroyed. The  exploit  of  the  Forty-eighth  Division,  which, 
finding  its  retreat  completely  intercepted,  cut  a  way  through 
to  contact  with  the  main  part  of  the  army,  is  similar  to  that 
of  the  Twentieth  Corps  in  the  retreat  from  East  Prussia 
which  escaped  from  the  iron  jaws  of  the  German  army  in 
the  forests  near  Suwalki. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  army  did  not  overcome  the  re- 
sistance of  its  opponents  on  the  lower  Dunajec  until  the 
6th,  when  Tarnow  was  taken  and  the  Russians  retreated 
towards  the  east  and  northeast. 


Austrians  in  Peremysl  after  the  evacuation  of  the  city  by  the  Russians. 


Austrian  troops  crossing  the  River  San.  As  the  Russians  retreated  they  of  course  de- 
stroyed the  bridges.  Abo-ue  is  shown  two  types  of  military  bridges,  one  of  pontoons  on  the 
right  background,  and  one  of  driven  piles  in  the  foreground. 


The  Great  Teutonic  Drive  in  Galicia        69 

The  Germans  won  crossing  points  on  the  Vislok  near 
Rymonof  and  at  Fryztak  on  the  8th,  and  by  the  9th  the 
Russian  battle-front  was  stretched  along  the  line  from  the 
outlet  of  the  Uszok  Pass  northwestward  through  Besko 
and  Debica  to  Szczucin  on  the  Vistula.  A  range  of  hills 
prolonging  in  a  general  sense  the  line  of  the  upper  San  as 
far  as  the  Vislok  and  even  beyond  it  formed  a  natural  sup- 
port for  this  position. 

Here  the  Russians  made  a  stand  for  a  few  days  until 
their  opponents'  heavy  field-artillery  and  von  Mackensen's 
principal  masses  of  infantry,  his  redoubtable  "phalanx," 
had  arrived.  Then,  after  shattering  the  enemy's  power 
of  resistance  by  a  furious  bombardment,  von  Mackensen 
delivered  his  sledge-hammer  blows  with  seven  picked  divi- 
sions drawn  up  in  compact  formation  on  a  front  of  about 
twelve  miles,  backed  by  six  other  divisions  in  reserve. 

The  Russians  were  again  in  retreat  on  the  12th,  the  Arch- 
duke Joseph  Ferdinand  had  reached  the  lower  Visloka,  and 
on  the  right  the  vanguard  of  the  Austro-German  host  was 
crossing  the  San  between  Sanok  and  Dynof .  Two  days  later 
von  Mackensen's  advanced  guard  appeared  before  the  for- 
tress of  Peremysl.  The  Austro-German  forces  throughout 
the  Carpathians  were  actively  cooperating.  Pouring  down 
from  the  Lupkow  Pass  in  the  direction  of  Sanok,  advancing 
from  the  Uszok  towards  Sambor,  and  from  the  Beskid 
towards  Stryj,  they  combined  with  the  armies  of  the  arch- 
duke and  von  Mackensen  on  a  common  front,  extending 
the  battle-line  towards  the  southeast,  while  Brussiloff  slowly 
withdrew  before  them.  Most  of  the  Austro-German  forces 
engaged  in  the  Galician  campaign  were  now  advancing  on 
converging  lines  in  the  general  direction  of  Lemberg,  so 
that  every  step  tended  to  consolidate  their  common  front. 

The  only  exception  was  in  the  extreme  southeast. 
There  early  in  May  von  Pflanzer  advanced  northward  on 


70  The  Great  War 

a  front  of  about  a  hundred  miles.  By  the  9th  his  left 
wing  rested  on  the  railway  about  midway  between  Nad- 

vorim  and  Stanislaw,  when  the  Russians  attacked  in  supe- 
rior force  and  in  a  five  days'  engagement  drove  his  army 

hack  to  the  Pruth.  This  reverse  was  quickly  followed  by 
another  blow  launched  at  the  opposite  extremity  of  the 
Austro-German  operative  line,  in  southern  Poland. 

There  the  Russian  army  commanded  by  General  Ewarts 
was  retreating  in  conformity  with  the  movement  of  the 
battle-front  in  Galicia,  its  left  wing  keeping  in  contact  with 
the  right  wing  of  the  Russian  army  south  of  the  Vistula. 
But  on  the  15th  General  Ewarts  suddenly  turned  against 
his  pursuers,  the  Austro-Hungarian  army  under  General 
von  Woyrsch.  Punctuating  the  attack  with  stinging  em- 
phasis by  sending  the  Cossacks  around  his  adversary's  flank 
to  strike  at  the  line  of  communications,  Ewarts  defeated 
the  Austro-Hungarian  army  in  a  three  days'  combat,  in- 
flicting heavy  losses  upon  it,  and  resumed  his  gradual  retro- 
grade movement,  free  for  a  time  from  molestation. 

The  conflict  on  the  San  had  meanwhile  begun.  The 
Russian  front  now  swerved  from  the  Carpathian  foothills 
near  the  outlet  of  the  Beskid  Pass  and  bore  northwest- 
ward, crossing  the  Stryj  and  Dniester  Rivers,  swinging 
round  the  fortress  of  Peremysl  in  a  loop,  keeping  west  of 
the  lower  San,  and  gradually  diverging  from  it  to  reach 
the  Vistula  at  Tarnobrzeg.  The  staggering  effect  of  the 
Austro-German  onslaught  may  be  appreciated  by  the  num- 
ber of  174,000  Russians  taken  prisoner  in  the  course  of 
the  operations  in  this  quarter  during  the  first  two  weeks  of 
May.  The  Russian  Third  Army  had  retreated  eighty-five 
miles  before  overwhelming  forces,  exposed  to  a  merciless 
shower  of  steel.  In  spite  of  terrible  losses  and  contrary  to 
all  reasonable  expectations,  it  had  preserved  its  cohesion  as 
a  fighting  force. 


The  Great  Teutonic  Drive  in  Galicia        71 

The  Teutonic  hosts  paused  longer  at  the  San  than  at  any 
other  stage  of  their  course  across  Galicia,  in  consequence 
of  the  need  felt  for  collecting  their  energy  after  the  tre- 
mendous exertions  of  the  preceding  fortnight,  the  greater 
compactness  of  the  Russian  front  resulting  from  the  con- 
centric retreat,  and  the  support  afforded  the  defensive  by 
the  stronghold  of  Peremysl. 

The  army  of  the  Archduke  Joseph  Ferdinand  gained 
the  left  bank  of  the  San  on  the  section  Jaroslaw-Sieniava. 
After  holding  out  two  days  against  the  Austro-Hungarian 
assaults,  the  fortress  of  Jaroslaw,  which  guarded  the  bridge- 
head, fell  on  the  night  of  the  15th-16th,  but  not  before 
most  of  the  Russian  forces  had  passed  the  river.  All 
through  the  16th  the  Austro-Hungarian  army  struggled 
for  the  crossing-points  and  by  the  17th  160,000  had  gained 
the  eastern  bank  and  driven  the  Russians  back  to  a  con- 
siderable distance.  But  the  latter,  launching  a  vigorous 
counter-attack,  held  their  assailants  at  bay  for  more  than 
a  fortnight  and  all  but  deprived  them  of  their  foothold  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  San.  The  bridge-head  at  Sieniava,  lost 
by  the  Austro-Hungarians  as  late  as  the  27th-28th,  was  not 
regained  until  June  12th.  Probably  lack  of  troops  properly 
armed  and  equipped  and  of  sufficient  ammunition  prevented 
Ivanoff  from  paralyzing  the  Austro-German  offensive  by  a 
turning  movement  against  von  Mackensen's  left  wing. 

Whatever  the  effect,  if  any,  on  the  Austro-Hungarian 
councils  of  Italy's  entrance  into  the  war  about  this  time, 
it  was  hardly  shared  by  the  less  susceptible  allies. 

Von  Mackensen's  phalanx  on  May  24th  forced  the  pas- 
sage of  the  San  at  Radymno.  Von  Boehm-Ermolli  was 
threatening  the  Peremysl-Lemberg  railway  from  the  south. 
The  intention  was  evidently  to  isolate  Peremysl  and  join 
forces  on  a  new  front  east  of  the  San  in  preparation  for  the 
next  great  forward  thrust. 


72  The  Great  War 

The  Russians,  menaced  from  all  sides  at  Peremysl,  strove 
to  hold  that  stronghold  only  till  they  could  remove  the 
war-material  and  supplies. 

The  first  rounds  were  fired  at  Peremysl  on  May  16th. 
The  Germans  concentrated  their  chief  efforts  against  the 
northern  section  of  the  outer  girdle,  where  some  of  the  forts 
were  almost  completely  demolished  by  the  terrific  bombard- 
ment. On  the  31st  Bavarian  troops  captured  several  of  the 
Russian  positions.  Already  von  Boehm-Ermolli  had  brought 
a  section  of  the  Peremysl-Lemberg  railway  within  range  of 
his  heavy  artillery.  The  southern  forts  of  Peremysl  were 
abandoned  on  June  1st.  The  final  assault  was  made  on  the 
night  of  the  lst-2d.  About  3.30  A.M.  the  German  troops 
forced  their  way  into  the  city  from  the  north  and  there  met 
the  Tenth  Austro-Hungarian  Corps  which  had  been  advanc- 
ing from  the  west.  Altogether  the  Teutonic  Allies  garnered 
269,732  prisoners,  including  873  officers,  251  cannon,  and  576 
machine-guns  in  the  Galician  offensive  during  May. 

Toward  the  east,  von  Marwitz  advanced  in  the  general 
direction  of  Lemberg  and  entered  Sambor  on  June  15th. 
Von  Linsingen's  army  advanced  to  the  Dniester,  bearing 
to  the  right  so  as  to  threaten  the  flank  and  rear  of  the  forces 
opposed  to  von  Pflanzer  near  Stanislaw  and  Halicz.  The 
situation  seemed  to  favor  the  execution  of  the  original  plan 
for  these  two  eastern  armies  on  the  Austro-German  front, 
that  of  bagging  a  considerable  number  of  their  adversaries 
by  a  combined  enveloping  maneuver. 

Returning  to  the  offensive,  von  Pflanzer  captured  Stanis- 
law on  June  9th  and  crossed  the  Dniester  at  Zaleszcyki  on 
the  11th,  while  von  Linsingen  forced  a  passage  of  the  same 
river  on  his  own  front  at  Zurawno  on  the  6th. 

Perceiving  the  dangerous  position  of  their  forces  be- 
tween these  two  points,  the  Russian  commanders  despatched 
reinforcements  to  the  point  menaced  by  von  Linsingen 


The  Great  Teutonic  Drive  in  Galicia        73 

and  after  a  conflict  of  three  days  forced  the  Austro-German 
forces  to  the  south  bank  of  the  river.  This  momentary 
success  insured  the  safe  withdrawal  of  the  remaining  Rus- 
sian forces  on  the  south  side  of  the  stream. 

But  all  other  operations  were  subordinate  to  the  outcome 
of  the  crucial  struggle  in  the  central  positions  near  the  San. 
With  strict  attention  to  the  ultimate  aims  of  the  campaign, 
von  Mackensen  conducted  his  operations  from  this  time 
on  with  reference  to  the  anticipated  struggle  in  Poland. 
He  turned  his  own  front  quite  sharply  to  the  left,  into  a 
position  facing  the  Wisznia  and  in  general  alignment  with 
the  archduke's  forces  on  the  left  along  the  San  and  those 
of  von  Boehm-Ermolli  on  the  right  stretching  across  to 
the  Dniester  marshes.  Continuing  to  swerve  gradually  to 
the  left,  his  army  was  headed  straight  for  the  vulnerable 
section  of  the  Russian  lines  in  Poland,  the  railway  between 
Lublin  and  Chelm. 

The  Austro-German  forces  now  attacked  the  Russians 
on  a  front  extending  about  forty  miles,  from  Piskorovice 
on  the  San  to  the  vicinity  of  Mosciska.  In  a  desperate 
conflict  on  the  12th  and  13th  the  Russian  front  was  broken 
southeast  of  Jaroslaw  and  a  large  number  of  captives  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  victorious  Teutonic  Allies. 

The  Russians  retired  to  a  line  which  ran  eastward  along 
the  Tanef  from  its  confluence  with  the  San,  then  swung 
round  to  the  south,  and  skirted  the  Grodek  lakes  and 
marshes  down  to  the  Dniester.  The  line  of  the  Grodek 
lakes  was  in  itself  almost  impregnable  to  frontal  attacks, 
but  it  could  be  turned  by  assailants  strong  enough  in  num- 
ber, just  as  the  Russians  had  outflanked  it  in  1914,  and  the 
execution  of  this  crucial  maneuver  accorded  well  with 
von  Mackensen's  general  line  of  operations.  Whilst  von 
Boehm-Ermolli  approached  the  Grodek  position  in  front 
on  his  way  to  Lemberg,  the  redoubtable  German  phalanx 


74  The  Great  War 

rolled  irresistibly  northeastward  towards  Rawaruska,  the 
scene  of  Russia's  earlier  hard-earned  victory,  the  real  key 
to  the  Galician  capital.  Here  the  Russians  were  over- 
powered in  a  tierce  battle  on  the  20th  and  the  defensive 
line  covering  Lemberg  was  turned.  The  Russians  aban- 
doned the  north  hank  of  the  Dniester  above  Halicz.  Their 
forces  deployed  along  the  Grodek  line  fell  hack  in  good 
order  before  von  Boehm-Ermolli,  whose  entrance  into 
Lemberg  on  the  afternoon  of  the  22d  afforded  a  very  wel- 
come tonic  to  the  spirit  of  the  Dual  Monarchy. 

After  attaining  the  chief  immediate  goals  of  the  offen- 
sive in  Galicia,  the  Austro-German  armies,  which  had 
thus  far  tended  to  converge,  now  spread  out  like  an  open 
fan.  The  Archduke  Joseph  Ferdinand,  after  finally  get- 
tin  g  the  better  of  the  resistance  on  the  lower  San,  advanced 
into  Poland.  Von  Mackensen  swept  northward  towards 
Tomasof  and  Zamosk  in  Polish  territory,  while  the  armies 
of  von  Boehm-Ermolli  and  von  Linsingen  spread  out 
towards  the  northeast  and  east  to  face  the  Russians  who  in 
these  directions  had  retired  to  a  line  extending  along  the 
upper  course  of  the  Bug  and  down  the  Gnila  Lipa  to  its 
confluence  with  the  Dniester. 

Germany's  policy  towards  Turkey  had  borne  fruit  in  the 
vassalage  of  that  country.  Through  Turkey  Germany  might 
hope  to  dominate  Asiatic  Turkey.  Russia's  disasters  were 
largely  attributable  to  her  isolation  because  of  the  closing  of 
the  Dardanelles,  the  mastery  over  which  involved  the  con- 
trol of  Russia's  vast  grain  exports.  Most  potent  considera- 
tions, therefore,  demanded  that  the  Western  Powers  should 
shatter  the  obstruction  that  barred  direct  cooperation  with 
their  ally  in  the  East,  and  we  shall  turn  to  the  consideration 
of  a  naval  operation  for  that  purpose,  followed  by  a  land 
offensive  conducted  under  unusual  difficulties. 


CHAPTER   IV 

Naval  Operations  at  the  Dardanelles 

British  naval  protection.  Consideration  of  the  tactics  of  the  Dardanelles 
operations.  Bombardment  of  Dardanelles  forts,  November  3, 1914.  Motives 
for  the  Dardanelles  expedition.  Admiral  Garden's  plan.  Divergence  of 
naval  opinions.  Mr.  Churchill's  expectations.  Earlier  British  passages 
of  the  Dardanelles.  Physical  characteristics  of  the  Strait  and  Gallipoli 
Peninsula ;  its  forts.  Bases  seized  by  the  British :  Imbros  and  Lemnos 
islands ;  Port  Mudros.  A  British  submarine  enters  the  Strait.  Operations 
of  February  19,  1915:  Allied  ships;  the  objectives;  the  day's  action; 
renewed  operations,  February  25th,  the  entrance  forced ;  operations  within 
the  Strait  and  in  the  Gulf  of  Saros.  Bombardment  of  Gallipoli.  Vice- 
admiral  de  Robeck  in  command.  The  disastrous  operations  of  March 
18th.  The  Allied  fleet  out  of  the  Dardanelles.  A  joint  military  and  naval 
attack  ordered.     Losses. 

Simultaneously  with  the  first  really  important  naval  battle 
of  the  war,  that  of  January  24,  1915,  in  the  North  Sea,  the 
Allies  were  considering  a  serious  naval  attack  on  the  Darda- 
nelles, which  was  soon  to  be  carried  out  in  force.  The 
dispatch  of  a  fleet  to  force  the  Dardanelles  constitutes  one 
of  the  spectacular  operations  of  the  British  navy,  nor  was  it 
undertaken  without  grave  anxiety  as  to  its  success.  Polit- 
ical and  economic  reasons  swayed  the  decision,  perhaps 
chiefly.  It  presented  unusual  problems,  and  the  relative 
values  of  land  defences  and  the  most  modern  naval  arma- 
ments were  to  be  put  to  a  new  test. 

As  this  campaign  of  ships  against  forts  is  one  of  the 
most  striking  in  history,  some  discussion  of  the  tactics  is 
of  interest,  if  not  necessity. 

Admiral  Garden,  in  a  telegram  of  January  5,  1915,  in 
reply  to  one  from  the  Admiralty  of  January  3d,  asking  his 


76  The  Great  War 

opinion  as  to  the  practicability  of  f<  >rcing  the  Dardanelles  by 

the  use  of  ships  alone,  said:  "  I  do  not  think  that  the  Darda- 
nelles can  be  rushed,  but  the}-  might  be  forced  by  extended 
operations  with  a  large  number  of  ships."  Admiral  Car- 
den's  successor,  De  Robeck,  seems  to  have  concurred  en- 
tirely with  this  view.  Whatever  views  are  here  advanced, 
they  are  given  with  every  reserve.  It  is  wholly  a  moot 
question,  not  a  strong  possibility:  "a  might  have  been." 
On  January  3,  1915,  the  Admiralty  (in  the  person  of  the 
First  Lord)  telegraphed  Admiral  Carden:  "The  import- 
ance of  the  results  would  justify  severe  loss." 

In  the  end,  six  battleships  and  many  thousand  officers 
and  men  of  the  Allied  fleet  were  lost,  and  still  many  more 
thousands  of  the  army. 

It  would  appear  at  least  not  unreasonable  that  had  the 
Strait  been  "rushed"  in  the  first  instance,  instead  of  bom- 
barding and  silencing  the  outer  forts  on  February  19th,  and 
a  swift  run  for  the  Sea  of  Marmora  been  made,  the  fleet 
would  have  got  through  with  less  loss  than  six  battleships. 
The  crux  of  the  situation  was  in  the  mine,  stationary  or  drift- 
ing with  the  current.  It  was  an  immense  danger  of  course, 
but  was  it  a  sufficient  one  to  cause  a  probable  loss,  in  such  an 
advance,  of  more  than  six  battleships  ?  Lord  Fisher's  calcu- 
lation of  probable  loss  in  extended  operations  was  twelve. 

Let  us  say  twelve,  with  the  loss  of  every  soul  aboard, 
some  twelve  thousand  officers  and  men.  The  ships  were, 
with  few  exceptions,  old  and  could  have  been  spared;  and 
such  loss  in  officers  and  men  would  have  been  but  a  frac- 
tion of  that  which  was  to  come  through  use  of  the  army, 
though  the  loss  in  the  trained  officer  or  man  of  the  navy 
was  a  far  more  serious  matter  to  that  service  than  an  equal 
loss  is  to  an  army. 

There  are  many  points  of  similarity  to  Farragut's  famous 
passing  of  the  forts  of  the  Mississippi,  a  feat  which  stands 


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Naval  Operations  at  the  Dardanelles        77 

in  the  front  rank  in  naval  annals,  and  in  the  writer's 
opinion  places  Farragut  as  the  greatest  of  naval  leaders  in 
daring  resource  and  conduct.  His  orders  were  to  "reduce 
the  defences  which  guard  the  approaches  to  New  Orleans, 
when  you  will  appear  off  that  city  and  take  possession  of 
it."  The  British  Admiral's  orders,  substituting  the  Darda- 
nelles and  Constantinople  for  the  Mississippi  and  New 
Orleans,  were  practically  the  same.  The  bend  of  the 
Mississippi  commanded  by  Fort  Jackson  on  the  right 
bank  and  Fort  St.  Philip  on  the  left  was  very  similar  to 
the  bend  of  the  Dardanelles  at  Chanak ;  the  breadth  of  the 
channel  and  the  swiftness  of  the  current  were  about  the 
same;  the  relative  armaments  of  forts  and  fleet  in  each 
instance  were  much  alike;  a  chain  barrier  supported  by 
hulks  was  across  the  river  in  the  one  case,  and  mines, 
floating  and  stationary,  obstructed  the  river  in  the  other; 
the  ships  in  the  one  case  were  of  unprotected  wood  and 
slow;  in  the  other  heavily  armored  and  fast.  As  to  mines, 
Farragut's  phrase  later  at  Mobile  was  applicable. 

It  is  difficult  to  see  that  there  was  any  insuperable  diffi- 
culty in  rushing  the  forts  and  entering  the  Sea  of  Marmora 
and  appearing  off  Constantinople,  which  would  have  been 
at  its  mercy.  Just  as  Farragut  felt,  despite  his  orders, 
that  the  possession  of  New  Orleans  would  involve  the 
surrender  of  the  forts,  so  "Lord  Kitchener  was  of 
opinion  that  directly  the  passage  had  been  forced  the 
Gallipoli  garrison  would  evacuate  the  peninsula,  inasmuch 
as  their  communications  with  Constantinople  would  be 
cut  off."  In  a  memorandum  dated  March  23,  1915,  he 
wrote:  "Once  the  ships  are  through,  the  position  of 
the  Gallipoli  peninsula  ceases  to  be  of  any  military  im- 
portance." Moreover,  as  it  appears  from  the  Dardanelles 
Commission  Report,  he  and  others,  including  Earl  Grey, 
"confidently  looked  forward  to  a  revolution  taking  place 


The  Great  War 

in  Constantinople  if  once  the  British  fleet  appeared  in  the 
Sea  ni  Marmora." 

The  belief  as  to  the  peninsula  was  justified;  it  would 
have  been  impossible  to  pass  supplies  by  the  narrow  isth- 
mus of  Bulair,  but  three  miles  across  and  thus  fully  com- 
manded from  the  sea,  even  had  there  been  a  base  from 
which  supplies  could  be  furnished.  Both  the  north  and 
south  sides  of  the  Sea  of  Marmora  were  destitute  of  rail- 
ways, and  transportation  of  supplies,  particularly  of  heavy 
ammunition,  was  almost  impossible.  Once  the  fleet  or 
even  a  very  moderate  portion  of  it,  was  at  Constantinople, 
the  way  would,  almost  surely,  be  open  to  the  Black  Sea. 
Even  if  not,  for  a  time,  the  Sea  of  Marmora  would  be  held, 
and  the  communications  by  way  of  the  Dardanelles  would 
soon  be  established.  The  worst  that  could  happen  would 
be  to  return  by  the  Strait  as  did  Admiral  Duckworth  in 
1807.  It  would  seem  clear  that  there  would  be  little 
danger  from  mines  in  such  a  return.  And  if  entrance  to 
the  Black  Sea  should  be  effected  through  the  surrender  of 
Constantinople,  the  entire  littoral  of  both  seas  would  be 
under  Entente  control.  The  dockyard  of  Sevastopol  would 
be  at  the  command  of  the  Entente  Powrers  for  repairs,  with 
all  Russia  as  a  base  of  supplies. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  exaggerate  the  political  effect. 
Bulgaria  would  have  joined  the  Entente  instead  of  the 
Central  Powers;  Serbia  would  not  have  been  invaded. 
Greece,  of  necessity,  would  have  been  friendly  and  the 
struggle  for  Mesopotamia  could  have  had  but  one  out- 
come. The  "Rush"  would  have  been  well  worth  the  loss 
of  even  the  twelve  battleships  estimated  by  Lord  Fisher. 
Most  of  the  ships  were  old  and  ineffective  for  the  battle- 
line  and  in  any  case  no  such  loss  would  have  occurred. 
What  was  needed  was  a  Farragut,  with  a  free  foot,  who 
when  he  saw  the  Tecumseh  go  down,  in  the  narrow  channel 


Naval  Operations  at  the  Dardanelles        79 

at  Mobile  Bay,  and  the  leader  of  his  line  stop  and  back, 
with  a  warning  cry  from  her  of  torpedoes  ahead,  and  his 
line  thrown  into  confusion  by  the  Brooklyn's  action,  could, 
from  the  main  shrouds  where  he  had  been  lashed  by  his 
flag-lieutenant,  shout  out,  "Damn  the  torpedoes!  Four 
bells.     Captain  Drayton,  go  ahead." 

Had  the  British  authorities  but  read  the  wonderful  story 
of  Mobile  Bay,  a  different  story  would  have  been  told  of 
the  Dardanelles,  for  the  "Rush"  in  all  probability,  would 
have  been  made. 

Turkey  entered  the  war  by  a  declaration  on  October  29, 
1914.  Her  action,  in  August,  in  giving  refuge  to  the  Ger- 
man battle-cruiser  Goeben  and  the  cruiser  Breslau,  to  which 
was  added  later  a  ship  of  the  East  Africa  line  with  a  cargo 
of  mines,  heavy  guns,  and  ammunition,  had  practically 
assured  the  Entente  Powers  of  what  her  coming  action 
was  to  be.  On  November  3d  the  first  act  of  war  came  in 
the  bombardment  by  four  battleships,  two  British  and  two 
French,  of  the  forts  at  the  entrance  of  the  Dardanelles. 
The  attack  was  at  a  range  of  seven  to  eight  miles,  was  at 
high  speed,  and  lasted  but  eight  to  ten  minutes.  It  was 
stated  as  a  reconnaissance  only  and  as  meant  to  test  the 
range  of  the  Turkish  guns. 

On  November  25th,  Mr.  Winston  Churchill,  then  First 
Lord  of  the  British  Admiralty,  brought  before  the  newly 
organized  War  Council,  the  question  of  an  attack  upon  the 
Dardanelles,  as  the  "ideal  method"  of  defending  Egypt. 

It  should  be  stated  that  from  the  beginning  of  the  war 
(August  3,  1914),  until  November  25th,  a  period  of  nearly 
four  months,  the  conduct  of  affairs  had  been  in  the  hands 
of  the  Cabinet,  of  which  there  were  twenty-two  members, 
assisted  in  some  degree  by  the  Committee  of  Imperial 
Defence,  a  committee  established  many  years  before  the 


80  The  Great  War 

war.  Of  the  twenty-two  members  of  the  Cabinet,  but 
one.  Lord  Kitchener,  the  Secretary  for  War,  was  in  any 
wise  an  expert.  On  November  25th  a  new  committee, 
known  as  the  War  Council,  met.  In  this  Council  there 
was  again  but  the  one  of  military  training  and  experi- 
ence. Lord  Kitchener.  The  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty, 
Mr.  Churchill,  himself  in  nowise  an  expert  in  naval  matters, 
represented  the  Navy. 

The  question  of  attacking  the  Dardanelles  was  brought 
up  by  Mr.  Churchill  at  the  first  meeting  of  the  War 
Council  as  the  "ideal  method  of  defending  Egypt." 

But  there  was  much  more  in  the  question  of  the  Darda- 
nelles than  the  safety  of  Egypt  and  aid  to  the  Russians. 
The  main  dominating  thought  of  British  policy  had  been 
the  control  of  all  highways  to  India.  The  Dardanelles 
forced,  the  forts  in  the  Allies  hands,  and  the  fleet  before 
Constantinople  wrould  have  made  such  a  control  a  surety 
and  would  have  saved  the  serious  struggle  in  Mesopotamia. 
Hence,  not  only  the  safety  of  Egypt  would  have  been 
assured  but  also  the  possession  of  the  great  railway  con- 
necting Constantinople,  and  thus  all  Europe,  with  Bagdad, 
of  which  all  but  498  miles  of  the  total  1,654  were  reported 
in  1916,  by  a  German  authority,  as  completed.  The  largest 
gap,  415  miles,  is  from  Ras-el-Ain  to  Samara,  sixty  miles 
from  Bagdad.  There  would  still  remain  to  be  built,  to  reach 
Koweit  on  the  Persian  Gulf,  about  500  miles  additional. 

This  undertaking  was  of  significant  importance  to  Great 
Britain  and  if  it  did  not  specifically  appear  among  the 
reasons  for  the  Dardanelles  venture,  it  was  necessarily 
always  a  matter  of  preoccupation. 

On  December  28, 1914,  the  Secretary  of  the  War  Council, 
Sir  Maurice  Hankey,  called  the  attention  of  that  body  by  a 
memorandum  to  the  "remarkable  deadlock  "  in  the  western 
theater  of  war  and  invited  consideration  of  the  possibility  of 


>x 


Naval  Operations  at  the  Dardanelles        81 

striking  the  most  effective  blow  against  Germany  "through 
her  allies,  and  particularly  Turkey." 

On  January  2,  1915,  a  telegram  was  received  by  the 
Foreign  Office  from  the  British  Ambassador  at  Petrograd 
conveying  a  request  from  the  military  authorities  of  Russia 
that  "a  naval  or  military  demonstration  against  the  Turks 
should  be  arranged  in  order  to  relieve  the  pressure  felt  by 
the  Russian  troops  at  the  Caucasus."  To  this  communica- 
tion a  reply  was  sent  on  the  following  day  to  the  British 
ambassador  authorizing  him  "to  assure  the  Russian  gov- 
ernment that  a  demonstration  would  be  made  against  the 
Turks."  It  was  added,  however,  that  such  action  would 
not  be  likely  to  effect  any  serious  withdrawal  of  enemy 
troops  in  the  Caucasus. 

The  discussion  of  the  demonstration  continued  till  Jan- 
uary 13th.  The  views  of  Lord  Kitchener,  Lord  Fisher,  and 
others  showed  considerable  divergence.  On  January  11th 
Admiral  Garden's  requested  suggestions  for  operations  had 
been  received.  As  has  been  stated,  his  first  telegram  dated 
5th  January,  addressed  to  Mr.  Churchill  said:  "I  do  not 
think  that  the  Dardanelles  can  be  rushed,  but  they  might  be 
forced  by  extended  operations  with  a  large  number  of  ships." 

Admiral  Carden's  plan  suggested  four  successive  opera- 
tions as  possible : 

"(a)  The  destruction  of  the  defences  at  the  entrance  of  the  Dardanelles, 

"  (t>)  Action  inside  the  Straits  so  as  to  clear  the  defences  up  to  and  in- 
cluding Cephez  [Kephez]  Point,  Battery  No.  8. 

"  (c)  The  destruction  of  the  defences  of  the  Narrows. 

"  (d)  Sweeping  of  a  clear  channel  through  the  mine  field  and  advance 
through  the  Narrows  followed  by  a  reduction  of  the  forts  further  up  and 
advance  into  the  Sea  of  Marmora." 

A  month  was  estimated  as  necessary  to  do  this. 
The  decision  of  the  Council  on  January  13th  was  in  the 
following  terms:   "The  Admiralty  should  prepare  for  a 


82  The  Great  War 

naval  expedition  in  February,  to  bombard  and  take  the 
Gallipoli  Peninsula  with  Constantinople  as  an  objective." 
The  plan  was  submitted  to  France  and  the  cooperation  of  a 
French  squadron  was  asked,  which  the  French  Admiralty 
promised.  Final  action  was  taken  by  the  War  Council  on 
January  28th. 

The  Report  of  the  Dardanelles  Commission,  after  set- 
ting forth  the  advantages  claimed  for  the  proposed  naval 
operation,  continues: 

"The  decision  of  the  War  Council  [January  28th]  was  then  trans- 
lated into  action.  The  plan  of  operations  was  finally  approved  by 
M.  Augagneur  (the  French  Minister  of  Marine),  who  pronounced  them 
to  be  '  prudent  et  prevoyant.'  The  final  arrangements  .  .  .  were 
completed  and  a  detailed  staff"  paper  on  the  proposed  operation  were  [Sic} 
sent  by  the  Admiralty  to  Admiral  Carden  on  the  5th  February.  On  the 
1  "th  or  1 8th  February  the  Prime  Minister  conveyed  to  the  Cabinet  the 
unanimous  decision  of  the  War  Council.  It  was  accepted  by  them  with- 
out question,  criticism,  or  discussion  of  any  kind. 

"The  bombardment  opened  on  the  19th  February." 

A  main  argument  leading  to  the  decision  of  the  War 
Council  was  the  experience  of  the  Belgian  fortresses. 
The  swift  fall  of  these  had  "led  to  the  belief  that- 
permanent  works  were  easily  dealt  with  by  modern  long- 
range  artillery.     .     .     . 

"The  utilization  of  air  craft  had  led  to  the  hope  that  in 
a  comparatively  confined  space  like  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula, 
the  value  of  naval  bombardment,  particularly  by  indirect- 
laying  would  be  enormously  increased." 

"We  have  received,"  says  the  Report  of  the  Darda- 
nelles Commission,  "abundant  evidence  to  show  that  these 
arguments  weighed  strongly  both  in  the  minds  of  ministers 
and  experts." 

In  the  very  beginning  (November  25th)  Mr.  Churchill 
insisted  that  the  experience  of  the  past  was  no  longer 
admissible  by  reason  of  the  "marvellous  potentialities  of  the 


Naval  Operations  at  the  Dardanelles        83 

Queen  Elizabeth'''  which,  brand-new  and  carrying  eight 
15-inch  guns,  was  being  hastened  into  commission.  His 
arguments  concerning  her  had  much  effect  in  bringing 
Lord  Kitchener  to  favor  the  effort.  By  the  middle  of 
January,  she  was  ready  for  her  gun  trials  which  were  to 
take  place  off  Gibraltar,  but  Lord  Fisher  suggested  that 
such  ammunition  might  as  well  be  expended  against  the 
forts  of  the  Dardanelles  instead  of  firing  uselessly  into  the 
sea.  "If  this  is  practicable  she  could  go  straight  there, 
hoist  Carden's  flag  and  go  on  with  her  exercises.  .  .  ." 
The  range  of  her  15-inch  guns  was  such  that  she  could 
keep  out  of  range  of  the  Turkish  forts  and  fire  with  the 
effect  in  some  degree  of  a  howitzer,  the  great  advantage  of 
the  use  of  which  is  in  the  large  angle  of  fall  (which  may 
be  almost  vertical)  and  the  consequent  inability  to  protect 
guns  or  the  interior  of  the  fort,  if  accuracy  be  assured. 
The  highest  elevation  of  the  Queen  Elizabeth's  guns  was, 
however,  but  20  degrees,  and  this  was  not  sufficient  for 
really  high-angle  fire:  "lying  15,000  yards  from  Gabe 
Tepe  and  firing  with  reduced  three-quarter  charge  at 
Kilid  Bahr,  the  angle  of  descent  would  be  17  degrees,  18 
minutes;  firing  at  Chanak  the  angle  of  descent  would  be 
20  degrees,  20  minutes.  At  24,000  yards  (twelve  sea  miles) 
the  range  used  later  against  the  Chanak  forts  across  the 
Isthmus  of  Gallipoli,  the  angle  of  fall  was  probably  as 
much  as  26  degrees,  but  even  this  bears  no  relation  to  the 
practically  vertical  fall  of  the  shot  from  a  howitzer. 

"Looking  to  all  the  facts  of  the  case,"  says  the  Report, 
"we  are  disposed  to  think  that  undue  importance  was 
attached  to  the  ease  with  which  the  Belgian  forts  were 
destroyed,"  and  the  analogy  between  these  and  the  forts 
at  the  Dardanelles  was  overrated. 

But  the  experience  of  the  bombardment  of  Alexandria 
in  1882  was  not  favorable  to  great  expectations  based  on 


S4  The  Great  War 

the  long-range  fire  of  the  Queen  Elizabeth.  "The  natural 
deduction  from  the  Alexandria  bombardment  [which  took 
place  under  the  most  favorable  conditions  for  the  ships] 
was  that  a  naval  attack  on  modern  forts,  well-armed  and 
adequately  manned,  would  be  a  highly  critical  operation, 
would  most  probably  end  in  failure,  and  could  only  suc- 
ceed at  the  cost  of  serious  loss,  "says  a  British  writer. 

The  experience  of  the  past  had  not  been  of  a  character 
to  encourage  the  effort,  though,  of  course,  it  must  be  said 
that  the  instruments  to  be  employed  were  ships  of  strength 
and  gun  power  then  unimagined.  But  defence  likewise 
had  been  busy.  Mines,  automobile  torpedoes  which  could 
be  discharged  from  the  shore,  guns  of  heaviest  caliber,  and 
works  much  more  resistant  to  gunfire  were  now  available 
and  all  these  were  prepared  under  the  able  surveillance 
of  the  German  Staff,  instead  of  by  the  somewhat  casual 
administration  of  the  old  time  Turk.  The  Isthmus 
of  Gallipoli  and  its  opposite  shore  were  now  a  great 
fortress. 

Admiral  Duckworth  had  passed  the  forts  in  1807  against 
guns  firing  stone  balls  twenty  inches  in  diameter  and  im- 
movable as  to  mountings.  He  had  arrived  before  Con- 
stantinople, but  had  to  retire  from  before  batteries  which 
were  built  during  prolonged  negotiations,  but  what  was 
more  serious,  through  having  behind  him  forts  which  he 
had  been  unable  to  garrison  and  which  thus  cut  off  all  sup- 
plies. Sir  Geoffrey  Hornby  on  February  12,  1878,  in  com- 
mand of  the  Mediterranean  Fleet  of  Great  Britain,  passed 
the  Strait,  unopposed,  and  anchored  in  the  Sea  of  Marmora. 
He  had  already  declared  (10th  August,  1877),  that  the  pos- 
session by  the  Russians  of  the  Peninsula  of  Gallipoli  and 
the  erection  of  batteries  "could  not  fail  to  stop  transports 
and  colliers,  and  would  be  most  difficult  for  men  of  war 
to  silence." 


"VMO^t'iT* 


1  ■  iwl-'rfflffl'!l 


•v  ■ :       ill 


Naval  Operations  at  the  Dardanelles        85 

The  Strait  of  Dardanelles,  known  to  the  ancients  as  the 
Hellespont,  famous  in  story  for  the  tragedy  of  Hero  and 
Leander,  and  in  history  as  the  point  where  Xerxes  crossed 
for  the  invasion  of  Greece,  is  thirty-eight  statute  miles  long 
from  Cape  Helles,  which  marks  the  westerly  entrance  on 
the  north  side,  to  the  town  of  Gallipoli  where  it  broadens 
into  the  Sea  of  Marmora.  From  Gallipoli  to  Constanti- 
nople is  125  miles.  The  breadth,  at  the  westerly  entrance, 
is  about  4,200  yards.  Leaving  the  Aegean,  the  southern 
point  is  known  as  Kum  Kale.  Just  east  of  this  the  river, 
anciently  known  as  the  Simois,  enters  the  Strait.  About 
four  miles  S.  S.  E.  is  Novum  Ilium,  the  site  of  ancient 
Troy.  Between  these  two  points  are  marshes  and  salt 
lagoons  making  an  extremely  difficult  terrain  for  attack  by 
troops.  East  of  this  marshy  land,  and  bordering  the  Strait, 
are  hills  rising  to  1,100  feet,  similar  in  roughness  to  those 
of  the  north  shore. 

Having  passed  the  entrance,  the  Strait  expands  at  its 
broadest;  nearly  double  the  width  at  the  entrance,  but  at 
ten  miles  within  it  contracts  to  one  and  three-quarter  miles. 
Four  miles  further  on  after  passing  another  broad  pocket, 
we  come  to  Chanak  (known  officially  as  Sultanieh),  the 
narrowest  part,  where  it  is  but  1,400  yards  across.  Here, 
it  turns  due  north  for  three  miles,  expanding  to  two  miles 
and  then  narrowing  suddenly,  when  it  turns  N.  E.,  to  2,000 
yards.  It  thence  continues  N.  E.  with  a  breadth  varying 
from  two  to  three  and  one-half  miles  to  the  Sea  of  Mar- 
mora, where,  on  the  north  shore  as  mentioned,  a  mile 
within  the  exit,  lies  the  sleepy  town  of  Gallipoli  of  some 
20,000  inhabitants  whence  the  peninsula  takes  its  name. 
This  peninsula,  lying  on  the  north  side  of  the  Strait  and 
connected  by  a  narrow  isthmus  but  three  miles  across  in 
its  narrowest  part,  is  some  fifty  miles  long.  The  part  of 
the  Aegean  on  the  N.  W.  coast  is  known  as  the  Gulf  of 


86  The  Great  War 

Xeros,  usually  anglicized  into  Saros.  The  peninsula  is  a 
scries  of  rough  ridges,  the  highest  of  which  is  on  the 
north  shore,  rising  at  one  point  to  1,471  feet.  The  army 
operations  which  were  finally  to  come,  were  to  be  at  the 
S.  W.  end,  in  the  roughest  and  most  difficult  part,  where 
the  land  has  the  profile  of  a  human  foot  thirteen  miles 
long  from  toe  to  heel.  The  elevations  here  are  from 
600  to  700  feet.  A  more  rugged,  difficult  mass  would 
be  hard  to  find.  "The  hills  are  so  deeply,  sharply  cut 
that  to  reach  their  tops  in  many  places  is  a  matter  of  sheer 
climbing.  There  is  little  cultivation,  few  villages  and  no 
properly  engineered  roads.  Most  of  the  land  is  covered 
with  a  dense  scrub  from  three  to  six  feet  high,  with 
stunted  forests  in  the  hollows.  Communications  are  so  bad 
that  the  usual  way  from  village  is  not  by  land  but  by  boat 
along  the  inner  or  outer  coast."  The  scrub  mentioned  was 
to  cause  the  death  of  many  soldiers  from  its  catching  fire 
through  bombardment  during  the  assaults  by  the  army. 

A  mile  and  a  half  from  the  village  of  Bulair,  at  the  nar- 
rowest part  of  the  peninsula  and  six  miles  N.  E.  of  Gal- 
lipoli,  is  a  strong  line  of  earth  works  thrown  up  in  1853, 
during  the  Crimean  War,  by  the  French  and  English. 
There  were  to  be  feints  of  landing  in  this  region,  but 
feints  only,  as  occupancy,  even  if  a  foothold  could  have 
been  gained  in  so  rough  a  region,  could  serve  no  good 
purpose  so  long  as  the  Turks  controlled  the  water  way. 

Taken  from  the  Aegean  to  the  Sea  of  Marmora  the 
principal  points  are  at  the  entrance;  Cape  Helles  and  (just 
within  Cape  Helles)  Sedd-ul-Bahr  on  the  north.  On  the 
south  side  Kum  Kale  and  two  miles  S.  W.  of  Kum  Kale 
the  village  of  Yeni  Sehr  with  Fort  Orkanieh.  All  these 
four  points  were  armed  with  batteries  of  10.2-inch  and 
9.2-inch  guns.  Then  eleven  miles  within,  on  the  south 
side,  came  Kephez  Point  with  Fort  Dardanos,  and  opposite 


Naval  Operations  at  the  Dardanelles        87 

to  these,  two  miles  across  the  Strait,  Fort  Soghandere. 
Four  miles  above  Kephez  Point  are  the  Narrows  with 
Chanak  on  the  south  side  and  Kilid  Bahr  on  the  north, 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  apart,  both  sides  powerfully  armed 
with  guns,  including  many  14-inch.  Nagara  Point,  another 
constriction  of  the  Strait,  was  again  four  miles  beyond 
Chanak.  It  and  its  opposite  point,  on  the  north  shore, 
were  also  heavily  armed.  The  fleet,  however,  never  ex- 
tended its  attack  beyond  Chanak. 

The  Turks  who,  as  mentioned,  from  their  reception  of 
the  Goebe?i  and  the  Breslau  were  clearly  going  to  enter  the 
war  on  the  side  of  the  Central  Powers,  had  under  German 
advice  and  leadership  altered  the  whole  character  of  the  de- 
fence. A  naval  attack  early  in  the  war,  before  the  defences 
could  be  so  perfected,  might  have  succeeded,  but  later  the 
forts  were  heavily  armed;  though  the  number  of  guns  is 
not  accurately  known,  it  is  certain  that  there  were  many  of 
14-inch  and  11-inch,  besides  large  numbers  of  less  caliber. 
Large  stores  of  ammunition  had  been  accumulated  during 
the  winter  and  an  army,  probably  less  than  400,000,  besides 
one  of  never  less  than  180,000  at  Constantinople,  was  avail- 
able at  the  Dardanelles.  It  was  but  130  miles  from  the 
capital  to  the  Strait  and  communication  by  water  was 
uninterrupted. 

Finally,  and  far  from  least,  the  narrowness  of  the  Strait 
enabled  a  perfect  use  of  automobile  torpedoes,  launched 
from  batteries  ashore.  These  now  have  ranges  up  to 
10,000  yards  (over  eleven  land  miles),  but  a  much  shorter 
range  is  sufficient  for  ordinary  use,  and  particularly  for  the 
Dardanelles,  which,  at  the  broadest  part,  is  but  four  miles 
across,  and  at  Chanak  but  three-quarters,  and  at  Nagara 
but  one  mile.  There  are  long  stretches  with  a  breadth  of 
but  4,000  yards,  which  is  the  range  of  the  ordinary  torpedo 
carried  in  battleships.     In  addition  to  such  an  advantage, 


88  The  Great  War 

there  was  the  constant  current  out  of  the  Sea  of  Marmora, 
with  a  velocity  <>t  from  one  to  four  knots,  the  latter  a 
strength  twice  that  of  the  Mississippi  at  high  water.  This 
gave  an  unsurpassed  opportunity  for  the  use  of  floating 
mines,  of  which  the  Turks  were  to  take  full  advantage. 

As  preparatory  to  the  operations  against  the  Dardanelles, 
the  island  of  Imbros,  thirteen  land  miles  from  the  entrance 
to  the  Strait,  with  an  anchorage  in  a  bay  open  to  the  north 
and  thus  of  small  value,  and  Lemnos,  with  an  admirably 
protected  anchorage  of  great  extent,  both  belonging  to 
Greece,  were  occupied  as  "a  military  necessity."  It  was 
vital  to  the  Allies  to  have  such  a  base  as  the  latter,  and, 
much  as  we  may  decry  such  ethics,  military  necessity  gov- 
erned, as  it  always  will  and  must.  While  certain  rules  are 
laid  down  for  the  governance  of  warlike  operations,  we 
must  remember  that  war  is,  itself,  an  absolute  negation  of 
law,  and  when  necessity  comes,  all  rules  must,  by  the  very 
nature  of  war,  take  second  place.  In  saying  this  we  are 
dealing  with  a  fact  and  not  a  theory. 

Lemnos  is  about  fifteen  miles  in  extreme  length  and 
breadth.  The  island  is  nearly  divided  by  two  deep  in- 
dentations opposite  and  separated  from  one  another  by 
only  two  miles:  Burnea  Bay  to  the  north  and  Mudros  to 
the  south.  The  former  is  an  open  roadstead;  the  latter  in 
all  its  parts  affords  good  anchorage,  and  the  upper  end  a 
particularly  secure  one. 

Port  Mudros  is  described  by  Masefield,  who  took  part 
in  the  later  expedition  of  the  army  (though  he  is  much 
amiss  as  to  the  number  of  ships  which  can  be  provided  for 
in  the  upper  bay),  as  "a  great  natural  harbor,  measuring 
some  two  or  three  miles  across,  (which)  provides  good 
holding  ground  in  from  five  to  seven  fathoms  of  water  for 
half  the  ships  in  the  world.  Two  islands  in  the  fairway 
divide  the  entrance  into  three  passages,  and  make  it  more 


Note  : 

Ships  sunk  are:  underscored 


Operations  Against 
The  Narrows 


Fsencm  Ships  o 


British  Ships    » 


Naval  Operations  at  the  Dardanelles        89 

easy  for  the  naval  officers  to  defend  the  approaches.  It  is 
a  safe  harbor  for  ocean-going  ships  in  all  weathers;  but 
with  northerly  or  southerly  gales,  such  as  spring  up  very 
rapidly  there  in  the  changeable  seasons  of  the  year,  and 
blow  with  great  violence  for  some  hours  at  a  time,  the 
port  is  much  wind-swept,  and  the  sea  makes  it  dangerous 
for  boats  to  lie  alongside  ships.  Mudros  itself  .  .  .  could 
not  even  supply  the  ships  with  fresh  water,  let  alone  meat, 
bread,  and  vegetables.  The  island  produces  little  for  its 
few  inhabitants;  its  wealth  of  a  few  goats,  fish,  olives,  and 
currants  could  be  bought  up  in  a  week  by  the  crew  of  one 
battleship.  Everything  necessary  for  the  operations  had 
therefore  to  be  brought  by  sea  and  stored  in  Mudros  till 
wanted.  When  this  is  grasped  the  difficulty  of  the  under- 
taking will  be  understood.  There  was  no  dock,  wharf, 
nor  crane  in  Mudros,  nor  any  place  in  the  harbor  where  a 
dock  or  wharf  could  be  built  without  immense  labor  of 
dredging.  Ships  could  not  be  repaired,  nor  dry-docked 
there,  nor  could  they  discharge  nor  receive  heavy  stores 
save  by  their  own  winches  and  derricks.  Throughout  the 
operations  ships  had  to  serve  as  wharves,  and  ships'  der- 
ricks as  cranes,  and  goods  were  shipped,  reshipped,  and 
transhipped  by  that  incessant  manual  labor  which  is  the 
larger  half  of  war." 

Alexandria  and  Port  Said  are  600  miles  away;  Malta  800, 
and  Gibraltar,  where  are  the  largest  docks,  1,000  miles 
beyond  Malta. 

On  November  3,  1914,  as  has  been  stated,  there  had  been 
a  tentative  bombardment  of  the  forts  at  the  entrance  by  four 
battleships,  two  British  and  two  French.  This  fact  is  im- 
portant only  because  it  followed  immediately  on  the  state- 
ment of  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  on  November  2d. 

On  November  18th  a  British  submarine  entered  the 
Strait  and  torpedoed  the  old  (though  refurbished)  Turkish 


90  The  Great  War 

battleship  Messudieh,  which  was  guarding  the  mine  fields. 
It  was  a  brave  and  gallant  feat  for  which  the  young  com- 
mander very  properly  received  the  Victoria  Cross. 

It  was  not  until  February  19,  1915  (which  fell  on  Friday, 
the  Mohammedan  Sunday),  that  Vice-admiral  Sackville  S. 
Carden,  who  was  in  chief  command, and  Rear-admiral  Gue- 
pratte,  commanding  the  French,  made  the  first  real  attack. 

The  British  ships  engaged  in  the  siege  of  the  Strait 
were  the  Queen  Elizabeth,  27,500  tons,  eight  15-inch  guns; 
Agamemnon,  16,500  tons,  four  12-inch  and  ten  9.2-inch ;  Lord 
Nelson,  a  sister  ship;  Irresistible,  15,000  tons,  four  12-inch; 
Implacable,  a  sister  ship;  Comwallis,  14,000  tons,  four  10-inch 
and  fourteen  7.5-inch;  London,  15,000  tons,  four  12-inch; 
Prince  of  Wales,  a  sister  ship;  Vengeance,  12,950  tons,  four 
12-inch;  Albion,  a  sister  ship;  Majestic,  14,950  tons,  four 
12-inch;  Prince  George,  a  sister  ship;  Triumph,  11,980  tons, 
four  10-inch  and  fourteen  7.5-inch;  Swiftsure,  a  sister  ship; 
Inflexible,  battle-cruiser,  17,250  tons,  eight  12-inch;  a  total  of 
fifteen  battleships  carrying  eight  15-inch  guns,  forty-eight 
12-inch,  twelve  10-inch,  twenty  9.2-inch,  and  forty-two 
7.5-inch,  a  total  of  one  hundred  and  thirty  heavy  guns  (all 
6-inch  and  lower  calibers  are  omitted).  The  15-inch  guns 
fired  a  shell  of  1,950  pounds,  the  12-inch,  one  of  850,  and 
the  10-inch,  one  of  500  to  600  pounds.  There  were  also 
seven  British  cruisers:  the  Bacchante,  Euryalus,  Dartmouth, 
Dublin,  Talbot,  Doris,  and  Minerva.  The  mother  ship  for 
seaplanes,  the  Ark  Royal,  was  fitted  with  all  appliances  for 
what  has  become  a  terrible  weapon  of  war.  The  Queen 
Elizabeth  was  one  of  a  class  of  five,  the  most  powerful  ships 
of  their  period.  The  general  data  concerning  them  is  as 
follows:  displacement,  27,500  tons;  length,  600  feet;  beam, 
90>^  feet;  draft,  28^  feet;  horse-power,  60,000;  machin- 
ery, Parsons  turbines;  armor  belt  thirteen  inches;  protec- 
tion to  heavy  guns,  10-inch;  main  armament,  eight  15-inch; 


Naval  Operations  at  the  Dardanelles        91 

secondary  armament,  twelve  6-inch;  torpedo  tubes,  four 
21-inch;  speed,  25  knots;  fuel,  oil  only.  The  Queen  Eliza- 
beth and  Irresistible,  being  the  most  valuable  ships,  were 
generally  employed  at  long  range;  notwithstanding  the 
former  was  severely  injured  and  had  to  be  sent  to  Gibraltar 
for  repairs,  being  towed  stern  foremost. 

The  French  fleet  comprised  five  battleships :  the  Charle- 
magne, Jaurequiberry,  Gaulois,  Suffren,  and  Henri  IV,  all  of 
an  older  type,  varying  from  about  11,000  to  about  12,000 
tons,  and  all  with  12-inch  or  lesser  caliber  battery. 

To  these  must  be  added  one  Russian  cruiser,  the  Askold. 

The  attack  was  made  with  the  Inflexible,  Agamemnon, 
Cornwallis,  Vengeance,  and  Triumph,  and  the  French,  the 
Gaulois  and  Suffren;  all  covered  by  a  flotilla  of  destroyers, 
with  the  Ark  Royal,  the  mother  ship  of  the  seaplanes  out- 
side.    From  this  last  were  sent  up  aircraft  as  observers. 

The  objectives  were  the  four  forts  at  the  entrance,  Cape 
Helles  and  Sedd-ul-Bahr  on  the  north  and  Kum  Kale  and 
Orkhanieh  on  the  south  or  Asiatic  side.  The  fort  at  Cape 
Helles  mounted  two  9.2-inch  guns;  Sedd-ul-Bahr,  six 
10.2-inch;  Kum  Kale,  four  10.2-inch  and  two  5.9-inch; 
Orkhanieh  (two  miles  S.  W.  of  Kum  Kale),  two  9.2-inch. 
Used  against  these  were  twenty  guns  heavier  than  any  of 
the  Turkish,  and  eight  of  which  were  four  times  as  power- 
ful as  any  of  the  latter.  The  ranges  used  by  the  Inflexible 
were  about  nine  land  miles;  those  of  the  other  ships  as 
low  as  six. 

"The  action  began  at  8  a.m.,"  says  a  British  writer.  "  It  was  clear  that 
the  forts  at  Cape  Helles  on  the  point  of  the  peninsula,  and  at  Kum  Kale, 
on  the  opposite  shore,  were  frequently  hit,  and  at  times  seemed  to  be 
smothered  in  bursting  shells.  It  was  harder  to  make  out  what  was  hap- 
pening to  the  low  earthworks  of  the  batteries  about  Sedd-ul-Bahr.  All 
the  morning  the  bombardment  continued;  it  was  like  target  practice,  for 
not  a  single  shot  was  fired  in  reply.  Admiral  Garden  came  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  forts  had  been  seriously  damaged  and  at  a  quarter  to  three 


92  The  Great  War 

m  the  afternoon  gave  the  orders  to  close  in.  What  follows  shows  that 
aerial  observation  at  long  range  is  no  easy  matter.  As  the  ships  steamed 
nearer,  the  hitherto  silent  and  apparently  destroyed  forts  began  to  shoot. 
They  made  bad  practice,  for  not  one  of  the  six  ships  that  had  shortened 
range  was  hit.  By  sundown  the  European  batteries  were  quiet  again,  but 
Kiim  Kale  was  still  tiring,  when,  on  account  of  the  failing  light,  Admiral 
Carden  withdrew  the  fleet." 

Bad  weather  came  on,  which,  while  not  particularly 
detrimental  to  the  use  of  the  ships,  was  so  to  the  use  of 
airplanes  for  observation.  It  was  not  until  nearly  a  week 
later,  February  25th,  that  operations  began  anew,  when,  at 

10  A.M.,  the  Irresistible  and  Queen  Elizabeth  took  position 
nine  miles  from  their  respective  targets,  the  Irresistible  firing 
at  Fort  Orkhanieh  on  the  Asiatic  shore,  and  the  Queen 
Elizabeth  against  Sedd-ul-Bahr  and  Cape  Helles;  both  ships 
were  out  of  range  of  any  of  the  enemy's  guns.  The  Gau- 
lois,  Agamemnon,  Vengeance,  Comwallis,  Suffren,  Charlemagne, 
Triumph,  and  Albion  were  later  to  take  position  further 
inshore  in  the  order  named,  from  south  to  north.     About 

11  o'clock  the  Agamemnon  was  struck  at  a  range  of  six 
miles  by  a  shell  from  Cape  Helles,  which  killed  three  and 
seriously  wounded  five  of  her  crew.  By  11.30  the  guns 
there  had  been  silenced  by  the  long  range  fire  of  the 
Queen  Elizabeth.  The  other  ships  stood  in  to  closer  range, 
some  2,000  yards. 

"It  says  much  of  the  courage  and  discipline  of  the  Turkish  artillery- 
men," continues  the  writer,  "that  though  they  had  to  face  overwhelming 
odds,  their  last  gun  was  not  silenced  till  after  5  P.  M.  Little  daylight 
remained,  but  covered  by  the  battleships  and  destroyers,  a  number  of 
North  Sea  trawlers  at  once  set  to  work  to  sweep  for  mines  in  the  en- 
trance. The  work  was  resumed  next  morning  at  sunrise  and  the  mine 
field  was  cleared  for  a  distance  of  four  miles  up  the  Strait.  Then  the 
Albion,  Vengeance,  and  Majestic  steamed  in  between  the  headlands  and 
opened  a  long  range  fire  on  Fort  Dardanos,  a  work  on  the  Asiatic  side 
some  distance  below  the  Narrows  (four  and  a  half  miles  below  Chanak). 
It  was  not  heavily  armed,  its  best  guns  being  four  5.9  Krupps.      As  the 


Naval  Operations  at  the  Dardanelles        93 

battleships  opened  fire,  a  reply  came  not  only  from  Dardanos  but  from 
several  unlocated  batteries  at  various  points  along  the  shore.  (The  Strait 
is  here  two  and  a  quarter  miles  broad.)  The  Turkish  fire,  however,  did 
little  harm,  and  we  were  able  to  attack  the  rear  of  the  entrance  forts  (which 
were  but  about  six  miles  in  the  other  direction  with  low  level  ground  in 
their  rear),  and  drive  off  several  bodies  of  Turkish  troops.  One  party 
near  Kum  Kale  was  driven  across  the  bridge  near  the  mouth  of  the  river 
Mendere  (the  ancient  Simois),  and  the  bridge  itself  destroyed  by  shell  fire." 

Believing  that  these  forts  had  been  abandoned,  marines 
were  sent  ashore  with  explosives  to  destroy  the  guns.  This 
was  accomplished,  a  detachment  of  Turks  was  encountered, 
a  hot  skirmish  ensued  and  the  marines  had  to  retire  with 
some  casualties. 

The  entrance  to  the  Strait  was  cleared,  but,  continues 
the  same  writer: 

"  This  was  only  the  easiest  part  of  the  problem,  and  only  the  beginning 
of  the  formidable  task  assigned  to  the  Allied  fleets.  The  real  defence  of 
the  Dardanelles — the  forts  at  the  Narrows — had  not  been  touched. 
Nevertheless,  with  that  misleading  optimism  which  has  done  so  much  to 
paralyze  national  effort,  the  Press  of  France  and  Britain  wrote  as  if  the 
fall  of  the  outer  forts  had  decided  the  fate  of  Constantinople  .  .  .  Enver 
(Pacha)  .  .  .  was  for  once  in  a  way  correct  when  he  told  a  correspondent : 
<•  The  real  defence  of  the  Straits  is  to  come.  That  lies  where  the  difficult 
waterway  deprives  ships  of  their  power  to  maneuver  freely  and  obliges 
them  to  move  in  a  narrow  defile  commanded  by  artillery  and  mines.'  " 

Attacks  were  continued  from  day  to  day.  On  March  1st 
the  Triumph,  Ocean,  and  Albion  bombarded  the  batteries  on 
the  low-lying  Kephez  Point  on  the  Asiatic  side  four  miles 
below  Chanak,  with  casualties  of  six  wounded,  and  four 
French  battleships  operated  against  the  lines  of  Bulair 
from  the  Gulf  of  Saros;  the  next  day  the  Canopus, 
Swiftsure,  and  Cornwallis  repeated  the  operations  of  the 
first  day  in  the  Strait  against  Point  Kephez  and  the  posi- 
tions opposite.  The  mine-layers,  covered  by  destroyers, 
were  active  within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  Point   Kephez, 


94  [E  Great  War 

with  sonic  half  dozen  of  their  crew  wounded.  The  Rus- 
sian cruiser  Askold  now  joined,  but  from  what  point  is 
not  mentioned. 

On  March  5th,  attack  was  begun  from  the  Gulf  of  Saros 
by  the  Queen  Elizabeth,  against  the  forts  of  Chanak,  firing 
over  the  land  at  a  range  of  21,000  yards,  or  about  twelve 
miles.  The  angle  of  fall  at  such  a  range  would  be  about 
twenty-five  degrees  and  thus  bore  some  resemblance  to  the 
tire  of  howitzers,  but  far  less  in  effect,  as  mentioned,  through 
the  reduced  angle  of  fall.  The  forts  thus  fired  against  were 
Rumilieh  Medjidieh  Tabia,  Hamadieh  II  Tabia,  and  Naza- 
mieh,  which  by  Admiralty  account  were  armed  as  follows: 
the  first,  with  two  11-inch,  four  9.4-inch,  and  3.4-inch  guns; 
the  second,  with  two  14-inch;  the  third,  with  one  11-inch, 
one  10.3-inch,  eleven  9.4-inch,  three  8.2-inch,  and  three 
5.9-inch.  The  Inflexible  and  Prince  George  were  present  to 
deal  with  the  neighboring  howitzer  and  field  artillery  fire. 
The  fire  was  observed  in  the  Strait  and  reported  by  the 
Irresistible,  Canopus,  Cornwallis,  and  Albion.  This  fire  directed 
and  spotted  by  aeroplanes,  required  extreme  accuracy  in 
range,  as  at  such  a  distance  the  angle  of  fall  was  about 
forty-five  degrees,  so  great  that  such  firing  was  akin  to 
howitzer  practice.  The  Queen  Elizabeth  fired  twenty-nine 
rounds  "with  satisfactory  results,"  it  being  stated  that  the 
magazine  of  Fort  Hamadieh  II  Tabia  (which,  as  men- 
tioned, was  armed  with  two  14-inch  guns),  was  blown  up. 
Action  next  day  was  favored  by  fine  weather.  The  Queen 
Elizabeth,  supported  by  the  Agamemnon  and  Ocean,  again 
fired,  with  a  like  range  of  21,000  yards  across  the  peninsula 
against  Forts  Hamadieh  I  Tabia  and  Hamadieh  III.  The 
former,  half  a  mile  below  Chanak,  was  armed  with  two 
14-inch  and  seven  9.4-inch  guns;  the  latter,  at  Chanak, 
with  two  14-inch,  one  9.4-inch,  one  8.2-inch,  and  four 
5.9-inch.    The  Queen  Elizabeth  was  replied  to  by  howitzers. 


Naval  Operations  at  the  Dardanelles        95 

and  field  guns;  three  shells  from  field  guns  struck  her 
without  causing  any  damage. 

Meanwhile,  inside  the  Strait,  the  Vengeance,  Albion,  Ma- 
jestic, Prince  George,  and  the  French  battleship,  Suffren,  fired 
on  Soghandere,  Mount  Dardanos,  and  were  fired  at  by  a 
number  of  concealed  guns. 

Fort  Rumilieh  Medjidieh  Tabia,  which  had  been  at- 
tacked on  the  previous  day,  opened  fire,  and  was  engaged 
and  hit  by  12-inch  shells.  The  majority  of  the  ships  inside 
were  struck  by  shells,  but  there  was  no  serious  damage 
and  no  casualties. 

"  On  March  7th  (the  Admiralty  reports  continue),  the  weather  continu- 
ing calm  and  fine,  four  French  battleships  (the  Gaulois,  Charlemagne,  Bouvet, 
and  Suffren)  entered  the  Strait  to  cover  the  direct  bombardment  of  the 
defences  of  the  Narrows  by  the  Agamemnon  and  Lord  Nelson.  The  French 
ships  engaged  the  Mount  Dardanos  battery  and  various  concealed  guns, 
silencing  the  former.  The  Agamemnon  and  Lord  Nelson  then  advanced 
and  engaged  the  forts  at  the  Narrows  at  14,000  yards  to  12,000  yards  by 
direct  fire  [a  distance  equivalent  to  about  eight  and  seven  land  miles;  the 
angle  of  fire  of  a  1 2-inch  shell  at  this  range  would  be  from  sixteen  degrees 
to  eighteen  degrees].  Forts  Rumilieh  Medjidieh  Tabia  (J)  and  Hama- 
dieh  I  Tabia  (U)  replied.  Both  were  silenced  after  heavy  bombardment. 
Explosions  occurred  in  both  forts.  Fort  I  (on  the  European  shore,  oppo- 
site Kephez  Point)  had  not  fired  since  the  explosion  on  the  5th.  The 
Gaulois,  Agamemnon,  and  Lord  Nelson  were  struck  three  times,  but  not 
seriously  damaged.      The  Lord  Nelson  had  three  men  slightly  wounded." 

While  these  operations  were  in  progress  the  Dublin  con- 
tinued to  watch  the  Bulair  Isthmus.  She  was  fired  at  by 
4-inch  guns  and  struck  three  or  four  times. 

Speaking  of  the  operations  of  this  day,  a  British  writer 
says: 

41  We  believed  that  we  had  put  the  Chanak  forts,  the  strongest  of  the 
Narrows,  out  of  action.  Subsequent  experience  showed  that  it  was  a 
difficult  matter  permanently  to  silence  the  forts.  Reports  of  German 
officers  made  it  clear  that  under  the  heavy  fire  of  the  ships  it  was  hard  to 
keep  the  guns  constantly  in  action,  not  so  much  on  account  of  any  serious 


%  The  Great  War 

damage,  but  because  the  batteries  were  flooded  with  stifling  vapors  from 
the  shells,  and  it  was  necessary  to  withdraw  the  men  until  the  air  cleared. 
Further,  the  defenders  had  been  ordered  to  economize  ammunition,  and  to 
reserve  their  tire  for  the  closer  attack  which  they  believed  would  follow. 
The  fact,  therefore,  that  a  fort  ceased  firing  was  no  proof  that  it  had  been 
really  silenced.  Again  and  again  during  these  operations  we  heard  of 
forts  being  silenced,  which  next  day,  or  a  few  days  after,  could  bring  most 
of  their  guns  into  action." 

The  Admiralty  reports  of  operations  of  March  7th  (such 
were  given  out  to  the  press  as  they  occurred),  says:  "Owing 
to  the  importance  of  locating  the  concealed  guns  the  sea- 
planes have  had  to  fly  very  low  on  occasions.  On  the  4th 
instant,  a  seaplane  .  .  .  became  unstable  and  nose-dived 
into  the  sea,  both  officers  (pilot  and  observer)  being  in- 
jured." Another  officer  reconnoitering  at  close  quarters 
was  wounded  but  managed  to  return  safely.  On  the  5th 
a  seaplane  was  hit  no  less  than  twenty-eight  times,  and 
another  eight  times  in  locating  concealed  positions.  "The 
Ark  Royal  is  equipped  with  every  appliance  necessary  for 
the  repair  and  maintenance  of  the  numerous  aircraft  she 
carries." 

Desultory  attacks  continued,  both  in  the  Strait  and 
against  the  Bulair  lines  at  long  range,  but  with  nothing  of 
decisive  character,  the  main  event  of  interest  being  the 
venture  too  far  of  the  cruiser  Amethyst  while  covering 
the  mine-sweepers.  Quoting  once  more  from  a  British 
writer's  account: 

"  She  was  suddenly  fired  upon  by  a  concealed  Turkish  battery  and  suf- 
fered terrible  loss  in  a  few  minutes.  As  the  result  of  a  dozen  hits  by  the 
Turkish  guns,  one-fifth  of  her  crew  were  put  out  of  action.  No  detailed 
account  of  this  unhappy  affair,  in  which  her  crew  displayed  the  utmost 
gallantry,  was  published  by  the  Admiralty,  and  this  [says  the  British  nar- 
rator] led  to  the  absurdest  legends  obtaining  credence.  Thus  it  was  said 
that  she  had  run  through  the  Narrows,  and  entered  the  Sea  of  Marmora. 
The  Nation  was  thus  allowed  to  rest  under  a  complete  misconception  of 
the  tremendous  difficulty  of  the  task  before  its  Navy." 


Camouflaged  British  cruiser  in  the  Dardanelles. 


The  British  and  French  squadrons  ofl"  the  Dardanelles. 


Naval  Operations  at  the  Dardanelles        97 

Admiral  Carden  was  obliged,  through  illness,  to  give  up 
the  command,  on  March  16th,  to  Vice-admiral  John  M.  de 
Robeck.  Two  days  later,  on  March  18th,  the  great  and 
serious  effort  of  the  ships  was  made. 

"It  was  a  bright,  clear  day  with  a  light  wind  and  calm  sea.  At  a 
quarter  to  eleven  in  the  forenoon,  the  ghxeen  Elizabeth,  Agamemnon,  Lord 
Nelson,  Triumph,  and  Prince  George  steamed  up  the  Straits  towards  the 
Narrows.  The  first  four  ships  engaged  the  forts  of  Chanak  and  the  bat- 
tery on  the  point  opposite,  while  the  Triumph  and  Prince  George  kept  the 
batteries  lower  down  occupied  by  firing  at  Soghandere  and  Kephez  Point. 
After  the  bombardment  had  lasted  for  an  hour  and  a  half  during  which 
the  ships  were  fired  upon  not  only  by  the  forts  but  by  howitzers,  and  field 
guns  on  the  heights,  the  French  squadron,  Bouvet,  Charlemagne,  Gaulois, 
and  Suffren  came  into  action,  steaming  in  to  attack  the  forts  at  short  range 
[a  mile  from  Kephez  Point;  four  from  the  forts  of  Chanak;  the  British 
ships  were,  in  this  phase,  seven  miles  from  Chanak;  later  six  of  the  eleven 
engaged  were  to  take  position  off"  Kephez  Point  which  is  three  miles  from 
Chanak].  Under  the  combined  fire  of  the  ten  [nine  at  the  moment]  ships 
the  forts  once  more  ceased  firing.  A  third  squadron  then  entered  the 
Straits  to  push  the  attack  further.  This  was  made  up  of  six  British  bat- 
tleships, the  Albion,  Irresistible,  Ocean,  Majestic,  Swiftsure,  and  Vengeance. 
As  they  steered  toward  Chanak,  the  four  French  ships  were  withdrawn  in 
order  to  make  room  for  them  in  the  narrow  waters  [the  channel  is  three 
and  a  half  nautical  miles  (four  land  miles)  broad  at  Kephez  Point],  but 
in  the  process  of  this  change  all  the  forts  suddenly  began  to  fire  again, 
which  showed  that  none  of  them  were  seriously  damaged.  According  to 
Turkish  accounts,  only  one  big  gun  had  been  dismounted. 

"Then  came  the  first  disaster  of  the  day,"  continues  Mr.  Buchan, 
"the  French  squadron  was  moving  down  to  the  open  water  inside  the 
Straits  being  still  under  fire  from  the  inner  forts  [at  Chanak].  An  officer 
on  a  British  destroyer  who  was  watching  its  movements  reported  that  he 
saw  three  large  shells  strike  the  Bouvet  almost  simultaneously,  and  that 
immediately  after  there  was  a  loud  explosion  and  she  was  hidden  in  a  cloud 
of  smoke.  The  first  impression  was  that  she  had  been  seriously  damaged  by 
shell  fire,  but  her  real  wound  was  from  one  of  the  mines  which  the  Turks 
were  now  sending  down  with  the  current.  They  had  waited  to  begin  this 
new  attack  till  the  narrow  waterway  was  full  of  ships.  As  the  smoke 
cleared  the  Bouvet  was  seen  to  be  heeling  over.  She  sank  in  three  minutes, 
carrying  with  her  most  of  her  crew. 

"The  attack  on  the  forts  continued  as  long  as  the  light  lasted.  The 
mine-sweepers  had  been  brought  up  the  Straits  in  order  to  clear  the  pas- 


98  The  Great  War 

sage  in  front,  and  to  look  out  for  drift  mines.  An  hour  and  a  half  after 
the  Bouvet  sank,  the  Irresistible  turned  out  of  the  fighting  line  with  a  heavy 
list.  She  also  had  been  struck  by  a  mine,  but  she  floated  for  more  than 
an  hour,  and  the  destroyers  took  off  nearly  all  her  crew — a  dangerous  task, 
for  they  were  a  target  all  the  time  for  Turkish  tire.  She  sank  at  ten  min- 
si\,  ami  a  quarter  of  an  hour  later  another  drift  mine  struck  the 
Ocean.  The  latter  sank  almost  as  quickly  as  the  Bouvet,  hut  the  destroyers 
were  on  the  alert,  and  saved  most  of  her  crew.  Several  of  the  other  ships 
had  suffered  damage  and  loss  of  life  from  the  Turkish  guns.  The  Gaulois 
hat!  been  repeatedly  hit,  her  upper  works  were  seriously  injured,  and  a  huge 
rent  had  been  torn  in  her  bows.  The  Inflexible  had  been  struck  by  a  heavy 
shell,  which  killed  and  wounded  the  majority  of  the  men  and  officers  in 
her  fire-control  station,  and  set  her  on  fire  forward. 

"As  the  sun  set  most  of  the  forts  were  still  in  action,  and  during  the 
short  twilight  the  Allied  fleet  slipped  out  of  the  Dardanelles.  The  great 
attack  on  the  Narrows  had  failed — failed  with  the  loss  of  three  battleships 
and  more  than  2,000  men." 

But  this  was  not  all.  In  addition  there  were  heavy 
damages  to  others  of  the  fleet.  The  "memorandum"  of 
Mr.  Roch,  Report  of  the  Dardanelles  Commission,  says: 

"The  Inflexible  had  various  compartments  flooded,  and  at  one  time  was 
in  danger  of  sinking;  the  Suff'ren  was  also  hit  below  water  and  had  to  be 
docked;  the  Gaulois  was  badly  damaged  and  had  to  be  beached  on  Drepana 
Island;  the  Charlemagne  had  her  stoke-hole  (in  American,  fire-room) 
flooded;  the  Agamemnon  had  one  12-inch  gun  damaged;  the  Lord  Nelson 
had  one  9.2-inch  gun  put  out  of  action,  (and)  the  Albion  s  fore  turret  was 
put  out  of  action  for  some  days. 

"Thus  out  of  the  sixteen  attacking  ships,  three  were  sunk  and  four 
others  so  severely  damaged  that  they  had  to  be  docked.  In  spite  of  these 
losses  Admiral  de  Robeck  telegraphed  to  the  Admiralty  on  the  following  day 
that  the  squadron  was  ready  for  immediate  action  except  as  regards  ships 
lost  and  damaged  but  it  was  necessary  to  reconsider  the  plan  of  attack." 

This  eventful  day  has  been  described  from  the  Turkish 
side  by  correspondents  of  the  American  Associated  Press. 
After  stating  that  the  Turkish  forts  had  not  been  silenced 
and  the  losses  sustained  by  their  garrisons  nominal,  the 
report  continues: 


Naval  Operations  at  the  Dardanelles        99 

"The  action  lasted  nearly  seven  hours,  during  which  time  there  was  a 
terrific  cannonade  from  the  ships  of  the  Allies  and  the  Turkish  forts. 
The  fire  from  the  warships  at  times  was  exceedingly  severe,  while  the 
Turkish  gunners  maintained  their  precision  wonderfully,  even  when  they 
were  literally  buried  in  the  earth  and  debris  which  the  exploding  shells 
from  the  warships  threw  broadcast  over  their  positions.  The  Allies  put 
in  an  appearance  about  11.30  a.m.,  throwing  their  first  shells  in  the 
town  of  Chanak-Kalessi.  Their  vessels  at  this  hour  numbered  four 
French  and  five  British  battleships.  A  little  later  five  British  warships 
entered  the  bay,  and  the  bombardment  became  truly  terrific  and  wonder- 
fully spectacular.  The  correspondent  of  the  Associated  Press  had  taken 
shelter  in  Fort  Chimenlik,  but  he  was  driven  out  by  shells  to  a  position 
on  a  hill  outside  the  town.  But  even  this  hill  already  was  burning  in 
two  places,  as  a  result  of  exploding  shells.  In  the  beginning  the  range 
of  the  British  and  French  gunners  was  excellent.  The  correspondent 
saw  a  shell  land  fair  on  a  corner  of  the  Fort  Kale-Sultanie  tower  and  tear 
a  large  hole  in  the  masonry.  This  rooted  out  a  party  of  newspaper  cor- 
respondents who  were  just  about  to  leave  cover. 

"While  traversing  Chanak-Kalessi  several  houses  were  knocked  to 
pieces  by  exploding  shells.  The  trip  to  the  town  was  accelerated  by  the 
well-directed  shots.  .  .  .  The  hillside  toward  which  the  correspond- 
ents were  making  their  way  was  finally  reached  about  12.30.  It  was  then 
seen  that  the  British  had  concentrated  their  fire  upon  the  forts.  The  noise 
of  the  explosions  and  the  replies  of  the  Turkish  batteries  were  deafening. 
The  area  of  the  fire  was  so  extended  that  at  certain  times  the  correspond- 
ents were  unable  to  find  cover  anywhere.  A  certain  vantage  point  was, 
however,  finally  decided  upon,  and  from  this  position  the  observers  looked 
upon  a  wonderful  assault, — the  concentrated  attack  of  a  large  group  of 
modern  battleships  against  well-built  and  well-defended  land  fortifications. 
The  British  [Allied]  ships  were  firing  heavily  and  continuously.  At  times 
the  smoke  was  so  thick  that  it  completely  blotted  out  the  horizon  and 
totally  enveloped  the  particular  Turkish  fort  under  fire.  One  would  get 
glimpses  of  the  fortifications  lifting  their  higher  points  out  of  clouds  of 
gray  smoke.  The  severity  of  the  fire  led  one  to  think  the  fort  had  been 
blown  away,  but  time  and  again  the  smoke  cleared  and  showed  the  Turkish 
position  virtually  undamaged. 

"The  fire  of  the  Turks  was  rapid  and  accurate,  so  much  so  that  the 
fire  from  the  Allied  warships  began  to  be  erratic.  Many  shots  flew  high 
while  others  fell  short.  One  result  of  this  was  that  the  town  of  Chanak- 
Kalessi,  behind  Forts  Hamadieh  and  Chimenlik,  had  wide  avenues  cut 
through  it.  Fire  broke  out  in  the  Greek  quarter  and  destroyed  a  con- 
siderable number  of  houses.  In  the  meanwhile  Turkish  soldiers  were 
formed  into  fire  brigades  and  were  successful  in  keeping  the  flames  in  check. 


100  The  Great  War 

"The  bombardment  reached  us  greatest  intensity  at  3.15  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon,  when  of  a  sudden  the  French  battleship  liouvet  was  observed 
by  the  Associated  Press  correspondent  to  be  riding  low  by  the  stun.  The 
next  minute  she  swung  a  little  to  port.  At  the  same  moment  her  stern 
disappeared  under  water.  For  about  two  minutes  she  held  in  this  posi- 
tion, the  water  nearing  her  conning  tower.  Then  she  settled  completely 
bv  the  stern,  her  bows  clear  of  the  water  and  pointing  toward  the  sky. 
The  next  instant  the  waves  closed  over  the  ill-fated  vessel.  On  shore  it 
was  understood  that  she  struck  a  mine.  Boats  rushed  to  the  rescue  but 
few  men  were  saved.  A  few  minutes  later  the  Associated  Press  corre- 
spondent was  watching  a  British  vessel  believed  to  be  the  Irresistible.  He 
saw  a  large  Turkish  shell  strike  her  deck.  When  the  smoke  of  the  ex- 
plosion had  died  away  it  was  seen  that  the  vessel's  foremast  had  been  cut 
near  the  crow's  nest  and  bent  on  one  side.  The  mast  rigging  was  hanging 
down  in  a  tangled  mass.  This  same  shot  apparently  damaged  the  machin- 
ery, for  it  was  seen  that  the  vessel  was  experiencing  difficulty  in  gaining 
the  open  sea.  This  was  hardly  over  when  the  correspondent  saw  another 
vessel  struck  heavily  on  deck.  She  was  also  obliged  to  retire  under  a 
galling  Turkish  fire. 

"  But  the  greatest  tragedy  came  at  about  a  quarter  before  five  in  the 
afternoon,  when  a  British  warship  [the  Ocean]  was  so  badly  damaged  that 
she  was  obliged  to  run  ashore  within  range  of  the  Turkish  guns.  For 
one  hour,  until  a  quarter  before  six,  warships  of  the  Allies  stood  by  and 
protected  their  stranded  companion  with  a  heavy  fire  on  the  Turkish  forts, 
but  the  coming  night  obliged  them  to  withdraw,  leaving  behind  them  the 
fated  vessel.  The  Turkish  guns  directed  an  accurate  fire  against  her  and 
she  was  holding  out  at  the  time  this  dispatch  was  written  and  started  on 
its  way  to  Constantinople.  The  correspondent  saw  eight  shots  strike  the 
vessel's  deck  full  and  square  in  a  space  of  about  ten  minutes.  Neverthe- 
less, she  continued  to  return  this  terrific  fire  to  the  best  of  her  ability. 
But  her  shots  had  no  apparent  effect  upon  the  forts.  As  night  came  on 
the  Turkish  guns  seemed  to  be  giving  the  final  touch  to  their  work.  The 
fire  from  all  the  vessels  of  the  Allied  fleet  came  to  an  end  at  sundown. 
Not  one  gun  of  a  Turkish  fort  was  silenced  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  some- 
thing between  1,200  and  2,000  shells  had  been  fired  at  the  shore  positions. 

"The  casualties  to  the  Turks  undoubtedly  were  very  small  and  the 
material  damage  inflicted  by  the  shell  fire  of  yesterday  was  very  slight.  A 
British  vessel,  the  Vengeance,  was  damaged  by  the  guns  of  the  forts  and 
drifted  helplessly  toward  the  entrance  to  the  Straits,  where  her  crew  was 
taken  off  by  the  torpedo  boats.  This  vessel  did  not  leave  the  Dardanelles 
waters,  nor  did  any  other  British  vessel  enter  during  the  night  to  bring 
help,  but  the  ship  this  morning  had  disappeared.  A  fourth  vessel  was 
struck  in  the  turret  and  otherwise  damaged  by  a  Turkish  shell.     She  was 


Naval  Operations  at  the  Dardanelles      101 

also  taken  out  of  action.  The  British  battleship  ®>ueen  Elizabeth  was  hit 
five  times  by  howitzer  shell  and  the  battle  cruiser  Inflexible  was  struck 
four  times. 

"The  foregoing  is  a  summary  of  the  reports  made  during  the  day  by 
observers  who  were  unable  last  night  to  reach  the  Turkish  headquarters. 

"The  Associated  Press  correspondent,"  says  the  New  York  Tribune, 
"to-day  visited  the  forts  which  had  been  bombarded.  The  material  dam- 
age was  slight  generally.  The  casualties  on  the  Turkish  side  were  about 
twenty  men  killed  and  thirty-five  wounded." 

Though  the  Turkish  forts  had  done  well  and  were  still 
serviceable,  it  was  the  mines  sent  down  with  the  current  to 
which  the  defeat  was  chiefly  due.  It  is  the  opinion  of  the 
writer  that  but  for  these,  the  forts  could  have  been  passed. 
This  would  seem  to  be  also  the  view  of  the  admiral  in 
command  (de  Robeck),  who,  in  a  telegram  on  March  17th, 
stating  that:  "weather  permitting  I  will  proceed  with 
operations  to-morrow,"  added :  "  I  am  convinced  that  suc- 
cess depends  on  our  ability  to  clear  the  mine  fields  for 
forcing  the  Narrows.  .  .  ."  The  constant  current  from 
the  Sea  of  Marmora  to  the  Aegean  was  a  great  factor  in  the 
Turks'  success. 

The  next  day,  March  19th,  was  so  stormy  that  the  aero- 
planes could  not  be  used  to  direct  the  fire.  This,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  serious  losses  of  three  battleships,  held  up 
further  action  for  the  time  being.  The  Admiralty  in  its 
statement,  however,  said:  "The  power  of  the  fleet  to 
dominate  the  fortresses  by  superiority  of  fire  seems  to  be 
established."  The  First  Lord  (Mr.  Churchill)  said:  "I  re- 
garded it  only  as  the  first  of  several  days'  fighting,  though 
the  loss  in  ships  sunk  or  disabled  was  unpleasant.  It  never 
occurred  to  me  for  a  moment  that  we  should  not  go  on, 
within  the  limits  of  what  we  had  decided  to  risk,  till  we 
reached  a  decision  one  way  or  the  other.  I  found  Lord 
Fisher  and  Sir  Arthur  Wilson  in  the  same  mood.  Both 
met  me  that  morning  [the  19th]  with  expressions  of  firm 


102  The  Great  War 

determination  to  fight  it  out."  At  a  meeting  of  the  War 
Council  on  March  19th,  it  was  decided  to  inform  Vice- 
admira]  de  Robeck  that  he  could  continue  operations  "if 
he  saw  fit."  But  the  admiral,  though  he  had  previously 
telegraphed  that  he  did  not  think  the  events  of  the  18th 
decisive,  changed  his  views  on  meeting  General  Sir  Ian 
Hamilton  on  March  22d  and  telegraphed  on  the  26th  that  he 
considered  a  combined  operation  essential.  Mr.  Churchill 
records,  as  set  forth  in  the  Report  of  the  Dardanelles  Com- 
mission: "I  proposed  that  we  should  direct  the  admiral 
to  renew  the  naval  attack,  according  to  his  previous  inten- 
tion. The  First  Sea  Lord  [Fisher],  however,  did  not  agree; 
nor  did  Sir  Arthur  Wilson;  nor  did  Sir  Henry  Jackson. 
Lord  Fisher  took  the  line  that  hitherto  he  had  been  willing 
to  carry  the  enterprise  forward,  because  it  was  supported 
and  recommended  by  the  commander  on  the  spot.  .  .  . 
Both  the  Prime  Minister  and  Mr.  Balfour,  with  whom  I 
discussed  the  matter,  were  inclined  to  my  view,  but  as  our 
professional  adviser  and  the  admiral  on  the  spot  were 
against  it,  it  was  impossible  to  go  further,  and  I  bowed  to 
this  decision,  but  with  regret  and  anxiety." 

But  the  idea  of  the  necessity  of  the  use  of  a  land  force 
had  been  steadily  developing  from  an  early  date;  not  that 
there  was  particular  doubt  as  to  the  ability  to  pass  the  forts 
by  the  navy,  but  with  the  view  to  occupancy  after  they 
were  silenced  or  destroyed.  Thus  "at  an  informal  meeting 
of  some  of  the  Ministers  on  February  16th,  it  was  decided 
to  despatch  the  29th  Division  [18,000],  to  Lemnos  and  that 
the  Admiralty  should  build  special  transports  and  lighters 
suitable  for  the  conveyance  and  landing  of  a  force  of  50,000 
men  at  any  point  where  they  might  be  required.  .  .  .  the 
scope  of  the  intended  military  operations  was  left  in  doubt. 
Lord  Kitchener  and  others  still  clung  to  the  idea  that  suc- 
cess was  attainable  by  naval  action  alone.    .    ,    ." 


Naval  Operations  at  the  Dardanelles      103 

"In  the  meanwhile,  the  Admiralty,  in  accordance  with 
the  decision  arrived  at  on  February  16th,  had  been  prepar- 
ing transports  to  convey  the  29th  Division  to  the  Mediter- 
ranean. It  was  calculated  that  their  departure  would 
commence  on  the  22d. 

The  necessary  steps  to  concentrate  troops  in  the  Medi- 
terranean went  forward.  On  the  20th  of  February,  the 
two  Australian  and  New  Zealand  Divisions  in  Egypt  were 
prepared  for  service  at  the  Dardanelles  and  placed  under 
the  command  of  General  Birdwood.  Transports  were 
arranged  for  them  and  for  the  29th  Division  and  the  Naval 
Division  in  England.  By  the  end  of  February,  a  French 
division  of  18,000  men  was  ready  to  embark.  The  Naval 
Division  of  11,000  men  sailed  on  March  3d.  The  approxi- 
mate strength  of  the  force  thus  available  consisted  of  81,000 
men  of  all  ranks,  with  178  guns  and  25,036  horses,  in  ad- 
dition to  which  there  was  a  Russian  Corps  of  47,000  men, 
298  guns,  and  10,750  horses. 

Three  weeks  of  valuable  time  had,  however,  been  lost. 
The  transports,  which  might  have  left  on  February  22d, 
did  not  get  away  until  March  16th. 

On  March  12th  General  Sir  Ian  Hamilton,  an  officer  of 
forty  years'  service,  had  been  nominated  for  the  command. 
He  left  next  day  for  the  Dardanelles.  The  transports 
gathered  in  Mudros  Bay  whence  the  great  fleet  sailed  on 
April  24th  for  the  landing  and  attack  which  took  place  next 
day,  April  25th.  The  second  phase  of  the  great  venture, 
one  outside  the  scope  of  this  chapter,  and  which  was  to 
exhibit  the  spirit  of  sacrifice  in  its  completest  form,  equally 
by  Briton  and  Turk,  was  now  to  begin.  The  struggle 
makes  a  human  story  of  unsurpassed  devotion  and  interest. 

Naval  action  was  of  course  to  continue,  but  it  was  now 
secondary.  The  main  effort  was  now  that  of  the  army  to 
take  and  hold  the  many  forts  of  the  great  fortress.     The 


104  The  Great  War 

main  objective  was  Maidos,  possessing  which,  Chanak 
would  have  to  yield  under  the  combined  effort  of  army 
and  naval  attack.     Hut  it  was  not  to  be. 

The  naval  losses  in  the  Dardanelles  and  the  Sea  of  Mar- 
mora were:  British  battleships  Irresistible  and  Ocean  on 
March  18,  1915,  the  Goliath,  torpedoed  May  12th,  the  Tri- 
umph, May  25th,  and  the  Majestic,  May  27th,  the  last  two 
sunk  by  submarine  attack ;  submarine  E-15,  ran  aground  in 
the  Dardanelles  and  was  destroyed  April  18, 1915,  by  British 
picket  boats  to  prevent  falling  into  enemy  hands;  AE-2, 
sunk  in  the  Sea  of  Marmora  April  30,  1915;  E-7  sunk  on 
September  4, 1915,  and  the  E-22  sunk  on  November  5, 1915. 

The  French  losses  were  the  battleship  Bouvet  on  March 
18th;  the  submarines  Saphir,  January  17,  1915,  Joule,  May 
1,  1915,  Mariotte,  July  26,  1915,  Turquoise,  injured  by  gun- 
fire, in  the  Sea  of  Marmora,  November  3,  1915,  refloated 
by  the  Turks  and  renamed  Ahmed. 

The  Turkish  losses  were  the  battleship  Messudieh,  sunk 
by  a  submarine  in  the  Dardanelles,  December  14, 1914;  the 
Kheyr-ed-Din,  torpedoed  in  the  Sea  of  Marmora,  August 
9,  1915;  the  destroyer  Yadikar  Milet,  in  April,  1915,  three 
gunboats  during  1915;  and  the  transports,  Nagara,  Carmen, 
and  Rechid  Pacha  in  May,  October,  and  December,  1915, 
the  Carmen  being  of  4,424  and  the  Rechid  Pacha  of  8,000 
tons. 


CHAPTER  V 

The  Campaign  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula 

Topography  of  the  peninsula.  The  main  purpose  of  the  operations. 
Difficulties  of  access  to  the  peninsula.  Composition  of  the  expeditionary 
forces.  The  landings  of  the  British  on  the  peninsula,  April  25-26,  1915; 
great  difficulties  at  the  beaches.  Descent  of  the  French  on  Kum 
Kale.  The  battle  of  April  27-28  and  consolidation  of  the  Allied  front 
with  the  French  contingent  on  the  right.  Turkish  attack  on  May  1st. 
The  struggle  for  Krithia,  May  6-8.  General  significance  of  the  operations 
on  the  peninsula.  The  battle  of  June  4th.  The  progress  of  the  French, 
June  21-30,  and  of  the  British  on  the  28th.  Need  of  reinforcements.  The 
plan  for  the  supreme  effort  in  August.  The  struggle  for  the  Sari  Bahr 
ridge,  August  6-10.  The  new  landing  at  Suvla  Bay,  August  7th,  and  the 
procrastinating  methods  in  that  quarter.  Failure  of  the  great  effort  and  of 
the  expedition.     Conclusions. 

The  failure  of  the  naval  attack  on  March  18th  to  effect 
the  passage  of  the  Dardanelles  forced  recognition  of  the 
fact  that  successful  land  attacks  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula 
were  indispensable  as  a  preliminary  to  the  passage  of  the 
Strait  by  the  Allied  fleets.  It  is,  therefore,  with  the  change 
of  the  attack  to  the  military  arm  that  the  second  chapter 
of  the  operations  in  this  quarter  is  inaugurated. 

The  most  conspicuous  topographical  feature  of  the  region 
is  the  communicating  waterway  between  the  seas,  which 
shuns  its  most  obvious  place  of  outlet  in  the  Gulf  of  Saros 
and,  by  swerving  to  the  left,  runs  for  nearly  fifty  miles  in 
a  course  roughly  parallel  with  the  coast-line  of  the  Aegean, 
severing  the  long  tongue  of  land  known  as  the  Gallipoli 
Peninsula  from  the  northwestern  littoral  of  Asia  Minor. 

The  breadth  of  this  peninsula  hardly  exceeds  twelve 
miles  at  any  point.    In  the  critical  section  of  the  forts  that 

105 


106  The  Great  War 

guard  the  Narrows  it  is  about  six  miles  broad.  While  all 
important  points  were  thus  within  possible  range  of  the 
most  powerful  guns  of  warships  operating  off  the  Aegean 
side,  the  surface  of  the  promontory  was  a  network  of  ele- 
vations and  abrupt  ravines  which  offered  abundant  chance 
for  cover  and  concealment. 

The  proximity  of  the  sea  to  the  back  of  all  the  Turkish 
strongholds  on  the  European  margin  of  the  Dardanelles, 
facilitating  the  distribution  of  hostile  troops  and  supplies, 
and  the  shortness  of  the  distances  to  be  traversed  made  this 
side  of  the  strait  unquestionably  more  advantageous  for  the 
operations  of  a  landing  force. 

All  the  important  forts  that  closed  the  passage  of  the 
Dardanelles  were  comprised  within  the  section  of  the  banks 
facing  the  narrow  channel  between  Kephez  Point  and 
Nagara  Point.  At  a  height  of  about  700  feet  the  plateau 
of  Pasha  Dagh,  west  of  Kilid  Bahr,  overlooks  these  strong- 
holds, while  further  south  a  rocky  barrier  traverses  the 
peninsula,  the  highest  peak  of  which  is  Achi  Baba,  about 
600  feet  above  the  sea. 

The  main  objective  of  the  offensive  on  the  peninsula 
was,  of  course,  the  possession  of  the  heights  overlooking 
the  Narrows,  which  would  enable  the  Allied  artillery  to 
sweep  the  Turkish  fortresses  on  both  banks  and  command 
the  entire  narrow  section  of  the  strait. 

A  rugged  country,  covered  in  large  part  with  prickly 
scrub-bushes,  roadless,  and  with  scanty  water  supply  offered 
unusual  obstacles  to  the  penetration  of  the  peninsula. 
Moreover,  the  absence  of  a  sheltered  harbor  made  the 
task  of  landing  troops  and  supplies  dependent  on  lighters 
and  other  small  craft,  a  condition  which  in  the  event  of 
unusual  stress  might  imperil  operations.  The  shores  were 
almost  everywhere  steep  and  the  few  available  approaches 
from   the   sea   were   easily   barricaded.      Under    German 


The  Campaign  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula   107 

supervision  the  Turks  had  constructed  lines  of  trenches 
supplied  with  numerous  machine-guns  and  field-pieces, 
which,  supplementing  the  natural  advantages,  obstructed 
every  avenue  of  progress  for  the  invader. 

There  were  three  possible  lines  of  communication  be- 
tween the  Turkish  defensive  positions  on  the  Gallipoli 
Peninsula  and  Constantinople:  the  highway  from  Uzun 
Kupru,  a  station  on  the  Oriental  Railway,  to  Gallipoli  and 
Maidos,  which  had  been  extensively  repaired  in  recent 
years,  but  passed  on  the  Bulair  isthmus  within  the  possible 
range  of  fire  of  hostile  warships  in  the  Gulf  of  Saros;  the 
water-route  through  the  Sea  of  Marmora,  which  was 
eventually  rendered  perilous  by  the  action  of  the  Allied 
submarines;  and,  finally,  the  land  route  on  the  Asiatic  side 
connecting  with  ferries  across  the  Narrows  from  Chanak 
to  Kilid  Bahr,  where  the  strait  contracts  to  a  width  of  only 
1,300  yards. 

The  Allied  plan  of  operations  was  based  upon  a  con- 
verging movement  from  various  landing-places  in  the 
southwestern  half  of  the  peninsula  towards  the  heights 
that  overlooked  the  Turkish  forts.  Considering  the  hard- 
ships suffered  by  the  invaders  in  aiming  at  this  central 
position  back  of  Kilid  Bahr,  one  is  led  to  surmise  that  with 
far  lighter  sacrifices  the  Allies  might  have  cut  off  their 
adversaries  and  accomplished  their  purpose  if  they  had 
launched  their  principal  attack  from  the  innermost  recess 
of  the  Gulf  of  Saros  across  the  slender  neck  of  land  east- 
ward towards  the  Sea  of  Marmora. 

But  two  chief  reasons  weighed  against  the  adoption  of 
such  a  plan:  first,  the  distance  to  the  island  bases;  secondly, 
the  main  Turkish  defenses  near  Kilid  Bahr  could  be  main- 
tained by  the  line  of  communications  along  the  Asiatic 
shore  of  the  strait.  The  military  operations  were  after  all 
subsidiary  to  the  action  of  the  fleet  and  therefore,  unless 


108  The  Great  War 

the  forts  near  Kilid  Bahr  were  silenced  and  the  channel 
( (pencil,  do  advantage  gained  on  land  could  have  changed 
decisively  the  general  situation.  Unless  the  Allies  had 
been  prepared  to  furnish  vastly  greater  forces  for  the  east- 
ern operations,  their  armies  could  never  have  advanced  on 
Constantinople  by  penetrating  the  Chatalja  lines,  which  had 
withstood  the  onslaught  of  the  victorious  Bulgarian  hosts 
two  years  before. 

The  British  Mediterranean  Expeditionary  Force  consisted 
of  the  Twenty-ninth  Division,  almost  wholly  composed  of 
regulars,  under  Major-general  A.  G.  Hunter-Weston,  the 
Naval  Division,  which  had  taken  part  in  the  defense  of 
Antwerp,  the  Australian  and  Australian-New  Zealand  Divi- 
sions, forming  a  corps  commanded  by  Lieutenant-general 
Sir  W.  R.  Birdwood,  the  East  Lancashire  Territorial  Divi- 
sion, which  had  spent  the  winter  in  Egypt,  and  a  consider- 
able number  of  Indian  troops,  altogether  a  strength  of 
three  army  corps.  The  general  command  was  entrusted 
to  General  Sir  Ian  Hamilton,  who  had  been  Commander- 
in-chief  in  the  Mediterranean  and  Inspector-general  of  the 
Overseas  Forces  since  1910,  and  was  already  distinguished 
as  a  skilful  author,  gallant  officer,  and  able  administra- 
tive chief. 

The  French  Corps  Expeditionnaire  de  l'Orient  consisted 
of  detachments  from  the  Fusiliers  Marins,  the  Armee 
Coloniale,  and  the  Foreign  Legion,  and  was  commanded 
by  General  d'Amade,  who  in  consequence  of  a  severe 
wound  was  relieved  by  General  Gouraud  on  May  10th. 

On  April  7th,  Sir  Ian  Hamilton,  accompanied  by  his 
general  staff,  sailed  from  Egypt,  where  the  Allied  Expedi- 
tionary Forces  were  assembled,  to  Lemnos,  which  had 
been  selected  as  base  and  chief  headquarters. 

The  landing  of  the  expeditionary  forces  was  set  for  April 
25th  and  it  was  arranged  that  simultaneous  disembarkation. 


Troops  in  lifeboats  being  towed  from  the  transports  to  landings  on  the 


The  Campaign  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula   109 

should  be  made  at  as  many  points  as  possible,  so  as  to 
distract  the  enemy.  But  all  the  landing-points  on  the 
Gallipoli  Peninsula  were  grouped  within  two  distinct  sec- 
tions of  the  coast-line.  The  one  extended  northward  from 
Gaba  Tepe  and  was  assigned  to  the  Australian  and  New 
Zealand  Army  Corps, — the  initials  of  which  gave  the  con- 
venient "Anzac," — while  the  other  stretched  around  the 
southern  extremity  of  the  peninsula  and  included  Capes 
Tekke  and  Helles  and  the  village  Sedd-ul-Bahr  in  its  scope. 

The  Second  Squadron,  which  was  assigned  to  escort  the 
transports  conveying  the  Anzac,  sailed  from  Mudros  Bay  in 
the  island  of  Lemnos  on  the  afternoon  of  April  24th  and 
arrived  within  four  miles  of  the  appointed  landing-place 
just  before  the  moon  set  about  three  on  the  morning  of 
the  25th.  No  signs  of  life  were  seen  along  the  shore. 
The  4,000  troops  of  the  covering  force  moved  towards  the 
beach  in  small  boats  and  in  the  destroyers,  which  could 
approach  unusually  near  at  this  place.  But  when  the  boats 
were  quite  close,  a  Turkish  battalion,  suddenly  appearing 
on  the  beach,  opened  a  violent  fire  of  small  arms. 

Scarcely  waiting  for  the  boats  to  touch  the  beach,  here 
only  a  narrow  strip  of  land  about  1,000  yards  in  length,  the 
Australians  leapt  ashore  and  sprang  at  the  enemy  with 
fixed  bayonets.  Seized  by  the  impulsive  enthusiasm  of 
the  moment,  many  of  the  boat-crews  deserted  their  less 
thrilling  duties,  and,  grasping  oars  or  other  casual  weapons, 
joined  in  the  impetuous  onslaught.  The  Turks  gave  way 
and  were  hotly  pursued  for  a  considerable  distance. 

Following  up  their  heroic  landing  the  Australians  scaled 
with  extraordinary  agility  and  gallantry  the  steep  banks 
overlooking  the  beach.  The  shell-fire  of  the  Turkish 
warships  in  the  Narrows  across  the  peninsula  and  the  fire 
of  the  artillery  on  the  hillsides  facing  the  beach  kept  the 
British  transports  at  a  safe  distance  from  the  shore  and  thus 


110  The  Great  War 

retarded  the  disembarkation.  The  British  squadron  bom- 
barded the  Turkish  position  in  reply  and  covered  as  well 
as  possible  the  landing  of  the  troops. 

By  afternoon  the  units  already  disembarked  formed  a 
continuous  semicircular  front  with  the  extremities  resting 
on  the  sea,  embracing  some  of  the  lesser  ridges,  but  over- 
looked by  the  Turkish  positions  on  the  more  prominent 
elevations  further  east.  Repeated  Turkish  attacks,  sup- 
ported by  heavy  artillery  fire,  failed  to  make  any  impression 
on  the  Anzac  front,  which  was  growing  stronger  all  the 
time.  By  the  close  of  the  26th  the  possession  of  an  initial 
position  north  of  Gaba  Tepe  could  be  regarded  as  secure. 

The  other  flotilla  left  Tenedos  about  midnight  and 
reached  the  final  rendezvous  off  Cape  Helles  just  before 
dawn  on  the  25th.  The  war  vessels  took  the  positions 
which  had  been  assigned  to  them  and  commenced  a  vio- 
lent bombardment  of  the  enemy's  defenses  about  five 
o'clock.  The  troops  were  being  transferred  to  the  small 
boats  and  as  rapidly  as  possible  towed  ashore  by  the  pin- 
naces. The  five  landing-places  were  situated  respectively 
about  two  miles  and  one  mile  northeast  of  Cape  Tekke; 
between  Cape  Tekke  and  Cape  Helles;  between  Cape 
Helles  and  the  village  of  Sedd-ul-Bahr;  and  at  Morto  Bay, 
just  inside  the  Dardanelles. 

The  troops  landing  at  the  first  of  the  places  indicated 
above  gained  the  summit  of  the  cliffs  without  encounter- 
ing any  resistance,  but  were  later  fiercely  attacked  by  supe- 
rior forces  and  compelled  to  abandon  their  position  and 
reembark  on  the  26th.  The  landing  at  the  second  of  the 
indicated  places  was  effected  without  difficulty.  But  the 
resistance  at  the  point  between  Cape  Tekke  and  Cape 
Helles,  supported  as  it  was  by  the  very  favorable  situation, 
could  only  be  vanquished  by  the  extraordinary  courage  and 
tenacity  of  the  assailants.     This  section  of  the  beach  was 


The  Campaign  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula   111 

dominated  by  a  sloping  cliff  furrowed  with  Turkish  trenches 
where  machine-guns  and  light  artillery  had  been  concealed. 
A  barbed  wire  entanglement  extended  the  whole  length  of 
the  beach  close  to  the  water's  edge  and  another  was  hid- 
den just  beneath  the  surface  of  the  sea  in  shallow  water. 
Although  the  bombardment  of  the  warships  was  con- 
tinued until  the  very  moment  before  the  small  boats 
touched  the  shore,  it  neither  completely  destroyed  the 
obstructions  nor  made  the  Turkish  positions  untenable. 

The  British  battalion  disembarking  about  six  suffered 
heavy  losses  before  the  entanglements  were  cut  and  it 
reached  the  base  of  the  cliffs.  But  the  capture,  at  the 
point  of  the  bayonet,  of  some  machine-guns  on  the  Turkish 
flanks,  by  which  the  beach  had  been  enfiladed,  relieved  the 
situation,  and  by  ten  the  British  troops  advancing  with  im- 
petuous ardor  had  captured  three  lines  of  trenches.  The 
conflict  continued  and  it  was  not  until  the  next  day  at 
one  P.M.,  when  definite  results  had  been  obtained  by  the 
landing  force  between  Cape  Helles  and  Sedd-ul-Bahr,  that 
the  position  between  Cape  Tekke  and  Cape  Helles  could 
be  regarded  as  assured. 

The  landing  at  the  first  of  the  two  places  last  mentioned 
was  attended  with  even  greater  difficulties,  because  the 
beach  was  flanked  by  the  village  and  castle  of  Sedd-ul- 
Bahr  on  the  east  and  by  the  perpendicular  cliffs  on  the 
west  and  was  commanded  by  an  amphitheater  of  hills  as  a 
stage  is  dominated  by  the  balconies.  The  beach  itself, 
which  is  350  yards  long  and  only  ten  yards  wide,  was  cov- 
ered with  wire  entanglements  which  in  places  extended 
into  the  sea.  A  converging  fire  from  the  Turkish  posi- 
tions swept  the  beach  like  a  tornado  as  soon  as  the  small 
boats  touched  land. 

A  portion  of  the  covering  troops  were  brought  to  shore 
in  the  River  Clyde,  a  collier  which  had  been  especially 


112  The  Great  War 

prepared  for  the  rapid  disembarkation  of  her  complement 
of  troops  by  the  opening  of  large  apertures  in  her  sides  and 
the  addition  of  a  broad  projecting  gangway.  By  these 
means  it  was  intended  that  the  troops  should  quickly  pass 
into  the  lighters  which  were  to  be  joined  together  to  form 
a  continuous  passageway  to  the  shore  as  soon  as  the  steamer 
grounded.  The  collier,  carrying  about  2,000  men,  was 
beached  but  the  gangway  was  swept  by  a  deadly  hail  of 
lead  and  soon  the  row  of  lighters  was  torn  from  the  shore 
by  the  violence  of  the  current,  and  even  after  communica- 
tion had  been  restored  the  fierceness  of  the  enemy's  fire 
necessitated  the  suspension  of  the  disembarkation  for  that 
day.  About  1,000  men  who  had  already  gained  the  beach 
had  to  remain  crouching  in  a  cramped  position  behind  a 
natural  escarpment  of  sand  about  four  feet  high,  close  to 
the  water's  edge,  enduring  agonies  of  thirst. 

The  rest  of  the  infantry  on  board  the  collier  disembarked 
without  difficulty  after  nightfall,  but  in  the  bright  moon- 
light the  fire  of  the  enemy  was  so  accurate  that  the  situa- 
tion on  shore  remained  unchanged  until  daybreak.  But 
finally  in  the  morning,  with  the  support  of  the  guns  of  one 
of  the  ships,  British  troops  gained  a  footing  in  the  village 
and  old  castle  of  Sedd-ul-Bahr  on  the  right  about  ten  and, 
pressing  forward  with  splendid  perseverance  in  the  face  of 
a  galling  fire  of  musketry  and  machine-guns,  made  them- 
selves masters  by  two  P.  M.  of  the  hill  which  dominated  the 
vicinity,  and  thus  insured  the  possession  of  the  beach,  and 
enabled  the  disembarkation  to  be  completed  without  more 
delay.  The  landing  at  Morto  Bay  had  been  accomplished 
by  7.30  on  the  morning  of  the  25th  with  very  little  difficulty. 

Concurrently  with  the  landing  of  the  British,  a  French 
force  successfully  disembarked,  under  cover  of  the  guns 
of  the  French  squadron,  at  Kum  Kale  at  the  southern 
extremity  of  the  Dardanelles  on  the  Asiatic  shore,  with 


The  Campaign  on  the  Galltpoli  Peninsula   113 

a  view  to  diverting  the  enemy's  attention  and  drawing  the 
fire  of  the  guns  on  that  shore  away  from  the  Allied  trans- 
ports and  the  beach  between  Cape  Helles  and  Sedd-ul- 
Bahr.  Although  the  advance  of  the  French  was  arrested 
by  the  stubborn  resistance  of  the  Turks,  they  repulsed  all 
the  counter-attacks  of  the  latter  and  withdrew  from  their 
position  at  the  point  on  the  26th,  having  accomplished  the 
major  purpose  of  the  maneuver.  On  the  evening  of  the 
same  day  the  principal  disembarkation  of  the  French  was 
begun  at  the  beach  between  Cape  Helles  and  Sedd-ul- 
Bahr.  Eventually  they  received  the  section  of  the  Allied 
front  on  the  right  wing  next  to  the  Dardanelles. 

For  tactical  reasons  an  immediate  advance  was  impera- 
tive. The  scattered  British  and  French  forces  were  joined 
and  the  line  was  consolidated  with  the  87th,  86th,  and  88th 
brigades  of  the  Twenty-ninth  Division  and  four  French 
battalions,  drawn  up  in  the  order  mentioned  from  left  to 
right  across  the  peninsula.  The  forward  movement  began 
on  the  27th  with  Krithia,  a  village  on  the  southwestern 
slope  of  Achi  Baba,  as  the  chief  objective,  but  through 
failure  in  the  supply  of  ammunition  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  28th  the  British  lost  the  opportunity  of  taking  Krithia, 
which  was  subsequently  defended  by  the  Turks  with  un- 
conquerable obstinacy  against  all  assaults.  Yet  consider- 
able progress  had  been  accomplished  by  the  Allies,  whose 
front  extended  by  the  evening  of  the  28th  from  a  point  on 
the  Aegean  coast  three  miles  northeast  of  Tekke  Burnu  to 
a  point  one  mile  north  of  Eski  Hissarlik,  whence  it  bore  off 
southward  to  the  Dardanelles. 

The  progress  of  the  Christian  invaders  sufficed  to  draw 
from  the  German  general  commanding  the  Turks  the  fol- 
lowing spirited  appeal  to  his  soldiers: 

"Attack  the  enemy  with  the  bayonet  and  utterly  destroy 
him!     We  shall  not  retire  one  step;   for,  if  we  do,  our 


114  The  Great  War 

religion,  our  country,  and  our  nation  will  perish!  Soldiers! 
the  world  is  looking  at  you!  Your  only  hope  of  salvation 
is  to  bring  this  battle  to  a  successful  issue  or  gloriously  to 
give  up  your  life  in  the  attempt!" 

The  landing  of  the  rest  of  the  infantry  of  the  French 
division  and  of  all  but  two  of  the  French  batteries  had 
been  completed  by  the  evening  of  May  1st;  and  very  op- 
portunely, for  about  ten  o'clock,  after  a  violent  cannonading 
of  the  Allied  trenches  lasting  about  half  an  hour,  the  Turks 
launched  a  series  of  furious  attacks.  The  foremost  of  the 
three  solid  lines  which  they  formed,  relying  solely  on  the 
bayonet,  crawled  forward  on  hands  and  knees  under  cover 
of  the  darkness  until  time  for  the  final  rush,  and  then 
sprang  at  their  opponents  in  the  Allied  trenches.  The 
veil  of  night,  rent  by  the  fitful  flashes  of  musketry  or  by 
the  gleam  of  bursting  shells,  rendered  more  terrible  the 
spectral  death-grapple.  A  part  of  the  86th  brigade,  which 
first  bore  the  brunt  of  the  attack,  gave  way,  but  the  front 
was  restored  with  the  help  of  a  detachment  from  the  88th. 

Next  the  storm  bore  with  special  fury  against  the  French 
left  wing,  which  began  to  waver,  but  was  sustained  by 
reinforcements  from  the  British.  At  daybreak  the  Allies 
launched  a  counter-attack  and  the  British  made  some 
progress  but  were  arrested  by  the  cross-fire  of  concealed 
machine-guns,  and  the  close  of  the  engagement  found  the 
Allies  in  the  same  general  position  as  at  the  beginning. 
The  Turks,  however,  fell  back  a  short  distance  to  intrench- 
ments  and  redoubts  which  had  been  prepared. 

A  second  struggle  for  the  possession  of  Krithia  on 
May  6-8  by  the  Allied  forces  secured  a  slight  gain  on  the 
first  day  in  the  face  of  a  tenacious  resistance,  followed  on 
the  7th  by  an  advance  by  one  section  of  the  British  to 
within  800  yards  of  their  objective,  where  they  intrenched. 
Twice  on  the  8th  the  attacks  of  the  Allies  were  preceded 


The  Campaign  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula   115 

by  a  terrific  bombardment,  in  which  all  the  available  heavy 
guns  of  the  fleet  and  shore-batteries  participated.  The 
second  attack  was  prolonged  until  well  into  the  night, 
when  the  front  line  intrenched  itself  where  it  stood.  The 
net  result  of  the  three  days'  conflict  was  a  gain  of  about 
1,000  yards. 

The  narrowness  of  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula  and  the  com- 
prehensive organization  of  the  enemy's  defensive  positions 
almost  eliminated  the  opportunity  for  surprise,  excluded 
enveloping  maneuvers,  and  condemned  the  Allies  to  the 
irksome  tactics  of  siege-warfare. 

In  the  political  and  economical  sense,  no  less  than  in  the 
military,  the  action  in  the  Near  East  had  now  developed 
into  one  of  the  most  engrossing,  tantalizing,  suspense-com- 
pelling situations  of  the  whole  war.  Virtually  a  space  of 
hardly  ten  miles  separated  the  Allies  from  the  resplendent 
goal  of  victory,  for  beyond  the  Narrows  nothing  could 
have  obstructed  their  advance.  An  achievement  that 
would  have  vitally  affected  the  whole  course  of  the  war, 
hastened  its  completion,  and  produced  incalculable  conse- 
quences lay  almost  within  their  grasp.  The  capture  of 
Constantinople  would  have  destroyed  Germany's  grandiose 
vision  of  an  empire  stretching  from  the  North  Sea  to  the 
Persian  Gulf  and  dominating  the  most  important  strategic 
positions  on  the  whole  earth. 

The  opening  of  communications  with  the  Black  Sea 
would  have  broken  the  blockade  that  crippled  Russia, 
and  alleviated  the  food  problem  in  the  western  countries; 
prevented  the  treachery  of  Bulgaria;  spared  Serbia  from 
submersion;  most  opportunely  quickened  the  decision  of 
Roumania  and  strengthened  her  when  she  became  an  ally 
of  the  Entente  Powers;  and  completed  the  circle  of  steel 
about  the  Central  Empires.  Besides,  it  would  have  sealed 
the  long-suspended  doom  of  the  Turkish  power  in  Europe. 


116  The  Great  War 

World-interest  centered   in  the  short  space  along  the 

Dardanelles.     Great  hopes,  now  stimulated  by  even  the 

fluctuating   progress  of   Allied  success,  now  yielding  to 

ration  as  its  small  measure  was  disclosed,  were  vainly 

cherished. 

A  fresh  and  vital  source  of  energy  had  galvanized  the 
Turkish  army  with  unexpected  vigor.  German  military 
instruction  before  the  war  and  German  control  of  the 
army  since  had  accomplished  wonders. 

The  difficulties  of  the  Allies  increased  as  summer  ad- 
vanced. Fresh  water  became  even  scarcer,  the  beaches 
were  still  exposed  to  desultory  shell-fire;  the  transportation 
facilities  were  limited  to  fleet  sweepers  and  other  small 
craft,  as  the  transports  had  to  be  sent  to  Mudros  Bay  on 
May  22d  for  safety  from  submarines;  added  to  which 
the  lack  of  roads  on  the  peninsula  made  the  removal  of  the 
wounded  a  particularly  serious  task.  The  losses  of  the 
British  in  the  peninsula  down  to  the  close  of  May  were 
greater  than  those  which  they  had  sustained  during  the 
entire  three  years  of  the  Boer  War. 

The  Allied  front  in  the  southern,  or  Cape  Helles  district, 
was  composed  of  four  sections  held  respectively  by  the 
Twenty-ninth  Division  on  the  left,  the  Forty-second  (East 
Lancashire  Territorial)  Division  on  the  left  center,  the 
Royal  Naval  Division  on  the  right  center,  and  the  French 
Expeditionary  Corps,  now  brought  to  its  full  complement  of 
strength  by  the  arrival  of  the  second  division,  on  the  right. 

The  third  struggle  for  Krithia  was  part  of  a  general 
action  along  the  Anglo-French  front  on  June  4th.  After 
violent  bombardment  of  the  Turkish  defenses  a  curtain  of 
fire  was  dropped  behind  the  enemy's  foremost  trenches, 
and  the  Allied  infantry  attacked  with  fixed  bayonets.  The 
British  penetrated  two  lines  of  enemy  trenches  in  the 
direction  of  Krithia  and  the  French  took  one  line  towards 


I'dfe"- 


Indian  troops  landing  at  the  Dardanelles. 


Lowering  dead  into  a  trawler  for  burial  at  sea  outside  the  Dardanellt 


The  Campaign  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula   117 

Kereves  Dere,  but  an  impetuous  counter-attack  forced 
back  the  French  at  one  point  and  compelled  the  Royal 
Naval  Division  to  retreat,  which  in  turn  involved  the 
Forty-second  Division.  The  day's  operations  in  spite  of 
heavy  losses   brought  but  little  advance  to  the  Allies. 

The  chief  causes  of  the  failure  to  attain  the  anticipated 
measure  of  success  on  June  4th  were  the  intricacy  of  the 
Turkish  wire  entanglements  and  the  skilful  concealment 
of  the  machine-gun  batteries  which  largely  escaped  de- 
struction by  the  artillery  preparation  of  the  Allies. 

An  instructive  episode  of  this  battle  was  the  capture  by 
the  Allies  of  prisoners  who  belonged  to  a  machine-gun 
company  composed  entirely  of  Germans,  sailors  from  the 
Goeben  and  Bres/au,  German  subjects  living  in  Turkey  and 
mobilizing  there,  and  others  who  had  percolated  singly  or 
in  groups  through  Bulgaria. 

In  the  morning  of  the  21st  the  Second  French  Division 
captured  two  lines  of  Turkish  trenches  and  crossed  the 
Kereves  Dere.  Late  in  the  day  the  First  Division  carried 
the  opposing  intrenchments  and  reached  a  position  in  line 
with  the  Second  Division. 

By  a  brilliant  charge  of  the  Foreign  Legion  and  a  bat- 
talion of  Zouaves  on  the  23d,  the  French  gained  a  position 
commanding  the  head  of  Kereves  Dere,  and  to  this  success 
was  added  on  the  30th  the  capture  of  a  redoubt,  known  as 
the  Quadrilateral,  in  the  same  vicinity,  which  involved  the 
taking  of  seven  lines  of  trenches.  But  in  this  engagement 
the  French  sustained  a  severe  loss  in  the  wounding  of 
General  Gouraud,  who  had  to  be  relieved  of  the  command, 
and  was  succeeded  by  General  Bailloud. 

Meanwhile,  the  British,  on  the  28th,  made  a  determined 
attack  on  the  Turkish  right  wing  that  tenaciously  clung  to 
its  positions  near  the  Aegean  coast.  Faultlessly  supported 
by  the  artillery  the  British  left  outer  wing  captured  rive 


118  The  Great  War 

distinct  lines  of  enem)  trenches  and  the  inner  wing  took 
two.  As  the  result  of  these  successes  the  Allied  front  had 
been  converted  from  a  convex  to  a  concave  outline. 

But  the  three  days'  battle  on  May  6-8  had  already  shown 
that  the  Allied  forces  on  the  peninsula  were  not  strong 
enough  to  blast  their  way  to  the  Narrows  within  a  service- 
able length  of  time.  Therefore,  on  May  10th,  Sir  Ian 
Hamilton  cabled  for  two  additional  divisions  and  on  the 
17th  for  two  supplementary  army  corps.  The  Fifty-second 
Territorial  Division  was  straightway  sent  from  England, 
but  in  the  meantime  the  Russians  had  given  up  their  naval 
operations  against  the  Black  Sea  end  of  the  Bosphorus,  and 
the  removal  of  this  continual  menace  released  a  far  larger 
force  of  Turkish  troops  for  service  at  the  Dardanelles. 

Finally,  however,  by  the  end  of  July,  in  answer  to  the 
earnest  entreaties  of  Sir  Ian  Hamilton,  three  regular  divi- 
sions of  the  British  New  Army  and  the  infantry  of  two 
Territorial  divisions  had  reached  the  eastern  Mediterra- 
nean, while  a  mounted  division  awaited  in  Egypt  the 
commander's  orders.  The  expeditionary  force  as  thus 
augmented  must  have  been  at  least  four  times  as  large  as 
the  entire  British  contingent  engaged  at  any  one  time  in  the 
Crimean  War. 

An  entirely  new  system  of  defensive  works  had  now 
been  created  by  the  Turks  along  the  slopes  of  Achi  Baba, 
capable  of  holding  out  even  in  case  the  Turkish  right  were 
turned  by  the  capture  of  Krithia.  The  situation  was,  there- 
fore, no  longer  propitious  for  the  renewal  of  the  offensive 
in  the  southern  part  of  the  peninsula  and  the  commander's 
attention  was  turned  to  the  possibilities  further  north. 
Kilid  Bahr  dominated  the  Narrows.  The  Anzac  position 
was  only  about  six  miles  from  there,  while  the  Allies'  south- 
ern front  was  about  ten.  Repeated  attacks  by  the  Turks  on 
the  Anzac  line  showed  that  a  sensitive   portion  of  their 


The  Campaign  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula   119 

front  was  near  the  Anzac  position.  To  the  east  and  rather 
to  the  left  of  the  latter  rises  the  Sari  Bahr  ridge  crowned  by 
Koja  Chemen  Tepe,  known  as  Hill  305,  from  its  height  in 
meters.  Not  far  north  of  Anzac  is  Suvla  Bay,  with  an  ex- 
cellent and  safe  anchorage  and  protection  from  submarines; 
the  wide,  level  shore  there  is  recessed  in  the  foothills  of  the 
Anafarta  ridge. 

Sir  Ian  Hamilton's  plan  for  the  supreme  effort  com- 
prised a  converging  movement  from  the  west  against  a 
central  section  of  the  ridges  that  constitute  the  backbone 
of  the  peninsula  and  from  this  vantage-ground  a  drive 
straight  through  to  the  Dardanelles.  The  new  divisions 
were  to  be  landed  at  Suvla  Bay,  and  from  there  and  Anzac 
the  simultaneous  dash  for  the  summits  was  to  be  under- 
taken, while  a  squadron  feinted  at  the  head  of  Saros  Gulf 
and  a  forcible  attack  in  the  south  engaged  the  attention  of 
the  enemy.  The  inauguration  of  this  great  concerted 
action  was  set  for  August  6th.  The  success  of  the  project 
depended  upon  punctual  and  exact  cooperation  in  all  the 
sections,  and  to  this  the  inexperience  of  the  new  divisions 
landed  at  Suvla  Bay  turned  out  to  be  a  fatal  bar. 

A  heavy  burden  of  staff  work  was  involved  in  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  reinforcements.  The  restricted  capacity 
of  the  positions  on  the  peninsula  and  the  great  need  of 
secrecy  in  the  preparations  required  that  these  new  forces 
should  be  kept  scattered  in  the  islands  until  the  last  possible 
moment.  But  to  provide  for  the  prompt  arrival  of  great 
masses  of  raw  troops  at  the  right  moment  and  at  the  ap- 
pointed landing  places,  with  all  their  equipment,  transport, 
and  supplies,  was  of  itself  a  formidable  undertaking.  The 
water  supply  was  another  serious  problem,  which,  as  events 
were  to  prove,  was  not  completely  solved. 

Sir  Ian  Hamilton  made  his  own  headquarters  in  the 
island  of  Imbros,  the  radiating  point  of  communications, 


120  The  Great  War 

where  he  could  follow  the  progress  of  operations  in  all 
sections. 

The  subsidiary  offensive  begun  in  the  south  on  the  6th 
revealed  the  greatly  increased  strength  and  confidence  of 
the  enemy.  It  happened,  in  fact,  that  the  Allied  attack 
anticipated  by  only  a  few  hours  an  intended  assault  by 
the  Turks,  for  which  the  latter  had  concentrated  in  con- 
siderable numbers.  In  this  quarter  the  Allies  continued 
their  offensive  on  the  7th  and  8th,  made  slight  gains  of 
territory,  and  immobilized  Turkish  forces  that  might  other- 
wise have  increased  the  strength  of  the  resistance  in  the 
critical  section  east  of  Anzac. 

In  the  chief  theater  of  operations  the  Australian  and  New 
Zealand  Division  on  the  left  wing  of  the  Anzac  front  was 
to  advance  towards  the  crest  of  Sari  Bahr  simultaneously 
with  the  landing  at  Suvla  Bay.  An  attack  by  Australian 
troops  on  the  right  of  Anzac  was  to  precede  and  screen 
the  more  essential  movement  on  the  left.  Reinforcements, 
consisting  mainly  of  the  Thirteenth  Division  of  the  New 
Army,  were  landed  at  Anzac  on  three  successive  nights, 
escaping  the  vigilance  of  a  watchful  enemy. 

After  an  hour's  preliminary  bombardment,  late  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  6th,  about  2,000  Australians  dashed  from 
their  cover  across  an  open  space  and  after  a  short  but  des- 
perate struggle  captured  the  roofed  trenches  of  the  enemy 
on  an  elevation  known  as  the  Lone  Pine  position.  By  this 
action  the  Australians  brought  down  upon  themselves  and 
thereby  immobilized  a  large  part  of  the  available  Turkish 
reserves;  and,  by  defending  the  Lone  Pine  position  for 
many  days  against  very  formidable  odds,  protected  the 
flank  and  rear  of  the  principal  operating  columns. 

The  main  ridge  of  Sari  Bahr  throws  off  a  number  of 
spurs  in  the  direction  of  the  coast  and  these  are  separated 
by  deep  ravines.     The  principal  attack  was  delivered  by 


The  Campaign  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula   121 

two  assaulting  columns,  one  on  the  right,  consisting  of  the 
New  Zealand  infantry  brigade  under  Brigadier-general 
Johnston,  advancing  against  Chunuk  Bahr,  the  other  on 
the  left,  made  up  of  the  4th  Australian  brigade  and  the 
29th  Indian  brigade,  under  Brigadier-general  Cox,  aiming 
to  make  a  long  circuit  and  gain  the  summit  of  Koja 
Chemen  from  the  northwest. 

The  columns  set  out  on  the  night  of  the  6th-7th  and  in 
the  morning  the  left  had  made  fair  progress  while  the  right 
had  occupied  Rhododendron  Ridge,  only  a  quarter  of  a 
mile  from  Chunuk  Bahr.  There  they  intrenched  in  the 
positions  occupied.  The  attack  was  resumed  the  next 
morning  at  4.15.  The  forces  on  the  right  quickly  gained 
the  southwestern  slopes  and  principal  knoll  of  Chunuk 
Bahr,  where  the  enemy  assailed  them  in  a  series  of  fierce 
counter-attacks.  On  the  left  the  British  forces  were  unable 
to  gain  any  permanent  foothold  on  the  crest. 

The  action  on  the  9th  was  begun  with  a  fierce  bombard- 
ment of  the  crest  of  Sari  Bahr  by  all  the  available  naval 
guns  and  shore  batteries,  covering  the  whole  ridge  with 
masses  of  flame  and  smoke.  But  at  this  critical  stage,  the 
prosecution  of  the  plan  of  operations  was  fatally  disturbed 
by  the  blunder  of  one  of  two  columns  sent  out  with  orders 
to  converge  on  a  hill  situated  midway  between  Koja  Che- 
men and  Chunuk  Bahr.  Setting  out  before  daybreak,  this 
column  lost  its  way  and  did  not  reach  the  vicinity  of  the 
crucial  point  in  time  to  cooperate  effectively.  The  gallant 
6th  Gurkhas  of  the  29th  Indian  brigade  and  a  part  of  the 
6th  South  Lancaster  Regiment  reached  the  crest  between 
Chunuk  Bahr  and  their  objective  and  for  a  moment  looked 
down  upon  the  waters  of  the  Dardanelles. 

But  before  the  expected  support  arrived  the  Turks  ral- 
lied, drove  the  British  from  the  crest,  and  hurled  them 
down  the  slope.     The  Turks  swarmed  along  the  ridge  in 


122  The  Great  War 

overwhelming  numbers  and  the  New  Zealanders  on  the 
southwestern  half  of  the  knoll  of  Chunuk  Bahr  maintained 
their  position  only  with  the  greatest  difficulty.  These 
troops,  who  had  had  no  time  to  dig  effective  trenches, 
were  relieved  on  the  night  of  the  9th-10th  after  three 
days  and  three  nights  of  ceaseless  fighting.  This  exposed 
position  only  afforded  room  for  800-1,000  men  and  the 
lines  of  communication  were  extremely  arduous  and  sub- 
ject to  the  enemy's  fire.  At  daybreak  on  the  10th  the 
Turks  attacked  with  great  force  the  two  battalions  of 
the  New  Army  which  had  taken  the  place  of  the  New 
Zealanders  and  swept  them  from  the  summit.  The  Turks 
poured  down  the  western  slope  of  Chunuk  Bahr,  but  in 
this  way  exposed  themselves  to  the  fire  of  the  naval  and 
military  guns  and  musketry  and  machine-guns  from  below 
and  were  compelled  to  withdraw  with  considerable  losses. 

Further  north  the  contestants  grappled  in  hand-to-hand 
engagements  along  the  slope  and  on  the  spurs,  but  the 
Turks  were  finally  repulsed.  The  British  losses  thus  far 
had  been  very  heavy.  Several  units  had  lost  more  than 
50%  of  their  effective  strength.  The  forces  struggling  for 
the  ridge  of  Sari  Bahr  looked  in  vain  for  the  expected  sup- 
port from  Suvla  Bay  which  might  still  have  definitely 
turned  the  tide  of  battle  even  when  the  fortune  of  the 
British  had  begun  to  wane. 

The  command  of  the  operations  in  the  region  of  Suvla 
Bay  was  in  the  hands  of  Lieutenant-general  the  Honorable 
Sir  Frederick  Stopford.  The  Eleventh  Division  of  the  Ninth 
Army  Corps  was  transported  from  Imbros  to  Suvla  Bay  in 
destroyers  and  motor-lighters,  each  of  the  former  towing 
one  of  the  latter  until  they  reached  shoal  water.  The 
motor-lighters,  after  landing  their  own  complement,  500 
troops  apiece,  returned  to  the  destroyers  and  in  one  trip 
emptied  these  also.    The  Eleventh  Division  was  put  ashore 


The  Campaign  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula   123 

at  Suvla  Bay  before  daybreak  on  the  7th,  and  at  dawn 
the  first  contingent  of  the  Tenth  Division  belonging  to 
the  same  corps  arrived  from  Mitylene. 

The  Turkish  troops  on  the  beach  were  taken  by  sur- 
prise and  driven  back.  As  soon  as  daylight  permitted,  the 
enemy's  artillery  opened  fire,  causing  some  confusion  and 
loss,  but  not  arresting  the  advance  of  the  British,  who  spread 
out  over  the  plain. 

The  newcomers,  called  upon  at  once  for  arduous  and 
prolonged  exertion  on  the  barren,  sun-scorched  flats,  in  a 
torrid  atmosphere  to  which  they  were  absolutely  unaccus- 
tomed, suffered  terribly  from  thirst,  partly  in  consequence  of 
the  inadequacy  of  the  means  of  distributing  water  from  the 
lighters,  but  partly,  no  doubt,  through  the  injudicious  con- 
sumption of  the  supply  which  had  been  actually  distributed. 

The  British  forces  deployed  upon  a  semicircular  front, 
but  attacked  none  of  the  really  important  positions  on  the 
heights.  General  Stopford  urged  his  division  commanders 
to  press  forward  with  energy,  so  as  to  gain  the  greatest  ad- 
vantage from  the  unexpectedness  of  their  arrival  and  place 
themselves  in  position  to  cooperate  effectively  with  the 
movements  further  south.  But  the  latter  protested  that 
the  troops  were  too  exhausted  to  proceed  and  their  repre- 
sentations overruled  the  chief  commander's  sense  of  obliga- 
tion. An  unwarrantable  interval  of  hesitation  and  delay 
sacrificed  the  coign  of  advantage  won  by  Anzac,  the  glow- 
ing chance  of  victory  which  never  would  return. 

The  Ninth  Corps  wasted  the  next  day  in  comparative 
inactivity,  although  their  immediate  adversaries  were  still 
weak  in  numbers.  Finally,  in  the  evening,  at  the  earnest 
solicitation  of  Sir  Ian  Hamilton,  a  single  brigade  was  ordered 
forward  to  seize  an  important  position  on  the  heights.  But 
the  execution  of  even  this  tardy  measure  was  delayed 
until  the  following  morning  at  four,  when  strong  Turkish 


124  The  Great  War 

reinforcements  bad  already  been  hurried  to  the  spot.  The 
brigade  was  attacked  <>n  both  flanks,  subjected  to  deadly 
crossfire,  and  compelled  to  retreat,  suffering  serious  losses. 
But  probably  the  whole  adjacent  range  of  hills  could  have 
been  captured  had  a  general  attack  been  pushed  home  with 
vigor  even  as  late  as  the  evening  of  the  8th.  At  about  the 
same  time  the  Turkish  resistance  was  stiffened  all  along  the 
western  line.     The  golden  opportunity  had  vanished. 

The  Fifty-third  and  Fifty-fourth  Territorial  Divisions 
were  landed  at  Suvla  Bay,  but  the  lack  of  alert,  decisive 
leadership  neutralized  all  the  advantage  of  reinforcements. 
The  righting  was  continued  with  inconsiderable  gains. 
General  Stopford,  who  had  shown  himself  to  be  unequal 
to  his  task,  resigned  on  the  15th,  and  his  place  was  taken 
by  Major-general  De  Lisle. 

After  this,  operations  languished  for  several  days  while 
Sir  Ian  Hamilton  completed  his  preparations  for  a  fresh 
attack.  So  severe  had  been  the  losses  in  the  recent  strug- 
gle that,  in  spite  of  the  heavy  reinforcements,  the  Allies 
now  mustered  only  95,000  available  rifles, — 30,000  at  Suvla, 
25,000  at  Anzac,  and  23,000  British  and  17,000  French  on 
the  southern  line, — as  against  about  110,000  Turks  who 
still  enjoyed  the  advantages  of  position.  The  British  com- 
mander begged  for  sufficient  reinforcements  to  provide 
50,000  additional  rifles  besides  bringing  the  effective  strength 
of  the  corps  already  present  up  to  their  normal  comple- 
ment. With  such  an  accession  of  strength  he  believed  that 
he  could  clear  a  passage  to  Constantinople.  But  it  was  im- 
possible to  persuade  the  military  authorities  in  France  and 
England  to  send  so  many  men  at  just  that  time. 

The  now  famous  Twenty-ninth  Division  was  transferred 
in  trawlers  from  Cape  Helles  to  Suvla  Bay.  Contact  had 
been  established  on  the  12th  between  the  right  at  Suvla 
Bay  and  the  left  of  Anzac.    It  was  now  necessary  to  capture 


English  bivouac  at  Gallipoli.      In  place  of  raising  tents  the  troops  dug  shallow  pits 
in  which  they  rested. 


Australian  artillery  in  operation  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula. 


The  Campaign  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula   125 

the  projecting  Turkish  positions  on  Ismail  Oglu  Tepe,  the 
southwestern  extremity  of  the  Anafarta  Sagir  ridge,  which 
rises  350  feet  above  the  level  of  the  plains  and  was  covered 
with  almost  impenetrable  scrub,  traversed  here  and  there 
by  goat  paths. 

At  three  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  the  21st,  two  bri- 
gades of  the  Twenty-ninth  Division  together  with  the 
Eleventh  Division  advanced  to  the  attack  on  a  front  of 
about  a  mile,  the  former  against  Ismail  Oglu  Tepe,  the 
latter  against  the  Turkish  defenses  further  to  the  right. 
The  British  troops  charged  with  magnificent  courage  across 
the  bare  plain,  a  distance  of  about  a  mile  and  a  half,  exposed 
to  the  enemy's  shrapnel  and  machine-guns,  gained  a  posi- 
tion on  a  lesser  ridge,  but  were  unable  to  reach  the  main 
crest.  During  the  ensuing  night  it  was  found  necessary  to 
withdraw  them  from  the  position  occupied,  and  the  under- 
taking ended  without  any  advantage  to  compensate  for  the 
5,000  casualties. 

A  moderate  success  brought  some  consolation  for  this 
serious  failure.  On  the  22d  a  lodgment  was  effected  on 
Hill  60,  on  the  left  flank  of  Anzac,  and  on  the  27th  the 
Turks  were  entirely  expelled  from  this  eminence.  This 
rendered  possible  the  consolidation  of  the  common  front 
of  Suvla  Bay  and  Anzac.  But  with  this  exploit  the  great 
offensive  terminated,  and  with  it  all  operations  on  a  grand 
scale  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula  ceased.  The  summer  had 
been  very  trying  on  the  arid,  sun-parched  slopes  and  plains 
of  the  peninsula.  The  soldiers  had  suffered  severely  from 
thirst,  the  swarms  of  flies,  and  sickness. 

The  Allies  still  lingered  in  their  positions  for  several 
months,  because  it  required  a  sterner  resolution  to  with- 
draw and  acknowledge  failure  than  to  remain.  Perilous  as 
was  the  attempt  to  force  the  passage  of  the  Dardanelles  by 
action  of  the  fleet  alone,  the  general  project  of  breaking 


126  The  Great  War 

the  enemy's  grip  upon  the  vital  waterway  was  justified  by 

a  fair  chance  of  success  and  by  a  consideration  of  the  tre- 
mendous advantages  which  success  would  have  conferred. 
It  is  a  trite  observation  that  in  warfare  great  decisions  almost 
always  involve  great  risks. 

In  defending  the  expedition  to  the  Dardanelles  in  the 
House  of  Commons  on  November  15th,  Winston  Spencer 
Churchill,  who  had  been  its  sponsor,  declared  that  "the 
advance,  for  instance,  which  took  Neuve  Chapelle,  or  Loos, 
or  Souchez,  if  made  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula,  would  have 
settled  the  fate  of  the  Turkish  army  on  the  promontory, 
would  probably  have  decided  the  whole  operation,  might 
have  determined  the  attitude  of  the  Balkans,  might  have 
cut  off  Germany  from  the  East,  and  might  have  saved 
Serbia."  He  added  that  the  army  had  "stood  all  summer 
within  a  few  miles  of  a  decisive  victory." 

In  August  the  necessary  reinforcements  had  been  denied 
because  a  great  effort  was  impending  in  the  West.  But 
it  is  doubtful  whether  the  great  offensive  did  as  much  to 
relieve  the  embarrassment  of  Russia  as  might  have  been 
accomplished  by  the  opening  of  the  Dardanelles  to  ship- 
ments of  munitions.  For  Russia  it  was  more  a  question  of 
ammunition  than  of  numbers.  The  failure  at  the  Darda- 
nelles was  one  of  the  many  misfortunes  and  disappoint- 
ments sustained  by  the  Allies  in  1915  by  reason  of  their 
unwillingness  or  inability  to  merge  all  their  efforts  in  a 
single  consistent  and  homogeneous  plan  to  win  the  war. 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  Destruction  of  the  Polish  Salient  and  the 
Great  Retreat 

The  situation  on  the  eastern  front  at  the  beginning  of  July,  1915.  Second 
battle  of  Krasnik,  July  5-8.  German  plan  for  the  grand  offensive.  Weak- 
ness of  the  Russians.  Disposition  of  the  armies  on  the  opposing  eastern 
fronts.  Resumption  of  the  offensive  by  von  Mackensen.  Ewarts  de- 
feated by  von  Woyrsch.  Von  Gallwitz  breaks  through  the  northern 
side  of  the  Polish  salient.  The  situation  in  front  of  Warsaw.  The 
critical  situation  in  the  Polish  salient  and  the  decision  of  the  Russians 
to  sacrifice  Warsaw  and  Poland.  Passage  of  the  Vistula  forced  by  the 
Germans  between  Ivangorod  and  Warsaw,  July  28th.  Abandonment  of 
Warsaw.  The  supposed  analogy  of  1812  and  1915.  Flight  and  pursuit 
The  line  of  the  Bug  rendered  untenable.  Capture  of  Kovno  by  the  Ger- 
mans, August  17th.  Fall  of  Novo  Georgievsk,  August  19th.  Attempted 
landing  of  the  Germans  in  the  Gulf  of  Riga.  Evacuation  of  Brest-Litovsk, 
August  25th.  The  Tsar's  resolution  to  command  the  armies  in  person, 
September  5th.  Alexeieff  as  Chief  of  the  General  Staff;  his  previous 
career.  The  final  attempt  to  engulf  the  Russian  armies ;  the  fall  of  Vilna 
and  escape  of  the  Russian  Tenth  Army.  Failure  of  the  Germans  to  achieve 
their  supreme  purpose  and  their  efforts  to  gain  a  suitable  stationary  front 
in  the  East ;  the  Riga-Vilna-Rovno-Lemberg  railway  and  the  coveted  line 
for  the  Teutonic  eastern  front.  The  configuration  of  the  southern  area  of 
the  eastern  theater ;  the  Austro-German  offensive  and  the  Russian  counter- 
offensive  in  that  section.  The  German  offensive  along  the  Dvina:  the 
Dvinsk  sector  and  the  failure  of  the  German  attacks ;  the  situation  before 
Riga  and  thwarting  of  the  German  efforts  there.  The  Russian  offensive 
in  the  south  in  the  winter  of  1915-1916. 

The  capture  of  Lemberg  and  the  expulsion  of  the  Rus- 
sians from  the  northern  part  of  Galicia  brought  the  con- 
tending forces  in  that  region  back  to  a  position  which  was 
almost  identical  with  the  situation  about  ten  months  before. 
Now  at  the  end  of  June,  1915,  the  Archduke  Joseph  Ferdi- 
nand and  Field-marshal  von  Mackensen  were  pushing 
northward  into  Polish  territory,  while  von  Boehm-Ermolli, 
von  Linsingen,  and  von  Pflanzer  were  taking  positions  to 

127 


128  The  Great  War 

cover  the  right  flank  and  rear  of  these  chief  operative 
armies.  Von  Linsingen  captured  Halicz  on  June  28th, 
turning  the  enemy's  line  on  the  Gnila  Lipa,  and  thus 
compelled  the  Russians  to  retire  to  the  Zlota  Lipa.  But 
further  north  Brussiloff  frustrated  all  the  attempts  of  von 
Boehm-Ermolli  to  cross  the  Bug. 

The  chief  operative  section  of  the  Teutonic  front  now 
lay  between  the  Vistula  and  the  Bug,  where  the  Archduke 
Joseph  Ferdinand  and  von  Mackensen  were  pushing  north- 
ward, the  former  on  the  left  in  the  direction  of  Lublin,  the 
latter  on  the  right  with  Chelm  as  his  immediate  objective. 

By  July  2d  the  general  line  of  the  Teutonic  front  passed 
through  Krasnik, — the  principal  intermediate  point  on  the 
archduke's  line  of  operation, — and  Zamosk.  On  July  4th 
the  Russians  took  up  a  position  about  three  miles  north  of 
Krasnik,  while  on  the  7th  von  Mackensen's  advance  was 
brought  to  a  standstill  half  way  between  Zamosk  and 
Krasnystav. 

The  archduke  was  involved  in  a  serious  conflict  on 
the  5th.  The  Vieprz  flowing  northward  between  his 
army  and  that  of  von  Mackensen  on  the  right  prevented 
their  cooperation,  while  General  Lesch,  concentrating 
powerful  forces  on  his  right  wing,  forced  back  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  center.  After  four  days  of  desperate  fighting 
the  archduke  was  driven  back  about  two  miles  on  a  front 
of  eighteen  and  there  was  about  a  week's  delay  in  the 
offensive  movement  in  this  sector.  But  already  the  Ger- 
man leaders  were  forging  another  mighty  blow  in  the 
north  and  presently  the  campaign  was  to  enter  upon  its 
second  and  vastly  more  tremendous  stage. 

The  almost  uninterrupted  battle  waged  by  the  Teutonic 
armies  for  more  than  two  months  in  Galicia  had  been  a 
unique  achievement  in  the  art  of  war,  one  to  which  accom- 
plished   generalship,    incomparable    staff   work,    and    the 


German  pioneers  re] 


ig  one  of  the  bridges  across  the  Vistula  which  had  been  blown  up 
by  the  Russians  on  their  retreat. 


Peasant  refugees. 


Great  numbers  of  Polish  peasants  left  theit 
into  Russia  before  the  German  army. 


uid  fled  eastward 


The  Destruction  of  the  Polish  Salient     129 

courageous  and  sustained  efforts  of  the  great  masses  of 
troops  had  all  contributed.  The  Russians  had  been  driven 
from  the  greater  part  of  Galicia,  Austria-Hungary  had 
been  given  a  new  lease  of  life,  and  the  tide  of  battle 
had  been  forced  back  into  Poland  from  the  south.  The 
prospects  on  the  eastern  front  had  undergone  a  revolution. 

The  original  Polish  salient,  resting  on  its  framework  of 
strategic  railways  was  now  everywhere  exposed.  The 
moment  was  ripe  to  match  the  great  effort  in  the  south  by 
an  attack  in  the  north.  With  success  on  both  sides  the 
main  Russian  armies  might  be  entrapped  within  the  salient. 
Von  Falkenhayn,  the  Chief  of  the  German  General  Staff, 
proposed  to  destroy  the  Russian  armies  by  the  now  familiar 
double  enveloping  strategy  applied  with  unprecedented 
strength  and  energy. 

While  the  Russians  were  assailed  with  violence  on  all 
parts  of  the  front,  the  chief  operative  masses  of  their  oppo- 
nents would  be  driven  through  the  opposite  flanks  of  the 
salient.  As  the  Teutonic  armies  pushed  towards  the  base 
of  the  salient  near  Brest-Litovsk,  a  distance  of  about  one 
hundred  miles  from  their  chief  operative  sectors,  crushing 
all  resistance  in  their  path,  the  Russian  army  in  the  apex, 
150  miles  west  of  this  critical  line  would  almost  inevitably 
be  cut  off  and  surrounded.  At  the  same  time  von  Below, 
who  had  already  overrun  Courland  as  far  north  as  the  Vin- 
dava,  by  sweeping  to  the  right  would  threaten  Kovno  and 
Vilna  from  the  flank,  cut  the  main  railway  line  to  Petrograd, 
and  intercept  the  fugitives  from  the  collapsed  Polish  salient. 
In  pursuance  of  this  plan  the  great  battle  in  the  East  raged 
on  with  redoubled  fury  and  extent,  filling  up  the  measure 
of  an  entire  campaign.  The  Germans  fought  with  the 
confident  expectation  that  the  end  of  this  campaign  would 
bring  peace  with  Russia  as  the  prelude  to  a  complete  and 
lasting  triumph  over  all  their  enemies. 


130  The  Qreat  War 

The  Russians  had  entered  the  war  with  a  good  equip- 
ment of  field  artillery  and  numerous  machine-guns,  in  the 
manipulation  of  which  they  exhibited  considerable  skill. 
Hut  ever  since  the  beginning  of  May  the  strength  of  the 
Russian  armies  had  been  largely  paralyzed  through  shortage 
of  ammunition.  At  different  times  ami  places  during  the 
summer  ammunition  for  the  artillery  gave  out  entirely,  so 
that  the  rear-guard  action  to  delay  the  enemy  devolved 
entirely  on  the  infantry  with  no  support  from  the  Russian 
mms  against  the  enemy's  terriric  cannonading. 

The  outstanding  feature  of  the  summer's  operations  is 
the  great  retreat  of  the  Russian  armies,  executed  as  a  whole 
with  admirable  skill  and  in  good  order.  The  cohesion  and 
organic  action  of  the  Russian  army  were  not  destroyed. 
The  campaign  was  a  grievous  disappointment  to  the  west- 
ern Allies,  and  a  formidable  blow  to  Russian  prestige,  but 
it  was  neither  a  fatal  calamity  nor  did  it  bring  fulfilment 
of  the  supreme  purpose  of  the  Central  Powers. 

By  this  time  it  was  generally  recognized  that  Russia's 
immense  superiority  in  population  over  Germany  did  not 
compensate  for  her  administrative,  economic,  and  trans- 
portational  shortcomings.  She  also  lacked  reserve  officers 
to  replace  the  fallen  and  to  provide  for  the  formation  of 
new  units,  and  the  substitution  for  these  of  non-commis- 
sioned officers  and  subalterns  was  a  less  satisfactory  expedient 
in  her  case  as  compared  with  the  western  powers,  owing  to 
the  low  average  of  education. 

The  extent  of  illiteracy  in  the  Russian  army  must  have 
either  seriously  restricted  the  choice  of  non-commissioned 
officers  and  subalterns  or  debased  the  general  standard  of 
their  quality.  The  vast  development  in  the  mechanism  of 
warfare  and  the  present  conditions  of  the  battlefield  have 
laid  an  unprecedented  burden  of  responsibility  upon  the 
members  of  this  class.     For  instance,  the  intense  fire  that 


The  Destruction  of  the  Polish  Salient     131 

sweeps  the  modern  battlefield  dissolves  the  larger  masses 
and  leaves  the  immediate  direction  of  the  troops  in  the 
hands  of  the  numerous  inferior,  subordinate  leaders.  The 
heavy  losses  of  the  Russians  may  probably  be  ascribed  in 
no  small  part  to  the  relative  unenlightenment  of  this 
humbler  leadership,  as  well  as  to  the  scarcity  of  suitable 
field  officers. 

To  throw  raw  formations,  imperfectly  equipped,  sup- 
plied, and  officered  into  the  fiery  furnace  of  modern  war- 
fare is  worse  than  wasteful  and  inhuman.  For  the  resulting 
fearful  augmentation  in  the  number  of  casualties  tends  to 
unnerve  the  friendly  forces  and  strengthen  the  assurance  of 
the  enemy,  and  therefore  Russia  very  wisely  held  back  large 
numbers  of  her  new  recruits  for  training  at  the  regimental 
depots  during  the  unfortunate  summer  of  1915,  although 
her  armies  were  so  greatly  outnumbered  in  the  field. 

The  armies  which  now  formed  the  German-Austro- 
Hungarian  front  from  the  Baltic  Sea  to  the  confines  of 
Roumania  were  disposed  in  the  following  order,  as  indi- 
cated by  the  names  of  their  commanders:  von  Below  in 
Courland;  von  Eichhorn  on  the  eastern  border  of  East 
Prussia;  von  Scholtz  and  von  Gallwitz  along  the  north- 
western side  of  the  Polish  salient;  Prince  Leopold  of 
Bavaria  in  the  central  sector  west  of  Warsaw ;  von  Woyrsch, 
the  Archduke  Joseph  Ferdinand,  and  von  Mackensen 
facing  the  southwestern  reentrant  of  the  Polish  salient; 
von  Boehm-Ermolli  northeast  of  Lemberg;  von  Linsin- 
gen  along  the  Gnila  Lipa  down  to  its  confluence  with  the 
Dniester:  and  von  Pnanzer  along  the  right  bank  of  the 
latter  as  far  as  the  Russian  boundary.  Fully  2,500,000 
Teutonic  soldiers  awaited  the  command  in  readiness  for 
instant  action. 

Before  the  close  of  the  summer  we  find  the  armies  on 
the  Russian  side  grouped  into  three  general  commands, 


132  The  Great  War 

under  Alexeieff  in  the  north,  Ewarts  in  the  center,  and 
[vanofT  in  the  south.  The  Fifth  Army  confronted  von 
Below  in  Courland;  the  Tenth,  under  the  direct  command 
of  Alexeieff,  held  the  Niemen  front  against  von  Eichhorn; 

General  Plehve's  Twelfth  Army  occupied  the  northern 
side  of  the  Polish  salient;  the  Second  guarded  the  apex  in 
front  of  Warsaw,  and  Ewarts  and  Lesch  with  the  Fourth 
and  Third  respectively  covered  the  southern  face;  while  in 
the  south  Brussiloff  and  Lechitsky  with  the  Eighth  and 
Ninth  Armies  opposed  von  Boehm-Ermolli,  von  Linsingen, 
and  von  Pflanzer.  The  Russians  were  probably  not  able  at 
any  time  during  this  summer  to  muster  2,000,000  effectives, 
fully  armed  and  equipped. 

Von  Hindenburg  commanded  the  group  of  Teutonic 
forces  in  the  north,  and  was  entrusted  with  the  congenial 
task  of  directing  the  concentric  operations  against  the 
northern  sector  of  the  Polish  salient.  Prince  Leopold  of 
Bavaria  was  group  commander  in  the  center,  and  von 
Mackensen  in  the  south,  while  von  Falkenhayn  as  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff  supervised  and  coordinated  all  the  efforts. 

About  the  middle  of  July  almost  the  entire  Teutonic 
front  burst  into  sudden  flame.  Along  nearly  the  whole 
line  of  a  thousand  miles  the  Russians  were  assailed  with  the 
utmost  violence  and  thus  robbed  of  the  advantage  of  strik- 
ing back  with  locally  superior  forces  at  different  crucial 
points  successively,  which  the  possession  of  interior  lines  of 
communication  in  the  Polish  salient  might  otherwise  have 
given  them.  On  the  south,  between  the  Vistula  and  the 
Bug,  where  it  is  said  that  no  fewer  than  fourteen  corps  had 
been  concentrated  under  von  Mackensen  and  the  Arch- 
duke Joseph  Ferdinand,  the  offensive  was  resumed  by  the 
former  on  the  night  of  the  15th-16th.  General  Lesch's 
Third  Russian  Army  of  probably  not  more  than  half  the 
aggregate  numerical  strength  of  its  two  opponents  had 


The  evacuation  of  Warsaw.      A  Russian  regiment  marching  through  the  city  the  day  before 
the  Germans  entered. 


The  Germans  in  Warsaw.       Officers  of  the  German  Headquarters  Staff  arriving  in  their 
gray  army  staff  motor-cars,  at  the  hotel  Bristol,  to  take  up  their  quarters  there. 


The  Destruction  of  the  Polish  Salient     133 

just  received  considerable  reinforcements,  including  a  corps 
of  Siberians  and  a  division  of  the  Guards,  because  the  Rus- 
sians themselves  had  planned  another  attack  in  this  same 
region.  Generally  speaking,  the  Siberians  were  regarded 
as  the  choice  troops  of  the  Russian  line. 

Although  the  Russians  were  still  greatly  outnumbered 
in  this  section  and  their  first  line  trenches  were  destroyed 
by  a  fearful  bombardment,  the  balance  was  restored  by  the 
Russian  Guards,  who  attacked  the  enemy  with  great  gal- 
lantry. After  two  days'  stubborn  fighting  von  Macken- 
sen's  superiority  in  shell  prevailed  on  the  18th,  the  Russians 
slowly  retired,  and  the  Germans  occupied  Krasnystav  and 
reached  a  point  within  ten  miles  of  the  vital  railway  be- 
tween Lublin  and  Chelm. 

The  retrogression  of  the  Third  Army  necessitated  the  re- 
tirement of  the  four  corps  of  General  Ewarts's  Fourth  Rus- 
sian Army  which  was  attacked  by  General  von  Woyrsch's 
army,  its  slightly  convex  front,  which  ran  by  Radom  and 
Sienno,  being  perforated  near  the  latter  place  on  the  17th 
so  that  the  following  night  the  Russians  were  compelled 
to  withdraw  behind  the  Itzanka.  After  a  further  struggle 
von  Woyrsch  occupied  Radom  on  the  20th  and  the  Rus- 
sian army  retreated  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Vistula.  Von 
Woyrsch  gained  positions  commanding  the  bridge-heads 
of  Nova  Aleksandrja  and  Ivangorod  by  the  21st.  This 
advance  together  with  that  of  von  Mackensen  compelled 
the  Russians  to  retire  from  the  intervening  section  opposite 
the  position  of  the  Archduke  Joseph  Ferdinand. 

Von  Gallwitz  fell  upon  the  Russians  on  the  northern 
salient,  swept  over  their  trenches  in  front  of  Przasnysz  on 
the  14th  and  drove  the  enemy  towards  the  Narev,  while 
von  Scholtz  further  to  the  northeast  was  driving  the  Rus- 
sians towards  the  same  river  between  Ostroleka  and 
Lomza.     By  the  20th  the  Germans  had  their  heavy  guns 


134  The  Great  War 

within  range  of  several  fortresses  along  the  line  of  the 
Narev  and  the  Bohr,  and  von  GallwitZ,  oil  the  23d,  broke 
through  the  Russian  lines  on  a  front  of  about  five  miles  and 
forced  the  passage  of  the  Narev  northeast  of  Pultusk. 

This  threatening  advance  of  the  Germans  on  the  Narev 
front  led  to  the  retirement  on  the  18th  of  the  Second  Rus- 
sian Army  from  the  famous  Rawka-Bzura  line,  twenty-five 
miles  west  of  Warsaw,  which  it  had  occupied  since  the 
previous  November,  to  a  position  running  from  Novo 
Georgievsk  straight  south  through  Blonie,  fifteen  miles 
from  the  Polish  capital,  which  had  been  fortified  for  in- 
tended occupancy  just  before  the  adoption  of  the  more 
western  line  the  fall  before.  The  Germans  moved  up  to  a 
position  opposite  the  Blonie  line. 

The  four  corps  composing  the  Second  Army  in  their 
order  from  north  to  south  were  the  Fifth  Siberian,  Sixth, 
Thirty-fifth  Reserve,  and  Thirty-sixth  Reserve.  In  con- 
sequence of  Ewarts's  retirement  behind  the  Vistula,  the  left 
wing  of  the  Second  Army,  beginning  at  Grodzisk,  was 
bent  back  until  its  extremity  touched  the  Vistula  at  Gora- 
kalwarja  and  thus  closed  the  front. 

The  closing  in  of  the  Teutonic  armies  on  Warsaw  and 
the  threatened  obliteration  of  a  large  section  of  the  Polish 
salient  probably  led  the  Russian  military  authorities  at  this 
time  to  resolve  to  sacrifice  Warsaw  and  evacuate  Polish  ter- 
ritory as  a  supreme  effort  to  save  the  Russian  armies.  But 
for  the  successful  application  of  even  this  heroic  remedy 
it  was  almost  too  late. 

Only  on  the  extreme  Austro-German  right  wing  did  the 
offensive  make  little  progress.  With  difficulty  von  Boehm- 
Ermolli  gained  possession  of  some  bridge-heads  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Bug,  while  further  south  the  Zlota  Lipa 
remained  the  dividing  line  between  the  hostile  armies  until 
the  latter  part  of  August.     But  a  further  very  formidable 


The  Destruction  of  the  Polish  Salient     135 

danger  for  the  Russians  was  making  its  appearance  in  the 
extreme  north,  where  the  German  forces  effected  the 
crossing  of  the  Vindava  on  July  14th,  on  the  right  near 
Kurschany,  under  the  command  of  General  von  Below, 
and  on  the  left  near  Goldingen,  under  General  von  Lauen- 
stein,  and  swept  eastward  on  a  broad  front  capturing  many 
prisoners.  Vindava  and  Tukkum  were  taken  on  the  left 
and  Shavli  on  the  right.  Von  Below  defeated  the  Russian 
Fifth  Army  on  the  23d  and  advanced  along  the  Libau- 
Dvinsk  railway,  while  von  Lauenstein,  after  a  violent  con- 
flict on  the  30th-31st,  captured  Mitau  on  August  1st  and 
consolidated  his  front  upon  the  east  bank  of  the  Aa  below 
Bausk.  During  the  first  week  of  the  great  offensive  the 
Teutonic  armies  had  taken  41,000  prisoners  on  the  por- 
tion of  the  front  between  the  Niemen  and  the  Vistula  and 
50,000  on  the  southern  operative  sector  between  the  Pilica 
and  the  Bug. 

Beginning  on  July  24th,  the  Russians  gradually  aban- 
doned the  Blonie  line  and  fell  back  on  the  forts  of  Warsaw. 
Any  lingering  hesitation  as  to  the  necessity  of  their  great 
strategical  decision  must  have  been  dispelled  by  the  ener- 
getic operations  of  von  Woyrsch.  For  a  portion  of  his 
army  succeeded  in  throwing  pontoon  bridges  across  the 
Vistula  near  the  mouth  of  the  Radomka,  between  Ivan- 
gorod  and  Warsaw,  on  the  morning  of  the  28th,  and  two 
corps  crossed  to  the  right  bank,  threatening  to  dislocate 
the  Russian  front  completely.  The  left  wing  of  the  Rus- 
sian Thirty-sixth  Reserve  Corps,  which  formed  the  south- 
ern member  of  the  Second  Army,  was  drawn  back  across 
the  river  and  thus  reestablished  contact  with  Ewarts's  right, 
but  the  situation  remained  precarious. 

The  safety  of  the  Second  Army  was  in  fact  due  to  the 
obstinate  resistance  for  about  two  weeks  of  the  Twelfth 
Army  between  the  Narev  and  the  Bug,  which  prevented 


136  The  Great  War 

the  advance  of  von  Gallwitz,  and  so  protected  the  northern 
flank  of  the  Second  Army.  ( )n  the  29th  von  Mackensen  cut 
the  Warsaw- KiefT  railway  and  on  the  next  day  Lublin  and 
Chelm  were  both  in  Austro-German  bands.  By  August  2d 
four  corps  bad  crossed  the  Vistula  below  Ivangorod,  and 
this  fortress,  now  included  in  a  concave  recess  of  the  Teu- 
tonic front  and  no  longer  tenable,  surrendered  to  General 
von  Koevess,  commander  of  an  Austro-Hungarian  army 
corps  on  von  Woyrsch's  right  wing,  on  August  4th.  At 
the  same  time  the  fate  of  the  Polish  capital  was  sealed. 
The  tragedy  of  alternating  hopes  and  fears  had  touched  the 
limit  of  its  protracted  course. 

During  the  evening  of  the  4th  the  retreating  Russian 
columns  filed  through  the  streets  of  Warsaw.  By  mid- 
night the  last  units  were  crossing  the  Vistula  bridges  which 
were  blown  up  about  three  hours  later.  Prince  Leopold's 
advance-guard  entered  the  city  about  five  A.  M. 

The  news  of  this  positive  acquisition,  in  lieu  of  the 
report  of  repeated,  but  inconclusive,  Teutonic  victories, 
filled  Germany  with  a  deep  sense  of  satisfaction.  It  prom- 
ised even  greater  political  than  strategic  results,  for  Ger- 
many might  conceivably  win  the  gratitude  and  cooperation 
of  a  nation  of  20,000,000  souls  through  her  capacity  to 
invest  them  with  the  name  and  substance  of  united  inde- 
pendent political  existence. 

Holding  to  the  traditional  theory  that  retreating  armies 
are  capable  of  inflicting  serious  damage  on  the  armies  of  an 
invader,  or  even  pave  the  way  to  their  destruction,  and, 
clinging  to  the  recollection  of  the  destruction  of  Napo- 
leon's Grande  Armee  in  1812,  the  Russians  in  their  retreat 
in  1915  resorted  to  insensate  devastation  of  a  large  part  of 
the  territory  which  they  evacuated.  They  burned  crops, 
villages,  and  towns,  and  forced  the  people  to  depart 
with  them,  not  realizing  that  such  measures  would  cause 


The  Destruction  of  the  Polish  Salient     137 

relatively  small  annoyance  to  the  Germans  with  their  re- 
markable technical  mastery  of  communications  and  trans- 
pose This  horde  of  exiles,  numbering  fully  2,000,000,  so 
greatly  embarrassed  the  movements  of  the  Russian  armies 
that  in  some  cases  the  orders  for  the  civilian  evacuation 
were  reversed. 

The  Second  Russian  Army  evacuated  the  suburb  of 
Praga  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Vistula,  opposite  Warsaw, 
on  August  9th,  and  entered  upon  a  veritable  race  with 
death,  though  partly  protected  by  the  brave  defense  of 
the  Twelfth  Army  on  its  northern  flank,  being  closely  pur- 
sued by  the  army  of  Prince  Leopold,  while  the  armies  of 
von  Woyrsch,  the  Archduke  Joseph  Ferdinand,  and  von 
Mackensen  were  converging  towards  the  critical  section 
of  the  base  of  the  Polish  salient  on  the  upper  Bug. 

With  astonishing  alacrity  the  German  engineers  pushed 
forward  their  work  upon  the  tracks  of  the  victorious 
armies.  In  some  sections  the  very  trace  of  the  Polish 
railways  had  been  almost  obliterated.  Yet  only  eleven 
days  after  the  capture  of  Warsaw  the  German  authorities 
were  able  to  announce  the  establishment  of  an  express 
service  of  passenger  trains  between  extreme  points  in  the 
occupied  territories  East  and  West.  An  express  train  leav- 
ing Lille  at  6.40  A.  M.  and  Brussels  at  8.30,  reached  Berlin 
at  midnight  and  arrived  in  Warsaw  in  time  for  luncheon 
the  next  day.  Without  waiting  for  the  reconstruction  of 
the  demolished  bridges  at  Warsaw  and  Ivangorod,  the 
Germans  reestablished  railway  communication  across  the 
Vistula  by  means  of  pontoon  bridges  formed  of  river 
barges  and  thus  provided  for  the  steady  flow  of  munitions 
and  supplies  for  the  advancing  armies. 

The  archduke  expelled  Ewarts's  left  wing  from  the  left 
bank  of  the  lower  Vieprz  on  August  7th,  von  Woyrsch 
drove  the  Russian  rearguards  from  their  positions  west  of 


138  The  Great  War 

Lukov  on  the  I Oth,  and  Prince  Leopold  reached  Kaluszyn 
on  the  same  day.  Lukov  was  taken  on  the  12th  and  the 
next  day  Siedlce  fell  on  the  very  heels  of  the  departing 
Russians.  Possibly  the  most  critical  period  in  the  retire- 
ment of  the  Second  Army  was  passed  when  it  escaped 
from  Siedlce  and  entered  a  forest  region  which  extends 
eastward  to  the  Bug. 

The  resistance  of  the  fortresses  barring  the  river  cross- 
ings on  the  northern  flank  was  a  most  important  factor. 
The  Russian  leaders  decided  to  sacrifice  the  garrison  of 
Novo  Georgievsk  for  the  sake  of  prolonging  the  resist- 
ance and  obstructing  the  Danzig- M lava- Warsaw  railway 
and  the  navigation  of  the  Vistula  at  that  point.  The 
offensive  impetus  encountering  at  intervals  the  stationary 
obstruction  of  the  fortresses  of  Novo  Georgievsk,  Ostro- 
leka,  Lomza,  and  Osovietz  gave  the  German  front  a  scal- 
loped contour,  like  canvas  bellying  before  the  blast.  All 
these  strongholds  except  Osovietz  fell  before  the  20th,  but 
not  without  rendering  an  invaluable  service. 

At  first  the  Grand-duke  Nicholas  had  probably  hoped 
to  hold  a  line  running  down  the  right  bank  of  the  upper 
Bug.  Along  this  line  the  railway  from  Brest-Litovsk 
through  Bialystok  to  Osovietz  would  provide  convenient 
lateral  communications.  But  the  German  advance  in  Cour- 
land  and  more  particularly  von  Eichhorn's  perforation  of 
the  Niemen  barrier  soon  extinguished  every  hope  of  arrest- 
ing the  Teutonic  deluge  before  it  had  swept  on  to  the  soil 
of  Holy  Russia. 

The  continued  possession  of  the  fortress  of  Kovno 
seemed  to  be  a  necessary  guarantee  against  disaster  for  the 
Russians.  Von  Below  in  the  north  was  pushing  towards 
Dvinsk,  and  if  Kovno  fell,  von  Eichhorn  might  join  in  a 
converging  movement  against  the  Russian  army  on  the 
Dvina  and  by  crushing  it  open  a  breach  through  which 


The  Destruction  of  the  Polish  Salient     139 

the  German  hosts  could  drive  at  Petrograd.  Or  its  fall 
might  be  the  natural  prelude  to  an  enveloping  movement 
against  the  Russian  center.  On  its  safety  depended  that 
of  the  other  Niemen  fortresses,  Olita  and  Grodno.  Kovno, 
from  its  importance  as  a  railway  center,  was  the  key  to  the 
Lithuanian  metropolis. 

Kovno  was  defended  by  eighteen  detached  forts,  nine  on 
each  side  of  the  Niemen;  but  this  system  had  not  been  ex- 
tended and  consolidated  by  continuous  lines  of  earthworks. 

Von  Eichhorn,  in  command  of  the  Tenth  German  Army 
of  five  corps,  advanced  to  the  vicinity  of  Kovno  and  com- 
menced the  bombardment  on  August  5th,  employing 
heavy  pieces  of  every  caliber  including  the  42-centimeter 
mortars.  The  heroic  defense  of  the  garrison  temporarily 
resisted  the  advancing  tide  and  permitted  the  Russians  to 
remove  a  large  part  of  the  stores  and  valuable  equipment. 
A  breach  made  by  General  Litzmann's  army  corps  in 
one  of  the  forts  on  the  southwest  opened  the  way  to  the 
Germans  and  by  the  17th  the  entire  fortress  was  captured, 
with  1,301  guns,  according  to  the  victor's  report.  A  con- 
siderable portion  of  the  garrison  made  its  escape  from  the 
forts  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Niemen. 

General  of  the  Infantry  von  Beseler,  the  conqueror  of 
Antwerp,  attacked  the  fortress  of  Novo  Georgievsk  with 
his  roving,  powerful  force  of  heavy  artillery.  He  began 
operations  on  the  northeast  and  after  taking  by  storm  a 
large  fort  and  two  intermediate  redoubts  on  the  16th  over- 
came the  stubborn  resistance  of  the  defenders,  who  relied 
on  the  obsolete  stationary  method,  and  captured  the  entire 
fortress  on  the  19th. 

The  Germans  reported  the  capture  of  20,000  men  and 
700  cannon  during  the  final  combat  and  at  the  surrender 
of  the  fortress,  but  claimed  that  the  prisoners  taken  during 
the  entire  siege  reached  the  amazing  total  of  90,000.     The 


140  The  Great  War 

larger  number,  it'  authentic,  must  have  included  all  pris- 
oners taken  anywhere  in  the  entire  vicinity,  even  in  field 
operations,  during  the  course  of  the  siege.  The  captured 
cannon  rose,  according  to  the  reported  final  enumeration, 
to  the  incredible  total  of  1,640. 

In  the  meantime  von  Mackensen,  marching  north  from 
Chelm,  had  crossed  the  Bug  at  Vladava  and  threatened 
Brest-Litovsk  in  flank  and  rear;  von  Woyrsch,  after  pass- 
ing through  Lublin  in  pursuit  of  Evvarts,  was  advancing 
against  the  west  front  of  Brest-Litovsk;  while  von  Gall- 
witz,  striking  eastward,  had  cut  the  Brest-Litovsk-Bialystok 
railway  at  Bielsk  on  August  18th.  A  little  further  north, 
von  Scholtz  took  Bialystok  on  the  26th.  In  Courland  the 
German  pressure  was  becoming  ever  more  formidable  in 
the  region  of  the  Dvina. 

The  capture  of  Kovno  as  already  recorded,  on  the  17th, 
led  immediately  to  the  evacuation  of  Suwalki  and  the 
retirement  of  the  Russians  from  the  forests  of  Augustovo, 
so  long  their  favorite  refuge  and  base  of  attack.  Olita  had 
to  be  evacuated  on  the  26th  and  by  September  1st  the 
Warsaw- Vilna-Petrograd  railway  had  been  cut  in  this  sec- 
tion also  northeast  of  Grodno  and  the  attack  on  the  western 
forts  of  Grodno  had  begun.  After  the  hasty  removal  of  a 
large  part  of  the  military  material  Grodno  was  abandoned 
by  the  Russians  on  the  3d. 

On  August  10th  a  German  squadron  of  nine  battleships, 
twelve  cruisers,  and  a  flotilla  of  destroyers  were  defeated 
in  an  attempt  to  enter  the  Gulf  of  Riga.  On  the  17th 
the  lighter  craft  entered  under  cover  of  a  dense  fog,  but 
their  attempt  to  disembark  at  Pernau  three  days  later  was 
frustrated  and  the  whole  landing-party  was  captured  or 
destroyed  by  the  Russian  flotilla.  The  landing  of  a  con- 
siderable German  force  in  the  Gulf  of  Riga  north  of 
the  mouth  of  the  Dvina  would  probably  have  caused  the 


FTTT      IT  IT  1 


Russian  prisoners  taken  at  Novo  Georgievsk. 


ffiV*&® 


-m 


s 


Heroic  wooden  statue  of  von  Hindenburg  erected  in  Berlin. 


The  Destruction  of  the  Polish  Salient     141 

evacuation  of  Riga  and  led  to  the  abandonment  of  the 
lower  Dvina  and  this  would  have  opened  the  way  for  an 
attack  on  Petrograd.  Meanwhile,  the  main  Russian  and 
German  squadrons  had  come  into  action,  principally  in  the 
Mohn  Sound,  and  the  Germans  after  sustaining  serious 
damage  were  compelled  to  leave  the  gulf.  It  was  reported 
that  two  German  cruisers  and  eight  destroyers  were  either 
sunk  or  put  out  of  action. 

The  fall  of  Kovno  imperilled  the  entire  Russian  right 
wing.  To  prevent  the  center  from  being  enveloped  by  a 
movement  of  the  Germans  across  the  Vilna-Petrograd  rail- 
way, it  was  necessary  to  withdraw  the  center  to  a  line 
beyond  the  range  of  such  a  movement. 

Accordingly,  Ewarts  held  out  at  Brest-Litovsk  only  long 
enough  for  most  of  the  material  of  war  to  pass  on  its  way 
towards  the  interior  and  evacuated  the  position  on  the  25th 
Just  as  von  Beseler  was  bringing  up  his  heavy  siege  artillery. 
Retreating  eastward  Ewarts's  army  soon  entered  the  region 
of  the  Pripet  marshes,  where  the  Russians  were  doubtless 
delayed  in  their  retreat  by  the  scarcity  of  parallel  routes,  but 
at  the  same  time  relieved  from  exposure  to  flank  attacks. 

In  this  time  of  cruel  disappointment  and  keen  anxiety, 
on  September  5th,  the  Tsar  announced  in  terms  of  heroic 
earnestness  his  intention  of  assuming  personal  command 
of  all  the  Russian  armies,  while  the  Grand-duke  Nicholas 
was  sent  to  the  Caucasus  as  viceroy,  transferred,  in  other 
words,  to  the  command  in  the  lesser  theater  of  operations 
on  the  Armenian  frontier. 

The  removal  of  the  grand-duke  gave  rise  to  the  most 
varied  surmises.  He  had  seemingly  shown  himself  to  be 
a  competent  general,  and  the  great  retreat,  the  inevitable 
result  of  the  less  effective  strength  and  of  deficiency  in  the 
material  equipment  of  the  Russians,  had  been  executed  in 
a  masterly  way.     Probably  the  misfortunes  of  Russia  had 


142  The  Great  War 

brought  about  a  state  of  discontent  that  could  only  be  ap- 
peased by  offering  a  scapegoat  But  the  chief  credit  for  the 
elaboration  of  the  plans  for  the  great  retreat  is  commonly  at- 
tributed to  General  Alexeieff,  who  was  now  made  Chief  of 
the  ( Jeneral  Staff  under  the  Tsar's  titular  supreme  command. 
Michael  Vassilievitch  Alexeieff  entered  the  army  from 
the  Moscow  Military  Academy  as  ensign  in  the  64th 
Kazan  regiment  on  December  1,  1876,  and,  like  many 
other  famous  Russian  generals  of  the  present  time,  re- 
ceived his  first  experience  of  actual  warfare  in  the  Russo- 
Turkish  struggle  of  1877-1878.  He  was  promoted  to  the 
rank  of  captain  in  1885,  completed  the  course  of  studies  in 
the  General  Staff  Academy  in  1890,  and  served  as  professor 
in  the  same  institution  from  1898  to  1904.  His  experience 
as  Quartermaster-general  of  the  Third  Manchurian  Army 
in  the  Russo-Japanese  War  was  doubtless  a  providential 
preparation  for  the  more  vital  administrative  problems  of 
the  war  in  Europe.  After  serving  as  Chief  of  Staff  for  the 
military  district  of  Kieff  from  1908  to  1912,  the  Great  War 
found  him  commanding  general  of  the  Thirteenth  Corps 
at  Smolensk  and  the  increasing  pressure  of  emergency  bore 
him  successively  to  ever  broader  fields  of  action  and  re- 
sponsibility, as  Ivanoff's  Chief  of  Staff,  commander  of  the 
northern  army  group,  and  finally  the  practical  head  of  all 
the  Russian  armies.  Alexeieff  must  have  inspired  the  con- 
fidence of  the  government.  The  situation  evidently  called 
for  the  guidance  of  a  man  of  his  peculiar  temperament 
and  training,  and  one  might  venture  the  conjecture  that 
the  interposition  of  the  Tsar  was  partly  intended  as  a  device 
to  palliate  the  passage  of  the  virtual  chief  command  from 
a  member  of  the  imperial  family  to  a  subject.  Russky 
succeeded  Alexeieff  as  commander  of  the  northern  army 
group,  while  Ewarts  and  Ivanoff  retained  their  positions  in 
the  center  and  south  respectively. 


The  Destruction  of  the  Polish  Salient     143 

Although  the  Russian  armies  at  the  center  had  success- 
fully cleared  the  base  line  of  the  former  Polish  salient  in 
their  eastward  flight,  von  Hindenburg  still  believed  that  by 
breaking  through  the  opposing  front  at  Vilna  the  Germans 
could  turn  the  enemy's  right  center  and  roll  it  back  upon 
the  Pripet  marshes,  where  it  could  neither  rally  nor  escape, 
and  thus  inflict  an  irreparable  disaster  and  consummate  the 
supreme  purpose  of  the  campaign.  To  effect  this,  general 
pressure  was  maintained  along  the  whole  front,  while  the 
left  center,  by  the  familiar  double  enveloping  movement 
undertook  to  isolate  Vilna  and  bag  the  Tenth  Russian  Army. 
While  von  Scholtz  and  von  Gallwitz  on  the  south  converged 
in  the  direction  of  Lida,  von  Eichhorn  engaged  in  a  frontal 
attack  on  the  Russians  west  of  Vilna.  On  September  8th 
his  right  center  captured  near  Novo  Traki  a  defile  through 
the  chain  of  lakes  that  covered  Vilna  on  the  west.  On  the 
12th  the  Russians  were  driven  back  across  the  Vilija  where 
it  approaches  Vilna  from  the  northeast  and  the  Germans 
cut  the  Vilna-Petrograd  railway  about  twenty-two  miles 
northeast  of  the  city. 

The  situation  was  now  ripe  for  throwing  forward  the 
other  arm  to  encircle  Vilna  on  the  north.  A  great  mass 
of  German  cavalry  under  von  Lauenstein,  numbering  about 
40,000,  swept  up  the  right  bank  of  the  Vilija  and  occupied 
Vileika  on  the  railway  running  northeast  from  Molo- 
detchno.  The  German  lines  were  now  enclosing  Vilna 
within  a  horseshoe-like  formation  and  the  fall  of  the  city 
was  inevitable. 

The  Russians  clung  to  Vilna  with  perhaps  imprudent 
tenacity,  while  with  feverish  energy  military  stores  and  the 
fortress  artillery  were  being  removed  through  the  rapidly 
diminishing  zone  of  unconquered  territory  eastward.  There 
was  only  one  suitable  line  of  retirement,  the  railway  and 
parallel  highway  through  Molodetchno.   The  railway  route 


144  The  Great  War 

by  way  of  Lida  was  still  in  the  possession  of  the  Russians, 
but  a  retirement  by  it  would  have  resulted  in  a  fatal  con- 
gestion with  the  troops  retreating  eastward  before  von 
Scholtz  ami  \<>n  Gallwitz.  By  the  15th  the  Germans  had 
crossed  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Vilija  east  of  Vilna  and  were 
all  but  in  possession  of  a  section  of  the  railway  from  Vilna 
through  Molodetchno  to  Minsk.  The  situation  for  the 
Russians  was  probably  the  gravest  that  had  occurred  since 
the  escape  of  the  army  that  had  been  stationed  before 
Warsaw.  The  hostile  ring  was  fast  closing  around  the 
Russian  army. 

The  old  Lithuanian  capital  was  evacuated  on  the  18th. 
The  retreat  of  the  Russian  army  from  the  Vilna  salient, 
which  was  executed  with  masterly  skill,  is  said  to  have 
been  directed  by  General  Alexeieff  from  the  General 
Headquarters.  The  German  columns  marched  into  the 
streets  of  Vilna,  which  a  short  time  before  had  throbbed 
with  life  and  animation,  but  where  a  deathlike  stillness 
now  prevailed.  Shops  and  houses  were  bolted  and  barred, 
the  shutters  were  closely  drawn,  and  the  tread  of  the  march- 
ing thousands  reechoed  with  a  weird  and  hollow  sound. 

Eastward  the  roads  presented  the  usual  spectacle  of 
anxious  flight;  endless  trains  of  artillery,  ambulances,  and 
supply  wagons ;  dense  crowds  of  fugitives  with  every  kind 
of  vehicle,  encumbered  with  personal  and  household  arti- 
cles, old  people  and  young  children,  the  sick  and  infirm, 
embarrassing  the  march  of  the  retreating  columns  of  sol- 
diers. In  almost  continuous  rearguard  engagements  the 
Russians  struggled  desperately  to  avert  the  impending  dis- 
aster, but  the  fall  of  Lida  on  the  19th  made  the  prospect 
even  more  disheartening. 

The  incidents  crowding  this  retreat  would  seem  to  ex- 
press the  full  sum  of  human  misery.  At  the  stations  most 
harrowing  scenes  occurred;  the  terror  of  the  people  at  the 


u     P     H     K     A  3     b 

A     p     M     I     M           H  CJlOTy. 

?3'-"   aBrycTa  1915     roaa 

Ccro       nvicna.       fl  npuHa^i     Ha       CE&fl       npeABOA*- 

xeTibCTBOBaHie        bc^mh  cyxonyTHUMM        n       mopckhmh 

BOopy>KeHHbtMtf       cn-naMi: ,  HaxoAfliuHMHca       Ha       TeaTp^ 

BOeHHbIXT>  A^^CTBiK 


An  historic  document. 
On  the  $th   of  September,  lQij~  {2jd  of  August,   Russian  calendar),   the  Tsar  of 
Russia  took  command  of  the  Russian  forces  on  land  and  sea. 

The  typewritten  paragraph  translates  as  follows  :  "I  have  this  day  taken  command 
oj  all  the  forces  on  land  and  sea  nvhich  are  stationed  in  the  zone  of  hostilities.''' 

The  Tsar  added  with  his  own  hand:  i(!f'ith  a  profound  faith  in  the  Divine  favor 
and  the  immovable  assurance  of  final  victory  -ive  'will  perform  the  sacred  duty  of  de- 
fending our  country  to  the  end  and  ive  tvill  not  dishonor  the  land  of  Russia/' 

Nicholas. 


The  Destruction  of  the  Polish  Salient     145 

approach  of  their  pitiless  conquerors  deprived  them  of 
the  power  of  reasoning  and  deadened  all  the  impulses  of 
compassion.  The  strong  ignored  the  helplessness  of  the 
weak;  the  sound,  the  claims  of  the  wounded;  a  veritable 
inferno  reigned.  It  was  "the  contest  for  survival  in  all  its 
hideousness ! " 

An  intensely  vivid  narrative  of  the  horrors  of  this  phase  of 
twentieth-century  war  is  furnished  by  the  journal  of  a  young 
French  lady  who  was  serving  as  a  Red  Cross  nurse  with  the 
retreating  Russian  army.  Her  story  appeared  in  the  Revue 
des  deux  Mondes  from  which  we  quote  the  following  words : 

"We  have  just  arrived  at  the  station  of  Gondagaye  after 
escaping  by  a  miracle  from  the  pursuit  of  the  Germans.  We 
are  ordered  to  halt  and  our  ambulance  is  quickly  installed. 
Great  battles  are  in  progress  in  the  vicinity.  In  and  around 
the  station  what  a  sight !  We  fairly  walk  over  the  wounded 
and  dying ;  they  are  everywhere,  on  the  benches,  on  the  floor, 
and  outside  along  the  platform.  .  .  .  Groans  fill  the  station, 
broken  at  times  by  piercing  shrieks.  A  poor  little  soldier, 
less  than  twenty  years  old,  holds  with  his  left  hand  his  right 
half  torn  off.  Another,  older,  seated  on  the  floor  with  his 
back  resting  against  the  wall,  his  eyes  closed  and  his  face  pale 
as  death,  his  side  stained  red,  rolls  his  head  against  the  wall, 
crying  repeatedly,  '  My  God,  my  God.'  One  can  scarcely 
stop.  More  wounded  arrive,  but  nothing  can  increase  the 
horror  of  the  scene.  .  .  .  The  number  of  fugitives  crowding 
the  station  and  its  vicinity  increases  every  minute.  The  last 
train  is  ready  to  depart.  The  wounded  crawl  towards  us  in 
their  terror,  some  of  them  on  mangled  hands  or  stumps  of 
amputated  legs.  There  is  a  moment  of  terrible  frenzy.  We 
almost  have  to  fight  with  the  refugees  to  prevent  them  from 
occupying  the  places  reserved  for  the  wounded.  ...  A 
voice  cries:  'The  station  is  going  to  be  blown  up.'  Des- 
perately we  lash  the  horses  and  they  rear  up  and  dash 


146  The  Great  War 

off.  .  .  .  We  had  scarcely  gone  500  meters  when  a  for- 
midable detonation  tells  that  'all  has  been  accomplished.' 

"Everything  is  on  fire.  Gondagaye  burns  behind  us. 
Other  villages  lift  their  bloody  torch  upon  the  horizon. 
We  flee  by  the  light  of  the  conflagrations,  a  ^rand  and 
terrible  spectacle." 

At  the  supremely  critical  moment,  when  like  the  hosts 
of  Pharaoh  the  Russian  army  was  threatened  with  sub- 
mersion by  the  hostile  tide  rolling  in  upon  it  from  both 
sides,  the  violence  of  the  German  offensive  seemed  to 
falter.  By  the  20th  the  Russians,  now  apparently  well 
supplied  with  ammunition,  were  turning  on  their  pursuers 
with  renewed  energy  and  assurance,  driving  them  from 
Vileika,  repelling  them  at  Lebedevo  on  the  21st,  recap- 
turing Smorgon.  The  neighborhood  of  Molodetchno 
remained  the  high-water  mark  of  the  German  invasion  in 
this  section.  The  last  great  crisis  of  the  Russian  retreat 
was  past  and  as  the  operations  subsided  into  trench  warfare 
the  line  of  division  between  the  fronts  settled  on  the  longi- 
tude of  Smorgon. 

The  probable  causes  of  the  failure  of  the  Germans  to  grasp 
their  final  opportunity  were  the  diverting  of  part  of  their 
energy  in  the  eastern  theater  to  meet  the  new  Allied  offen- 
sive in  the  West,  the  gradual  lessening  of  the  alacrity  and 
buoyancy  of  the  troops;  the  increasing  difficulty  of  em- 
ploying their  most  effective  instrument  of  aggression,  their 
heavy  artillery,  the  further  they  penetrated  into  a  country 
of  indifferent  roads;  and,  specifically,  the  fact  that  the  flying 
German  wing,  wanting  the  steadying  support  of  infantry 
and  field  artillery,  crumbled  before  a  determined  counter- 
offensive. 

For  many  months  Great  Britain  and  France  had  strug- 
gled in  vain  to  open  a  suitable  avenue  through  the.  Darda- 
nelles by  which  to  bear  the  needed  succor  to  their  hard 


The  Destruction  of  the  Polish  Salient     147 

pressed  ally.  Their  great  offensive  in  the  West  was  prob- 
ably launched  at  this  time  before  the  attainment  of  the 
full  measure  of  their  intended  preparation  in  response  to 
Russia's  plight. 

The  gigantic  efforts  of  the  Germans,  in  spite  of  a  suc- 
cession of  astounding  victories  without  parallel,  the  subju- 
gation of  a  great  number  of  important  fortresses,  and  the 
occupation  of  a  vast  expanse  of  hostile  territory,  had  failed 
to  accomplish  the  destruction  of  the  Russian  armies.  The 
available  season  for  active  operations  on  the  Russian  front 
was  now  drawing  to  a  close.  The  impending  great  offen- 
sive in  the  Balkan  peninsula  would  henceforth  demand  the 
chief  attention,  while  at  the  same  time  the  activity  of  the 
Allies  in  the  West,  if  not  a  vital  peril,  was  certainly  a  cause 
of  serious  preoccupation.  For  these  reasons  the  Central 
Powers  were  inclined  to  restrict  their  efforts  in  the  eastern 
theater  from  now  on  to  such  operations  as  were  necessary 
to  gain  a  suitable  stationary  front,  so  as  to  obtain  an  interval 
of  comparative  repose,  be  able  to  withdraw  as  many  troops 
as  possible  for  operations  elsewhere,  and  make  the  neces- 
sary provision  for  winter  quarters. 

In  the  autumn  of  1915  the  line  connecting  Riga,  Dvinsk, 
Vilna,  Luniniets,  Rovno,  and  Lemberg  was  the  only  rail- 
way in  the  vast  zone  between  Brest-Litovsk  on  the  west 
and  the  course  of  the  Dnieper  on  the  east  connecting  the 
northern  and  southern  sections  of  the  theater  of  war  in 
Russia.  A  section  of  this  lateral  railway  including  Vilna  was 
already  in  the  possession  of  the  Germans  and  every  con- 
sideration of  strategical  expediency  demanded  the  subjuga- 
tion of  the  entire  line  and  pointed  clearly  to  the  belt  of 
territory  lying  in  front  of  it  as  the  appropriate  general 
position  for  the  proposed  stationary  front. 

Operations  were  already  in  progress  throughout  a  large 
part  of  the  eastern  theater  which  looked  solely  to  the 


148  The  Great  War 

removal  of  depressions  in  the  Austro-German  front  and 
might  therefore  be  regarded  as  the  necessary  steps  to  the 
consolidation  of  the  stationary  winter  position.  On  the  left 
center  Prince  Leopold's  efforts  were  directed  chiefly  against 
Baranovich,  an  important  junction  on  the  much  coveted 
lateral  railway.  But  here  the  Germans  were  unsuccessful 
and  the  end  of  September  found  the  Russians  firmly  in- 
trenched before  the  place. 

The  consistent  development  of  the  Teutonic  campaign 
required  that  the  German  right  wing  in  the  south,  which 
had  remained  practically  stationary  at  the  Bug  and  Zlota 
Lipa  since  the  early  part  of  July,  should  be  pushed  for- 
ward and  brought  into  alignment  with  the  center  and, 
particularly,  that  the  forces  of  the  Central  Powers  should 
gain  possession  of  the  triangle  of  fortresses,  Lutsk,  Dubno, 
and  Rovno,  which  commanded  the  railway  system  of  Vol- 
hynia,  including  a  section  of  the  important  line  from  Riga, 
through  Vilna  and  Rovno,  to  Lemberg. 

The  chief  river  in  the  central  area  is  the  Pripet,  a  slug- 
gish stream  that  imperfectly  drains  the  territory  in  its 
course.  East  of  Brest-Litovsk  it  flows  through  a  shallow 
basin,  where  the  waters  from  the  surrounding  elevations 
stagnate  in  the  famous  Pripet  Marshes,  which  cover  an 
area  as  large  as  Scotland  or  the  state  of  Indiana  and  exceed 
120  miles  in  width  near  Pinsk.  The  principal  tributary  of 
the  Pripet  is  the  Styr,  which  enters  it  from  the  south. 

From  the  watershed  south  of  the  basins  of  the  Bug  and 
the  Pripet  with  their  tributaries,  the  Gnila  Lipa,  the  Zlota 
Lipa,  the  Strypa,  and  the  Sereth  flow  southward  into  the 
Dniester,  and  by  their  roughly  parallel  courses  constitute 
for  eastern  Galicia  a  succession  of  important  defensive 
lines. 

Towards  the  close  of  August  von  Mackensen  was  ad- 
vancing eastward  from  the  vicinity  of  Brest-Litovsk  with 


Russian  artillery  retreating  in  good  order  on  the  road  east  of  Warsaw  in  the  directiot 
of  Brest-Litovsk. 


How  the  Russians  kept  valuable  metal  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Germans.  Showing 
a  portion  of  a  collection  in  the  monastery  of  Nicolsky,  near  Moscow,  of  over  three  hundred  bells 
taken  from  Orthodox,  Catholic,  and  Lutheran  churches  in  Russia  before  evacuation  of  the  territory 
to  the  Germans.      Each  bell  is  marked  with  a  tag  to  indicate  from  whence  it  came. 


The  Destruction  of  the  Polish  Salient     149 

his  right  wing  skirting  the  southern  margin  of  the  Pripet 
Marshes.  A  strong  cavalry  force  under  General  Puhallo 
filled  the  gap  between  von  Mackensen's  right  and  von 
Boehm-Ermolli's  left,  while  the  latter's  front  extended 
southward  as  far  as  ZlochofF  near  the  head-waters  of  the 
Bug.  Count  von  Bothmer's  army  followed  along  the 
right  bank  of  the  Zlota  Lipa  and  von  Pnanzer's  extended 
down  the  Dniester  as  far  as  the  Austro-Russian  border. 
Brussiloff  confronted  Puhallo,  von  Boehm-Ermolli,  and 
von  Bothmer,  and  Lechitsky  faced  von  Pflanzer. 

By  gaining  the  southern  section  of  the  Riga-Lemberg 
railway  and  all  the  lines  radiating  from  Lemberg  eastward 
and  by  depriving  the  Russians  of  the  defensive  lines  of  the 
parallel  rivers  in  eastern  Galicia,  the  Austro-Germans  could 
make  their  right  wing  practically  impregnable.  Conse- 
quently the  purpose  of  the  Teutonic  operations  was  prac- 
tically twofold,  the  subjugation  of  the  Volhynian  fortresses 
and  the  expulsion  of  the  Russians  from  Galicia.  The  plan 
for  the  attainment  of  the  first  of  these  objectives  was  based 
upon  a  concentric  movement  on  Rovno,  Puhallo  advancing 
through  Kovel  and  Lutsk  and  von  Boehm-Ermolli  through 
Brody  and  Dubno.  The  railways  from  Warsaw  and  Brest- 
Litovsk  converge  at  Kovel  and  from  there  diverge  east- 
ward in  the  direction  of  Kieff  and  Odessa,  crossing  the 
Riga-Vilna-Lemberg  lateral  railway  at  Sarny  and  Rovno 
respectively.  Puhallo  entered  Kovel  as  early  as  August  23d, 
but  the  inauguration  of  the  great  Austro-German  offensive 
movement  in  the  south  is  commonly  dated  on  the  27th, 
when  a  part  of  von  Boehm-Ermolli's  army  shattered  a  sec- 
tion of  the  Russian  front  on  the  watershed  between  the 
Bug  and  Zlota  Lipa,  forcing  the  Russians  to  abandon  their 
positions  on  the  Bug.  Lutsk  fell  to  the  Teutonic  forces 
on  August  31st,  Brody  on  September  1st,  and  Dubno  on 
the  8th. 


150  The  Great  War 

Simultaneously,  further  south  on  August  27th,  von  Bath- 
mer,  fighting  on  the  anniversary  and  site  ol  the  first  great 
battles  east  of  Lemberg,  forced  the  passage  of  the  '/Iota  Lipa 
near  Brzezan) ,  while  \  on  Pflanzer's  left  \\  ingattacked  in  the 
direction  of  Buczacz  on  the  Strypa.  These  southern  armies 
reached  the  Strypa  on  the  29th  and  by  September  3d  the 
Russians  were  hack  on  the  Sereth,  having  retired  a  distance 
of  about  thirty  miles. 

But  just  as  the  Teutonic  right  wing  was  advancing  under 
full  headway,  with  formidable  momentum,  and  with  every 
apparent  prospect  of  winning  a  complete  victory,  it  fell  un- 
expectedly upon  a  determined  counter-offensive  started  by 
Ivanoff  as  group  commander  on  the  left  wing  of  the  Rus- 
sians. The  Austro-Germans  staggered  backward  before 
the  hostile  impact.  The  recovery  of  the  initiative  by  the 
Russians  and  their  renewed  aggressive  operations  were 
the  most  conspicuous  feature  of  the  closing  months  of  the 
campaign  in  the  southern  area.  On  September  7th  the 
Russians  forestalled  and  thwarted  an  intended  decisive 
operation  of  the  Teutonic  forces  planned  for  the  follow- 
ing night,  when  BrussilofT  surprised  and  defeated  the 
Third  Division  of  the  Prussian  Guard,  the  Forty-eighth 
German  Reserve  Division,  and  an  Austro-Hungarian  bri- 
gade with  a  strong  force  of  artillery,  which  were  moving 
against  Tarnopol  on  the  Sereth.  At  the  same  time  Lech- 
itsky  defeated  von  Pflanzer  in  the  vicinity  of  Tremblova. 
At  this  time  the  Russians  seem  to  have  had  a  plentiful 
supply  of  ammunition  both  in  the  north  and  south.  By 
the  evening  of  the  9th  the  Russian  offensive  on  the  Sereth 
had  brought  in  a  harvest  of  more  than  17,000  prisoners. 
On  the  evening  of  the  13th  the  Austro-Germans  were 
back  on  the  line  of  the  Strypa. 

Von  Mackensen's  right  wing  failed  in  an  attack  on  the 
front  of  the  Russian  Third  Army  west  of  Sarny.     But  in 


The  Destruction  of  the  Polish  Salient     151 

the  center  he  took  Pinsk  on  the  16th  and  almost  reached 
the  corresponding  section  of  the  intended  winter  front. 
The  Austro-German  forces  were  unsuccessful  in  another 
attempt  to  reach  Sarny  and  Rovno  on  the  17th.  Von  Lin- 
singen  succeeded  von  Mackensen  on  the  eastern  front 
when  the  latter  departed  for  the  campaign  in  Serbia. 

The  continued  activity  of  the  Russian  southern  wing 
was  a  disconcerting  factor  in  the  Austro-German  plans. 
It  compelled  the  Teutonic  allies  to  strengthen  their  right 
wing  on  the  Russian  front  at  a  time  when  it  was  desirable 
to  withdraw  as  many  men  as  possible  from  the  eastern 
theater  and  it  completely  thwarted  their  attempt  to  win 
the  desired  line  for  their  front  in  this  quarter.  Further- 
more, it  was  a  moral  as  well  as  strategical  asset  for  the 
Russians  to  retain  possession  of  a  strip  at  least  of  Austro- 
Hungarian  territory.  In  the  latter  part  of  September 
Ivanoff  transferred  his  chief  attention  to  the  Volhynian 
sector  of  the  Russian  front,  where  Dubno  was  retaken 
and  Lutsk  temporarily  reoccupied  and  the  attacks  of  the 
Russians  were  continued  throughout  October. 

Simultaneously  with  the  above-mentioned  operations  in 
the  southern  area  a  series  of  severe  conflicts  were  in  prog- 
ress in  the  extreme  northern  portion  of  the  eastern  theater, 
where  the  Germans  were  likewise  struggling  to  win  an 
adequate  position  for  their  front.  Here  it  was  imperative 
that  von  Hindenburg  should  extricate  his  lines  from  the 
forests  and  morasses  and  gain  a  strong  defensive  front 
along  the  Dvina.  With  Dvinsk  and  Riga  and  the  con- 
necting railway  in  their  hands  the  Germans  could  face  the 
coming  winter  with  composure  and  look  forward  to  an 
auspicious  resumption  of  their  offensive  towards  Petro- 
grad  in  the  spring.  There  were  no  fewer  than  thirteen 
German  army  corps  in  this  northern  section,  besides 
von  Lauenstein's  cavalry,  and  these  were  being  reinforced 


152  The  Great  War 

by  large  numbers  of  reserves,  chiefly  Landsturm,  from 
Germany. 

For  about  fifty  miles  along  the  Dvina,  from  Riga  up  to 
Friedrichstadt,  there  is  no  suitable  crossing  place,  the 
marshy  forests  making  all  approach  by  an  army  from  the 
south  impracticable.  Friedrichstadt  was  therefore  a  vital 
point  in  the  defensive  line  of  the  Dvina.  On  August  29th 
von  Below  made  a  forcible  attack  at  this  place,  captured 
the  bridge-head,  and  subjected  the  section  of  the  Riga- 
Dvinsk  railway  opposite  to  the  fire  of  the  German  heavy 
artillery.  By  September  3d  the  Germans  had  cleared  the 
left  bank  of  the  Dvina  for  a  distance  of  about  ten  miles 
from  Friedrichstadt  to  Linden. 

After  this  the  Germans  transferred  their  chief  attention 
for  a  time  to  Dvinsk,  a  pivotal  point  in  the  Russian  front, 
where  the  line  coming  from  the  south  swung  westward 
towards  the  Gulf  of  Riga.  The  Russians  derived  one 
special  advantage  from  the  marshy,  difficult  character  of 
the  zone  of  territory  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Dvina,  in 
that  the  lines  of  approach  to  the  Russian  front  were  few 
and  clearly  defined  and  could  therefore  be  more  easily 
watched  and  intercepted.  In  the  vicinity  of  Dvinsk  this 
feature  was  especially  pronounced. 

Although  in  a  general  sense  Dvinsk  was  at  the  point  of 
a  reentrant  angle  in  the  Russian  front,  the  actual  operative 
sector,  extending  from  Lake  Drisviaty  south  of  the  city  to 
Illuxt  towards  the  northwest,  a  distance  of  more  than  thirty 
miles,  was  slightly  convex,  bulging  outward  in  the  direction 
of  the  assailant.  Russky,  in  other  words,  profiting  by  the 
lesson  of  the  previous  sieges  in  this  war,  had  thrown  out 
his  lines  in  the  form  of  an  arc  to  a  distance  of  at  least 
twelve  miles  from  the  city,  so  as  to  shelter  this  vital  center 
of  communications  from  the  enemy's  fire.  Dvinsk  owed 
its  salvation  to  the  fact  that  it  was  not  a  fortress  in  the 


The  Destruction  of  the  Polish  Salient     153 

conventional  sense  but  merely  an  intrenched  section  of 
the  front. 

In  the  operations  against  Dvinsk  von  Hindenburg  was 
aided  by  the  same  von  Morgen  who  had  given  such  signal 
proof  of  efficiency  at  the  Masurian  Lakes.  Subsequently 
his  place  in  this  section  was  taken  by  von  Lauenstein. 

Attacking  along  the  Novo  Alexandrovsk  road  near  the 
center  of  the  defensive  sector  southwest  of  Dvinsk  on  Sep- 
tember 25th,  the  Germans  pushed  the  Russians  back  to  a 
point  about  eight  miles  from  the  city;  but  this  initial  suc- 
cess practically  marked  the  limit  of  their  achievement. 
The  numerous  lakes  scattered  throughout  the  region  in 
front  of  Dvinsk  created  strategic  problems  and  possibilities 
like  those  of  the  Masurian  region  of  East  Prussia.  But  the 
conditions  were  now  in  large  part  reversed.  For  the  Ger- 
mans had  become  the  invaders  and  von  Hindenburg  was  no 
longer  in  his  old  familiar  haunts,  while  the  Russians  had 
the  advantage  of  convenient  lines  of  communication  and 
adequate  supplies  of  ammunition  and  had  drawn  valuable 
lessons  from  their  experience  and  mistakes. 

A  great  effort  of  the  Germans  on  October  3d  consisted 
of  a  series  of  desperate  thrusts  at  the  intervals  between  the 
lakes  supported  by  a  great  mass  of  heavy  artillery.  Von 
Morgen  with  ten  of  the  largest  howitzers  and  an  operative 
force  of  80,000  failed  to  make  progress  along  the  Novo 
Alexandrovsk  road.  Later  the  Germans  endeavored  to  press 
in  the  Russian  wings  and  thus  bring  a  destructive  cross- 
fire to  bear  upon  the  Russian  center.  On  October  23d 
they  broke  through  the  Russian  lines  west  of  Illuxt  and 
occupied  the  town,  but  this  advance  was  checkmated  by  a 
Russian  counter-attack  a  little  further  south.  At  the  end 
of  October  the  Russians  attacked  in  the  central  portion  of 
the  Dvinsk  sector  near  Lakes  Sventen  and  Ilsen,  and  by 
November  11th  they  had  consolidated  their  positions  on 


154  The  Great  War 

the  isthmus  between  the  two  lakes  and  gained  control  of 
the  western  hank  of  Sventen,  advancing  in  places  as  much 
as  three  miles. 

During  the  conflict  before  Dvinsk,  for  almost  the  first 
time  in  this  campaign,  German  bombardments  were  silenced 
by  Russian  guns  and  German  infantry  charges  were  broken 
by  artillery  fire  alone.  The  increased  expenditure  of  metal 
on  the  Russian  side  immediately  effected  a  marked  decrease 
in  the  consumption  of  human  gun  fodder. 

During  the  third  week  of  October  von  Hindenburg 
launched  a  determined  effort  against  Riga.  In  this  con- 
nection our  attention  should  be  directed  to  the  topograph- 
ical conditions  of  the  region  on  the  left  bank  of  the  lower 
Dvina.  Here  the  River  Aa  with  its  tributaries,  the  Eckau 
and  the  Misse,  sweeping  round  in  a  bold  curve,  presents  a 
convex  front,  as  a  natural  defensive  outwork  of  Riga,  in 
the  face  of  an  aggressor  approaching  from  the  southwest. 
Several  smaller  streams,  wrorking  their  way  through  the 
marshes  and  thickets,  empty  into  the  Dvina  from  the  left. 

Six  army  corps  and  a  strong  force  of  artillery  were  con- 
centrated along  the  German  front  of  about  seventy  miles 
which  crossed,  in  the  vicinity  of  Kemmern,  from  the  Gulf 
of  Riga  to  the  Aa,  followed  the  Aa  and  Eckau,  and  swung 
over  to  the  bank  of  the  Dvina  near  Linden.  Von  Hinden- 
burg's  plan  combined  a  turning  movement  along  the  left 
bank  of  the  Dvina  from  the  southeast  with  a  frontal  attack 
towards  Riga  from  the  center  of  the  German  front  at 
Mitau.  The  flanking  force  ate  its  way  northwestward 
along  the  Dvina,  until  by  October  24th  it  had  reached  a 
point  within  ten  miles  of  Riga  opposite  the  upper  end  of 
the  island  of  Dahlen,  which  divides  the  river  into  com- 
paratively narrow  channels.  Meanwhile,  by  the  22d,  the 
German  center  had  passed  the  Eckau  and  reached  Olai  on 
the   Misse  twelve  miles  from   Riga.      But  as  at  Dvinsk 


The  Destruction  of  the  Polish  Salient     155 

their  early  efforts  brought  them  to  the  practical  limit  of 
penetration. 

Successive  attempts  to  advance  along  the  coast  were 
thwarted  by  the  cooperation  of  the  Russian  naval  and 
military  forces.  The  marshes  in  the  center  proved  to  be 
an  insuperable  hindrance  to  the  movement  of  the  heavy 
guns  on  which  the  Germans  so  largely  relied.  The  Ger- 
mans gained  a  foothold  on  the  island  of  Dahlen  but  were 
unable  to  retain  it.  After  a  final  ineffectual  effort  in  this 
corner  of  the  field  the  offensive  lapsed  before  Riga  as  well 
as  before  Dvinsk,  and  the  Germans  had  to  accommodate 
themselves  as  best  they  could  to  winter  quarters  in  dreary, 
inhospitable  localities. 

The  situation  in  the  Balkans  in. December,  full  of  peril 
for  the  Allies,  seemed  to  call  for  a  diversion  on  the  Russian 
front.  At  the  same  time  the  strengthening  of  the  Austro- 
German  right  wing  in  the  eastern  theater  apparently  por- 
tended an  invasion  of  Bessarabia  in  the  extreme  southwest 
of  Russia,  perhaps  a  drive  at  Odessa.  The  Teutonic  forces 
on  the  eastern  front,  which  probably  amounted  altogether 
at  this  time  to  120  divisions  of  infantry  and  twenty-three  of 
cavalry,  were  now  divided  into  four  group  commands  under 
von  Hindenburg,  Prince  Leopold  of  Bavaria,  von  Linsin- 
gen,  and  the  Archduke  Frederick  respectively.  The  right 
wing  consisted  of  the  Fourth  Austro-Hungarian  Army  of 
the  Archduke  Joseph  Ferdinand,  with  Puhallo  and  the  First 
Austro-Hungarian  on  its  right  along  the  Styr;  the  Second 
Austro-Hungarian  Army  under  von  Boehm-Ermolli  ex- 
tending across  the  divide  in  northeastern  Galicia ;  the  army 
of  von  Bothmer,  largely  German  in  its  composition,  along 
the  Strypa;  and  the  Sixth  Austro-Hungarian  Army  under 
von  Pflanzer  along  the  Dniester  and  in  Bukovina. 

At  her  Black  Sea  bases  Russia  had  been  organizing  a 
new  army,  the  Seventh,  under  General  Scherbacheff,  for  an 


156  The  Great  War 

intended  attack  across  Dobrudscha  at  the  rear  of  the  Bul- 
garians. When  such  an  operation  was  prevented  by  Rou- 
mania's  tirm  insistence  upon  the  strict  neutrality  of  her 
territory,  Russia  decided  to  strike  a  blow  at  the  enemy  in 
Bukovina  instead. 

With  the  Russian  Eighth  Army,  Brussiloff  was  at  this 
time  facing  the  Archduke  Joseph  Ferdinand  and  Puhallo 
on  the  Styr;  the  Eleventh  Army  under  General  Sakharoff 
confronted  von  Boehm-Ermolli  in  northeastern  Galicia;  the 
new  Seventh  now  took  its  place  along  the  Strypa  against 
von  Bothmer;  and  Lechitsky's  Ninth  Army  opposed  von 
Prlanzer  in  Bukovina.  Czernowitz  was  selected  as  the 
objective  of  the  Russian  offensive,  since  it  was  apparent 
that  the  capture  of  this  place  would  effectively  preclude  an 
invasion  of  Bessarabia  or  an  attempt  to  intimidate  Rou- 
mania  and  constrain  her  to  join  the  Teutonic  alliance  by 
enclosing  her  on  the  north  as  well  as  on  the  south.  The 
plan  was  to  strike  at  Czernowitz  with  the  Ninth  Army  and 
at  the  same  time  execute  an  enveloping  movement  with 
the  Seventh.  Five  German  divisions  were  transferred  from 
Bulgaria  to  the  threatened  section  and  von  Mackensen  re- 
placed the  Archduke  Frederick  as  group  commander  on 
the  right  flank  of  the  Teutonic  front  in  the  eastern  theater. 

Lechitsky's  offensive  movement  began  on  December 
24th.  In  a  holding  operation  further  north  Brussiloff  cap- 
tured Czartorysk  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Styr  on  January 
7,  1916.  The  offensive  against  Czernowitz  lasted  until 
January  16th  without  making  any  considerable  gains  in 
territory;  but  it  probably  relieved  the  pressure  on  the  Allies 
in  the  Balkans  and  thwarted  any  Austro-German  expecta- 
tions of  overrunning  Bessarabia  at  this  time. 


CHAPTER  VII 

The  Welter  in  the  Balkans  and  the  Submersion 
of  Serbia 


The  Balkan  labyrinth.  Conflicting  tendencies.  The  situation  in  Greece : 
political  revival,  1910-1913;  Venizelos  as  prime  minister ;  the  estrangement 
between  Venizelos  and  the  king ;  problems  left  by  the  Balkan  Wars ;  the 
project  for  Greek  cooperation  with  the  Allies  and  the  resignation  of 
Venizelos;  Greek  and  Italian  interests  in  the  Near  East;  the  election 
of  June  13,  1915.  The  attitude  of  Bulgaria:  the  advantage  of  the  Central 
Powers  in  bargaining  with  Bulgaria;  the  powerful  influence  of  military 
events  on  Bulgarian  policy;  Bulgaria's  decision  and  agreement  with  Tur- 
key. Obligation  of  Greece  with  respect  to  Serbia.  Resignation  of 
Venizelos  on  October  5th ;  King  Constantine's  attitude.  The  Zaimis  and 
Skouloudis  ministries  and  the  Greek  elections  of  December  19th.  Bul- 
garia casts  her  lot  with  the  Central  Empires.  The  strategical  situation  of 
Serbia.  Commencement  of  the  Serbian  campaign.  Union  of  the  Bul- 
garian and  German  armies  and  the  crushing  of  Serbian  resistance.  Exodus 
of  Serbian  fugitives.  Flight  by  the  Ibar  valley  and  across  the  Plains  of 
Kossovo.  Escape  of  the  remnants  of  the  Serbian  armies  through  Albania. 
Arrival  and  failure  of  the  Allied  relief  expedition.  The  British  and 
French  establish  a  fortified  base  at  Salonica.  Withdrawal  of  the  Allies 
from  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula.     Reflection  on  the  close  of  the  campaign. 

There  is  no  single  Ariadne's  thread  to  guide  the  be- 
wildered explorer  through  the  tangled  labyrinth  of  Balkan 
politics.  Despite  Bulgaria's  central  position,  which  gave 
her  an  importance  out  of  all  proportion  to  her  size,  strength, 
or  resources,  the  attitude  of  Tsar  Ferdinand's  government 
was  not  the  sole  decisive  factor  in  the  welter  of  conflicting 
impulses  in  which  the  three  remaining  Balkan  states  were 
now  involved.  Some  of  the  more  potent  general  factors 
may  be  enumerated,  as  follows: 

1.  The  widespread  sympathy  among  the  Balkan  peoples  for  the 
nations  of  the  Entente.    The  Greeks  esteemed  Great  Britain, 

157 


158  The  Great  War 

France,  and  Russia  as  their  deliverers  from  bondage  to  the 
Turks,  at  a  time  when  the  Teutonic  courts  regarded  the 
Greek  revolution  either  with  indifference  or  with  suspi- 
cious disapproval  as  a  dangerous  assertion  of  the  preten- 
sions of  nationality.  No  German  poets  or  enthusiasts  laid 
down  their  lives  for  the  redemption  of  the  sacred  soil  of 
Hellas.  Greece  owed  the  Ionian  Isles  to  the  magnanimity 
of  Great  Britain,  and  Thessaly  to  the  support  of  the  present 
Entente  Powers.  The  Roumanians,  proud  of  their  Latin 
origin,  regarded  Italy  and  France  with  the  attachment  of 
a  sister;  and,  in  spite  of  recent  occurrences,  the  Bulgarian 
peasants  still  harbored  a  deep  feeling  of  gratitude  for  Russia 
as  their  liberator. 

2.  The  hostile  ambitions  and  mutual  suspicions  of  the  Balkan 
states.  The  outcome  of  the  second  Balkan  War  left  an 
unbridgeable  gulf  of  hatred  between  Bulgaria  and  her 
Christian  neighbors.  She  was  inconsolable  for  the  loss 
of  Macedonia  in  particular  and  the  sight  of  thousands  of 
refugees,  who  had  fled  from  Serbia's  drastic  measures  for 
nationalizing  the  population  of  that  region,  nourished  her 
yearning  for  revenge. 

3.  Dynastic  influences  favoring  the  Central  Powers.  Serbia 
and  Montenegro  were  the  only  Balkan  states  having  sov- 
ereigns of  indigenous  stock.  Constantine,  the  King  of 
Greece,  grandson  of  Christian  IX  of  Denmark,  was  born 
on  August  3,  1868,  and  was  married  to  Princess  Sophia  of 
Prussia,  sister  of  Emperor  William  II,  in  1889.  His  acces- 
sion to  the  throne  of  Greece  followed  the  assassination  of 
his  father,  King  George  I,  which  occurred  at  Salonica  on 
March  18,  1913. 

Ferdinand  I,  Tsar  of  Bulgaria,  was  born  in  1861,  son 
of  Prince  Augustus  of  Saxe-Coburg-Gotha  and  Princess 
Marie-Clementine  of  Bourbon-Orleans,  a  daughter  of 
Louis-Philippe.     His  versatile  and  inquisitive  disposition, 


The  Welter  in  the  Balkans  159 

dilettantism  in  art,  elegant  appearance,  astuteness,  and 
cruelty  recall  the  characteristic  traits  of  the  Italian  despots 
of  the  Renaissance.  Nature  endowed  him  with  great  am- 
bition, but  seems  to  have  withheld  the  gift  of  personal 
bravery,  the  place  of  which  was  supplied  by  subtlety  and 
cunning. 

Charles  I  (Carol),  King  of  Roumania,  was  born  on  April 
20,  1839,  the  son  of  Prince  Charles  Anthony  (Karl  Anthon) 
of  Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.  He  was  elected  Prince  of 
Roumania  in  1866  and  assumed  the  rank  of  king  in  188L 
He  married  Princess  Elizabeth  of  Wied,  better  known  by 
her  nom  de  plume  as  Carmen  Sylva,  in  1869,  and  was  suc- 
ceeded at  his  death,  October  11,  1914,  by  his  nephew, 
Prince  Ferdinand  of  Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.  The 
latter,  who  rules  as  Ferdinand  I,  was  born  in  1865  and  was 
married  in  1893  to  Marie  Alexandra  Victoria,  the  eldest 
daughter  of  the  Duke  of  Edinburgh  and  granddaughter  of 
Queen  Victoria. 

At  first  the  Entente  governments  seem  to  have  made  the 
mistake  of  underrating  the  importance  of  the  dynastic 
factor  in  the  case  of  Greece  and  Bulgaria,  and,  in  the  case 
of  Greece  especially,  the  power  of  the  king  to  thwart  the 
natural  inclination  of  the  people.  But  the  sovereigns  of 
Greece  and  Bulgaria  were  doubtless  actuated  far  more  by 
practical  considerations  of  interest  and  prudence  than  by 
sentimental  attachment  for  Germany  or  for  the  head  of 
the  family  of  Hohenzollern.  As  officers  with  German 
training  they  were  dominated  by  blind  admiration  for  the 
high  standard  of  efficiency  of  the  German  army  and  by 
the  conviction  that  Germany  would  win  the  war. 

4.  Popular  disinclinatio?i  for  warfare  and  dread  of  the  results 
of  intervention.  After  a  period  of  turmoil  and  bloodshed 
the  peasants  of  the  Balkan  states  had  returned  to  their 
neglected  farms  only  a  few  months  before.     Their  apathy 


160  The  Great  War 

for  fresh  schemes  of  conflict  must  have  heen  felt  in  all  the 
states,  but  was  naturally  stronger  in  those  which  were  not 
stung  by  a  sense  of  wrongs  endured.  It  is  not  unlikely 
that  the  actual  majority  of  the  Greeks,  although  Greece 
had  most  to  win  by  alliance  with  the  Entente,  were  averse 
to  any  warlike  enterprises  for  aggrandizement. 

The  Balkan  peoples  watched  the  titanic  struggle  of  the 
Great  Powers  with  a  sense  of  awe  and  consternation  and 
shrank  from  the  fiery  arena  where  a  casual  shifting  of  the 
balance  might  mean  the  ruin  of  a  Balkan  state. 

5.  Apprehension  in  regard  to  the  designs  of  Russia.  A  state- 
ment made  by  Sazonoff  before  the  Duma  on  February 
9,  1915,  though  rather  enigmatical  in  form,  was  generally 
accepted  as  an  official  confirmation  of  the  supposed  under- 
standing that,  if  the  Entente  should  be  victorious,  Russia 
would  receive  Constantinople  with  the  acquiescence  of  the 
western  powers.  Such  a  result  would  thwart  the  fondest 
pan-Hellenic  aspiration,  that  of  recovering  the  seat  of  the 
Greek  patriarchs  and  the  ancient  capital  of  the  Greek 
Empire.  Bulgaria  foresaw  that  her  independence  would 
be  destroyed  if  Russia  were  installed  at  Constantinople, 
and  Roumania  could  not  be  indifferent  to  the  future  dis- 
position of  the  Strait  which  was  the  only  outlet  for  her 
sea-borne  commerce.  That  the  realization  of  the  Teu- 
tonic dream  of  a  hegemony  extending  from  the  North 
Sea  to  the  Persian  Gulf  implied  the  absolute  subordination 
of  Bulgaria's  policy  to  that  of  Germany  seems  to  have 
created  no  apprehension.  Perhaps  engrossment  in  their 
present  grievances  had  dulled  the  perception  of  the  Bul- 
garians for  the  ultimate  consequences  of  a  German  vic- 
tory. But  it  was  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  diversity 
of  interests  of  the  partners  in  the  Entente  would  make  an 
Allied  victory  less  dangerous  for  Balkan  independence  than 
a  German  victory. 


The  Welter  in  the  Balkans  161 

Nowhere  is  the  collision  of  these  varied  and  discordant 
forces  more  strikingly  illustrated  than  in  the  turgid  course 
of  Grecian  politics.  The  rather  sorry  figure  made  by  the 
Hellenic  kingdom  during  the  critical  stages  of  the  Great 
War  forms  a  disappointing  epilogue  to  the  wonderful  period 
of  national  regeneration  which  commenced  in  1910  and 
reached  its  culmination  in  the  victories  of  the  Balkan 
Wars.  Greece  had  fallen  into  a  discouraging  state  of 
political  corruption  and  national  and  military  indifference 
before  this  revival.  But  in  its  extremity  the  nation  shook 
off  this  lethargy  and  found  a  leader.  Eleutherios  Venizelos 
is  unquestionably  one  of  the  ablest  European  statesmen  of 
the  present  age.  Born  in  Crete  in  1864,  the  period  of  his 
manhood  had  thus  far  been  spent  in  the  midst  of  the 
passionate  struggle  for  the  liberation  of  his  native  island 
and  for  its  union  with  the  Hellenic  kingdom,  in  which  his 
unquenchable  zeal  and  unfailing  judgment  had  made  him 
the  leader.  Relinquishing  the  premiership  of  Crete  in 
1910,  he  brought  the  ardent  spirit  of  a  crusader  to  the 
service  of  his  brother  Hellenes  on  the  mainland,  where 
the  fervor  of  the  heroic  period  had  been  cooled  by  the 
three  generations  that  had  passed  since  the  revolutionary 
struggle  with  the  Turks.  By  his  unswerving  devotion  to 
the  sacred  aspiration  of  liberating  the  Greater  Greece  be- 
yond the  limits  of  the  existing  kingdom,  by  his  impetuous 
enthusiasm  tempered  with  prudence,  and  by  his  delibera- 
tion and  consistency  of  method,  Venizelos  towered  above 
the  shifty  politicians  of  the  mainland,  whose  selfish  intrigues 
had  made  the  political  life  of  their  country  a  byword  of 
contemptuous  ridicule. 

Venizelos  was  a  man  of  dauntless  courage  as  well  as 
magnetic  personality.  At  the  time  of  his  reception  in 
Athens,  which  was  made  the  occasion  for  a  brilliant  ova- 
tion, he  dared  to  insist,  in  defiance  of  the  crowd,  that  the 


162  THE  Great  War 

kingship  should  be  preserved.  Chosen  a  member  of  the 
Greek  Chamber  and  summoned  to  the  premiership  in 
1910,  Venizelos  turned  his  energy  to  the  internal  rehabilita- 
tion of  Greece  as  the  indispensable  preliminary  for  the 
realization  of  his  greater  hopes.  Administrative  reforms 
and  the  exclusion  of  politics  from  the  army  prepared  the 
country  for  taking  advantage  of  opportunities  for  develop- 
ing its  strength.  The  army  and  navy  were  modernized 
under  the  supervision  of  French  and  British  officers,  so 
that  in  two  years  Greece  was  able  to  put  200,000  men  into 
the  field,  well  organized  and  equipped.  The  tireless  devo- 
tion, enthusiasm,  and  tact  of  Venizelos  smoothed  the  way 
for  the  formation  of  the  Balkan  League,  which  without 
his  genius  would  have  been  an  unthinkable  achievement. 

To  his  enlightened  statesmanship  were  chiefly  due  the 
Greek  victories  in  the  Balkan  Wars,  but  politicians  were 
incapable  of  understanding  his  disinterestedness  and  his 
loyalty  was  rewarded  with  the  proverbial  ingratitude  of 
princes.  Constantine  embodied  the  heroic  idea  of  the 
people  as  the  result  of  Greek  fortune  in  war  and  enjoyed 
a  military  reputation  that  he  may  not  have  entirely  de- 
served. Hardly  had  he  become  king  before  indications  of 
friction  with  his  prime  minister  were  apparent.  The  sting 
of  the  latter's  successful  efforts  to  secure  the  complete 
separation  of  Crete  from  Turkey,  which  brought  about 
the  resignation  of  Constantine  as  High  Commissioner  of 
the  protecting  Powers  in  1906,  may  have  been  the  original 
cause  of  the  aversion  of  the  prince,  but  aggravating  circum- 
stances grew  out  of  the  irreconcilable  conceptions  of  the 
sovereign  and  his  minister  regarding  the  nature  and  func- 
tion of  a  constitutional  ruler.  Added  to  these  were  tem- 
peramental qualities  and  inherent  egotism,  all  tending  to 
foster  in  the  king's  mind  a  determination  to  strengthen  and 
exalt  the  royal  power. 


The  Welter  in  the  Balkans  163 

The  termination  of  the  Balkan  Wars  left  unsettled  some 
vexatious  problems  relative  to  the  delimitation  of  the  Hel- 
lenic kingdom.  One  of  these  was  the  disposition  of  the 
islands  seized  by  Greece  from  Turkey  when  she  annexed 
Crete  on  the  outbreak  of  the  Balkan  War.  By  the  Treaty 
of  London,  May  30,  1913,  the.  annexation  of  Crete  was 
sanctioned,  but  the  disposition  of  the  other  islands  was 
reserved  to  the  Great  Powers.  Another  was  the  Albanian 
principality.  The  Great  Powers  refused  to  admit  the 
Greek  claim  to  the  whole  of  northern  Epirus  and  included 
within  the  southern  boundary  of  Albania  a  considerable 
area  where  the  population  was  predominantly  Greek. 

Friction  between  Turkey  and  Greece  was  renewed  after 
the  war  by  the  question  of  the  Aegean  Islands,  when  the 
former  purchased  the  two  dreadnoughts  then  under  con- 
struction in  British  yards,  which  were  subsequently  requisi- 
tioned by  the  British  government,  and  Greece  replied  by 
acquiring  the  Idaho  and  the  Mississippi  from  the  United 
States. 

The  powers  informed  Greece  by  a  collective  note  on 
February  13,  1914,  that  on  condition  of  the  withdrawal  of 
Greek  troops  from  Albanian  Epirus  by  March  31st,  they 
would  permit  her  to  retain  all  the  islands  claimed  by  Tur- 
key except  Tenedos,  Imbros,  and  Castelorizo.  Greece 
reluctantly  accepted  these  conditions  on  the  16th,  but  on 
the  24th  the  Greek  population  of  northern  Epirus  declared 
that  it  would  resist  incorporation  with  Albania  and  set  up 
a  provisional  government  at  Argyrocastro.  A  compromise 
was  brought  about  in  May,  by  which  the  Epirotes  acknowl- 
edged Albanian  supremacy  in  return  for  extensive  local 
privileges.  But  this  arrangement  was  soon  abrogated  by 
the  Albanian  revolution  bringing  in  a  Moslem  supremacy, 
for  the  Epirotes  refused  to  live  under  a  Moslem  govern- 
ment.    Finally,  the  occupation  of  Avlona  by  the  Italian 


164  The  Great  War 

forces  in  the  autumn  was  responded  to  by  the  advance  of 
Greek  troops  into  Albanian  Epirus,  the  turbulent  conditions 
affording  a  plausible  motive  tor  each  of  these  measures. 

Meanwhile,  there  had  been  intimations  that  the  Turks 
would  endeavor  to  regain  by  force  the  large  islands  of 
Mitylene  and  K  hios,  which  lie  directly  off  the  coast  of  Asia 
Minor  and  were  thought  to  he  necessary  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  mainland,  and  relations  between  Greece  and 
Turkey  continued  to  be  strained  until  the  outbreak  of  the 
Great  War. 

The  Balkan  policy  of  the  Entente  in  the  earlier  stages 
of  the  world-war  was  governed  by  the  idea  of  reconstitut- 
ing the  Balkan  League  as  an  ally  and  thus  completing  the 
iron  circle  about  the  Central  Powers.  But  the  reconcilia- 
tion of  Bulgaria,  which  was  indispensable  for  this  purpose, 
could  only  be  accomplished  by  satisfying  the  Bulgarian 
aspirations  which  had  been  so  rudely  disappointed  in  1913. 

The  enmity  between  the  Greeks  and  the  Turks  naturally 
led  the  Allies  to  hope  that  they  could  count  on  the  assist- 
ance of  the  former  in  their  operations  at  the  Dardanelles. 
In  February,  1915,  Venizelos  and  the  Allies  discussed  the 
project  of  Greek  cooperation,  with  Smyrna  and  a  consider- 
able section  of  western  Asia  Minor  as  compensation,  and 
Venizelos  was  inclined  to  cede  Drama  and  Kavala  to  Bul- 
garia as  a  final  means  of  securing  concord.  His  party 
which  controlled  the  majority  in  the  Greek  Chamber 
eagerly  supported  this  policy.  A  council  called  together 
of  former  prime  ministers  favored  immediate  war  with 
Turkey.  But  the  king  was  determined  not  to  join  forces 
with  the  Entente,  and  it  was  possibly  at  his  instigation  that 
the  Greek  General  Staff  declared  that  Greece  could  not  em- 
bark upon  a  campaign  at  the  Dardanelles  without  positive 
assurance  of  Bulgarian  neutrality.  But  Bulgaria  required 
as  the  price  of  her  neutrality  most  of  Serbian  Macedonia 


M  CD 

<  * 

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<  * 

r.  -= 

c 

w 


w    s 


. 


sider- 

ition,  and 

inclined  to  cede  Drama  and  Bul- 


em- 

sitive 

a  required 

donia 


ot 

sec 

h 

w 

-2 

bO 

X 


-Hi 


*** 


The  Welter  in  the  Balkans  165 

and  all  of  Greek  Macedonia  east  of  the  Struma,  and  with 
seemingly  ingenuous  indignation  the  king  refused  to  sanc- 
tion the  relinquishment  of  territory  which  had  been  won  by 
the  blood  of  the  Greek  armies  and  later  publicly  reproached 
Venizelos  with  such  a  suggestion.  Thus  thwarted  in  his 
foreign  policy,  Venizelos  resigned  on  March  6th  and  Gou- 
naris  formed  a  new  cabinet  on  the  9th. 

The  Entente  Powers  renewed  their  offer  to  the  Gounaris 
cabinet,  and  Gounaris  asked  them  to  define  clearly  the  com- 
pensations which  they  were  disposed  to  grant.  Operations 
in  the  Near  East  had  now  reached  a  critical  stage;  for  it 
was  evident  that  without  the  cooperation  of  a  powerful 
force  on  land  the  undertaking  at  the  Dardanelles  could  not 
succeed.  This  made  very  palpable  the  value  of  the  aid 
that  Greece  could  render.  That  the  Allies  were  deterred 
from  offering  Greece  such  terms  as  she  would  eagerly  have 
accepted  may  perhaps  be  attributable  to  the  conditions  in- 
volved in  the  terms  of  compensation  to  be  made  to  Italy 
for  her  support  of  the  Entente,  which  was  apparently 
secured  about  the  close  of  April,  after  the  visit  of  Sir 
Edward  Grey  to  Rome  in  the  second  half  of  that  month. 
Italian  aspirations  and  Greek  interests  were  in  conflict  in 
Epirus  and  the  Dodecanese  and  probably  in  Asia  Minor. 

But  notwithstanding  the  depressing  effect  of  the  Allies' 
agreement  with  Italy  on  pro-Entente  tendencies  in  Greece, 
efforts  to  align  the  Hellenic  kingdom  with  the  anti-German 
coalition  were  not  abandoned. 

In  spite  of  the  exercise  of  systematic  and  possibly  un- 
lawful pressure  to  win  support  for  the  Gounaris  cabinet,  the 
result  of  the  parliamentary  elections  in  Greece  on  June  13th, 
the  return  of  180  Venizelist  deputies  to  the  Chamber  out  of 
a  total  of  315,  was  a  brilliant  endorsement  of  the  policy  of 
the  former  prime  minister.  But  the  king  had  no  real  in- 
tention of  yielding  before  this  overwhelming  demonstration 


166  The  Great  War 

of  the  national  inclination,  and  even  the  resignation  of 
Gounaris,  which  was  the  normal  consequence  of  the  popu- 
lar verdict,  was  delayed  until  August  16th. 

In  the  meantime  the  leaders  of  Bulgaria  had  probably 
expected  from  the  first  that  due  provision  for  the  national 
interests  would  eventually  lead  them  to  throw  in  their  lot 
with  the  Central  Powers  and  fall  upon  Serbia  in  the  rear 
whenever  a  favorable  opportunity  should  be  presented,  and 
there  were  not  lacking  significant  indications  of  a  close 
accord  between  Bulgaria  and  her  future  partners.  For  in- 
stance, early  in  February,  1915,  Bulgaria  obtained  from  the 
Disconto  Gesellschaft  an  instalment  of  about  $30,000,000 
on  a  loan  of  $100,000,000  which  had  been  negotiated  with 
German  bankers  before  the  war. 

While  the  Bulgarian  government  was  accessible  to  the 
overtures  of  both  parties  and  did  not  commit  itself  definitely 
to  any  policy  until  July  or  August,  yet  the  Central  Powers 
had  a  distinct  advantage  in  competing  with  the  Entente 
for  Bulgaria's  support,  because  they  were  not  beholden  to 
either  of  the  states  at  whose  expense  Bulgarian  desires 
chiefly  required  satisfaction.  And  for  this  same  reason  a 
Teutonic  victory  must  have  seemed  to  the  Bulgarians  to  be 
a  more  trustworthy  guarantee  for  the  fulfilment  of  their 
stipulations  of  alliance  than  a  triumph  of  the  Allies.  To 
put  the  matter  in  somewhat  different  terms,  the  war  policy 
of  Bulgaria  would  be  determined  by  the  prospect  of  regain- 
ing as  much  as  possible  of  the  territory  which  she  had  lost, 
from  Turkey  on  the  one  hand  and  from  Roumania,  Serbia, 
and  Greece  on  the  other.  Whichever  group  of  belligerents 
acquired  the  adhesion  of  Bulgaria  would  have  to  induce 
one  or  more  of  its  allies  or  friends  to  make  a  preliminary 
sacrifice.  But  the  only  sacrifice  required  on  the  Teu- 
tonic side,  that  namely  in  the  case  of  Turkey,  would  be  a 
small  one. 


The  Welter  in  the  Balkans  167 

It  may  be  added  that  the  adhesion  of  Bulgaria  was  indis- 
pensable for  the  realization  of  Germany's  dream  of  empire 
and  that  the  spur  of  necessity  is  apt  to  be  a  very  powerful 
factor  of  success  in  competition. 

Prime  Minister  RadoslavofT  declared  on  March  28th  in 
the  Sobranje  that  Bulgaria's  conduct  would  be  determined 
by  purely  objective  considerations  of  self-interest.  The 
diplomatic  representatives  of  the  Entente  Powers  at  Sofia 
addressed  a  joint  note  to  Bulgaria  on  May  29th,  urging  her 
to  join  the  Allies  in  return  for  extensive  concessions,  and 
about  two  weeks  later  Bulgaria  in  reply  asked  for  more 
definite  assurances.  The  eagerness  of  the  Entente  Powers 
is  especially  comprehensible  at  this  time  when  a  Bulgarian 
attack  upon  the  rear  of  the  Turkish  position  on  the  Galli- 
poli  Peninsula  must  have  been  decisive. 

In  an  interview  as  late  as  August  9th  RadoslavofT  de- 
clared that  Bulgaria  would  join  the  Allies  whenever  they 
could  give  absolute  guarantees  that  southern  Macedonia 
would  be  restored  to  her.  The  final  offer  of  the  Entente 
Powers  was  presented  at  Sofia  about  August  10th.  The  text 
of  this  proposal  has  not  been  published;  but  it  is  believed 
that  nearly  all  of  Serbian  Macedonia  and  the  district  of 
Kavala  were  offered  in  return  for  Bulgaria's  participation 
as  an  ally. 

But  any  lingering  indecision  on  the  part  of  the  Bulgarian 
government  was  swept  aside  by  the  potent  argument  of 
events  in  the  different  fields  of  operations. 

Italy's  belligerency  had  failed  to  shake  the  resolution  of 
the  Central  Powers,  the  British  and  French  had  failed  thus 
far  to  win  a  decisive  advantage  at  the  Dardanelles,  and  later 
the  ponderous  Allied  offensive  in  the  West,  forecast  with 
so  much  assurance,  accomplished  little  and  was  soon  ex- 
hausted. But  the  Teutonic  hosts  were  rolling  forward 
from  victory  to  victory  in  the  East.     Warsaw  had  fallen, 


168  The  Great  War 

the  Russians  were  expelled  from  Poland,  and  their  armies 
were  threatened  with  destruction.  Russia  was  tottering  on 
the  edge  of  an  abyss.  The  supreme  moment  seemed  to  be 
at  hand  when  Bulgaria  must  throw  in  her  lot  with  the  Cen- 
tral Powers,  if  she  wished  to  share  in  the  prizes  of  their 
triumph.  Never  did  a  great  military  effort  accord  more 
perfectly  with  the  exigencies  of  diplomacy  as  well  as 
strategy  than  the  great  eastern  offensive  of  the  Central 
Powers  in  1915.  The  diplomatic  triumph  of  the  Balkans 
was  largely  won  on  the  battlefields  of  Poland. 

In  fact,  it  is  very  probable  that  latterly  the  apparent  will- 
ingness of  the  Bulgarian  government  to  treat  with  the  Allies 
was  only  a  ruse  to  cover  a  decision  already  formed,  that  as 
early  as  July  17th  a  secret  treaty  between  Bulgaria  and  the 
Central  Powers  had  been  signed,  and  that  most  of  Greek, 
as  well  as  Serbian,  Macedonia,  and  even  a  part  of  Albania 
were  promised  to  Bulgaria  as  the  price  of  her  intervention. 
It  is  also  affirmed  that  Germany  guaranteed  the  neutrality 
of  Greece.  If  this  implies  that  Constantine  gave  secret 
assurance  at  this  time  that  Greece  would  stand  aside  while 
Bulgaria  stealthily  assailed  her  confederate  in  the  rear,  we 
need  no  further  evidence  of  the  treachery  and  disloyalty  of 
the  court  of  Athens.  Germany  seems  to  have  promised 
northern  Epirus  as  a  reward  for  the  neutrality  of  Greece. 

On  the  same  day  that  the  Allies  presented  their  final 
proposal  at  Sofia,  Bulgaria  secured  a  further  advance  of 
about  $50,000,000  from  the  Disconto  Gesellschaft,  about 
half  of  which  was  delivered  in  cash. 

Germany  exerted  her  influence  to  bring  about  a  satisfac- 
tory agreement  between  Bulgaria  and  Turkey.  Bulgaria 
no  longer  demanded  the  restitution  of  Adrianople,  of 
which  city  and  the  adjacent  territory  Turkey  had  retaken 
possession  during  the  second  Balkan  War,  but  only  the 
cession  of  the  territory  on  the  western  bank  of  the  Maritza, 


The  Welter  in  the  Balkans  169 

including  the  railway  station  of  Adrianople,  so  as  to  con- 
trol the  entire  railway  down  to  the  sea. 

Turkey  could  hardly  resist  the  coercion  of  circumstances 
backed  by  the  pressure  of  German  diplomacy.  A  Turco- 
Bulgarian  agreement  was  concluded  on  August  23d,  the 
details  of  which  were  published  on  September  7th,  and  it 
was  formally  ratified  on  the  22d.  Bulgaria  ordered  a  mobili- 
zation on  the  21st,  ostensibly  to  maintain  armed  neutrality 
as  agreed  upon  with  Turkey.  These  occurrences  coincid- 
ing with  the  concentration  of  powerful  Teutonic  forces 
along  the  Save  and  the  Danube  left  little  room  for  doubt 
that  Serbia  would  straightway  be  assailed  from  both  sides 
by  overwhelming  forces. 

Serbia  and  Greece  had  mutually  bound  themselves  by 
treaty  to  render  aid  in  case  either  were  attacked  by  Bul- 
garia without  provocation.  As  the  absolute  validity  of  this 
compact  had  never  been  impugned,  Greece  was  confronted 
with  the  immediate  and  fateful  occasion  for  fulfilling  her 
engagement.    Greece  began  to  mobilize  on  September  24th. 

Venizelos  had  resumed  the  premiership  on  August  23d 
after  an  agreement  with  the  king  that  his  policy  was  to  be 
based  upon  benevolent  neutrality  towards  the  Allies,  the 
fulfilment  of  the  treaty  obligations  in  respect  to  Serbia,  and 
the  preservation  of  the  integrity  of  Grecian  territory. 

On  September  21st  Venizelos  inquired  of  France  and 
Great  Britain  whether  they  were  willing  to  send  150,000 
men  to  the  support  of  Serbia,  supposedly  the  number  that 
Greece  was  by  treaty  bound  to  furnish  in  case  Serbia  were 
attacked.  But  the  announcement  of  the  landing  of  a 
Franco-British  force  about  to  march  to  the  support  of 
Serbia  across  Greek  territory  on  October  2d  brought  forth 
a  formal  protest  by  the  Greek  government  on  the  ground 
that  Bulgaria  had  as  yet  neither  attacked  Serbia  nor  declared 
war  against  her. 


170  The  Great  War 

With  scornful  derision  the  spokesmen  of  Germany  have 

pointed  to  the  intrusion  of  the  Allied  forces  on  the  neutral 
s<  >il  of  Greece  and  the  subsequent  conduct  of  the  Allies  with 
reference  to  that  country  as  glaring  proof  of  the  hypocrisy 
of  the  latter's  claim  that  they  are  fighting  to  avenge  the 
wrongs  of  Belgium.  But  in  reality  the  cases  of  Greece 
and  Belgium  are  quite  different.  The  British  and  French 
landed  at  Salonica  at  the  implied  request  of  the  existing 
government  in  Greece  and  probably  with  the  approval  of 
the  majority  of  the  Greek  people.  There  were  other 
grounds  to  justify  the  intervention  of  the  Entente  Powers 
from  the  legal  point  of  view.  The  international  convention 
by  which  Prince  George  of  Denmark  was  installed  on  the 
Hellenic  throne  in  1866  declared  that  "Greece,  under  the 
sovereignty  of  the  Prince  of  Denmark  and  the  guarantee  of 
the  three  Courts  (London,  Paris,  and  St.  Petersburg),  forms 
a  monarchical,  independent,  and  constitutional  state."  This 
implies  a  duty  as  well  as  right  of  the  guarantors  to  intervene 
in  Greece,  either  to  defend  the  country  against  its  foreign 
foes  or  to  protect  the  people  against  any  infringement  of 
the  constitution  which  was  hereby  sanctioned. 

As  an  outcome  of  the  Balkan  Wars,  Greece  had  formally 
granted  Serbia  a  right  of  way  across  Greek  territory  to  the 
sea  at  Salonica.  With  much  reason  would  it  seem,  there- 
fore, that  the  Allies,  who  were  hastening  to  the  aid  of 
Serbia  at  the  hour  of  her  greatest  need,  could  claim  the 
benefit  of  this  immunity. 

Venizelos  defended  his  policy  in  the  Greek  Chamber  on 
October  4th  and  his  conduct  was  sustained  by  a  vote  of  142 
to  102.  But  he  resigned  the  next  day  because  the  king 
refused  his  sanction.  Constantine  was  doubtless  convinced 
that  to  provoke  the  invincible  might  of  the  Kaiser  was  to 
invite  certain  disaster,  Moreover,  he  and  his  adherents 
quibbled  over  the  terms  and  intent  of  the  Greco-Serbian 


The  Welter  in  the  Balkans  171 

agreement,  and  claimed  that  Serbia  had  rendered  it  void 
by  consenting  to  territorial  concessions  for  conciliating 
Bulgaria  without  the  consent  of  Greece  and  that  it  was 
not  intended  to  apply  in  the  case  of  a  European,  as  opposed 
to  a  Balkan  war. 

Zaimis  formed  a  new  ministry  on  the  7th  and  on  the 
19th  rejected  the  British  offer  of  Cyprus  in  return  for 
Greek  intervention  in  behalf  of  Serbia.  But  his  ministry 
existed  only  on  sufferance  of  Venizelos,  who  still  com- 
manded the  same  large  majority  in  the  chamber,  and  it  was 
overthrown  by  a  vote  of  147  to  114  on  November  4th. 
The  king  called  Skouloudis  to  office,  dissolved  the  intract- 
able parliament  on  November  11th,  and  called  for  new 
elections  to  be  held  on  December  19th.  An  appeal  to  the 
electorate  so  soon  after  the  election  in  June,  when  the  will 
of  the  people  had  been  quite  emphatically  expressed,  and 
at  a  time  when  a  large  part  of  the  electors  had  been  called 
to  the  colors  and  therefore  could  not  vote,  so  that  the 
returns  would  not  be  representative,  was  regarded  by 
Venizelos  and  his  followers  as  an  arbitrary  and  unconsti- 
tutional proceeding.  Venizelos  requested  his  adherents  to 
abstain  from  voting  and  Skouloudis  secured  a  majority  of 
the  chamber  elected  by  a  minority  of  the  voters. 

Only  the  most  obdurate  optimism  could  have  blinded 
the  vision  of  any  Entente  statesman  to  the  real  purpose  of 
Bulgaria's  mobilization,  which  was  ordered  on  September 
21st,  although  the  Bulgarian  government  solemnly  affirmed 
that  this  step  was  "merely  a  preventive  measure  in  view  of 
the  threatened  Austro-German  invasion  of  the  Balkans" 
and  not  directed  against  Serbia  or  Greece.  German  offi- 
cers were  already  present  in  large  numbers  at  the  ministry 
of  war  and  on  the  staff  of  the  Bulgarian  army. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  declared  in  the  House  of  Commons  on 
September  24th  that  if   Bulgaria  assumed  an  aggressive 


172  The  Great  War 

attitude  on  the  side  of  the  enemy,  the  British  government 
would  give  its  friends  in  the  Balkans  all  the  Support  in  its 
power  in  the  manner  that  would  he  most  welcome  to  them, 
in  concert  with  the  Allies,  "without  reserve  and  without 
qualification."  But  the  event  seemed  to  justify  Bulgaria's 
indifference  to  this  pretentious  warning. 

Russia  sent  an  ultimatum  to  Sofia  on  October  3d,  stating 
that  the  presence  of  the  German  and  Austrian  officers,  the 
concentration  of  Bulgarian  troops  on  the  Serbian  border, 
and  the  extensive  financial  support  accepted  by  Bulgaria 
from  Germany  left  no  doubt  as  to  the  object  of  Bulgaria's 
military  preparations.  Bulgaria  was  given  twenty-four 
hours  in  which  to  "break  with  the  enemies  of  the  Slav 
cause  and  of  Russia." 

As  early  as  August,  1915,  there  were  reports  of  an  exten- 
sive concentration  of  Teutonic  troops  and  equipment  along 
the  Serbian  frontier.  As  soon  as  it  was  clear  that  Germany 
had  missed  the  supreme  decision  in  Russia,  she  launched  a 
new  movement  in  the  south,  where  a  somewhat  longer 
season  of  active  operations  could  be  expected. 

A  number  of  important  motives  led  Germany  to  undertake 
the  definite  elimination  of  Serbia  at  this  time.  The  prestige 
of  the  Teutonic  alliance  was  at  stake,  and  now  the  adhesion 
of  Bulgaria,  which  was  conditional  upon  the  participation  of 
the  Central  Powers  in  a  vigorous  attack  on  Serbia,  would 
make  the  subjugation  of  the  little  state  a  comparatively  easy 
matter.  The  drastic  chastisement  of  Austria-Hungary's 
original  opponent  would  serve  as  an  impressive  warning 
to  curb  the  hostile  tendencies  in  Roumania  and  Greece. 
More  important  still,  the  removal  of  the  only  barrier  be- 
tween the  Central  Powers  and  Turkey  would  put  at  end  to 
the  chronic  danger  of  an  ammunition  famine  at  the  Darda- 
nelles, which  had  become  acute  since  Roumania  refused  to 
permit  the  transit  of  military  supplies  across  her  territory. 


The  Welter  in  the  Balkans  173 

In  spite  of  boastful  expressions  of  indifference  to  the 
continual  increase  in  strength  of  the  Allied  forces  in  the 
West,  the  German  leaders  probably  regarded  with  anxiety 
the  eventual  possibility  of  being  overwhelmingly  outnum- 
bered and  overpowered  in  that  quarter.  They  trusted  that 
a  successful  diversion  could  be  effected  and  the  danger  in 
the  West  forestalled  by  this  undertaking,  which  would  con- 
solidate the  Teutonic  Alliance  in  the  Near  East,  securely 
blockade  the  Franco-British  armies  in  the  Gallipoli  Penin- 
sula, fill  England  with  terror  for  the  safety  of  the  Suez  Canal 
and  Egypt,  and  thrill  the  hearts  of  the  German  people 
with  irrepressible  enthusiasm.  With  these  and  other  mo- 
tives Germany  embarked  upon  an  enterprise  through  which 
her  splendid  dream  of  an  empire  from  the  North  Sea  to  the 
Persian  Gulf  was  practically  realized,  for  the  time  at  least. 

Internationally,  as  we  have  seen,  the  political  and  com- 
mercial significance  of  Serbia  was  mainly  due  to  her  posi- 
tion on  certain  of  the  actually  or  potentially  most  prominent 
trade  routes  of  Europe.  For  more  than  a  hundred  miles 
in  the  north  her  territory  bordered  on  the  Danube,  includ- 
ing about  forty  miles  where,  with  Roumania  opposite,  she 
separated  Austria-Hungary  from  Bulgaria,  depriving  the 
Central  Empires  of  continuous  communication  with  the 
Turkish  Empire.  Serbia  covered  a  central  section  of 
the  railway  from  the  heart  of  Europe  to  Constantinople 
and  possessed  besides  the  natural  highway  from  the  Danube 
to  Salonica  by  the  Morava  and  Vardar  valleys. 

The  main  trunk  of  the  Serbian  railways  ran  from  north 
to  south  through  this  depression  and  was  continued  through 
Greek  Macedonia  down  to  Salonica,  Serbia's  natural  outlet 
on  the  sea  and  the  supposed  goal  of  Austria-Hungary's  am- 
bition. It  was  evident  that  the  interruption  of  this  central 
line  would  dislocate  the  entire  system  of  communications 
and  fatally  divide  the  efforts  for  the  defense  of  Serbia's 


174  The  Great  War 

national  territory.  The  Oriental  Railway  to  Constantinople 
leaves  this  central  line  at  Nish  and  ascends  the  valley  of  the 
Nishava,  crossing  into  Bulgaria  a  little  southwest  of  Pirot. 
The  other  Serbian  railway  lines  were  all  in  reality  branches 
of  these  two.  In  the  prevailing  conditions  Serbia  was  most 
susceptible  to  attack  where  the  Bulgarian  territory  ap- 
proached nearest  to  the  vital  Salonica  railway  in  the  south. 

By  the  middle  of  September  ten  Teutonic  divisions  had 
been  concentrated  on  the  northern  frontier  of  Serbia.  The 
flattening  of  the  battle-line  in  Russia,  by  reducing  the  length 
of  the  Austro-German  eastern  front,  had  permitted  the 
withdrawal  of  considerable  German  forces  for  operations 
in  the  southern  theater.  In  fact  von  Gallwitz's  army  was 
transferred  thither  as  a  whole  and  deployed  along  the  Dan- 
ube from  the  Roumanian  border  westward  to  Semendria. 
Von  Koevess,  the  conqueror  of  Ivangorod,  commanded  an 
Austro-Hungarian  army  which  extended  along  the  rest  of 
the  Austro-Serbian  border  on  von  Gallwitz's  right.  The 
general  supervision  of  the  Teutonic  operations  against 
Serbia  was  entrusted  to  von  Mackensen,  who  was  already  a 
popular  hero  scarcely  less  venerated  than  von  Hindenburg. 

Bulgaria  could  muster  fifteen  divisions  of  the  first  line 
and  five  of  the  second,  besides  three  volunteer  divisions, 
probably  about  400,000  men  in  all.  Her  artillery  was 
armed  mainly  with  the  French  Schneider-Canet  7.5  centi- 
meter rapid-fire  field  material,  but  partly  with  the  German 
Krupp  7.7  centimeter  pieces  which  had  been  captured  from 
the  Turks  in  the  first  Balkan  War. 

Serbia  was  not  only  threatened  by  forces  more  than  twice 
as  numerous  as  her  own;  she  suffered  all  the  disadvantages, 
while  unable  to  realize  any  of  the  natural  advantages,  of  an 
interior  position  in  respect  to  her  enemies.  Confined  for 
three  hundred  miles  on  her  eastern  frontier  by  Bulgaria, 
for  a  hundred  and  fifty  in  the  north  and  a  hundred  in  the 


The  Welter  in  the  Balkans  175 

northwest  by  Austria-Hungary,  she  formed  a  prominent 
salient  and  was  exposed  to  attack  from  three  sides  at  the 
same  time,  while  the  poverty  of  her  means  of  communica- 
tion prevented  the  rapid  shifting  of  troops  from  one  threat- 
ened point  to  another.  Furthermore,  the  attitude  of  the 
Albanian  tribes  was  a  matter  of  serious  concern.  Serbia  was 
dependent  upon  the  single  line  of  railway  to  Salonica  for 
the  replenishment  of  her  meager  supplies  of  ammunition. 

The  Bulgarian  forces  concentrated  on  the  eastern  Serbian 
border  were  grouped  in  two  armies,  one  under  General 
BojadiefF  in  the  northern  section  from  the  Danube  to  the 
Oriental  Railway,  the  other  under  General  Teodoroff  in 
the  southern  section  from  the  Oriental  Railway  to  the 
Struma.  Altogether  about  250,000  Bulgarians  and  200,000 
Austro-Germans  were  ready  to  advance  simultaneously  on 
converging  lines  against  the  Serbian  armies,  whose  effective 
strength  was  probably  about  200,000  men. 

Fourteen  months  of  a  kind  of  warfare  which  even  in 
this  remoter  field  absorbed  unprecedented  quantities  of 
mechanical  equipment  and  ammunition  had  reduced  Serbia 
almost  to  the  limit  of  her  material  resources.  It  is  scarcely 
necessary  to  add  that  the  Serbians  had  nothing  to  match 
the  powerful  mass  of  artillery  which  the  Austro-Germans 
had  now  concentrated  against  them.  The  Serbian  First 
Army  held  the  angle  between  the  Drina  and  the  Save  in 
the  northwest,  the  Third  Army  faced  von  Gallwitz  and 
the  Bulgarian  right  wing  in  the  northeast,  and  the  Second 
Army  was  stretched  along  the  eastern  border  in  front  of 
Nish.  Although  there  was  a  considerable  Serbian  garrison 
at  Uskub,  Serbia  had  to  trust  mainly  to  the  expected  inter- 
vention of  the  Allies  for  the  defense  of  the  vital  zone  of 
communication  in  the  south. 

The  batteries  of  von  Koevess  began  to  bombard  Bel- 
grade on  September   19th,   but  the   artillery  preparation 


176  The  Great  War 

along  the  northern  frontier  commenced  in  earnest  on 
October  3d,  and  the  Austro-German  forces  effected  the 
crossing  of  the  Save  and  the  Danube  at  several  places  on 
the  7th.  Belgrade,  rendered  untenable  by  the  enemy's 
bombardment,  was  practically  evacuated  on  the  next  day, 
although  street  fighting  continued  until  the  9th.  By  the 
11th  the  German  authorities  announced  that  the  Serbian 
river  front  had  been  won  throughout  a  distance  of  a  hun- 
dred miles.  To  secure  its  communications,  the  First  Ser- 
bian Army  in  the  northwest  fell  back  on  the  series  of 
ridges  where  the  Austro-Hungarians  had  been  so  signally 
defeated  the  year  before. 

The  Bulgarians  began  hostilities  as  soon  as  the  Austro- 
Germans  had  forced  the  line  of  the  Save  and  the  Danube 
and  were  thus  definitely  committed  to  the  task  of  crush- 
ing Serbia.  Bulgarian  advance  guards  crossed  the  Serbian 
border  on  October  11th  a  few  hours  before  the  formal 
Bulgarian  declaration  of  war,  and  by  the  next  day  serious 
operations  were  in  progress. 

After  some  sharp  conflicts  Bulgarian  cavalry  cut  the 
Salonica  railway  at  Vrania  on  the  16th.  The  last  train 
actually  crossed  a  battlefield  while  conveying  tne  treasure 
of  the  Serbian  National  Bank  to  safety  in  Salonica.  The 
Bulgarian  offensive  was  now  under  way  along  the  entire 
front  and  made  rapid  progress  in  the  south  where  little 
resistance  could  be  offered.  The  capture  of  Uskub,  the 
important  center  of  communications,  on  the  22d  was  a 
serious  blow  for  the  Serbians.  Connection  between  the 
Vardar  and  Morava  valleys  was  thus  effectively  cut. 

According  to  the  Bulgarian  account,  the  Bulgarian 
Crown  Prince  Cyril  and  the  commanding  general  of  the 
invading  army  were  received  in  Uskub  with  a  frenzy  of 
delight  by  the  inhabitants,  who  wept  with  joy,  the  whole 
town  presenting  a  gala  appearance. 


The  Iron  Gate  on  the  Danube. 


Railroad  bridge  over  the  Save  at  Belgrade  wrecked  by  the  Serbians  in  endeavoring  to  prevent 
the  capture  of  the  city  by  the  Germans. 


The  Welter  in  the  Balkans  177 

The  loss  of  the  central  zone  of  Serbia,  the  region  trav- 
ersed by  the  Belgrade-Salonica  railway  could  not  be  long 
deferred. 

On  October  23d  the  Germans  forced  the  passage  of  the 
Danube  at  Orsova,  near  the  western  entrance  to  the  famous 
defile  known  as  the  Iron  Gate,  and  straightway  opened  the 
stream  for  navigation  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Bul- 
garia, so  that  a  great  number  of  steamers  and  barges  laden 
with  ammunition  and  supplies  for  the  allies  of  the  Central 
Powers  in  the  Near  East  proceeded  on  their  way.  The  Ger- 
mans and  Bulgarians  gained  contact  in  northeastern  Serbia  on 
October  26th,  but  an  effective  union  of  the  two  armies  was 
not  secured  until  about  November  4th.  In  the  northwest 
on  October  23d  the  passage  of  the  Drina,  which  separates 
Serbia  from  Bosnia,  was  forced  by  the  Austro-Hungarians 
near  Vishegrad;  and  they  were  thus  enabled  to  turn  the 
position  on  the  ridges  of  Suvobor  where  they  had  been  so 
disastrously  defeated  in  December  of  the  year  before. 

The  Serbian  armies  were  now  confined  within  a  hostile 
arc  the  ends  of  which  were  being  constantly  pressed  closer, 
threatening  to  stifle  them  within  the  steel  embrace.  Prac- 
tically every  avenue  of  escape  was  closed  except  the  road 
through  the  valley  of  the  Ibar  towards  the  southwest,  and 
it  was  very  doubtful  whether  the  masses  of  retreating  sol- 
diery could  pass  in  time  through  this  narrow  outlet,  choked 
as  it  soon  would  be  with  fleeing  peasants. 

Nish,  the  temporary  capital,  was  taken  by  the  Bulgarians 
after  a  desperate  struggle  of  three  days  on  November  6th. 
The  credibility  of  repeated  Bulgarian  accounts  describing 
the  transports  of  enthusiasm  with  which  the  Bulgarian 
troops  were  greeted  as  deliverers  by  the  inhabitants  of  the 
doubtful  regions  of  the  south  is  rather  weakened  by  the 
recurrence  of  the  same  details  in  the  official  reports  of  their 
reception  in  Nish  and  other  towns  of  Serbia  proper. 


17S  The  Great  War 

Von  Mackensen  and  the  Germans  were  chiefly  con- 
cerned with  the  opening  of  a  broad  connecting  zone 
between  the  Central  Powers  and  Turkey;  the  Austro- 
Hungarians  were  probably  more  directly  interested  in  the 
occupation  of  as  large  an  area  as  possible  of  contiguous 
territory  as  a  field  for  future  political  and  economic  expan- 
sion; but  the  Bulgarians,  stirred  by  a  burning  thirst  for 
vengeance  and  the  conviction  that  the  extermination  of  the 
enemy  was  the  only  guarantee  for  the  tranquil  enjoyment 
of  the  fruits  of  victory,  pressed  forward  with  indefatigable 
energy  to  intercept  the  Serbian  armies.  The  escape  of  the 
Serbians  and  the  maintenance  of  their  communications  with 
Greece  by  the  western  defiles  through  Monastir  depended 
upon  the  defense  of  two  critical  positions,  the  Katchanik 
Pass,  northwest  of  Uskub,  and  the  Babuna  Pass,  the  key  to 
the  road  from  Veles  southwestward  to  Monastir.  If  the 
Bulgarians  had  seized  the  Katchanik  Pass  in  time,  they 
might  have  thrown  a  barrier  across  the  outlet  for  all  the 
Serbian  armies  in  the  north  near  Mitrovitza. 

A  detachment  of  about  5,000  of  the  Serbian  contingent 
which  had  been  stationed  around  Uskub,  reinforced  by 
three  regiments  from  the  north,  struggled  desperately  to 
hold  the  Katchanik  Pass  against  very  much  superior  Bul- 
garian forces.  They  were  finally  overpowered,  but  not 
before  the  critical  period  had  passed  and  the  chief  masses 
of  the  Serbian  armies  had  effected  their  escape.  Another 
detachment  of  about  5,000  Serbians  held  out  for  more  than 
a  week  in  the  Babuna  Pass  against  great  odds  but  were 
finally  compelled  to  give  way. 

The  collapse  of  Serbia  brought  with  it  one  of  the  most 
terrible  tragedies  of  the  Great  War,  the  sudden  flight  and 
dispersion  of  a  vast  multitude  of  people,  involving  untold 
suffering  and  misery.  The  exodus  commenced  in  the 
north  and  northeast  and  every  advance  of  the  enemy  set 


The  Welter  in  the  Balkans  179 

fresh  streams  of  fugitives  in  motion.  All  classes  of  the 
population,  rich  and  poor,  strong  and  weak,  the  aged  and 
infirm,  young  children,  the  maimed  and  mangled,  were 
driven  to  blind,  distracted  flight  by  their  loathing  of  the 
enemy  and  frightful  apprehensions  too  well  substantiated 
by  the  memory  of  previous  Balkan  wars. 

Columns  of  homeless  fugitives  were  converging  on  Kra- 
lyevo  situated  on  the  I  bar,  close  to  its  junction  with  the 
upper  Morava,  while  the  government  still  tarried  in  Nish, 
whence  Pashitch  addressed  despairing  appeals  to  the  Allied 
governments  for  assistance.  In  the  midst  of  its  agony  the 
Serbian  people  clung  with  pathetic  confidence  to  the  con- 
viction that  the  Allies  would  somehow  come  in  strength 
for  its  deliverance.  The  constant  rumor  that  the  Russians 
were  invading  Bulgaria  across  Dobrudscha  had  a  certain 
basis  of  fact  in  that  Russia  was  actually  assembling  a  new 
army  in  the  south. 

On  October  28th  the  order  was  issued  for  the  retirement 
of  the  Serbian  armies  to  the  line  of  Kralyevo,  Kruchevatz, 
Alexsinatz,  and  Nish,  with  the  effect  of  contracting  the 
northern  battle-front  to  a  much  smaller,  interior  arc.  The 
government  repaired  to  Kralyevo  on  the  29th,  and  two 
days  later  to  Rashka,  further  up  the  valley  of  the  Ibar. 
The  hospitals  of  Kruchevatz  and  Kralyevo  were  hastily 
evacuated.  Many  of  the  seriously  wounded  pulled  their 
strength  together  by  the  sheer  force  of  an  indomitable 
determination  and  chose  to  endure  the  indescribable  suf- 
fering of  a  journey  under  the  harshest  conditions  rather 
than  to  remain  and  become  prisoners.  They  were  exposed 
to  the  most  inclement  weather  without  adequate  clothing 
or  footwear.  Bandages  became  soaked  with  rain;  wounds 
that  had  begun  to  heal  were  torn  open  by  the  untimely 
violence  of  feverish  efforts.  Mangled  and  helpless  soldiers 
lay  for  days  upon  drenched  straw  in  open  trucks,  deprived 


180  The  Great  War 

of  food  and  drink,  in  spite  of  the  unsparing  labor  of  the 
inadequate  sanitary  contingent. 

Premier  Pashitch,  standing  on  the  bridge  at  Rashka,  a 
pathetic,  solitary  figure,  watching  the  endless  procession 
of  his  homeless  countrymen,  exclaimed  with  the  tears  run- 
ning down  his  cheeks: 

"It  is  here  that  we  were  born;  Heaven  grant  that 
Rashka  be  not  our  grave." 

The  line  of  retreat  for  both  the  armies  and  the  civilian 
throng  passed  up  the  valley  of  the  Ibar,  which  becomes  a 
narrow  gorge  above  Rashka,  wildly  picturesque,  where 
the  road  is  a  ledge  along  the  face  of  beetling  cliffs.  Motor- 
vehicles  frequently  rolled  over  the  precipice  at  the  narrow 
windings  and  often  an  interruption  in  the  march  at  a  single 
point  delayed  the  whole  line  of  vehicles  behind  it. 

There  was  a  wild  stampede  when  the  government  and 
headquarters  staff  left  Mitrovitza  on  November  16th.  The 
last  train  departed  with  the  station  beset  by  a  despairing 
crowd  of  10,000  fugitives.  Every  available  vehicle  and  pack 
animal  was  pressed  into  service.  From  Mitrovitza  the  sor- 
rowful procession  of  misery  entered  the  ill-starred  Kossovo- 
polje,  the  Plain  of  Kossovo,  or  Blackbirds'  Plain,  forever 
devoted  to  the  tragic  memory  of  the  national  disaster,  the 
destruction  of  the  old  Serbian  Empire  by  the  Turks  in  1389. 

The  misery  of  soldiers  and  fugitives  was  now  extreme. 
Most  of  them  were  barefooted  and  in  rags;  their  pre- 
carious diet  was  the  scanty  forage  of  the  fields,  a  little 
cabbage  or  maize  eaten  raw  for  lack  of  fuel.  The  draft 
animals  fell  dead  in  their  traces  from  starvation  or  were 
turned  loose  and  abandoned  when  the  fodder  was  ex- 
hausted. The  elements  conspired  to  add  a  second  terrible 
calamity  to  the  gruesome  associations  of  this  locality.  In- 
cessant rains,  which  had  converted  the  plain  into  a  sea  of 
mud,  were  suddenly  transformed  into  a  blinding  blizzard 


Cettinje,  capital  of  Montenegro.      The  square  building  in  the  center  is  the  palace  of  the  king. 


~<&4h 

y. 

ill 

W\ 

J 

HK^^E*^"' 

The  German  invasion  of  Serbia.      Both  the  retreating  Serbians  and  the  invading  Germans 
ivere  greatly  hampered  by  the  -very  bad  condition  of  the  roads. 


The  Welter  in  the  Balkans  181 

lashed  by  the  icy  blasts  of  winter.  Dazed  with  hunger 
the  hopeless  column  stumbled  on,  shut  off  from  the  pros- 
pect of  everything  except  its  own  deplorable  situation. 
Thousands  fell  by  the  roadside,  overcome  by  famine  and 
exhaustion.  The  presence  of  the  aged,  of  women,  and  of 
young  children  made  the  spectacle  more  terrifying  than  the 
proverbial  retreat  from  Moscow.  The  route  was  strewn 
with  half  sunken  motors,  carts,  and  wagons,  dead  horses  and 
oxen,  abandoned  implements  and  weapons,  the  wreckage  of 
a  nation.  But  the  lugubrious  picture  was  illuminated  by 
heroic  touches,  the  stern  endurance  and  unflinching  spirit 
of  the  Serbian  people  unconquerable  in  death. 

The  irruption  of  the  Bulgarians  through  the  passes 
towards  the  south  necessitated  a  change  in  the  direction 
of  the  retreat.  Near  Pristina  two  opposite  streams  of  fugi- 
tives flowed  together  and  poured  westward  toward  Albania, 
where  the  inhospitable  ridges  already  deeply  mantled  with 
snow  lay  like  a  gigantic  dam  across  their  course. 

The  Serbian  armies,  now  reduced  to  destitute,  disor- 
ganized masses,  approached  the  borders  of  Albania  and 
Montenegro  between  Prisrend  and  Ipek.  The  remnant 
of  the  First  Army,  which  had  turned  towards  the  north- 
west from  Mitrovitza,  retreated  to  the  little  plain  of  Ipek 
in  Montenegro  and  made  its  way  from  there  to  Scutari 
and  the  Adriatic.  A  portion  of  the  Third  Army,  after 
passing  Pristina  and  Prisrend,  traversed  Albania  by  way  of 
Scutari,  but  the  majority  ascended  the  valley  of  the  Black 
Drin  as  far  as  Dibre  and  then  crossed  by  way  of  El  Bassan 
to  Durazzo  on  the  Adriatic.  The  line  of  march  of  the 
Second  Army  corresponded  with  the  latter  route.  This 
army  was  joined  near  Lake  Ochrida  by  the  contingent 
which  had  fallen  back  before  the  Bulgarians  from  the 
Babuna  Pass.  Terrible  as  had  been  the  hardships  of  the 
Serbian  troops  and   people  while  still  within  their  own 


182  The  Great  War 

territory,  their  sufferings  in  the  bleak  Albanian  mountains 
must  have  been  still  more  horrible.  There  had  been 
ample  reason  to  anticipate  a  hostile  attitude  on  the  part  of 
the  Albanian  tribes.  But  fortunately,  this  cause  of  anxiety 
turned  out  to  be  largely  groundless;  since  Essad  Pasha, 
whose  authority  was  now  recognized  throughout  the 
greater  part  of  Albania,  had  declared  for  the  Entente 
Allies.  In  any  case,  however,  it  seemed  for  a  long  time 
unbelievable  that  as  many  as  130,000  Serbian  troops  and 
great  numbers  of  civilians  actually  reached  the  shore  of 
the  Adriatic  across  this  desolate,  frozen  region. 

King  Peter,  travelling  incognito  with  three  officers  and 
four  soldiers,  crippled  with  rheumatism  and  almost  blind, 
but  never  faltering  in  his  faith  in  the  eventual  liberation 
and  restoration  of  his  country,  passed  through  the  hills  in- 
habited by  the  unfriendly  Catholic  Albanian  tribes  to  Scutari 
and  proceeded  thence  to  Durazzo,  Avlona,  and  Salonica. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  forces  advancing  from  the  north 
upon  the  heels  of  the  retreating  Serbians  occupied  the 
plain  of  Ipek.  On  the  other  hand,  Mount  Lovcen,  the 
western  bastion  of  the  natural  fastness  which  is  Monte- 
negro, was  bombarded  by  an  Austro-Hungarian  squadron 
from  the  Gulf  of  Cattaro.  The  primitive  fortifications, 
incapable  of  an  effective  resistance,  were  carried  by  an 
infantry  assault  on  January  16,  1916.  Three  days  later  the 
enemy  entered  the  capital,  Cetinje,  but  King  Nicholas  and 
his  army  had  escaped  southward.  Continuing  their  march, 
the  Austro-Hungarians  entered  Scutari  on  January  23d,  and 
proceeded  southward  in  the  direction  of  the  Italian  forces 
which  had  occupied  Durazzo  on  December  21st. 

Before  dismissing  consideration  of  the  events  that  at- 
tended the  overthrow  of  Serbia  it  remains  for  us  to  turn  to 
the  extreme  southern  section  of  the  Serbian  field  of  con- 
flict and  trace  briefly  the  vicissitudes  of  the  Franco-British 


The  Welter  in  the  Balkans  183 

forces  which  endeavored  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  their 
hard-pressed  ally. 

The  Tenth  British  and  Second  French  Divisions,  which 
had  been  withdrawn  from  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula  about  the 
middle  of  September,  were  the  first  instalment  of  the  relief 
expedition.  They  landed  at  Salonica  on  October  5-8.  The 
French,  under  General  Sarrail,  pushed  up  the  Morava  valley, 
drove  the  Bulgarians  from  Strumnitza  Station,  and  occupied 
the  summit  of  Kara  Hodjali  which  commands  an  extensive 
area  in  Serbian  Macedonia  including,  particularly,  a  narrow 
gorge  where,  without  energetic  action  of  the  Allies,  the 
enemy  might  easily  have  blocked  the  railway. 

This  entire  region  is  broken  and  rugged  and  exceed- 
ingly difficult  to  traverse,  except  by  a  few  clearly  marked 
defiles.  The  French  pushed  westward  from  Krivolak, 
crossed  the  Tcherna,  a  tributary  of  the  Morava  from  the 
southwest,  and  tried  to  reach  the  defenders  of  the  Babuna 
Pass  across  a  mountainous  interval  of  ten  miles;  but  they 
failed  in  the  attempt,  and  were  obliged  to  take  up  a  defen- 
sive position  between  the  Tcherna  and  the  Morava,  with 
their  right  wing  reaching  as  far  as  Strumnitza  Station.  The 
British,  in  the  meantime,  deployed  along  a  line  extending 
from  the  French  right  as  far  as  Lake  Doiran. 

The  Serbian  defenders  of  the  Babuna  Pass  were  forced 
to  fall  back  on  Prilip,  November  16th,  and  to  Monastir 
on  December  2d.  Monastir  itself  was  abandoned  to  the 
victorious  Bulgarians  three  days  later.  The  advance  of 
the  Bulgarians  threatened  to  turn  the  French  left  wing. 
Furthermore,  the  utter  collapse  of  Serbia  left  the  scanty 
Allied  force  to  bear  alone  the  full  pressure  of  the  Bulgarian 
army  flushed  with  victory.  A  prompt  relinquishment  of 
all  positions  in  Serbian  Macedonia  was  indispensable  for  the 
safety  of  the  Allies.  The  withdrawal  of  the  French  began 
on  December  2d,  and  by  the  12th,  the  Allies,  successfully 


1S4  The  Great  War 

beating  off  the  Bulgarian  attacks,  had  retired  across  the 
frontier  of  Greece. 

At  first  Skouloudis,  the  Prime  Minister  of  Greece,  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  consistency  with  their  professed 
neutrality  required  that  the  Greeks  should  disarm  and 
intern  any  belligerents  who  were  compelled  to  seek  refuge 
within  their  territory.  But  the  British  and  French  gov- 
ernments were  quite  naturally  not  disposed  to  accept  this 
rigorous  interpretation.  They  presented  a  note  at  Athens, 
demanding  assurance  that  the  Allied  troops  would  not  be 
interned,  but  should  enjoy  full  liberty  of  action,  promising 
at  the  same  time  that  the  territory  occupied  would  be 
restored  and  fair  indemnity  paid  for  it.  The  Greek  gov- 
ernment demurred  for  a  time,  but  was  brought  to  terms 
by  a  commercial  blockade.  Greece  eventually  acquiesced 
in  the  occupation  of  an  extensive  region  in  the  north,  in- 
cluding Salonica,  and  turned  over  to  the  Allies  the  roads 
and  railways  in  this  military  zone.  The  Allies  proceeded 
to  establish  a  very  strong  fortified  base  by  executing  a  sys- 
tem of  intrenchments  from  the  Vardar  to  the  Gulf  of 
Orpani,  passing  ten  miles  north  of  Salonica. 

While  the  armies  of  the  Central  Empires  and  of  their 
allies  in  the  Near  East  were  rolling  together  across  Serbia, 
forming  the  continuous  communication  between  Berlin 
and  Constantinople,  the  British  and  French  forces  tarried 
on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula,  although  all  hope  of  obtaining 
any  substantial  results  had  vanished.  It  was  becoming  more 
and  more  difficult  to  remain  and  perilous  to  depart,  but  the 
Allied  governments  probably  dreaded  the  loss  of  prestige  in 
the  Mohammedan  world  which  might  result  from  an  evac- 
uation and  the  palpable  acknowledgment  of  failure. 

The  Turks  were  constantly  receiving  new,  high-powered 
German  artillery.  The  Allied  positions  could  not  be  held 
without  communication  by  sea  and  this  would  be  precarious 


The  Welter  in  the  Balkans  185 

on  an  inhospitable  coast  during  the  stormy  winter  season. 
But  it  was  expected  that  embarkation  in  the  face  of  a 
numerous  enemy  would  mean  serious  loss,  if  not  disaster. 
With  the  available  transports  the  evacuations  could  only  be 
carried  out  by  instalments  and  at  the  mercy  of  the  weather. 

Nevertheless,  the  withdrawal  was  decided  upon  in  No- 
vember, the  plan  was  very  carefully  elaborated,  and  its 
remarkably  successful  execution  illuminated  with  a  parting 
radiance  the  disappointing  Gallipoli  campaign. 

One  British  and  one  French  division  had  already  been 
transferred  to  Salonica  and  a  British  mounted  division  had 
gone  to  Egypt,  but  about  nine  Allied  divisions  still  remained 
on  the  peninsula.  The  artillery  and  other  equipment  was 
gradually  removed  from  the  positions  by  night,  the  effect 
of  these  operations  being  skilfully  concealed  by  day.  All 
but  picked  battalions  had  embarked  from  Suvla  and  Anzac 
by  December  18th,  and  the  departure  of  the  latter  during 
calm  weather  on  the  nights  of  the  18th  and  19th  was  car- 
ried out  so  secretly  that  the  Turkish  batteries  shelled  the 
deserted  trenches  after  they  had  gone.  The  evacuation  of 
the  French  and  the  British  at  the  extremity  of  the  peninsula 
was  also  effected  without  loss  on  the  nights  of  January 
8  and  9,  1916,  in  spite  of  a  severe  southwestern  gale. 

These  were  the  concluding  events  in  a  long  period  of 
almost  unbroken  failure  and  disappointment  for  the  Allies, 
who  tried  to  glean  a  forlorn  consolation  from  the  notion 
that  Germany's  wonderful  victories  were  really  a  source  of 
weakness,  undermining  her  vitality,  because  they  destroyed 
her  compactness  and  prolonged  her  lines  of  combat  to 
such  an  extent  that  she  could  not  adequately  guard  them. 
The  Balkan  expedition,  in  particular,  was  regarded  by 
many  as  a  dissipation  of  energy  on  the  part  of  the  Central 
Powers  upon  an  excentric  objective,  which  was  bound  to 
compromise  their  resources  at  the  really  vital  spots. 


186  The  Great  War 

This  theory  rested  upon  a  complete  misconception  of 
the  facts.  In  the  first  place,  the  modern  practice  of  war- 
fare has  tended  to  strengthen  greatly  the  defensive  at  the 
expense  of  the  attack.  The  evidence  of  Liege,  Namur,  and 
Antwerp,  and  of  the  Polish  fortresses,  which  seems  to  con- 
tradict this  statement,  is  confronted  by  that  of  Riga,  Dvinsk, 
and  Verdun.  At  the  former  places,  the  defense  was  over- 
come with  startling  rapidity,  but  it  had  been  conducted 
with  antiquated  methods  against  modern  tactics  and  ap- 
pliances; at  the  latter,  however,  every  process  of  attack 
that  the  most  recent  science  and  experience  could  devise 
was  employed  in  vain  against  a  defense  maintained  in  ac- 
cordance with  correct  contemporary  principles.  It  follows 
that  the  defensive  when  conducted  in  an  adequate  manner 
was  distinctly  more  effective  in  localities  where  the  general 
conditions  were  fairly  equal  for  both  sides.  But  when  the 
central  regions  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  had  once  been 
encompassed  in  the  Teutonic  grip  of  steel,  in  lines  skilfully 
fortified  and  abundantly  supplied  with  artillery  and  machine- 
guns,  as  these  were  sure  to  be,  the  rugged  character  of  the 
country,  scarcity  of  roads,  and  remoteness  from  England 
and  France  presented  such  formidable  obstacles  for  an 
Allied  offensive,  that  it  is  not  surprising  that  conditions 
enabled  the  Central  Powers  to  effect  a  great  economy  in 
the  use  of  troops  for  guarding  the  new,  far-flung  position. 
And  even  more  significant  in  this  connection  is  the  con- 
sideration that  the  conquest  of  Serbia  and  the  protection 
of  the  territorial  acquisitions  thereby  made  were  largely 
performed  by  the  Bulgarian  army  whose  cooperation  was 
obtained,  and  could  only  have  been  obtained,  by  the  em- 
barkation of  the  Central  Powers  upon  the  Balkan  enterprise. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

Internal  Evolution  of  the  Principal  Belligerents 

Importance  of  the  internal  development.  The  chief  internal  problems  of 
Great  Britain.  Difficulties  in  the  way  of  a  national  organization  of  indus- 
try. Munitions  shortage,  the  formation  of  a  coalition  government,  and  the 
creation  of  a  ministry  of  munitions.  The  Munitions  Act  and  the  Welsh 
coal  strike.  The  recruiting  problem  and  the  agitation  for  compulsory 
service.  The  National  Register,  August  15,  1915.  The  Earl  of  Derby's 
recruiting  plan  and  its  results.  The  Military  Service  Act  of  1916,  passed 
in  January  of  that  year.  Nature  of  the  British  financial  problem.  War 
loans.  The  problem  of  foreign  exchanges.  The  Sinn  Fein  rebellion. 
The  fall  of  the  Asquith  ministry.  The  economic  situation  in  France. 
French  ministerial  changes.  French  war  finance.  The  economic  situa- 
tion in  Germany  and  the  official  control  of  the  distribution  of  the  most 
necessary  commodities.  Sessions  of  the  Reichstag,  votes  of  war  credits, 
war  loans,  the  attitude  of  political  parties,  and  the  discussion  of  peace 
terms.  The  evolution  and  conflict  of  opinions  in  the  higher  circles. 
Situation  in  Austria-Hungary,  death  of  Francis  Joseph.  The  ministerial 
changes  in  Russia.  The  crisis  in  September,  1915.  The  increasing 
antagonism  between  the  government  and  the  Duma. 

Few  would  deny  that  the  memory  of  the  Great  War  will 
endure  as  a  conspicuous  landmark  in  the  course  of  history. 
As  to  the  precise  character  of  its  preeminence,  however, 
the  most  varied  and  contrasted  views  have  found  acceptance. 
To  some  it  is  primarily  a  struggle  for  the  independent 
development  of  nationalities;  to  others,  a  conflict  for  the 
vindication  of  international  justice.  The  Allies  regard  it  as 
the  contest  of  democracy  against  despotism.  The  Germans 
have  variously  proclaimed  themselves  to  be  the  defenders 
of  the  West  against  the  hordes  of  Russia  and  the  champions 
of  the  freedom  of  the  seas.  Each  nation  fights  with  the 
passionate  conviction  that  it  is  defending  its  liberty  and 
existence.     All  are  ostensibly  fighting  for  a  lasting  peace. 

187 


188  The  Great  War 

War  is  a  sculptor  at  whose  fiery  touch  the  most  rigid 
forms  of  society  become  plastic,  but  the  interpretation  of 
his  work  is  only  possible  with  time,  patience,  and  discern- 
ment. This  epochal  struggle  has  brought  into  view  latent 
national  energies  and  developed  unlooked-for  resources, 
collective  and  individual. 

Perhaps  the  most  brilliant  phenomenon  in  the  internal 
life  of  any  of  the  contending  nations  has  been  the  rapidity 
and  thoroughness  with  which  the  French,  in  spite  of  the  loss 
of  their  most  important  coal  and  iron  deposits  and  of  their 
leading  manufacturing  region  at  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
have  adapted  and  developed  their  industrial  organization 
so  as  to  supply  their  deficiency  in  heavy  artillery  and  pro- 
vide ammunition  of  all  calibers  in  abundant  quantity.  But 
the  evolution  most  replete  in  human  interest  was  the  trans- 
formation of  British  industry  and  institutions  to  conform 
with  the  demands  imposed  by  the  great  struggle,  because 
this  process  involved  a  profound  revolution  in  inveterate 
practices  and  modes  of  thought. 

Instances  of  conspicuous  enterprise  displayed  by  the 
British  government  in  dealing  with  the  economical  prob- 
lems of  the  Great  War  in  its  earliest  stage  have  already 
been  observed;  but  some  others  deserve  mention  at  this 
point.  The  British  railways,  for  instance,  were  virtually 
taken  over  by  the  government  in  the  first  days  of  the 
struggle  and  directed  as  a  single  national  system  by  a 
committee  of  the  several  general  managers,  so  that  the 
waste  involved  in  competition  was  eliminated  and  the 
highest  efficiency  obtained  through  a  uniform  and  com- 
prehensive policy.  The  wages  of  the  employees  were  in- 
creased, partly  at  the  expense  of  the  government.  At  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  moreover,  the  government  requisi- 
tioned the  cold  storage  ships  running  to  South  America 
and  Australia.    The  United  Kingdom,  although  the  largest 


c 


4  ■  *\*  n 


LU 
CO 


on 

Q- 


o 


Internal  Evolution  of  Belligerents        189 

consumer  of  sugar  in  Europe,  produced  none  of  this  com- 
modity at  home  and  imported  about  a  half  of  its  supply 
from  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  In  view  of  the 
shortage  consequently  threatened  the  government  straight- 
way purchased  800,000  tons  by  cable  and  had  them  brought 
on  requisitioned  ships.  Thanks  in  part  to  these  and  other 
measures,  the  increase  in  food  prices  was  not  so  marked  in 
Great  Britain  as  among  her  enemies.  By  February,  1917, 
after  thirty  months  of  warfare,  the  cost  of  living  for  the 
laboring  classes  was  said  to  have  increased  119%  in  Berlin 
and  122%  in  Vienna  as  compared  with  40%  in  England. 

The  London  Stock  Exchange  reopened  in  January,  1915, 
but  with  severe  restrictions  to  prevent  the  enemy  from 
raising  money  by  selling  stocks  in  London  through  the 
medium  of  neutral  countries.  Minimum  prices  were  estab- 
lished, all  transactions  were  required  to  be  for  cash  within 
the  month,  and  no  fresh  issues  of  stock  were  permitted 
without  the  approval  of  the  Treasury. 

The  chief  internal  problems  of  Great  Britain  for  the 
conduct  of  the  war  were  connected  with  the  supply  of 
munitions,  the  adjustment  and  application  of  the  finan- 
cial resources,  and  the  providing  of  troops  in  adequate 
numbers. 

In  August,  1914,  the  munitions  industry  was  in  an  unor- 
ganized state  and  utterly  inadequate  to  meet  the  demands 
of  the  military  operations  forced  on  the  nation ;  the  labor 
conventions  militated  against  intensified  production;  and 
lack  of  discrimination  in  enlistments  allowed  to  serve  in  the 
trenches  skilled  labor  that  was  indispensable  to  the  making 
of  munitions.  The  nation,  as  a  whole,  failed  to  realize 
that  the  fullest  systematic  cooperation  of  all  its  producing 
capacity  was  essential  to  meet  the  new  conditions  of  war. 
The  consequences  of  the  lack  of  heavy  artillery  were  bit- 
terly emphasized  by  the  Battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle  in  March, 


190  The  Great  War 

1916,  and  the  Second  Battle  of  Ypres  a  few  weeks  later. 
Credit  for  the  solution  of  the  munitions  problem  is  largely 
due  to  Mr.  David  Lloyd  George,  who  was  one  of  the  first 
men  in  England  to  realize  the  vital  importance  of  high 
power  shell. 

The  Defense  of  the  Realm  Act  passed  by  parliament  in 
March,  1915,  gave  the  government  power  to  take  and  ex- 
ercise control  over  manufacturing  plants  capable  of  being 
used  for  the  manufacture  of  munitions.  About  the  same 
time  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Mr.  Runciman,  President  of 
the  Board  of  Trade,  formed  agreements  with  the  repre- 
sentatives of  labor  of  the  industries  involved  providing 
against  delay  in  work  on  government  munition  contracts 
through  labor  disagreements  or  trade  union  regulations 
during  the  course  of  the  war. 

In  May  a  coalition  ministry  was  formed,  in  which  the 
most  significant  portfolio  was  the  newly-created  one  of 
Minister  of  Munitions,  which  was  held  by  Mr.  Lloyd 
George.  This  innovation  was  quickly  followed  by  the 
measure  known  as  the  Munitions  Bill,  which  was  intro- 
duced on  June  23d  and  became  law  on  July  2d.  The 
measures  incorporated  in  this  law  applied  a  moderate  degree 
of  compulsion  to  all  establishments  directly  or  indirectly 
concerned  with  the  supply  of  war  material  and  laid  the 
foundation  for  a  vast  system  of  scarcely  concealed  state 
socialism  in  the  so-called  "controlled"  industries. 

The  arbitration  of  labor  disputes  was  made  obligatory  in 
all  munition  works  and  the  Minister  of  Munitions  was 
authorized  to  extend  this  obligation  to  other  industries. 
The  same  authority  could  declare  any  industrial  plant  a 
"controlled  establishment,"  which  involved  the  limitation 
of  the  employers'  profits;  the  suspension  of  all  rules  that 
might  restrict  the  employment  or  production;  and  the 
control  of  changes  in  wages  by  the  minister  or  arbitration 


Internal  Evolution  of  Belligerents        191 

tribunal.  Each  munitions  tribunal  was  composed  of  repre- 
sentatives of  labor  and  capital  in  equal  numbers. 

Hardly  had  the  law  gone  into  effect  when  the  Miners' 
Federation  of  South  Wales  and  Monmouth  ignored  it  and 
200,000  miners  struck  on  July  15th,  refusing  to  submit 
their  grievances  to  arbitration,  although  the  Munitions  Act 
had  been  extended  to  the  South  Wales  area.  In  the  midst 
of  this  crisis  Mr.  Lloyd  George  went  to  Cardiff  on  July 
19th  and  conferred  with  the  representatives  of  capital  and 
labor,  and  on  the  next  morning  terms  of  settlement  were 
accepted  and  the  men  returned  to  work.  With  the  gradual 
consolidation  of  public  sentiment,  the  increasing  spirit  of 
cooperation,  and  the  growing  belief  in  the  approximate 
fairness  of  the  decisions  of  the  arbitration  tribunals,  labor 
troubles  diminished  and  finally  in  large  part  ceased. 

As  a  result,  largely,  of  the  indefatigable  activity  of  the 
Minister  of  Munitions,  there  were  in  operation  in  the 
United  Kingdom  by  September  15,  1915,  no  fewer  than 
715  munitions  factories  as  "controlled  establishments,"  em- 
ploying an  army  of  800,000  workers.  Besides  this,  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions  had  constructed  twenty  shell  fac- 
tories and  was  constructing  eighteen  more. 

Although  the  voluntary  system  of  enlistments  had  pro- 
duced very  creditable  results,  the  conviction  was  growing 
that  it  operated  in  a  haphazard,  capricious,  and  unjust 
manner.  But  the  government  was  reluctant  to  consider 
officially  the  introduction  of  the  principle  of  compulsion, 
which  would  almost  certainly  provoke  a  violent  contro- 
versy, and  on  which  the  members  of  the  ministry  them- 
selves were  not  agreed.  In  fact,  the  prime  minister  himself 
scarcely  concealed  his  personal  distaste  for  conscription. 

Hints  were  made  from  time  to  time,  however,  that  the 
situation  might  eventually  compel  a  resort  to  some  form  of 
compulsion.     Thus  the  prime  minister  declared: 


192  The  Great  War 

"Under  the  conditions  in  which  we  are  now  placed, 
every  man  in  this  country,  without  any  distinction  of  any 
kind,  ought  to  he  doing  the  thing  for  which  in  view  of  the 
purposes  of  the  war  he  is  best  fitted." 

For  obtaining  a  comprehensive  basis  of  fact  for  deter- 
mining the  entire  number  of  persons  available  for  some 
form  of  national  service,  a  bill  was  passed  establishing  a 
National  Register  of  all  persons  of  both  sexes  between 
fifteen  and  sixty-five  years  of  age,  who  were  required  to  fill 
out  forms  showing  their  occupation,  the  number  of  persons 
depending  on  them,  and  other  facts  determining  their  avail- 
ability.    This  register  was  taken  on  August  15,  1915. 

As  a  final  effort  to  meet  the  situation  without  recourse 
to  compulsion,  Lord  Derby  proposed  a  recruiting  cam- 
paign based  on  a  comprehensive  domiciliary  canvass.  All 
men  of  proper  age  for  enlistment,  according  to  the  National 
Register,  were  visited  by  the  canvassers  and  invited  to 
signify  their  willingness  to  serve.  This  trial  closed  on 
December  11,  1915.  The  net  result  of  the  campaign 
showed  that  651,160  single  men  not  employed  in  indus- 
tries necessary  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war  had  failed 
to  respond. 

Mr.  Asquith  and  most  of  the  cabinet  were  now  con- 
vinced of  the  necessity  of  compulsion,  and  a  bill  to  this 
effect  was  introduced  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  Jan- 
uary 5,  1916,  passed  its  third  reading  by  a  vote  of  483  to  36 
on  the  24th,  and  became  law  three  days  later.  This  law, 
known  as  the  Military  Service  Act  of  1916,  which  did  not 
extend  to  Ireland,  provided  that,  with  certain  exceptions, 
all  single  men  and  widowers  without  children  dependent  on 
them,  British  subjects,  ordinarily  resident  in  Great  Britain, 
who  were  between  eighteen  and  forty-one  years  of  age  on 
August  15, 1915,  should  from  the  appointed  date,  five  weeks 
after  the  passage  of  the  bill,  be  regarded  as  enlisted  in  His 


Internal  Evolution  of  Belligerents        193 

Majesty's  regular  forces  "for  the  period  of  the  war,  and  to 
have  been  forthwith  transferred  to  the  reserve,"  unless  ex- 
empted in  the  interval  on  one  of  the  recognized  grounds. 

The  adoption  of  compulsory  service  in  Great  Britain  was 
a  bitter  disappointment  for  the  Germans,  who  had  counted 
from  the  first  upon  the  supposed  apathy  of  the  British 
character.  Now  for  the  first  time  the  British  had  given 
unmistakable  proof  of  a  determination  to  prosecute  the 
war  with  their  entire  available  resources. 

The  British  financial  problem  was  twofold:  it  concerned 
the  raising  of  funds  internally  for  domestic  expenditure, 
and  the  providing  by  special  means  for  the  payment  of 
purchases  abroad. 

The  first  British  war  loan  was  issued  in  November,  1914, 
for  funding  the  floating  indebtedness  in  the  form  of  treasury 
notes,  or  short  term  securities,  by  which  the  war  expenses 
had  thus  far  been  met.  The  sum  of  ^350,000,000  was  real- 
ized by  the  proceeds  of  this  new  government  stock,  which 
was  sold  at  a  discount  of  5%  and  carried  5)4%  interest. 
This  successful  operation  eclipsed  the  amazing  and  hitherto 
unparalleled  result  of  the  German  loan  placed  in  September. 

The  second  British  war  loan  was  placed  on  the  market 
in  June,  1915.  It  was  offered  at  par,  but  carried  A%% 
interest,  so  that  the  actual  return  to  the  investor  was  con- 
siderably higher  than  in  the  case  of  the  November  loan. 
The  subscriptions  represented  the  sum  of  ^594,000,000 
when  the  lists  were  closed  on  July  10th,  by  far  the  largest 
total  ever  raised  in  any  financial  operation. 

The  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  introduced  the  second 
war  budget  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  September 
21,  1915.  British  war  expenditure  had  risen  from  about 
.£2,660,000  a  day  in  June  to  /3,500,000  a  day  in  September. 

The  total  British  expenditure  for  the  fiscal  year  1915- 
1916  was  estimated  in  round  figures  at  ^1,600,000,000,  of 


194  The  Great  War 

which  £'423,000,000  represented  loans  to  the  allies  and 
colonies.  It  was  proposed  that  somewhat  more  than 
j£300,000,000,  should  be  raised  by  taxation,  leaving  nearly 
j£  1,300,000,000  to  be  covered  by  borrowing.    The  income 

tax  rates  were  increased  40%  and  the  limit  for  incomes 
exempted  from  taxation  was  reduced  from  .£150  to  .£130. 
A  new  ad  valorem  import  duty  of  33*3%  was  imposed  on  a 
number  of  foreign  articles  of  luxury,  the  motive  being 
parti}'  to  restrict  the  importation  of  unnecessary  commodi- 
ties. An  excess  profits  tax  of  50%  was  levied  on  all  busi- 
ness profits  made  during  the  war. 

For  the  fiscal  year  1916-1917  an  increased  expenditure 
of  about  .£200,000,000  was  estimated  and  the  necessary  aug- 
mented revenue  was  partly  provided  by  further  increases 
in  the  income  tax  and  the  advance  of  the  excess  profits  tax 
to  60%.  The  United  Kingdom  gave  proof  of  amazing 
financial  vitality  by  raising,  in  the  midst  of  the  most  tre- 
mendous and  exacting  struggle,  the  largest  sums  ever  ob- 
tained by  any  power  through  taxation,  and  it  was  the  only 
one  of  the  belligerents  that  undertook  to  discharge  a  con- 
siderable part  of  the  war  expenditure  while  the  war  was 
still  in  progress. 

The  second  task  of  British  finance,  which  consisted  in 
meeting  obligations  arising  from  the  purchases  made  by 
the  United  Kingdom  or  her  allies  in  neutral  countries  pre- 
sented probably  more  serious  difficulties.  The  returns  for 
the  foreign  commerce  of  the  United  Kingdom  always  dis- 
played a  considerable  excess  of  imports  over  exports.  In 
time  of  peace  the  national  income  from  external  sources, 
such  as  the  carrying  trade,  banking  commissions,  and  the 
interest  from  overseas  investments,  not  only  offset  this 
unfavorable  balance,  but  provided  for  an  annual  incre- 
ment of  about  .£200,000,000  in  the  total  value  of  colonial 
and  foreign  investments.     With  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 


Internal  Evolution  of  Belligerents        195 

however,  the  income  from  external  sources  tended  to 
diminish,  while  the  excess  of  imports  over  exports  ex- 
panded very  rapidly. 

The  problem,  moreover,  was  complicated  by  the  financial 
burden  assumed  by  the  British  nation,  chiefly  through  its 
government,  for  the  benefit  of  the  less  affluent  colonies  and 
allies.  The  obligations  of  this  nature  assumed  by  the  British 
government  in  neutral  markets  swelled  the  volume  of  ex- 
ternal debits  requiring  special  means  of  settlement. 

The  most  serious  problem  of  foreign  exchanges  was  in- 
volved in  the  financial  relationship  of  the  United  Kingdom 
and  the  United  States.  By  June  30,  1915,  the  trade  balance 
in  favor  of  the  United  States  greatly  exceeded  the  current 
indebtedness  of  the  latter  to  Great  Britain.  Thus  the  finan- 
cial equilibrium  was  disturbed  and  exchange  on  London 
in  New  York  fell  alarmingly.  The  reduction  of  imports 
of  non-essential  articles  and  the  export  of  gold  by  Great 
Britain  were  insufficient  remedial  measures.  Finally,  in 
September,  1915,  an  Anglo-French  commission  arranged 
in  New  York  for  a  loan  of  £100,000,000  at  b%,  the  pro- 
ceeds of  which  were  to  be  employed  solely  in  America 
for  steadying  the  exchange. 

The  total  amount  of  British  investments  in  the  United 
States  was  variously  estimated  at  from  £500,000,000  to 
£700,000,000.  Steps  were  taken  by  the  British  govern- 
ment to  make  a  register  of  all  American  securities  in 
British  hands,  so  that  as  necessary  they  could  be  taken 
over  in  return  for  war-loan  stock  and  used  for  paying  debts 
in  the  United  States. 

The  lack  of  a  consistent  plan  for  the  coordination  and 
constructive  development  of  the  operations  of  the  Entente 
Allies  was  painfully  evident.  Their  indecisive  diplomacy 
in  the  Balkans  created  a  lack  of  confidence  and  a  change 
of  ministers  in  France  and  governmental  changes  in  Great 


196  The  Great  War 

Britain  resulted.  Sir  Edward  Carson  regarded  as  a  breach 
of  national  honor  the  failure  to  give  adequate  support  to 
Serbia  and  resigned  from  the  British  ministry  on  Octo- 
ber 12th.  The  British  General  Staff  was  reconstructed  and 
Lieutenant-general  Sir  Archibald  Murray  was  placed  at  its 
head,  thus  relieving  Lord  Kitchener,  Minister  of  War,  of 
many  overburdensome  duties.  On  November  2d,  the 
Prime  Minister  announced  the  formation  of  a  special  War 
Council  within  the  cabinet,  consisting  of  himself,  Mr.  Bal- 
four, Mr.  Lloyd  George,  Mr.  Bonar  Law,  and  Mr.  Mc- 
Kenna,  which  should  communicate  its  findings  for  final 
decision  to  the  cabinet  as  a  whole.  This  was  a  useful  step 
towards  the  concentration  in  fewer  hands  of  a  large  part 
of  the  governmental  functions  in  connection  with  the  war, 
for  which  the  cabinet  as  a  whole  had  proven  to  be  too  un- 
wieldy. At  the  same  time  Mr.  Asquith  declared  that  the 
responsibility  for  the  Dardanelles  expedition  rested  on  the 
whole  cabinet,  and  thus  exonerated  Mr.  Winston  Spencer 
Churchill  from  charges  which  had  gained  a  certain  cur- 
rency. The  latter  resigned  the  sinecure  position  to  which 
he  had  been  relegated  in  May  and  joined  his  regiment  in 
France.  The  adoption  of  compulsory  service  in  January, 
1916,  led  to  the  resignation  of  the  Home  Secretary,  Sir 
John  Simon,  the  only  member  of  the  cabinet  who  persisted 
to  the  last  in  opposition  to  this  measure. 

The  renunciation  of  party  strife  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war  was  extended  to  the  Irish  contest,  and  the  free  thus 
established  had  been  honorably  observed  by  the  leaders  of 
the  opposing  factions.  This  result  had  been  a  disconcert- 
ing factor  for  the  plans  of  Germany,  who  had  counted  on 
Irish  disloyalty  and  disunion.  But  the  Germans  did  not 
despair  of  this  situation. 

An  assiduous  revolutionary  agitation  promoted  by  secret 
Gcman  agents  and  supported  by  German  money  found  a 


The  Tsar  :it  the  reopening  of  the  Duma,  February  iz,  19  16. 


The  Sinn  Fein  rebellion.      The  Dublin  post  office  after  being  burned  by  the  rebels. 


Internal  Evolution  of  Belligerents     ■  197 

convenient  nucleus  of  disaffection  in  a  society  called  the 
Sinn  Fein,  which  means  literally  "Ourselves."  This  asso- 
ciation had  been  founded  about  sixteen  years  before  by  the 
extreme  Nationalists,  but  did  not  owe  allegiance  to  any  of 
the  recognized  parties.  It  was  at  first  an  academic  move- 
ment of  a  harmless  character  for  the  encouragement  of  the 
Irish  language,  literature,  and  crafts.  But  when,  with  the 
progress  of  the  war,  the  incitement  of  a  vague  but  spec- 
tacular opportunity,  intensified  by  impatience  at  the  de- 
ferring of  the  promulgation  of  the  Home  Rule  Act,  fanned 
the  smoldering  fires  of  sedition,  the  Sinn  Fein  in  coopera- 
tion with  the  remnants  of  the  Larkinite  labor  faction  be- 
came active  in  the  forming  of  Irish  volunteers  and  in 
training  its  followers  as  a  revolutionary  force. 

Sir  Roger  Casement,  who  had  formerly  been  a  British 
consular  officer,  represented  the  revolutionary  movement 
at  the  Kaiser's  capital  and  in  the  German  headquarters  and 
was  charged  with  the  coordination  of  the  plans  for  an  Irish 
uprising  with  the  advent  of  the  stipulated  German  assistance. 
Late  on  the  evening  of  April  20,  1916,  a  German  vessel 
laden  with  arms,  but  disguised  as  a  Dutch  trader,  accom- 
panied by  a  German  submarine,  arrived  off  the  Kerry  coast. 
The  vessel  was  stopped  by  a  patrol  boat  and  ordered  to 
Queenstown,  but  was  sunk  on  the  way  by  the  crew,  who 
gave  themselves  up  as  prisoners.  Sir  Roger  Casement 
with  two  companions  was  put  ashore  from  the  submarine, 
but  failed  to  meet  the  expected  party  of  Sinn  Feiners,  and 
was  arrested  on  the  morning  of  the  21st. 

This  circumstance  embarrassed  the  plans  of  the  con- 
spirators. But  the  movement  had  already  gone  too  far  to 
be  halted.  On  April  24th,  Easter  Monday,  armed  bands 
seized  St.  Stephen's  Green,  in  the  heart  of  Dublin,  with  the 
post-office,  law  court,  and  part  of  Sackville  Street.  But 
troops  hastening  to  the  scene  of  the  outbreak  surrounded 


198  The  Great  War 

the  central  section  held  by  the  insurgents.  A  territorial 
brigade  arrived  from  England  on  the  26th  and  by  May  1st 

the  insurrection  bad  been  completely  crushed.  During 
May  fifteen  of  the  principal  conspirators  were  court- 
martialled  and  shot.  Sir  Roger  Casement  was  imprisoned 
in  the  Tower  of  London,  tried  by  the  High  Court  of 
justice,  found  guilty  of  treason  on  June  29th,  and  hanged. 

A  national  disaster  occurring  on  June  5th  filled  Great 
Britain  with  profound  sorrow.  Lord  Kitchener  sailed  in 
the  afternoon  from  the  north  of  Scotland  on  the  cruiser 
Hampshire  on  a  military  mission  to  Russia  at  the  invitation 
of  the  Tsar.  Two  destroyers  accompanied  the  cruiser  at 
the  start,  but  returned  toward  evening  on  account  of  the 
heavy  seas.  About  eight  P.  M.  the  Hampshire  struck  a  Ger- 
man mine  west  of  the  Orkneys  and  foundered  in  ten 
minutes.  The  small  boats  were  sunk  and  only  twelve  sur- 
vivors reached  shore  on  a  raft.  Lord  Kitchener  perished, 
but  the  essential  part  of  the  great  task  of  organization,  in 
which  he  was  the  central  figure,  had  already  been  accom- 
plished. It  was  announced  on  July  6th  that  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  would  assume  the  Secretaryship  of  War  with  Lord 
Derby  as  Under-secretary. 

It  was  becoming  evident  in  the  autumn  of  1916  that  the 
Coalition  ministry  was  losing  the  public  confidence.  The 
government  as  a  whole  seemed  to  fall  short  of  the  degree 
of  relentless  resolution  which  the  situation  demanded  and 
the  majority  of  the  nation  expected.  The  prestige  of  the 
government  suffered  from  the  Roumanian  disasters  and 
from  the  halt  of  the  British  advance  on  the  Somme,  which 
created  considerable  popular  disappointment.  The  govern- 
ment had  also  shown  lack  of  foresight  in  not  adopting  com- 
prehensive measures  for  dealing  with  the  food  situation. 

But  the  fall  of  the  ministry  came  rather  unexpectedly. 
Late  in  November  Mr.  Asquith  decided  to  reduce  the 


Internal  Evolution  of  Belligerents        199 

number  of  the  War  Committee,  which  then  consisted  of 
seven  members,  while  at  the  same  time  increasing  its  ac- 
tivity. But  Mr.  Lloyd  George  was  not  satisfied  with  the 
changes  as  proposed  and  announced  his  intention  of  retir- 
ing from  the  ministry  unless  the  reform  were  made  more 
drastic.  The  resignation  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George  on  Decem- 
ber 5th,  after  the  rejection  of  his  counter-proposals,  was 
straightway  followed  by  that  of  Mr.  Asquith  himself.  The 
king  sent  for  Mr.  Andrew  Bonar  Law,  who,  however,  de- 
clared himself  unable  to  form  an  administration.  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  was  then  summoned  and  accepted  the 
premiership  on  December  7th. 

A  War  Cabinet  within  the  ministry  was  now  formed  of 
Mr.  Andrew  Bonar  Law,  Lord  Curzon,  Lord  Milner,  and 
Mr.  Arthur  Henderson,  with  the  prime  minister  as  chair- 
man. As  premier,  Mr.  David  Lloyd  George  became  First 
Lord  of  the  Treasury,  while  most  of  the  other  more  im- 
portant members  of  the  government  were  of  the  Unionist 
party.  The  Liberal  members  of  the  former  cabinet,  who 
had  passed  into  retirement,  pledged  themselves  to  give  the 
new  administration  a  fair  trial. 

In  spite  of  the  necessity  for  domestic  union,  the  political 
truce  agreed  upon  by  all  parties  in  France  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  and  the  broadly  representative  character  of  the 
French  cabinet  as  reorganized  in  August,  1914,  the  French 
government  in  course  of  time  found  itself  confronted  by 
an  increasing  tide  of  opposition.  Struggling  as  it  was  in 
the  teeth  of  the  fiercest  tempests  of  the  world  war,  when 
quickness  of  judgment  and  the  greatest  freedom  of  action 
were  prime  conditions  of  salvation,  it  was  natural  for  it  to 
shrink  instinctively  from  exposing  its  counsels  to  the  vacil- 
lating temper  of  a  popular  assembly.  But  it  was  also 
natural  that  the  Chamber,  jealous  of  its  prerogatives,  should 
have  suspected  that  this  reticence  concealed  unjustifiable 


200  The  Great  War 

encroachments  of  the  military  upon  the  civil  organs  of 
authority.  There  was,  besides,  a  genera]  spirit  of  restless- 
ness fed  by  disappointment  at  the  lack  of  decisive  operatic >ns 
and  by  rumors  of  incompetence,  especially  in  connection 
with  the  supply  of  ammunition. 

On  August  13,  1915,  M.  Buzon,  a  deputy,  excited  op- 
position to  the  government  by  a  speech  eulogizing  General 
Sarrail,  who  had  been  recently  appointed  to  the  secondary 
theater  at  the  Dardanelles  and  was  commonly  regarded  as 
an  extreme  republican.  M.  Georges  Clemenceau  started 
a  press  campaign  against  the  ministry  with  a  series  of  bitter 
attacks  in  his  journal  L' Homme  Enchaine.  The  opposition 
was  silenced  for  a  time  by  a  brilliant  speech  in  defense  of 
the  government  delivered  by  M.  Viviani  before  the  Cham- 
ber of  Deputies  on  August  26th,  but  broke  out  afresh  at 
the  failure  of  the  French  and  British  to  send  adequate  aid 
to  Serbia. 

The  prime  minister's  explanation  of  the  Balkan  situation 
was  published  in  the  press  on  October  13th  and  the  same 
evening  M.  Delcasse,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  tendered 
his  resignation,  alleging  reasons  of  ill  health  as  well  as  dis- 
agreement with  his  colleagues  on  the  Balkan  policy.  He 
will  be  remembered  as  one  of  the  chief  authors  of  the 
Entente  Cordiale  and  the  foreign  minister  who  defied 
Germany  in  1905.  His  present  resignation  hastened  the 
ministerial  crisis. 

M.  Aristide  Briand  was  entrusted  with  the  formation  of 
a  new  cabinet  on  the  29th.  His  aim  was  evidently  to 
bring  together  the  most  eminent  administrative  talent  of 
the  country.  In  the  new  cabinet  were  grouped  no  fewer 
than  eight  former  prime  ministers:  Briand,  Viviani,  Dou- 
mergue,  Combes,  Ribot,  Meline,  Leon  Bourgeois,  and 
de  Freycinet;  and  its  breadth  is  attested  by  the  fact  that 
both  M.  Jules  Guesde,  a  United  Socialist,  and  M.  Denys 


Internal  Evolution  of  Belligerents        201 

Cochin,  the  leader  of  the  right,  retained  their  seats  in  it. 
The  prime  minister  took  for  himself  the  portfolio  of  for- 
eign affairs.  General  Gallieni,  who  had  been  commander 
of  Paris  during  the  critical  days  of  the  Battle  of  the  Marne 
was  called  to  the  Ministry  of  War  and  Admiral  Lacaze  to 
the  Ministry  of  Marine.  But  the  system  of  administration 
was  essentially  the  same,  although  the  situation  demanded 
a  radical  reorganization.  Discontent  again  became  mani- 
fest and  in  the  autumn  of  1916  the  government  proposed 
changes  for  greater  compactness  and  efficiency  of  adminis- 
tration, which  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  approved. 

On  December  9th  the  Chamber  passed  a  bill  that  charged 
the  prime  minister  with  the  reconstruction  of  the  govern- 
ment and  the  reorganization  of  the  high  command.  In 
consequence,  the  cabinet  was  reduced  from  twenty-two  to 
eleven  members.  M.  Briand  retained  with  the  premier- 
ship the  portfolio  of  foreign  affairs.  M.  Ribot  remained 
in  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  Admiral  Lacaze  in  that  of  the 
marine,  and  M.  Thomas  in  that  of  national  industries.  The 
new  minister  of  war  was  General  Lyautey,  the  French 
President  General  of  Morocco,  who  had  given  striking 
proof  of  his  talent  as  an  administrator  and  soldier  in 
Morocco  since  April  28,  1912. 

An  inner  Cabinet,  or  War  Committee,  was  now  created, 
with  five  members:  Briand,  Ribot,  Lyautey,  Lacaze,  and 
Thomas.  Quite  as  sensational  were  the  changes  in  the 
high  command.  General  Joffre  relinquished  the  office  of 
commander-in-chief  and  became  military  adviser  to  the 
War  Committee,  receiving  the  distinguished  title  of  Mar- 
shal of  France,  which  had  not  been  conferred  upon  anyone 
since  the  downfall  of  the  Second  Empire.  The  new  com- 
mander-in-chief of  the  armies  in  the  West  was  General 
Nivelle,  whose  phenomenal  advancement  from  the  rank 
of  colonel  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  to  the  command  of 


202  The  Great  War 

the  Second  Army  in  the  region  of  the  Meuse  will  he 
noticed  later. 

F<>r  more  than  fifteen  months  the  French  government 
provided  for  its  war  expenditure  by  the  emission  of  short 
term  securities  and  by  advances  from  the  Bank  of  France, 
the  latter  facilitated  by  the  increase  of  the  paper  circula- 
tion. The  regular  form  of  the  short  term  security  was  the 
Son  dn  trisor,  or  treasury  bill,  maturing  in  three,  six,  or 
twelve  months.  By  a  decree  of  September  13,  1914,  these 
bills  received  the  appellation  Bons  de  la  Defense  Nationale, 
or  National  Defense  Bills,  and  their  interest  was  fixed  at  4% 
for  those  of  three  months  and  b%  for  those  of  six  months 
or  one  year.  By  November  12,  1915,  National  Defense 
Bills  to  the  value  of  8,353,000,000  francs  were  in  circulation 
in  France,  while  others  amounting  to  1,059,500,000  francs 
had  been  discounted  by  the  British  government  for  pur- 
chases of  war  material  made  by  France  in  the  United  King- 
dom. France  had  also  received  about  1,500,000,000  francs 
from  the  joint  Allied  loan  negotiated  in  the  United  States. 

A  law  of  February  10,  1915,  had  provided  for  the  emis- 
sion of  decennial  obligations  of  the  National  Defense, 
redeemable  not  later  than  1925,  bearing  b%  interest. 

By  the  close  of  1915  the  circulation  of  the  Bank  of 
France  had  risen  to  13,000,000,000  francs,  and  the  bank's 
advances  to  the  state  amounted  to  approximately  5,000,- 
000,000.  For  the  period  of  the  war  and  until  one  year 
after  the  conclusion  of  peace  the  interest  on  this  indebted- 
ness was  fixed  at  the  rate  of  \%,  and  subsequently  at  ?>%. 

Against  these  various  forms  of  increased  indebtedness 
should  be  reckoned  1,056,000,000  francs  which  France  had 
lent  to  her  allies  down  to  the  close  of  1915. 

In  November,  1915,  the  French  government  determined 
to  fund  a  large  part  of  its  floating  indebtedness  by  the  sale 
of  bonds.     Subscriptions  for  a  national  loan  were  open 


Internal  Evolution  of  Belligerents        203 

from  November  25th  to  December  15th.  The  new  bonds 
bore  5%  interest.  The  subscriptions  totalled  14,500,000,000 
francs  in  round  figures,  of  which  5,500,000,000  were  cov- 
ered by  coin  or  bank  notes,  2,500,000,000  by  National 
Defense  Bills  and  the  remainder  by  decennial  obligations 
and  the  former  5%  rentes  presented  for  conversion. 

The  second  French  war  loan  was  placed  on  the  market 
in  October,  1916.  It  was  sold  at  88^,  bore  interest  at  5%, 
and  was  exempt  from  all  French  taxes.  The  subscriptions 
amounted  to  about  11,360,000,000  francs,  of  which  b^/2% 
was  new  money,  the  rest  representing  conversions. 

Postponing  the  situation  in  Italy  for  more  convenient 
notice  later,  we  turn  next  to  the  conditions  in  the  Central 
Powers. 

The  naval  blockade  of  Germany  undoubtedly  caused 
very  serious  embarrassment,  although  it  failed  to  produce 
the  prompt  and  decisive  results  which  had  been  quite  com- 
monly anticipated.  It  was  even  claimed  by  some  German 
authorities  that  its  effect  was  in  at  least  one  respect  bene- 
ficial to  the  expected  victim.  For  Germany  through  a 
carefully  devised  system  of  tariffs,  with  a  systematic  organi- 
zation of  supply  and  distribution,  found  means  to  satisfy 
her  most  pressing  food  requirements  from  the  block  of 
territory  comprised  within  her  own  and  her  allies  coast 
and  battle  lines.  The  problem  of  supplying  her  industries 
with  the  necessary  raw  materials  was  more  complicated. 
But  she  was  free  from  the  question  of  unfavorable  foreign 
exchanges,  the  debts  contracted  were  payable  to  German 
citizens.  By  cutting  off  the  importation  of  foreign  war- 
supplies,  the  Allied  blockade  threw  Germany  back  upon 
her  own  resources,  applying  the  spur  of  necessity  to  the 
ingenuity  of  German  science  in  devising  substitutes  for 
standard  raw  commodities  and  producing  a  wonderful  de- 
velopment of  the  nation's  war-industries. 


2(14  The  Great  War 

The  Allies  had  expected  that  Germany's  munitions  in- 
dustries would  soon  be  paralyzed  by  lack  of  war  materials. 
In  this  they  seemed  justified.  For  instance,  copper,  a  vital 
factor,  the  annual  consumption  of  which  in  Germany  before 
the  war  was  250,000  tons,  was  declared  contraband  and  the 
importation  was  largely  cut  off.  Germany's  domestic  pro- 
duction of  copper  had  never  exceeded  50,000  tons.  It  has 
been  calculated  that  the  wastage  of  copper  by  50,000  men 
in  daily  action,  even  assuming  that  four-fifths  of  that  used 
were  recovered,  amounts  to  over  180,000  tons  a  year.  The 
munitions  requirements  of  the  constantly  expanding  opera- 
tions were  met,  in  part  by  the  requisitioning  of  the  metal 
that  had  been  used  for  architectural,  electrical,  and  domestic 
purposes,  and  in  part  by  the  more  thorough  exploitation  of 
the  copper  mines  in  Germany  and  in  the  allied  and  occu- 
pied regions.  But  when  the  final  record  of  the  industrial 
phases  of  the  great  struggle  shall  have  been  composed,  the 
chapter  on  the  devices,  expedients,  and  subterfuges  by 
which  the  German  factories  and  workshops  were  nour- 
ished and  supplied  will  doubtless  vie  with  the  most  en- 
gaging tales  of  fiction. 

At  the  outset  Germany  was  far  less  thoroughly  prepared 
for  war  in  an  economic  than  in  a  financial  or  a  military 
sense.  The  Germans  had  based  their  calculations  on  the 
expectation  of  a  short,  decisive  struggle,  and  had  not 
made  exceptional  accumulations  of  food  and  raw  materials. 
Before  the  close  of  the  second  month  of  warfare  there  was 
a  threatened  shortage  in  the  supply  of  ammunition.  Nearly 
five  months  passed  before  the  government  realized  the 
necessity  of  a  systematic  regulation  of  the  food  supply. 

The  first  comprehensive  measures  for  the  regulation  of 
the  food  supply  went  into  effect  on  February  1,  1915,  when 
control  of  the  distribution  and  consumption  of  cereals  was 
vested   in    the   Imperial    Distributing   Bureau,   under  the 


Internal  Evolution  of  Belligerents        205 

regulations  of  which  all  stores  of  wheat  and  rye  were 
requisitioned  and  purchased  by  the  War  Grain  Association. 
A  communal  association  was  formed  to  control  the  dis- 
tribution of  cereals  and  bread  in  each  locality.  The  indi- 
vidual bread  ration  was  usually  based  on  a  weekly  maximum 
of  about  two  kilograms. 

To  meet  the  effects  of  a  protracted  blockade  it  was  ex- 
pected that  by  a  systematic  regulation  of  the  supplies  and 
by  curtailing  the  acreage  planted  to  beets  and  potatoes,  of 
which  there  had  been  a  heavy  surplus  production  before 
the  war,  and  increasing  to  a  corresponding  extent  the  grain 
and  fodder  crops,  in  which  there  had  been  a  shortage,  ex- 
cessive hardship  would  be  avoided. 

One  cause  for  serious  misgivings,  a  shortage  of  agricult- 
ural labor  as  a  result  of  mobilization,  was  removed  by  the 
progress  of  the  war  itself,  which  placed  at  the  disposal  of 
the  Germans  a  great  host  of  prisoners,  who  were  largely 
assigned  to  rural  tasks.  By  the  end  of  July,  1915,  the 
number  of  prisoners  had  risen  to  nearly  2,000,000. 

The  best  talent  was  mobilized  in  the  formulation  of  a 
rational  dietary  and  in  the  apportionment  of  the  grain  sup- 
ply between  human  beings  and  the  domestic  animals. 
Nevertheless,  the  government  found  it  necessary  to  estab- 
lish maximum  prices  for  meat  and  butter  and  to  decree 
meatless  and  fatless  days. 

In  a  similar  way  control  was  exercised  over  distribution 
of  essential  raw  materials  by  means  of  the  Central  Pur- 
chasing Office,  which  through  its  branches  purchased  the 
entire  supply  and  production  of  these  commodities,  the 
allotment  being  made  by  the  central  office  in  proportion 
to  the  ascertained  requirements  of  the  several  districts. 
This  system  eliminated  competitive  buying  and  established 
prices  on  a  fair  and  uniform  basis.  Incidentally,  the  cen- 
tral control  and  systematic  distribution  introduced  greater 


206  The  Great  War 

economy  in  transportation.  This  system  was  the  most 
important  step  that  had  yet  been  taken  towards  a  rational, 
socialistic  organization  of  industry. 

The  most  conspicuous  figure  in  the  management  of 
German  war-finances  was  that  of  Dr.  Carl  Helfferich,  who, 
after  a  brilliant  and  characteristic  career  as  a  banker,  at  a 
comparatively  early  age,  became  the  German  Chancellor's 
right  hand  man  and  one  of  the  most  influential  statesmen 
in  Europe.  In  1904  he  was  made  Director  of  the  Ana- 
tolian Railway  in  Asia  Minor,  the  initial  section  of  the 
Constantinople-Bagdad  line,  intended  as  the  main  highway 
for  German  penetration.  Four  years  later  he  passed  to  the 
directorship  of  the  Deutsche  Bank,  where  he  especially  rep- 
resented the  Near  Eastern  interests  of  this  great  institution. 

Dr.  Helfferich  was  appointed  Secretary  of  State  to  the 
Imperial  Treasury  in  January,  1915,  and  passed  to  the  Min- 
istry of  the  Interior  in  May,  1916.  Thus  his  control  of 
the  Treasury  covers  the  greater  part  of  the  period  em- 
braced within  the  present  chapter. 

German  and  British  systems  of  war-finance  stood  in 
marked  contrast.  The  German  policy  was  to  meet  the 
entire  war-expenditure  by  means  of  loans,  the  British  was 
to  provide  for  a  considerable  part  of  this  expenditure  by 
increased  taxation  during  the  period  of  the  war  itself. 
British  financiers  regarded  the  German  practice  of  con- 
tracting an  enormous  indebtedness  without  taking  any  steps 
for  interest  and  redemption  as  a  gamble  on  the  chance  of 
victory.  The  successive  German  war-appropriations  voted 
by  the  Reichstag  with  the  corresponding  war-loans  fol- 
lowed one  another  at  intervals  of  about  six  months.  The 
successful  flotation  of  the  first  German  war-loan  has  already 
been  noticed.  The  second,  which  was  in  the  form  of 
treasury  bills  and  imperial  bonds,  sold  at  9Sj4,  and  bearing 
interest  at  b%,  was  open  for  subscription  from  February  27 


Internal  Evolution  of  Belligerents        207 

to  March  19,  1915.  The  subscriptions  aggregated  about 
9,061,000,000  marks.  The  third,  September  4-22,  1915, 
issued  at  99,  with  5%  interest,  realized  approximately 
12,101,000,000  marks,  thus  surpassing  the  phenomenal 
result  of  the  second  British  war-loan  early  in  the  summer. 
The  fourth,  March  4-24,  1916,  consisting  of  treasury  bills 
at  95,  with  interest  at  \yi%,  and  imperial  bonds  at  98}£, 
with  interest  at  5%,  produced  a  total  of  about  10,712,000,- 
000  marks.  A  new  departure  was  taken  at  this  time  in  the 
adoption  of  the  government's  proposal  to  raise  480,000,000 
marks  of  additional  revenue  by  increased  taxation.  But 
this  was  a  bagatelle  in  comparison  with  the  increased  load 
of  taxation  assumed  by  the  United  Kingdom.  The  fifth 
German  war-loan  in  September,  1916,  treasury  bills  at  95, 
with  \y2%  interest,  and  imperial  bonds  at  98,  bearing  b% 
interest,  brought  in  10,680,000,000  marks.  By  this  time 
a  total  of  approximately  47,000,000,000  marks  had  been 
raised  by  loans,  while  the  aggregate  war-credits  totalled 
about  52,000,000,000  marks. 

In  considering  the  attitude  of  the  German  people  ten- 
dencies rather  than  definite  facts  present  themselves.  The 
opinions  of  the  masses  were  often  the  unreflecting  re- 
sponse to  deliberate  formative  influences  exercised  by 
determined  minorities.  At  first  universal  exultation  pos- 
sessed the  people  as  the  German  armies  pushed  through 
Belgium  and  northern  France.  They  looked  for  a  sudden 
victory,  and  the  failure  of  this  created  a  diversity  of  opinion. 

With  the  repeated  victories  of  the  eastern  and  south- 
eastern campaigns  of  1915  the  divergency  in  view  of  the 
extreme  parties  was  accentuated.  Pan-Germanism,  the 
true  character  of  which  was  unmasked  by  the  German 
victories,  found  its  chief  supporters  in  the  Conservative  and 
National  Liberal  parties,  who  insisted  on  the  annexation  of 
the  valuable   territory  occupied  by  the  German   troops, 


jos  The  Great  War 

without  respect  to  the  affinity  or  desires  of  the  population 
of  the  regions  involved.  These  aims  found  striking  ex- 
pression in  Friedrich  Naumann's  Mitteleuropa,  or  Middle 
Europe,  which  appeared  in  the  summer  of  1915.  The 
underlying  idea,  which  was  not  original,  was  here  treated 
in  a  more  definite  manner  than  in  any  previous  work. 

Naumann  insisted  that  the  central  hlock  of  European 
territory  occupied  hy  the  Teutonic  powers  with  their  lesser 
allies  and  neighbors  would  constitute  a  natural  economic 
unit  which  ought  to  form  the  basis  for  the  political  unity 
of  200,000,000  souls.  He  urged  that  the  seed  be  sown  for 
the  new  order  during  the  stress  of  the  great  conflict.  It  is 
significant  that  about  this  time  greater  attention  was  being 
paid  to  the  improvement  of  the  navigation  of  the  Danube 
and  the  development  of  canals  connecting  the  Danube  with 
the  Rhine  and  the  German  rivers  of  the  north,  so  as  to 
provide  a  more  convenient  inland  water  route  for  German 
commerce  to  the  Near  East. 

But  the  results  of  the  great  campaign  of  1915  just  as 
naturally  stimulated  the  desire  of  the  opposite  extremists 
for  the  negotiation  of  an  immediate  peace  on  terms  honor- 
able for  all  parties.  Since  the  Socialists  had  only  been  in- 
duced to  support  the  war  at  the  beginning  by  the  assurance 
that  it  was  a  struggle  for  self-defense  against  the  aggressive 
force  of  Russian  despotism,  they  naturally  tended  to  become 
restive  as  soon  as  the  Slav  peril  had  been  destroyed. 

Signs  of  a  growing  spirit  of  insubordination  appeared  as 
early  as  the  third  war-session  of  the  Reichstag,  convoked 
on  March  10,  1915,  when  Herr  Haase  pleaded  for  "a 
lasting  peace  that  will  not  contain  within  it  the  germs  of 
new  entanglements  and  dissensions,"  and  Liebknecht  with 
one  companion  voted  against  the  budget. 

The  National  Executive  of  the  Social  Democratic  party 
issued  a  manifesto  on  June  23,   1915,   calling  upon  the 


Internal  Evolution  of  Belligerents        209 

government  to  open  immediate  peace  negotiations.  This 
manifesto  was  published  in  Vorwarts,  which  was  tempo- 
rarily suppressed  as  a  punishment  for  its  temerity.  Another 
statement  of  the  Socialists  in  August  of  the  same  year  pro- 
claimed, as  the  suitable  conditions  for  a  lasting  peace,  the 
integrity  of  the  German  Empire,  Austria-Hungary,  and 
Turkey,  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  international  arbitration, 
and  the  promotion  of  international  free  trade. 

The  government  identified  itself  neither  with  the  dicta- 
torial Chauvinism  of  the  Junkers  and  military  set  nor  with 
the  incoherent,  but  deep,  instinctive  longing  of  the  masses 
for  international  conciliation.  But  its  attitude  in  respect  to 
the  war  aims  was  often  vague,  enigmatical,  or  vacillating. 
At  the  opening  of  the  fifth  war-session  of  the  Reichstag 
on  August  19th,  the  Chancellor,  von  Bethmann-Hollweg, 
reviewed  once  more  the  causes  of  the  war,  described  the 
Anglo-German  negotiations  of  1912,  and  declared  that  the 
war  would  go  on  until  the  way  was  clear  for  a  new  Europe, 
"free  from  French  conspiracies,  from  Muscovite  lust  for 
conquest,  and  from  English  tutelage." 

At  this  time  thirty-six  members  voted  against  the  grant- 
ing of  the  new  war  credit  in  the  Socialist  party  conference. 
Liebknecht  voted  against  the  budget  in  the  Reichstag 
while  most  of  the  minority  Socialists  abstained  from  voting. 

The  discussion  of  war  aims  reached  a  more  striking 
stage  when  Dr.  Scheidemann  interpellated  the  government 
on  the  subject  of  possible  terms  of  peace  in  the  fifth  war 
session  of  the  Reichstag  on  December  9th,  claiming  that 
Germany's  incontestable  superiority  in  the  field  enabled 
her  to  make  the  first  move  in  the  direction  of  peace. 

In  reply,  von  Bethmann-Hollweg  dwelt  on  the  folly  and 
hypocrisy  of  the  Entente  Powers  who  refused  to  admit 
their  palpable  defeat  and  made  themselves  responsible  by 
this  stubbornness  for  all   further  bloodshed  and  horrors. 


210  The  Great  War 

He  affirmed  that,  whenever  the  Entente  would  admit 
defeat,  Germany  was  ready  to  listen  to  any  proposals  which 
should  be  in  keeping  with  her  dignity  and  security,  but 
that  the  longer  and  more  bitterly  the  enemy  waged  war, 
the  greater  would  be  the  necessary  guarantees  for  Ger- 
many's safety.  "Neither  in  the  West  nor  in  the  East,"  he 
declared,  "must  the  enemies  of  to-day  hold  in  their  pos- 
session the  entrance  gates  to  our  country  through  which 
they  might  attack  or  menace  us  anew." 

In  this  session  nineteen  Minority  Socialists  voted  openly 
against  the  war  credit. 

In  the  spring  of  1916  a  controversy  in  regard  to  the 
scope  of  operation  of  the  submarines,  which  had  been 
smoldering  for  many  months,  broke  out  in  a  violent  minis- 
terial conflict.  The  Kaiser  threw  the  weight  of  his  author- 
ity on  the  side  of  the  advocates  of  a  moderate  policy  as 
against  the  extremists  who  demanded  the  unrestricted  use 
of  this  formidable  weapon.  In  consequence,  Admiral  von 
Tirpitz  resigned  the  Ministry  of  Marine  on  March  15th, 
and  was  succeeded  by  Admiral  von  Capelle.  In  May  of 
the  same  year  a  Ministry  of  Food  Supplies  was  created  and 
entrusted  to  Herr  von  Batocki,  who  had  been  President  of 
the  Province  of  East  Prussia. 

German  strategy,  as  we  have  seen,  consisted  of  alter- 
nating efforts  in  the  West  and  East,  and  these  mutations 
were  in  part  determined  by  the  conflict  of  more  or  less 
consciously  formulated  tendencies  among  the  German 
leaders.  Since  it  was  impossible  to  strike  in  both  direc- 
tions simultaneously  with  effective  force,  some  were  in- 
clined to  choose  the  East  as  the  theater  for  the  supreme 
operations,  while  others  preferred  the  West.  Von  Hinden- 
burg  was  naturally  the  chief  representative  of  the  eastern 
group,  while  in  the  first  half  of  1916,  the  Chief  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff,  von  Falkenhayn,  favored  the  western  view.     But 


Internal  Evolution  of  Belligerents        211 

the  western  policy  of  von  Falkenhayn,  who  was  sponsor 
for  the  attack  on  Verdun,  turned  out  to  be  a  conspicuous 
failure,  the  coordinated  efforts  of  the  Allies  were  creating 
an  increasingly  perilous  situation  for  the  Central  Powers, 
and  the  German  nation  welcomed  with  a  grateful  spirit  of 
relief  the  appointment  of  the  popular  hero,  von  Hinden- 
burg,  as  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  with  von  Ludendorff 
as  Quartermaster  General,  on  August  29th. 

This  was  the  signal  for  renewed  energy  and  resolution. 
In  November  was  established  the  War  Bureau  or  central- 
ized administration  directing  and  coordinating  the  depart- 
ments of  works,  field  ordnance,  munitions,  war  raw  materials, 
factories,  substitution  service,  food  supply,  and  exports  and 
imports,  and  the  Reichstag  passed  on  December  2d  the 
Patriotic  Auxiliary  Service  Bill  for  the  mobilization  of  all 
the  available  man-power  of  citizens  from  seventeen  to  sixty 
years  of  age,  not  called  to  the  armed  forces,  for  compulsory 
service  in  the  indispensable  occupations. 

A  temporary  sensation  was  created  by  the  convocation 
of  an  emergency  meeting  of  the  Reichstag  on  Decem- 
ber 12th,  at  which  the  Chancellor  formally  announced  that, 
coincidently  with  the  other  members  of  the  Quadruple 
Alliance,  he  had  on  that  day  communicated  peace  pro- 
posals to  the  hostile  powers  through  the  representatives 
of  Spain,  the  United  States,  Switzerland,  and  other  neutral 
powers,  together  with  the  Vatican.  In  his  speech  before 
the  Reichstag  he  insisted  that  the  unshakable  strength  of 
the  Quadruple  Alliance  had  been  demonstrated,  and  that 
with  no  desire  to  crush  their  antagonists  Germany  and  her 
allies  would  spare  the  world  a  prolongation  of  the  slaughter 
and  so  were  prepared  to  negotiate  a  peace  on  terms  that 
would  insure  their  own  existence,  honor,  and  liberty  of 
evolution.  This  specious  display  of  magnanimity  was 
quickly  seen  to  be   only  the  willingness   of  Germany  to 


212  The  Great  War 

conclude  peace  on  the  basis  of  the  "war-map"  and  her 
own  aspirations. 

The  absolute  cessation  of  parliamentary  activity  in  Aus- 
tria during  the  period  discussed  in  the  present  chapter 
invested  the  public  life  of  that  country  with  a  partial  sem- 
blance of  concord,  despite  the  rumors  of  agonizing  and 
seething  discontent.  The  Austrian  Reichsrat  and  the 
seventeen  provincial  diets  had  been  closed  since  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war.  Count  Stiirgkh,  the  Austrian  Prime 
Minister,  was  shot  and  killed  in  the  restaurant  of  a  hotel 
in  Vienna  on  October  21,  1916.  His  refusal  to  convoke 
parliament  was  probably  one  of  the  motives  of  the  assassin, 
who  was  a  Socialist.  His  successor,  Herr  von  Koerber, 
resigned  suddenly  on  December  13th. 

In  Hungary,  as  in  nearly  all  the  other  belligerent  coun- 
tries, the  legislative  body  continued  to  hold  sessions,  served 
to  some  extent  as  a  mouthpiece  for  public  sentiment,  and 
was  often  the  scene  of  animated  discussions.  Count  Tisza 
remained  in  power  and  an  outward  truce  continued  in 
force  between  the  principal  parties,  each  pledged  to  a  vig- 
orous prosecution  of  the  war.  But  in  July,  1916,  a  section 
of  the  Independent  party  seceded  under  Count  Michael 
Karolyi,  declared  itself  in  favor  of  peace  by  negotiation, 
without  annexations,  and  thus  became  the  first  non-Social- 
istic party  in  the  Central  Powers  to  renounce  openly  the 
aim  of  a  peace  dictated  by  victory. 

The  death  of  the  aged  monarch,  Francis  Joseph  I,  upon 
which  so  many  speculations  had  been  based,  occurred  on 
November  21,  1916.  He  had  been  born  on  August  18, 
1830,  became  Emperor  of  Austria,  December  2,  1848,  in 
the  midst  of  revolutionary  turmoil,  and  was  crowned  King 
of  Hungary,  June  8,  1867.  He  was  succeeded  by  his  great- 
nephew,  the  Archduke  Charles  Francis,  who  was  born  on 
August  17,  1887,  was  married  to  the  Bourbon  Princess  Zita 


„mctallfammlung"  auf  dcm  13al>nbof  oon  Hni5t)  (Dcp.  fiisnc).        P 
Collection  of  metal  at  the  railroad  station  at  Anizy,  Department  of  the  Aisne.      Repro- 
duction of  an  illustration  which  appeared  in  the  Berlin  "Lokal  Anzeiger"  in  October,  /p/J, 
showing  ho-iv  the  Germans  systematically  stripped  of  all  metals  the  territory  which  they  occupied. 


Manufacture  of  shells  of  large  caliber  at  the  Creusot  works  in  France. 


Internal  Evolution  of  Belligerents        213 

of  Parma,  and  became  Emperor  Charles  I  of  Austria  and 
King  Charles  IV  of  Hungary. 

The  dark  period  of  Russian  adversity  in  the  campaign 
of  1915  was  rendered  still  more  gloomy  by  the  existence 
of  intrigue,  corruption,  and  reactionary  tendencies  in  the 
administration,  impeding  the  full  and  hearty  cooperation 
of  the  government  and  the  more  substantial  classes  of  the 
population,  which  was  essential  for  the  full  development  of 
the  national  energy.  The  bright  promise  of  the  early  days 
of  August,  1914,  still  awaited  fulfilment. 

General  SoukhomlinofT  was  charged  with  flagrant  mis- 
conduct and  neglect  of  duty  and  compelled  to  resign  the 
Ministry  of  War  in  June,  1915,  being  succeeded  by  Gen- 
eral PolivanofF. 

At  the  opening  of  the  session  of  the  Duma  on  August  1st, 
the  president,  M.  Rodzianko,  urged  in  a  patriotic  address 
that  the  government  should  collaborate  more  fully  with  the 
people.  In  the  fervor  of  the  patriotic  reaction  provoked 
by  the  crisis  in  September,  the  progressive  constitutional 
parties  in  the  Duma  formed  a  combination,  demanding  the 
appointment  of  ministers  who  possessed  the  nation's  confi- 
dence, a  frankly  conciliatory  policy  towards  the  subordinate 
nationalities  within  the  Empire,  the  reform  of  local  admin- 
istration, the  punishment  of  criminally  inefficient  officials, 
and  the  vigorous  prosecution  of  the  war.  But  the  enthu- 
siastic cooperation  of  the  most  responsible  elements  was  met 
by  the  unexpected  prorogation  of  the  Duma  on  the  16th. 
Suspicion  of  the  government's  intentions  was  increased  by 
the  appointment  to  the  Ministry  of  the  Interior  on  Octo- 
ber 10th  of  Alexis  KhvostofF,  a  confirmed  reactionary. 

The  Prime  Minister,  Goremykin,  resigned  on  February 
1,  1916,  for  alleged  reasons  of  ill-health  and  was  succeeded 
by  Boris  Stiirmer,  who  was  of  German  descent  and  was 
regarded  as  a  reactionary.     The  Duma  was  reopened  on 


214  The  Great  War 

February  22d.     Khvostoff  resigned  in  consequence  of  a 

violent  discussion  in  the  Duma  on  March  24th,  and  some- 
what later  Polivanoff  was  succeeded  by  General  Shuvayeff 

as  Minister  of  War.  The  dismissal  of  Foreign  Minister 
Sazonoflf  in  August  was  a  great  disappointment  to  the  lib- 
eral elements,  since  he  was  a  statesman  of  unquestioned 
ability,  breadth  of  view,  and  patriotism.  The  prime  minister 
assumed  the  duties  of  the  foreign  office.  The  appoint- 
ment of  M.  Protopopoff,  who  was  suspected  of  reactionary 
tendencies,  alienated  still  further  the  liberal  parties  in  the 
Duma.  When  this  assembly  was  convened  on  November 
14th,  Miliukoff,  the  leader  of  the  Constitutional  Democrats, 
attacked  the  government  in  a  speech  of  amazing  frankness, 
accusing  it  of  corruption,  incompetence,  and  a  treacherous 
interference  with  popular  activity  in  support  of  the  war 
by  repressing  such  agencies  as  the  All-Russian  Zemstvo 
Union,  the  Union  of  Municipalities,  and  the  War  Indus- 
tries Committee.  It  was  predicted  that  the  resignation  of 
Stiirmer,  which  followed  this  arraignment  in  the  representa- 
tive chamber,  might  become  a  constitutional  precedent  of 
supreme  importance,  leading  to  parliamentary  government. 

But  Stunner's  successor  was  M.  Trepoff,  a  strong  con- 
servative, although  believed  to  be  a  patriotic  and  an  honest 
man,  while  the  retention  of  Protopopoff  prevented  the 
sincere  cooperation  of  the  Duma  with  the  ministry. 

While  the  exuberance  of  the  first  days  of  the  war  in  Russia 
had  been  chastened  and  transformed  by  adversity,  the  sub- 
stantial classes  of  the  nation  gave  increasing  signs  of  soli- 
darity and  resolution.  But  the  government,  persisting  in  a 
narrow,  unenlightened  policy,  looked  with  suspicion  on  all 
private  initiative  and  antagonized  the  very  elements  which 
should  have  been  its  chief  support.  Matters  were  rapidly 
approaching  an  internal  crisis  which  must  profoundly  affect 
the  whole  course  of  the  war. 


CHAPTER  IX 

Resumption  of  Offensive  Operations  in  the  West 

The  defensive  organizations  and  offensive  tactics  in  the  West.  The 
Allied  offensive  of  September,  1915;  its  aims.  Subsidiary  attacks  in 
Flanders.  The  principal  effort  of  the  British;  array  of  the  opposing 
German  and  British  forces  on  the  sector  of  attack ;  capture  of  Fosse  8  and 
the  Hohenzollern  Redoubt ;  capture  of  Loos  and  spectacular  charge  of  the 
Fifteenth  Division;  failure  to  consolidate  the  extreme  positions  won. 
Action  of  the  Tenth  French  Army  in  Artois;  capture  of  positions  on  the 
Vimy  Heights.  The  supreme  effort  of  the  French  in  Champagne ;  the 
local  situation ;  initial  assault  on  the  25th ;  limit  of  penetration  north  of 
Souain;  desperate  struggle  for  the  heights  north  of  Massiges;  general 
results  of  the  offensive. 

The  waning  of  the  Allied  offensive  in  June  was  followed 
by  a  comparative  lull  in  the  warlike  operations  in  the 
western  theater,  broken  only  by  minor  engagements  in 
which  local  vantage  points  were  contested  without  notice- 
able effect  upon  the  general  fortunes  of  the  campaign. 
Yet  both  sides  exerted  themselves  with  unsparing  energy 
in  preparing  for  the  crucial  test  of  strength  which  was 
believed  to  be  impending  on  this  front.  The  Allies  were 
constantly  increasing  their  reserves  of  men  and  stores  of 
ammunition,  and  improving  and  expanding  their  transpor- 
tation facilities  in  the  rear. 

Popular  opinion  in  the  western  countries  awaited  with 
eager  expectancy  definite  results  from  the  prodigious  in- 
dustrial efforts  of  Great  Britain  and  France,  ascribing  the 
delay  to  the  circumspection  of  the  military  leaders,  who 
were  presumably  unwilling  to  institute  the  decisive  opera- 
tion before  an  overwhelming  superiority  in  men  and  means 
should  assure  an  unquestionable  victory  with  the  smallest 

215 


216  The  Great  War 

sacrifices.  It  was  often  stated  on  the  highest  expert  author- 
ity that  the  Allies  could  drive  the  invaders  from  the  soil  of 
France  whenever  they  were  disposed  to  pay  the  necessary 
price  in  blood  and  treasure. 

The  Germans  had  lavished  skill  and  labor  upon  the  de- 
fensive organization  which  had  enabled  them  to  hold  their 
opponents  in  the  West  at  bay  while  the  chief  weight  of 
their  operative  forces  was  hurled  with  terrible  force  against 
the  more  vulnerable  adversaries  in  the  East.  Practically 
the  whole  German  front  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Swiss 
border  was  covered  by  two  or  three  complete,  parallel  posi- 
tions. The  first  or  outermost  of  these  consisted  of  several 
lines  of  trenches  supported  at  intervals  by  very  powerful 
bastions  or  redoubts,  and  provided  with  dug-outs  and  bomb- 
proof shelters,  the  latter  often  thirty  or  forty  feet  below  the 
surface  of  the  earth. 

The  second,  or  reserve,  position  usually  followed  at  a  dis- 
tance of  500-800  yards  in  the  direction  of  the  rear,  and  was 
essentially  similar  to  the  first  in  its  arrangements.  The  third 
position  was  a  mile  or  more  further  toward  the  rear.  These 
successive  series  of  intrenchments  were  connected  by  fre- 
quent zigzag  communication  trenches;  they  were  screened 
by  intricate  barbed-wire  entanglements;  and  the  spaces  be- 
tween them  were  a  maze  of  lesser  trench  elements,  with 
concealed  artillery  emplacements,  machine-gun  redoubts, 
fortified  villages  and  farm  buildings,  and  isolated  resistance 
centers  of  every  kind.  Almost  every  avenue  of  approach 
was  exposed  to  deadly  gusts  of  fire  from  hidden  guns. 

Similar  but  less  elaborate  were  the  positions  of  the  Allies, 
who  apparently  assumed  that  their  own  role  would  hence- 
forth be  that  of  the  assailant. 

Now  that,  with  the  gradual  reversion  of  the  center  of  grav- 
ity to  the  western  theater,  the  course  of  events  brings  us  to  a 
period  when  the  chief  problem  was  to  shatter  continuous 


Resumption  of  Offensive  in  the  West      217 

fortified  lines  of  defense,  a  brief  analysis  of  the  methods 
used  in  such  attempts  may  assist  in  forming  a  clearer  appre- 
ciation of  the  remaining  conspicuous  occurrences  of  1915  as 
well  as  of  all  the  important  operations  of  the  ensuing  year. 

Events  had  shown  that  by  means  of  a  tremendous  local 
superiority  in  heavy  guns,  fed  by  inexhaustible  stores  of 
ammunition,  with  the  accurate  coordination  of  the  action 
of  the  artillery  and  infantry,  and  efficient  staff  work,  the 
strongest  intrenchments  could  undoubtedly  be  demolished 
and  a  way  opened  through  the  most  formidable  defensive 
lines.  But  the  Allies  had  thus  far  failed  to  maintain  their 
offensive  efforts  at  the  required  pitch  of  intensity  long 
enough  to  break  completely  through  the  enemy's  defen- 
sive system. 

An  indispensable  preliminary  for  the  offensive  effort  was 
the  elaboration  of  the  battle-map  or  a  plan  of  the  con- 
templated scene  of  action,  upon  which  all  the  important 
natural  features  of  the  terrain  were  indicated,  besides  all 
the  elements  of  the  enemy's  defensive  organization  as 
furnished  by  the  intelligence  service  in  conjunction  with 
the  aviation  corps. 

Obviously  the  mastery  of  the  air  during  the  period  pre- 
ceding a  great  offensive  movement  is  a  fundamental  con- 
dition of  success.  It  enables  the  prospective  assailant  to 
hide  the  concentration  of  his  operative  forces  and  supplies, 
and  consequently  the  position  of  the  contemplated  sector 
of  attack,  and  at  the  same  time  to  impair  his  opponent's 
mobility  by  bombing  railway  stations,  junctions,  and  other 
crucial  points  in  the  hostile  system  of  communications. 
The  contestant  whose  vision  ranges  over  the  position  of  an 
opponent  who  is  blind  enjoys  from  the  first  a  substantial 
element  of  superiority. 

A  number  of  days  or  even  weeks  before  the  supreme 
moment  of  attack,  the  general  plan  of  action  is  drawn  up, 


218  The  Great  War 

and  upon  this  basis  the  commanding  general  of  each  army 
corps  destined  to  participate  'prepares  his  order  of  battle, 
describing  the  general  purpose  of  the  intended  maneuver 

and  the  character  of  the  terrain,  defining  the  zone  of  attack 
of  the  particular  corps  as  a  whole  and  the  smaller  zones  of 

attack  of  its  component  divisions,  the  successive  objectives 
to  he  attained,  the  distribution  of  the  forces  for  the  attack, 
the  initial  positions  of  the  reserves,  and  the  command  posts. 
This  order  serves  in  turn  as  basis  for  the  subsequent  divi- 
sional and  regimental  orders,  through  which  the  original 
conception  is  adapted  to  the  guidance  of  the  rank  and  file. 
Meanwhile,  the  special  technical  sections  are  constantly 
employed  in  plotting  by  means  of  the  various  methods  of 
observation  and  triangulation  the  position  and  range  of  the 
hostile  targets  to  regulate  the  fire  of  the  artillery. 

Awaiting  the  signal  for  attack,  the  assaulting  units  were 
usually  massed  in  the  first  line  trenches  or  in  the  so-called 
parallels  of  departure,  or  "jumping  off"  trenches,  which 
had  been  expressly  prepared  in  front  of  the  other  elements. 
The  general  custom  was  to  open  the  attack  of  the  infantry 
at  an  hour  determined  in  advance,  because  the  telephone 
was  not  absolutely  reliable  as  a  medium  of  communication 
for  combining  properly  the  action  of  artillery  and  infantry 
in  the  case  of  extemporaneous  decisions.  The  arbitrary 
determination  of  the  precise  moment  for  attack  sometimes 
involved  its  execution  in  quite  unfavorable  conditions,  as 
those  of  the  weather,  which  could  not  be  foreseen.  But, 
in  the  case  of  operations  in  which  the  moment  of  attack 
was  not  prescribed,  a  failure  of  the  supporting  artillery  to 
Lengthen  its  range  of  fire  at  the  critical  juncture,  when  the 
infantry  was  sweeping  across  the  space  between  the  fronts, 
could  easily  result  in  a  deplorable  catastrophe. 

In  the  night  preceding  an  attack,  zigzag  passages  were 
cut  at  intervals  through  the  wire  entanglements  covering 


Resumption  of  Offensive  in  the  West      219 

the  section  of  the  front  from  which  the  attack  was  to  be 
launched.  The  infantry  passed  through  these  openings  and 
advanced  in  successive  waves  against  the  hostile  lines.  The 
first  or  skirmishing  wave  was  especially  equipped  for  fight- 
ing at  close  range  or  hand-to-hand  with  the  defenders  of  the 
assaulted  trench;  and,  for  this  purpose,  grenades,  revolvers, 
and  knives  were  found  to  be  more  serviceable  than  rifles. 

While  this  movement  was  in  progress,  the  supporting 
artillery  projected  a  curtain  of  fire  to  isolate  the  hostile 
trenches  of  the  enemy's  first  line,  the  first  objective  for  the 
attacking  infantry.  As  soon  as  this  position  had  been  gained 
and  the  units  of  attack  had  been  reformed,  the  range  of  the 
guns  was  lengthened  at  a  predetermined  hour  or  at  a  pre- 
scribed signal  and  the  torrent  of  shell  was  turned  upon  the 
second  objective  and  eventually  the  approaches  leading  to 
it  from  the  opponents'  rear.  In  an  ideal  offensive  operation 
this  concordance  was  maintained  until  the  final  objective 
had  been  gained,  the  artillery  sweeping  the  entire  terrain 
in  this  series  of  successive  bounds. 

However,  the  most  carefully  directed  artillery  prepara- 
tion almost  inevitably  varied  in  the  thoroughness  of  its 
effects,  so  that  while  the  assailants  penetrated  some  parts 
of  the  enemy's  line  almost  without  fighting,  at  other  points 
the  defensive  organization  remained  capable  of  stubborn 
resistance.  Therefore,  in  the  course  of  even  the  most 
carefully  planned  attacks,  the  assaulting  line  became  irreg- 
ular and  broken  and  was  therefore  exposed  to  enfilading 
fire  from  the  enemy's  resistance  centers  and  offered  vul- 
nerable spots  for  the  adversary's  counter-attacks. 

The  western  German  front  was  probably  held  in  Sep- 
tember, 1915,  by  about  1,250,000  combatants.  The  different 
armies,  as  indicated  by  the  names  of  their  commanders, 
were  stationed  in  the  following  order:  the  Duke  of  Wurt- 
temberg,  from  the  North  Sea  coast  to  Ypres;  the  Crown 


220  The  Great  War 

Prince  of  Bavaria,  from  Ypres  to  Arras;  von  Bulow,  from 
Arras  to  the  Somme;  von  Fabeck,  in  the  salient  between 
the  Somme  and  the  Oise;  von  Heeringen,  along  the  Aisne; 
\<>n  Einem,  across  Champagne;  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prus- 
sia, in  the  Argonne  and  on  the  sector  facing  Verdun;  von 
Strautz,  in  the  Woevre;  von  Gaede,  in  Lorraine;  and  von 
Falkenhausen,  in  the  Vosges  and  Alsace. 

On  the  side  of  the  Allies,  the  British  had  taken  over  late 
in  the  summer  an  additional  sector  of  the  front  about  thirty 
miles  in  length.  The  Allied  front,  as  we  have  seen,  was 
divided  into  three  army  group  commands,  that  of  General 
Foch  from  the  North  Sea  to  Compiegne,  that  of  de  Castel- 
nau  from  Compiegne  to  Verdun,  and  that  of  Dubail  from 
Verdun  to  Belfort. 

The  Belgian  army  with  a  French  detachment  held  its  old 
position  from  the  sea  to  Boesinghe.  Sir  Herbert  Plumer's 
Second  British  Army  stretched  southward  to  a  point  beyond 
Armentieres,  and  the  First  British  Army  under  Sir  Douglas 
Haig  followed  as  far  as  Grenay  west  of  Lens.  D'Urbal's 
Tenth  French  Army  held  the  next  section  of  the  front  to 
a  point  beyond  Arras,  whence  the  new  Third  British  Army 
under  Sir  Charles  Monroe  extended  to  the  Somme.  Dubois 
lay  between  the  Somme  and  the  Oise,  followed  by  the 
Fifth  French  Army  under  Franchet  d'Esperey  along  the 
Aisne  and  the  Fourth  under  de  Langle  de  Cary,  later  under 
Petain,  across  Champagne.  Humbert's  Third  Army  held 
the  Verdun  sector,  while  Dubail  and  Maud'huy  stood  in 
Lorraine  and  in  the  Vosges  and  Alsace  respectively.  The 
British  had  not  far  from  600,000  combatants  in  the  field, 
while  the  French  numbered  about  2,000,000. 

The  execution  of  the  great  offensive  movement,  which 
took  place  in  September,  1915,  was  probably  hastened  by 
the  critical  situation  of  the  Russian  armies.  The  complete 
disruption  of  the  German  defensive  system  in  the  West 


Resumption  of  Offensive  in  the  West      221 

was  probably  not  contemplated  by  the  Allied  commanders 
at  this  time.  Their  intentions  were  rather  to  breach  the 
German  lines  at  certain  places,  distract  the  German  coun- 
sels, and  conquer  observing  and  supporting  points  which 
would  contribute  materially  to  the  success  of  the  eventual 
culminating  effort. 

The  chief  part  of  the  Allied  plan  was  to  crush  in  the 
defensive  shell  on  opposite  flanks  of  the  rounding  German 
salient  in  northern  France  by  simultaneous  blows  delivered 
respectively  in  Artois  and  Champagne,  where  vital  lines  of 
communication  ran  just  behind  the  hostile  front.  In  this  re- 
spect the  offensive  of  September  was  significant  as  a  revised 
edition  of  the  aggressive  operations  of  the  spring  and  the  pre- 
cursor of  the  mighty  efforts  of  the  subsequent  campaigns. 

Minor  attacks  in  Flanders  and  elsewhere  served  to  divert 
the  attention  of  the  enemy  and  dissemble  the  location  of 
the  really  important  action. 

Preparations  on  what  was  then  regarded  as  an  unprece- 
dented scale  had  been  under  way  for  many  weeks.  This 
movement,  which  extended  in  some  form  or  other  to  the 
greater  part  of  the  western  battle-front  was  regulated  in  its 
initial  stages  with  almost  the  unison  and  coordination  of  a 
vast  machine.  The  Allied  line  burst  into  flame  on  Sep- 
tember 23d;  the  preliminary  bombardment  reached  its 
climax  of  intensity  on  the  night  of  the  24th-25th  and  sud- 
denly ceased  on  the  morning  of  the  25th,  when  great 
masses  of  infantry  on  the  various  sectors  of  attack  dispersed 
along  a  front  of  several  hundred  miles  sprang  to  the  attack. 

Beginning  our  survey  in  the  north,  we  first  consider 
briefly  the  events  in  Flanders.  Two  British  divisions 
attacked  the  German  trenches  near  Hooge  east  of  Ypres, 
carried  the  first  objective,  were  subsequently  arrested  by 
converging  fire  from  the  flanking  defenses  of  the  enemy, 
and  were  compelled  to  relinquish  most  of  their  gains,  but 


222  The  Great  War 

fulfilled  their  purpose  of  drawing  to  this  point  considerable 

reserve  forces  of  their  adversaries  at  a  time  when  the  really 
significant  operations  were  in  progress  elsewhere. 

The  Eighth  Division  of  the  Third  British  Corps  attacked 
at  the  same  time  in  the  sector  southwest  of  Armentieres. 
The  first  German  position  and  considerable  sections  of  the 
second  were  quickly  captured  by  the  attacking  units,  but 
the  center  was  arrested  by  machine-gun  positions,  so  that 
the  British  front  became  uneven  and  was  exposed  in  places 
to  severe  enfilading  fire.  The  British  were  withdrawn  from 
the  advanced  positions  in  good  order  after  the  purpose  of 
a  holding  combat  had  been  achieved. 

At  this  time  the  Indian  Corps  occupied  the  Neuve 
Chapelle  sector  with  the  Meerut  Division  on  the  left  and 
the  Lahore  Division,  strengthened  by  a  brigade  of  the  New 
British  Army,  on  the  right.  Attacking  on  the  25th,  the 
Meerut  Division  was  borne  with  magnificent  impetuousness 
across  several  lines  of  German  trenches,  and  disappeared  in 
an  impenetrable  mantle  of  fog  made  denser  by  the  fumes 
of  gas  and  bursting  shells.  The  unfavorable  condition  of 
the  weather  destroyed  the  concordance  of  the  British  efforts. 
The  Indians  had  not  paused  to  clear  up  the  trenches  passed 
over  in  their  impulsive  charge  and  no  supports  had  fol- 
lowed to  perform  this  task.  Consequently,  the  surviving 
defenders  recovered  their  courage  and  assailed  the  Indians 
in  the  rear,  just  as  the  German  counter-attacks  were  devel- 
oping in  front  and  on  the  flanks.  The  Meerut  Division 
sustained  serious  losses  in  fighting  its  way  out  of  this  pitfall, 
while  the  Lahore  Division  on  the  right  made  little  progress 
in  advance.  But,  of  course,  these  operations  had  the  effect 
of  absorbing  the  enemy's  attention,  as  was  intended. 

A  fourth  subsidiary  attack  was  executed  by  parts  of  the 
Second  and  Nineteenth  British  Divisions  west  of  La  Bassee, 
in  close  relationship  with  the  far  greater  British  effort  south 


Resumption  of  Offensive  in  the  West      223 

of  the  canal.  No  permanent  gains  were  made,  but  the 
unpretentious  purpose  of  an  action  of  this  kind  was  doubt- 
less served. 

The  principal  attack  of  the  British  occurred  between  the 
La  Bassee  Canal  and  Grenay  in  close  cooperation  with  the 
movement  of  the  Tenth  French  Army  in  the  next  sector 
on  the  south.  It  was  doubtless  the  intention  that  these 
two  armies,  after  crushing  the  opposing  sectors  of  their 
adversaries'  front,  should  close  in  on  Lens,  the  important 
mining  center,  from  both  sides.  In  dealing  with  the  events 
in  these  localities  we  are  treading  a  terrain  that  was  to  be- 
come forever  memorable  by  the  gigantic  struggles  of  the 
subsequent  campaigns. 

The  German  first  position  confronting  the  British  in  the 
sector  northwest  of  Lens  ran  southeastward  for  a  short  dis- 
tance from  the  La  Bassee  Canal,  then  southward  skirting  a 
gentle  rise,  and  finally  turned  decidedly  to  the  southwest, 
reaching  the  apex  of  a  pronounced  salient  in  front  of 
Grenay,  about  five  miles  west  by  north  of  Lens.  Some  of 
the  prominent  defensive  elements  of  this  sector  were  a  coal 
mine  with  a  strongly  fortified  slag-heap,  known  as  Fosse  8, 
about  two-thirds  of  a  mile  south  of  Auchy,  the  powerful 
Hohenzollern  Redoubt,  projecting  about  500  yards  in 
front  of  the  German  lines  and  bristling  with  artillery  and 
machine-guns,  the  Quarries  between  the  first  and  second 
positions,  southeast  of  the  Hohenzollern  Redoubt,  and  the 
so-called  Loos  Road  Redoubt,  crowning  the  summit  of 
the  ridge,  three-quarters  of  a  mile  northwest  of  Loos. 
The  second  or  reserve  position  was  roughly  parallel  with 
the  first  and  generally  not  more  than  a  mile  behind  it.  But 
the  third  position,  after  running  for  some  distance  in  a 
general  course  parallel  with  the  two  others,  bore  decidedly 
to  the  southeast,  where  they  swung  off  southwestwards. 
Besides  the  continuous  lines  of  intrenchments,  the  town  of 


224  The  Great  War 

Loos,  three  miles  northwest  of  Lens,  and  numerous  villages 
with  slag-heaps  and  other  obstructions  had  been  converted 
into  strong  resistance  centers. 

The  British  front  was  occupied  by  General  Haig's  First 
British  Army,  which  consisted,  in  the  order  of  their  posi- 
tion from  north  to  south,  of  the  Second,  Ninth,  and  Seventh 
Divisions  composing  the  First  Corps,  and  the  First,  Fif- 
teenth, and  Forty-seventh  Divisions  composing  the  Fourth. 
But  the  Second  Division  was  chiefly  engaged  in  the  opera- 
tions already  mentioned  in  the  next  sector  to  the  north. 
The  German  front  was  held  by  the  Fourth  Corps  with  a 
portion  of  the  Prussian  Guard  in  reserve. 

The  charge  was  launched  on  all  parts  of  the  British 
front  with  remarkable  precision.  The  left  wing  of  the 
Ninth  Division  attacking  in  the  vicinity  of  Fosse  8  and 
the  Hohenzollern  Redoubt  was  checked  by  fire  from  the 
flanking  position  on  the  higher  ground  near  Auchy,  but 
the  right  wing  captured  the  two  strongholds  mentioned 
after  a  very  severe  struggle.  The  Seventh  Division  quickly 
cleared  the  first  and  second  positions  and  penetrated  a  small 
section  of  the  third.  Wheeling  northward  it  reached  the 
village  of  Haisnes  and  threatened  to  cut  off  the  Germans 
opposed  to  the  Ninth  Division  on  its  left.  But  these  ex- 
treme gains  were  soon  forfeited  through  lack  of  support. 
A  part  of  the  First  Division  reached  the  last  German  line 
of  defense.  But  it  remained  for  the  Fifteenth  Division,  a 
formation  of  the  New  Army,  wholly  Scottish  in  its  com- 
position, to  register  the  most  sensational  performance  of 
the  day.  Charging  with  irresistible  vehemence  it  gained 
possession  of  the  entire  first  position,  several  trenches  deep, 
in  thirty-five  minutes.  At  the  expiration  of  seventy  min- 
utes from  the  signal  of  departure  the  Highlanders  were 
swarming  through  the  streets  of  Loos,  and  this  town,  where 
every  house  had  been  transformed  into  a  little  fortress,  was 


Resumption  of  Offensive  in  the  West      225 

swept  clean  by  nine  o'clock.  Rushing  straight  ahead  the 
Scotch  were  soon  over  the  trenches  at  the  top  of  Hill  70,  an 
eminence  east  of  Loos,  the  highest  elevation  in  the  vicinity. 
With  unabated  ardor  they  swept  down  the  gradual  declivity 
towards  the  northeast  of  Lens,  and  within  three  hours'  time 
one  brigade  had  passed  through  all  the  German  defenses. 
For  a  moment  Lens  was  threatened  and  the  fate  of  the 
whole  German  position  in  the  north  hung  in  the  balance. 

But  the  British  plans  had  never  contemplated  an  imme- 
diate penetration  to  so  great  a  depth  and  sufficient  reserves 
were  not  at  hand  to  consolidate  the  hold  on  the  advanced 
positions.  The  Germans  recovered  from  their  bewilder- 
ment; reserves  were  hurried  to  the  threatened  spot;  many  of 
the  defenders  who  had  been  overlooked  in  the  trenches  and 
dug-outs  on  the  crest  of  Hill  70  recovered  their  organization 
and  turned  a  reversed  fire  on  their  momentary  conquerors. 
The  Scots  suddenly  found  themselves  in  a  perilous  situation 
and  fought  their  way  out  only  with  the  greatest  difficulty, 
paying  dearly  for  their  magnificent  temerity.  The  Forty- 
seventh  Division  on  the  south  executed  its  appointed  attack 
with  notable  precision  and  cooperated  in  the  capture  of  Loos. 

By  the  afternoon  of  the  25th  the  tide  of  the  German 
counter-offensive  was  running  strong  and  the  British  were 
struggling  with  the  greatest  difficulty  to  maintain  them- 
selves along  Hill  70  and  northward  past  the  Quarries  and 
Fosse  8.  The  Twenty-first  and  Twenty-fourth  Divisions, 
forming  the  Eleventh  Corps,  which  had  been  held  in  gen- 
eral reserve  and  placed  at  Sir  Douglas  Haig's  disposition  on 
the  morning  of  the  25th  were  brought  up  during  the  night 
of  the  25th-26th  to  relieve  the  hard  pressed  First  and  Fif- 
teenth Divisions.  But  these  were  new  formations  that  had 
never  been  under  fire  and  the  hurricane  of  steel  into  which 
they  were  suddenly  launched  was  an  ordeal  which  was 
almost  beyond  the  limit  of  their  endurance. 


226  The  Great  War 

Gradually  the   British  yielded   ground  throughout  the 

26th  ami  the  First  ami  Fifteenth  Divisions  had  to  be  re- 
called to  the  battle  line.  The  British  Guards  Division  was 
brought  into  action  on  the  27th  to  break  the  force  of  the 
German  counter-offensive  ami  win  hack  the  lost  terrain. 
[n  desperate  encounters  it  pushed  hack  the  adversaries  on 
the  northern  flank  of  Hill  70,  but  was  unable  to  consolidate 
a  position  on  the  crest.  With  the  close  of  the  period  of 
intense  conflict  at  the  end  of  September  the  British  front  in 
embracing  Loos  formed  a  very  sharp  salient,  involving  an 
excessive  prolongation  of  the  line,  in  consequence  of  which 
the  Ninth  French  Corps  took  over  the  sector  from  Grenay 
northeastward  to  the  northern  slope  of  Hill  70. 

The  aggregate  British  losses  in  this  conflict  were  about 
45,000.  The  British  gained  some  points  of  considerable 
tactical  importance  for  the  eventual  resumption  of  the 
offensive.  The  military  leaders  declared  that  the  purpose 
of  the  British  effort  had  been  fulfilled.  But  the  public  was 
generally  disappointed  in  the  results,  and  the  impression 
of  the  spring  remained,  that  the  army  had  done  all  that 
personal  gallantry  could  accomplish,  but  that  the  effect  had 
been  largely  neutralized  by  failure  in  the  leadership  and 
especially  by  defective  staff  work. 

The  September  offensive  opened  with  the  Tenth  French 
Army  in  practically  the  same  position  in  which  the  waning 
of  the  preceding  great  forward  movement  had  left  it  at  the 
end  of  June.  Starting  at  the  British  right  near  Grenay, 
the  French  front  passed  west  of  Souchez  village  and  then 
southeastward  along  the  eastern  margin  of  the  famous 
Labyrinth  where  the  Germans  still  clung  to  a  few  trench 
elements.  The  immediate  objective  of  the  Tenth  Army 
was  the  Vimy  Heights  directly  east  of  their  position.  These 
rise  to  an  elevation  of  about  400  feet,  dominate  the  Arras- 
Lens  railway,  and  command  an  extensive  view  over  the 


Resumption  of  Offensive  in  the  West      227 

rolling  plain  eastward  towards  the  Scarpe.  The  German 
positions  were  held  by  nine  divisions,  while  the  Tenth 
French  Army  had  been  increased  to  seventeen  divisions. 

Unlike  the  operations  on  all  the  other  sectors  of  attack, 
the  initial  charge  of  the  Tenth  Army  was  not  launched 
until  one  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of  the  25th.  At  first 
the  wings  were  more  successful  than  the  center,  which 
encountered  a  very  stubborn  resistance  in  the  ruins  of  the 
village  of  Souchez.  On  the  26th  the  French  on  the  left 
wing  crossed  the  little  Souchez  River,  which  winds  through 
meadows  east  of  the  village,  and  started  up  the  Vimy 
Heights,  while  the  center  dislodged  the  Germans  from 
their  cover  on  the  site  of  Souchez. 

The  final  movement  against  the  heights  was  begun  on  the 
28th.  The  defenders  had  meanwhile  received  strong  rein- 
forcements, including  two  divisions  of  the  Prussian  Guard. 
They  had  prepared  a  remarkable  defensive  organization 
which  included  a  series  of  very  largely  connected  subter- 
ranean shelters  opening  on  a  sunken  road  which  ran  along 
the  slope  about  half  way  to  the  top.  Here  the  contending 
forces  came  to  a  close  and  desperate  engagement  with  hand 
grenades.  The  Germans  were  finally  expelled  from  their 
positions  and  by  the  29th  the  French  held  a  line  running 
just  behind  the  crest,  controlling  the  whole  western  slope. 

The  supreme  feature  of  the  September  offensive  opera- 
tions as  a  whole  was  the  French  attack  in  the  eastern  part 
of  Champagne  on  a  front  of  about  fifteen  miles,  a  part  of 
which  corresponded  with  the  battle-front  of  the  earlier 
offensive  undertaken  there  in  February.  The  surface  of 
this  particular  region  is  covered  with  irregular  elevations 
and  depressions  and  interspersed  with  woods  and  thickets. 
In  general  the  Germans  occupied  the  higher  ground.  The 
French  front  passed  just  south  of  Auberive,  and  just  north 
of  Souain,   Perthes,  and   Massiges.     North  of  Perthes  a 


228  The  Great  War 

natural  corridor  between  wooded  hills  leads  northward  to 
the  Hills  193  and  201  and  the  Butte  de  Tahure,  a  prominent 
elevation  on  the  line  of  the  second  German  position.  Op- 
posite Mesni]  the  Germans  held  a  very  strong  position 
Hanked  by  bastion-like  elevations.  The  eastern  flank  of  the 
( .ei man  defensive  system  on  the  prospective  sector  of  attack 
was  formed  by  a  strongly  fortified  position  on  Hills  191  and 
\(){K  north  of  Massiges,  which  were  called  La  Main  from 
their  resemblance  in  outline  to  a  hand,  the  tinkers  of  which 
were  outstretched  in  the  direction  of  the  French. 

The  chief  positions  of  the  Germans  were  two  or  three 
miles  apart  from  front  to  rear.  The  first  consisted  of  at  least 
three,  and  sometimes  five,  parallel  trenches.  In  some  places 
these  lines  of  trenches  were  separated  by  wire  entangle- 
ments from  fifteen  to  sixty  meters  broad.  The  second 
position  consisted  of  a  single  trench.  This  position  was 
almost  entirely  on  the  reverse  side  of  a  crest,  so  that  it  was 
concealed  from  direct  observation  of  the  French  artillery. 
In  addition  to  these  main  elements,  there  was  a  veritable 
maze  of  auxiliary  intrenchments,  communication  trenches, 
isolated  redoubts,  hidden  batteries,  block  houses,  and 
machine-gun  emplacements. 

Through  their  intelligence  agencies  the  French  had  pre- 
pared a  battle-map  of  the  proposed  sector  of  attack  which 
was  a  model  of  accuracy,  showing  every  natural  and  arti- 
ficial feature  of  the  German  position. 

The  Champagne  offensive  was  executed  by  de  Langle 
de  Cary's  Fourth  Army,  which  consisted  of  the  Second, 
Seventh,  Twenty-first,  and  Colonial  Corps,  and  doubtless 
received  very  strong  reinforcements  at  the  time.  The 
artillery  preparation,  which  was  kept  up  uninterruptedly 
for  three  days,  was  the  heaviest  bombardment  yet  expe- 
rienced on  the  western  front.  Parapets  were  levelled, 
barbed-wire    entanglements    wrecked,    and    subterranean 


Resumption  of  Offensive  in  the  West      229 

shelters  blown  to  pieces  on  the  German  front,  while  depots, 
lines  of  communication,  and  sensitive  points  in  the  rear 
were  shelled  by  the  artillery  of  longest  range. 

In  spite  of  a  foggy,  misty  dawn,  the  attack  was  opened 
at  the  appointed  moment,  9.15  on  the  morning  of  the 
25th.  Wave  after  wave  of  infantry  swept  across  the  space 
between  the  opposing  fronts.  The  first  part  of  the  opera- 
tion was  executed  with  such  unison,  vehemence,  and  rapid- 
ity, that  the  first  position  of  the  Germans  was  quickly  taken 
with  much  booty.  Cavalry  was  sent  into  the  zone  between 
the  first  and  second  positions  and  swept  in  masses  of  pris- 
oners and  many  guns.  The  French  75-centimeter  guns 
were  driven  forward  and  cooperated  admirably  with  the 
advancing  infantry. 

But  soon  the  French  encountered  defensive  elements 
which  had  not  been  demolished  by  the  preliminary  bom- 
bardment; the  assaulting  front  was  broken  into  zigzags; 
and  the  battle  tended  to  resolve  itself  into  a  series  of  de- 
tached engagements  which  it  would  be  tedious  and  scarcely 
profitable  to  consider  in  detail.  A  brief  account  of  some 
of  the  more  prominent  features  must  suffice. 

In  the  Souain  sector  the  first  attack  met  with  brilliant  suc- 
cess. On  the  left  the  assailants  advanced  a  mile  and  a  quarter, 
and  in  the  center  nearly  two  miles  in  less  than  an  hour.  In 
a  great  effort  on  the  27th  the  French  perforated  the  last 
German  position  barring  the  way  from  Souain  northward 
to  the  strategic  railway  at  Somme-Py ;  but  the  breach  was  so 
narrow  that  they  were  unable  to  hold  the  advanced  position. 

The  Germans  had  regarded  as  impregnable  their  position 
in  "The  Hand";  but  in  fifteen  minutes  the  French  scaled 
the  heights  north  of  Massiges  on  the  25th.  The  struggle 
for  this  position  lasted  eight  days  and  was  waged  continu- 
ously with  the  greatest  fury.  Yard  by  yard  the  French 
fought   their  way  forward   through  the   communication 


230  Thi    Gri  it  War 

trenches  in  desperate  hand-to-hand  encounters.  Continu- 
ous hies  of  men  stretching  back  to  Massiges  maintained 
the  supply  of  bombs  and  hand  grenades,  the  most  effective 
ammunition  in  such  a  combat,  by  passing  them  forward 
from  hand  to  hand.  The  final  loss  of  Massiges  Heights 
was  a  distressing  blow  for  the  German  General  Staff,  which 
at  first  denied  the  fact  and  later  claimed  that  the  Germans 
had  withdrawn  voluntarily  on  account  of  the  overwhelming 
violence  of  the  French  bombardment.  The  freedom  of 
choice  implied  in  this  assertion  recalls  the  voluntary  renun- 
ciation of  extensive  tracts  of  French  territory  by  the  Ger- 
mans directly  after  the  Battle  of  the  Marne  the  year  before. 

The  offensive  operations  in  Champagne,  like  those  near 
Lens,  died  away  about  October  1st.  Twenty-five  thousand 
prisoners  and  150  German  guns  remained  in  French  hands 
as  evidence  against  the  German  claim  that  the  offensive 
movement  in  Champagne  had  been  an  expensive  failure. 
The  net  gain  for  the  French  in  territory  was  represented 
by  an  average  advance  of  about  two  and  one-half  miles  on  a 
front  of  fifteen.  The  French  military  authorities  expressed 
themselves  in  terms  of  satisfaction  with  the  outcome. 

The  indirect  results  of  the  general  offensive  in  the  West 
may  have  been  far  more  important  than  the  tangible  ad- 
vantages in  territory,  booty,  and  the  wastage  of  the  enemy. 
For  it  is  believed  that  ten  or  twelve  divisions  were  with- 
drawn from  the  German  front  in  Russia  in  consequence 
of  the  menace  in  the  West,  and  the  Franco-British  effort 
corresponded  roughly  with  the  cessation  of  the  phenom- 
enal course  of  German  victories  in  the  East. 

Yet  the  results  as  a  whole  fell  far  below  the  expectations 
of  the  people  in  the  Allied  countries  and  probably  lowered 
still  further  the  military  prestige  of  the  Allies  in  the  esti- 
mation of  certain  neutrals  upon  whose  opinion  important 
consequences  depended  at  this  time. 


CHAPTER  X 

The  Struggle  for  Verdun 

Reasons  for  the  offensive  against  Verdun.  German  preparations.  Four 
stages  of  the  offensive.  The  first  stage,  February  21 -March  2  :  opening  of 
the  attack,  steady  advance  of  the  Germans,  the  most  critical  period  for  the 
defenders,  fierce  struggle  for  Douaumont  on  the  25th ;  General  Petain,  his 
arrival ;  French  lines  of  communication  ;  the  turning  point.  The  second 
stage,  March  2- April  11 :  extension  of  the  combat  to  the  left  bank  of  the 
Meuse,  the  attack  on  March  4th.  Successive  attacks  on  Hills  295  and  304, 
general  attack  on  April  9th.  The  third  stage,  April  11-May  3  :  the  waning 
offensive  and  French  counter-attacks.  The  fourth  stage  from  May  3d  until 
the  waning  of  the  offensive  effort  in  the  summer:  advent  of  General 
Nivelle;  renewed  German  attacks  west  of  the  Meuse  and  conquest  of 
Hills  304  and  295 ;  offensive  east  of  the  Meuse  and  capture  of  Fort  Vaux ; 
last  great  attack  on  June  23d.     General  observations  on  the  struggle. 

The  great  attack  on  Verdun  can  be  consistently  explained 
as  the  result  of  purely  military  reasons  without  recurring 
to  such  visionary  or  fantastic  motives  as  the  supposed  mad- 
ness of  the  Kaiser,  the  necessity  of  establishing  the  martial 
reputation  of  the  Crown  Prince,  or  the  desire  to  thrill  the 
imagination  of  the  German  people  by  the  recovery  of  an 
ancient  and  celebrated  bulwark  of  the  mediaeval  empire. 
Zealous  supporters  of  the  throne  no  doubt  rejoiced  in  the 
belief  that  the  normal  development  of  events  would  soon 
add  to  the  future  prestige  of  the  reigning  house  the  splen- 
dor of  personal  laurels  of  victory.  But  if  this  had  been  the 
fundamental  aim,  there  is  no  good  reason  why  the  Heir 
Apparent  could  not  have  been  transferred  to  the  nominal 
command  of  any  other  section  where  the  situation  favored 
the  launching  of  a  decisive  blow. 

231 


232  The  Great  War 

Despite  the  tremendous  expansion  of  Germany's  military 
Btrength  throughout  the  first  year  of  the  war,  the  Germans 
accepted  the  maxim  that  time  was  fighting  with  their  op- 
ponents. Any  question  as  to  the  accuracy  of  this  view  does 
not  concern  us  here.  The  essential  fact  is  that  the  German 
leaders  felt  that  they  had  no  time  to  lose.  For  obvious 
reasons  Germany  was  striving  frantically  for  a  decision. 

Circumstances  in  the  first  winter  of  the  conflict  had  com- 
pelled the  Germans  to  struggle  in  the  deep  snows  of  the 
Carpathians  and  in  the  frozen  wilderness  of  the  East  Prus- 
sian marshes.  But  Germany  was  now  more  fortunate,  since 
she  could  choose  the  field  for  her  offensive  operations.  The 
early  Russian  winter  had  cut  short  the  favorable  season  for 
action  on  a  grand  scale  in  the  East.  The  Central  Empires 
turned  their  striking  forces  against  Serbia  and  quickly  over- 
ran the  Balkan  Peninsula  as  far  as  it  was  expedient  to  go, 
accomplishing  the  most  important  part  of  the  Pan-Germanic 
dream  of  empire. 

The  Germans  looked  forward  with  assurance  to  the 
victorious  resumption  of  operations  for  the  overthrow  of 
Russia;  but  five  months  intervened  before  an  offensive 
could  be  profitably  conducted  in  that  direction,  and  relent- 
less necessity  permitted  them  no  respite  in  their  course  of 
strenuous  effort. 

The  western  front  remained,  where  operations  on  a  grand 
scale  could  be  undertaken  before  the  close  of  winter.  Rus- 
sia, the  Balkans,  France,  and  again  Russia, — this  would  be 
the  appropriate  round  of  successive  fields  of  action,  follow- 
ing the  revolution  of  the  seasons.  One  more  tremendous 
effort  in  the  West  followed  by  the  rapid  transfer  of  the  forces 
for  the  final  thrust  at  Russia,  a  repetition  of  the  original  plan 
of  operations,  should  bring  the  longed  for  culmination. 

Germany  resumed  the  initiative  on  the  western  front, 
choosing  the  place  and  form  of  her  assault.     With  the 


The  Struggle  for  Verdun  233 

reversion  to  the  West  determined,  the  choice  of  Verdun 
as  the  sector  of  attack  was  the  natural  outcome  of  a  clear, 
objective  estimation  of  the  possibilities  and  conditions  at 
the  different  points  along  the  line. 

Defensive  impulses,  though  scarcely  yet  acknowledged, 
already  found  a  place  in  the  deliberations  of  the  German 
chiefs,  who  could  not  fail  to  see  that  Germany  would  in- 
evitably lose  the  chance  for  a  decisive  victory  and  have  to 
exert  her  utmost  energy  to  avoid  complete  defeat,  unless 
she  managed  to  eliminate  one  of  her  principal  opponents 
before  all  were  fully  ready.  A  marvellous  course  of  vic- 
tories, unrivalled  since  Napoleon's,  had  failed  to  gain  this 
necessary  end.  After  the  collapse  of  Russia's  striking 
power,  the  conspicuous  development  of  the  aggressive 
strength  of  the  Allies  in  the  West  became  the  increasing 
source  of  Germany's  preoccupation.  This  rising  tide  of 
hostile  forces  and  equipment  was  the  inexorable  problem 
for  the  German  General  Staff.  By  sheer  force  of  reckless 
daring,  without  adequate  leadership  or  support,  British 
units  had  on  one  occasion  broken  through  the  entire  Ger- 
man system  of  defenses.  What  would  happen  when,  to 
superior  numbers  and  greater  personal  zest,  there  were 
added  the  foresight,  effective  coordination,  and  proficient 
generalship  that  must  inevitably  be  acquired  in  the  stern 
school  of  experience  ? 

It  was  generally  believed  that  the  Franco-British  forces 
would  reach  their  maximum  strength  in  the  early  part  of 
the  following  summer.  The  situation  as  presented  to  the 
Germans  constrained  them  to  deliver  a  crushing  blow 
before  that  time. 

Sound  principles  of  strategy,  moreover,  prompted  them 
to  parry  the  impending  onslaught  of  the  Allies  by  striking 
as  far  as  possible  from  the  chief  centers  of  the  oppo- 
nents' strength,  with  the  hope  that  the  forces  of  the  latter, 


234  The  Great  War 

particularly  those  of  the  British,  would  be  dissipated  in  a 
premature  and  desultory  counter-operation  or  that  their 
laborious  organization  would  be  confused  and  dislocated 
in  an  impulsive  effort  to  reach  and  reinforce  the  threat- 
ened point. 

This  consideration  suggested  the  Verdun  sector,  points 
beyond  it  towards  the  southeast  being  much  less  favorable 
for  a  grand  attack. 

The  capture  of  Verdun  by  the  Germans  would  deprive 
the  French  of  an  eventually  valuable  base  for  their  own 
offensive  operations.  The  front  at  Verdun  was  like  a  wedge 
awaiting  a  mighty  impact  to  drive  it  straight  through  the 
German  lines  to  the  chief  source  of  Germany's  mineral  sup- 
ply. Besides,  Verdun  and  the  upper  valley  of  the  Moselle 
were  the  natural  starting  points  for  a  converging  movement 
against  Metz,  the  closed  gateway  of  southwestern  Germany. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  fortress  barrier  extending  from 
Verdun  to  Toul  would  constitute,  in  the  possession  of  the 
Germans,  a  wonderfully  effective  base  for  offensive  opera- 
tions against  the  interior  of  France.  The  communications 
between  this  position  and  the  ammunition  factories  and 
sources  of  supply  in  western  Germany  could  quickly  be 
brought  to  the  highest  state  of  efficiency.  With  Verdun 
captured  and  the  northern  flank  turned,  the  remainder  of 
the  barrier,  already  undermined  at  St.  Mihiel,  and  threat- 
ened with  assault  from  the  rear,  would  quickly  crumble 
and  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Germans. 

The  loss  of  Verdun  would  involve  the  disruption  of  the 
French  lines  for  a  long  distance  in  each  direction.  Verdun 
was  the  most  prominent  point  on  the  western  lines,  the 
most  exposed  salient  on  any  front.  After  the  capture  of 
St.  Mihiel  by  the  Germans,  the  hostile  lines  swept  around 
Verdun  on  three-fifths  of  a  circle.  No  other  point  was  such 
a  convenient  target  for  the  concentrated  fire  of  artillery  or 


The  Struggle  for  Verdun  235 

afforded  the  same  advantage  for  the  converging  attack  of 
infantry.  In  directing  their  forces  against  such  a  salient 
the  Germans  had  an  unusual  space  for  the"  development 
of  their  rear  organization,  the  cantonment  of  the  troops 
and  the  elaboration  of  lines  of  supply  and  evacuation,1 
depots  and  assembling  points;  they  enjoyed  the  greatest 
freedom  in  the  distribution  of  their  forces;  while  the 
zone  of  access  to  the  position  of  the  enemy  was  restricted, 
the  lines  of  communication  were  few  and  inadequate,  and 
the  defenders  were  cramped  within  a  narrow  arc.  The 
Germans  expected,  not  simply  to  indent  the  Allied  front 
as  heretofore,  but  to  sever  completely  one  of  its  organic 
sections,  leaving  the  vital  interior  of  France  exposed. 

Like  the  keystone  of  an  arch,  Verdun  sustained  the  ad- 
jacent sectors  of  the  front.  The  removal  of  the  supporting 
member  would  inevitably  result  in  the  collapse  of  the  entire 
structure. 

Verdun  lies  in  a  depression  in  the  midst  of  an  undulating 
plateau,  which  is  tilted  upwards  towards  the  east  and  rather 
abruptly  cut  from  south  to  north  by  the  winding  course 
of  the  Meuse.  From  the  elevated  eastern  border  of  the 
plateau,  the  now  famous  Heights  of  the  Meuse,  there  is  a 
steep  descent  to  the  plain  of  the  Woevre.  The  crest  is 
a  ridge  of  irregular  outline  which  forms  the  watershed 
between  the  streams  which  descend  eastward  into  the 
Woevre  and  westward  to  the  Meuse  respectively,  furrow- 
ing the  slopes  into  deep  ravines.  This  ridge,  especially  in 
the  region  of  Douaumont,  is  the  dominating  feature  of  the 
entire  position. 

The  Meuse,  which  is  about  150  yards  wide  in  the  region 
of  Verdun,  was  a  strategical  factor  of  very  great  import- 
ance. It  divided  the  defensive  zone  into  two  parts ;  and  yet 
the  French,  instead  of  concentrating  their  resistance  on  the 
western  bank,  which  might  have  seemed  more  prudent, 


236  The  Great  War 

clung  to  their  eastern  positions  on  the  Heights  of  the 
Meuse,  which  formed  a  sort  of  natural  bridge-head  de- 
fense as  well  as  an  eventual  sally-port  for  an  incursion  into 
Germany.  The  Germans  doubtless  regarded  the  position 
of  the  river  as  not  the  least  of  the  factors  in  their  favor. 
The  Meuse  interrupted  the  close  cohesion  of  the  defen- 
sive front;  it  largely  deprived  the  French  of  the  advantage 
of  moving  troops  from  point  to  point  by  short  interior 
lines  across  the  space  inclosed  within  the  rounding  sector 
of  their  battle-front;  and  it  hindered  the  replenishment  of 
supplies  of  food  and  ammunition  for  the  troops  upon  the 
eastern  bank. 

The  Germans  could  shift  their  forces  at  will  from  bank 
to  bank  at  a  safe  distance  from  the  hostile  front,  but  the 
bridges  at  Verdun,  or  any  temporary  crossing  points  avail- 
able for  the  French,  would  be  constantly  exposed  to  bom- 
bardment by  the  hostile  long  range  artillery. 

The  German  plan  comprised  an  initial  attack  of  un- 
precedented fury  from  the  north  and  northeast  against  the 
French  positions  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse,  supple- 
mented by  a  turning  movement  from  the  east;  and  as  soon 
as  the  first  maneuver  had  succeeded,  and  the  defenders  of 
the  east  bank  were  retreating  in  disorder,  choking  the 
bridges  and  the  war-torn  streets  of  Verdun,  a  culminating 
operation  on  the  west  bank  for  sweeping  up  the  whole 
French  army. 

Allusion  has  been  made  to  the  wonderful  foresight  with 
which  the  Germans,  even  when  engaged  in  the  most 
gigantic  operations,  found  time  for  the  systematic  prepara- 
tion of  subsequent  performances.  Preparatory  measures 
for  the  attack  on  Verdun,  which  was  not  launched  until 
February  21,  1916,  went  back  at  least  as  far  as  the  previous 
October,  when  the  moral  and  physical  training  of  the 
special  striking  force  was  started.     The  Fifteenth  Corps 


A  street  in  Verdun  aft« 


omlianlnient. 


nmawA*0> 


f9wmk 


I   I    s 


The  Battle  of  Verdun.      Ammunition  in  readiness  to  be  transported  to  the  front. 


The  Struggle  for  Verdun  237 

was  taken  from  the  Fourth  Army,  the  Eighteenth  Corps 
from  the  Second,  the  Seventh  Reserve  Corps  from  the 
Seventh,  and  the  Third  Corps  was  probably  summoned 
from  the  East.  These  troops  were  installed  in  cantonments 
far  from  the  fatigue  and  turmoil  of  the  front,  where  they 
were  refreshed  in  body  and  soul,  and  where  all  exercises 
calculated  to  harden  their  strength,  increase  their  agility, 
and  stimulate  their  eagerness  were  applied  in  anticipation 
of  the  supreme  ordeal. 

There  came  a  period  of  ominous  indications,  when  the 
whole  world  quivered  with  the  expectation  of  impending 
great  events.  The  attention  of  the  Allies  was  challenged 
by  a  series  of  sharp  attacks  delivered  at  intervals  along  the 
entire  course  of  the  western  front.  At  this  time  the  Ver- 
dun sector  was  part  of  the  front  of  General  Humbert's 
Third  Army,  and  Verdun  itself  was  held  by  a  compara- 
tively small  detachment.  The  French  were  not  misled  by 
any  artifices.  Perfectly  aware  of  the  formidable  concentra- 
tion before  Verdun,  the  French  High  Command  sent  six 
infantry  divisions  and  six  artillery  regiments  to  reinforce 
the  units  there. 

In  the  zone  selected  for  the  first  attack  the  Germans 
already  held  the  northern  edge  of  the  high  ground  on  the 
east  bank  of  the  Meuse.  A  great  force  of  artillery  was 
concentrated  against  a  comparatively  short  section  of  the 
French  front,  where  the  Germans  expected  to  bury  the 
defensive  organization  beneath  the  overwhelming  weight 
of  their  attack.  They  had  beforehand  reconnoitered  all 
the  French  positions  from  the  air  and  had  computed  the 
range  of  everything  in  sight.  Never  was  a  great  military 
operation  prepared  with  more  elaborate  skill,  equipped 
with  more  powerful  engines  of  destruction,  or  executed 
with  a  more  astonishing  combination  of  foresight  and 
impetuosity. 


238  The  Great  War 

The  city  of  Verdun,  still  encircled  by  the  bastioned 
enceinte  of  Vauban,  the  celebrated  military  engineer  of 
Louis  \IV,  had  become  the  center,  since  the  war  of  1870- 
L871,  of  a  series  of  detached  forts,  thirty-six  in  all,  forming 
a  ring  about  thirty  miles  in  circumference.  Soon  after  the 
outbreak  of  the  Great  War  the  French,  comprehending 
the  lesson  of  Liege,  Namur,  and  Antwerp,  hastened  to 
screen  their  chief  centers  of  defense  with  lines  of  earth- 
works. A  shifting  defensive  organization  was  substituted 
for  the  stationary  one.  The  Verdun  position  became  an 
integral  part  of  the  continuous  front,  resembling  any  other 
part,  except  that  it  was  geographically  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant sectors.  The  heavy  artillery  was  moved  from  the 
permanent  forts  to  emplacements  along  the  field  works, 
where  the  pieces  could  be  more  easily  concealed  and  their 
position  shifted.  The  existence  of  the  forts  was  hence- 
forth little  more  than  a  casual  circumstance;  although 
popular  imagination  persisted  for  a  time  in  regarding  the 
position  as  essentially  a  closed  and  self-sustaining  fortress, 
rather  than  a  sector  of  the  front. 

The  German  Crown  Prince,  as  commander  of  the  Fifth 
German  Army,  was  in  official  command  of  the  German 
operations,  but  the  report  that  old  Marshal  von  Haeseler 
was  his  chief  adviser  was  a  myth.  The  general  plans  were 
drawn  by  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  von  Falkenhayn. 

The  Germans  counted  on  winning  Verdun  by  the  tactics 
which  had  proven  invincible  in  the  Galician  campaign. 
The  successful  advocates  of  the  new  offensive  argued  that 
no  such  tornado  of  fire  with  tremendous  massed  attacks  of 
infantry  as  that  which  burst  through  the  Russian  lines  on 
the  Dunajec  had  been  employed  against  the  western  Allies. 
They  proposed  to  grind  the  opposing  lines  to  dust  by  the 
overwhelming  weight  of  men  and  guns  employed  against 
a  narrow   front.      They   probably  expected  that  in   each 


The  Struggle  for  Verdun  239 

successive  stage  of  the  attack  the  opponents'  resistance 
would  be  crushed  by  action  of  the  artillery,  so  that  there 
would  be  little  for  the  German  infantry  to  do  except  to  ad- 
vance and  occupy  the  ground  already  conquered.  Prepa- 
rations for  the  first  attack  were  made  along  a  front  of  about 
eight  miles  from  Brabant  to  Ornes.  More  than  1,000  pieces, 
largely  of  heavy  high-power  artillery,  were  massed  against 
this  comparatively  short  section.  The  topography  enabled 
the  Germans  to  use  the  cover  of  several  neighboring  for- 
ests for  their  artillery  and  to  intensify  the  effect  by  firing 
on  converging  lines  against  their  opponents'  convex  front. 

The  first  position  of  the  French  in  the  region  of  the 
initial  attack  ran  from  near  Consenvoye,  past  Brabant, 
Caures  Wood,  and  Herbebois,  to  Ornes.  A  second  line  ran 
through  Samogneux,  Hill  344,  and  Bezonvaux.  The  third 
position  corresponded  with  the  principal  line  of  forts  and 
was  defined  by  the  villages  of  Bras,  Douaumont,  and  Har- 
daumont,  by  Fort  Vaux,  and  the  village  of  Eix.  Eastward, 
it  should  be  remembered,  the  French  lines  ran  out  into  the 
Woevre  almost  to  Etain  before  they  swung  southwestwards 
to  reach  the  Meuse  at  St.  Mihiel. 

The  great  struggle  for  Verdun  may  be  conveniently 
divided  into  four  general  periods:  the  first,  from  February 
21st  to  March  2d,  the  period  of  the  German  attacks  from 
the  north  and  northeast  against  the  French  positions  on  the 
right  bank,  creating  the  most  perilous  situation  for  the  de- 
fenders on  the  25th-26th;  the  second,  extending  to  April 
11th,  the  period  of  combined  offensive  operations  on  both 
banks,  culminating  in  a  general  assault  on  the  left  bank; 
the  third,  continuing  to  May  3d,  a  period  of  desultory 
efforts  by  the  Germans,  with  an  increasing  tendency  of 
the  French  to  strike  back ;  and,  finally,  the  fourth,  a  period 
of  renewed  intensive  effort  of  the  assailants  during  May 
and  June,  gradually  subsiding  after  July  1st. 


240  The  Great  War 

During  the  first  stage  of  the  conflict  the  gradual  retire- 
ment of  the  defenders,  who  were  confronted  by  a  vastly 
superior  nrrav  of  men  and  means,  was  inevitable  and  ex- 
pected. The  assailant  chooses  the  hour  and  place  of  his 
attack,  the  conditions  of  which  can  never  be  foreseen  with 
absolute  certainty  by  his  opponent.  In  spite  of  the  evi- 
dence at  hand  presaging  an  impending  blow  at  Verdun, 
the  French  High  Command  could  not  immobilize  a  con- 
siderable part  of  their  general  reserve  on  any  particular 
sector  of  the  front  until  they  could  distinguish  beyond  a 
doubt  between  the  essential  undertaking  of  the  enemy  and 
his  many  deceptive  demonstrations  elsewhere.  In  the 
meantime  it  was  the  business  of  the  holding  units  on  the 
defensive  lines  at  Verdun  to  serve  as  a  buffer  to  retard 
the  initial  momentum  of  the  attack,  exact  the  heaviest  pos- 
sible toll  for  every  rod  of  ground  relinquished,  and,  if  need 
be,  sacrifice  themselves  for  gaining  time. 

The  composition  of  the  German  forces  concentrated 
against  the  Verdun  sector  during  the  first  stage  of  the  great 
offensive,  in  the  order  of  their  position  from  the  eastern 
border  of  the  Argonne  around  to  the  limit  of  attacking 
operations  in  the  Woevre,  was  probably  as  follows:  Seventh 
Reserve  Corps,  Fourteenth  Reserve  Division;  Eighteenth, 
Third,  and  Fifteenth  Corps;  Bavarian  Ersatz  Division, 
Fifth  Corps,  Fifth  Landwehr  Division,  and  Third  Bava- 
rian Corps. 

The  Germans  devoted  comparatively  little  energy  to  the 
preparation  of  special  trenches  for  the  first  assault.  There 
were  neither  the  customary  parallels  of  departure  nor  saps 
projected  perpendicularly  to  the  general  line  of  front.  The 
attacking  units  congregated  in  the  regular  first-line  trenches, 
where  many  bomb-proof  shelters  had  been  formed.  Con- 
sequently, the  space  to  be  covered  by  the  infantry  in  the 
assault  varied  greatly  at  different  points  along  the  line,  and 


The  Struggle  for  Verdun  241 

in  some  places  the  attack  was  launched  from  the  extraor- 
dinary distance  of  1,100  meters, 

Another  circumstance  that  may  have  been  an  indication 
of  the  absolute  confidence  of  the  Germans  in  the  invinci- 
bility of  their  artillery  was  the  fact  that  the  usual  prepara- 
tory bombardment  of  forty-eight  hours  was  reduced  to 
one  of  much  shorter  length,  but  of  indescribable  fury.  It 
began  at  7.15  A.  M.  on  February  21st.  In  the  more  exposed 
section  the  French  trenches  of  the  first  line  were  demol- 
ished, the  parapets  levelled,  the  shelters  disrupted,  and  the 
occupants  blown  to  pieces  or  entombed  alive;  forests  were 
blasted  and  the  very  contour  of  the  hills  was  changed.  But 
the  defenders,  although  cut  off  from  communication  with 
the  rear,  held  on  with  grim  determination,  and  the  French 
artillery  replied  to  the  enemy's  fire  and  strove  to  diminish 
the  intensity  of  the  bombardment. 

About  5  P.M.  the  German  batteries  lengthened  their 
range  and  the  demolition  fire  was  converted  into  a  barrage 
or  curtain  fire.  At  once  the  attacking  waves  of  infantry 
advanced  in  close  formation,  15,000  or  20,000  men  to  the 
mile  of  front.  But  contrary  to  expectation  resistance  had 
not  been  completely  stifled  in  the  French  trenches.  The 
Germans  were  received  with  a  deadly  fire  of  rifles  and 
machine-guns  where  it  was  believed  that  no  human  beings 
could  have  survived. 

In  the  center  the  bombardment  had  been  successful  and 
the  assailants  occupied,  almost  without  encountering  resist- 
ance, the  first-line  positions  in  the  Wood  of  Hautmont  and 
the  Wood  of  Caures,  which  afforded  useful  cover  But 
the  French  line  was  still  intact  on  both  sides  of  this  dis- 
rupted section,  at  Brabant  and  at  Herbebois. 

The  continuation  of  the  attack  on  the  22d  opened  with 
a  discharge  of  liquid  fire.  The  French  slowly  yielded 
ground,  pivoting  on  their  right  wing  which  held  fast  at 


242  The  Great  War 

Herbebois.  In  tbe  following  night  Brabant  on  the  left 
flank  had  to  be  evacuated.  A  fresh  bombardment  on  the 
23d  was  followed  by  a  series  of  massed  infantry  attacks 
more  violent  than  those  before.  One  after  another  the 
assaulting  waxes  advanced  with  unfaltering  regularity  only 
to  be  caught  and  overwhelmed  in  the  fierce  tempest  of 
French  fire.  By  their  great  superiority  in  numbers  and 
the  rapid  succession  of  their  attacks,  the  Germans  hoped 
to  outstrip  the  progressive  wastage  of  their  own  effectives. 
The  French,  resisting  with  desperate  courage,  were  borne 
back  by  sheer  weight  of  the  opposing  numbers. 

The  loss  of  Wavrille  Wood  necessitated  the  abandonment 
of  Herbebois.  By  the  close  of  the  23d  the  French  front 
ran  from  Samogneux,  past  Hill  344  and  Beaumont,  to  Ornes, 
while  behind  this  line  Talou  Hill  and  Poivre  Hill  were 
being  hastily  organized  for  defense. 

The  French  lines  projecting  eastward  into  the  Woevre 
were  now  drawn  backward  to  the  foot  of  the  Heights  of 
the  Meuse.  The  progress  of  the  assailants  continued  un- 
interruptedly on  the  24th.  The  French  relinquished  Ornes 
and  Samogneux  at  the  extremities  of  the  sector  of  attack. 
The  Germans  captured  Hill  344  and  drove  forward  at  the 
center  near  Louvemont  almost  to  the  last  defensive  line  in 
front  of  Verdun.  By  nightfall  the  French  front  was  almost 
back  to  the  line  of  the  chief  forts.  It  formed  an  arc  run- 
ning from  the  Meuse  at  Vacherauville,  along  the  northern 
edge  of  Poivre  Hill,  south  of  Louvemont,  and  through 
La  Vauche  Wood  and  Hardaumont  to  the  eastern  edge 
of  the  plateau. 

The  most  critical  period  had  now  been  reached.  The 
Germans,  after  advancing  about  four  miles  in  as  many  days, 
had  nearly  penetrated  the  inner  margin  of  the  defensive 
zone.  The  assailants,  repeatedly  relieved  by  the  interven- 
tion of  fresh  forces,  still  fought  with  energy  and  force; 


The  Struggle  for  Verdun  243 

while  the  defenders,  probably  outnumbered  five  to  one  and 
thus  far  reinforced  by  only  two  brigades,  could  scarcely 
spare  a  single  soldier  from  the  battle-line.  The  same 
French  troops  who  had  faced  the  opening  onslaught,  after 
struggling  almost  incessantly  for  four  days,  were  almost  at 
the  point  of  complete  exhaustion.  The  fate  of  Verdun, 
and  perhaps  of  France,  depended  on  the  speedy  arrival  of 
reinforcements,  and  on  the  capacity  of  the  battle-worn  de- 
fenders to  hold  their  last  position  by  a  supreme  effort  of 
determination  until  such  help  should  come. 

The  sector  of  attack  had  been  contracted  to  a  space  of 
about  five  miles  from  Poivre  Hill,  which  overlooks  the 
Meuse,  to  Hardaumont  Wood  on  the  eastern  margin  of 
the  heights.  On  the  right  wing  of  the  French  position 
stood  Fort  Douaumont,  600  feet  above  the  level  of  the 
Meuse  and  just  below  the  highest  point  of  the  entire  region, 
a  short  distance  southeast  of  Douaumont  village  and  less 
than  five  miles  on  a  straight  line  northeast  of  Verdun.  The 
efforts  of  the  Germans  on  the  25th  were  directed  chiefly 
against  Poivre  Hill  and  the  Douaumont  position,  the  main 
bulwarks  of  the  French  front. 

The  day  opened  with  a  snowstorm  and  severe  cold.  Re- 
peated attacks  on  Poivre  Hill  exposed  to  the  flanking  fire 
of  the  French  batteries  from  the  left  bank  of  the  Meuse 
failed  to  gain  any  appreciable  advantage.  The  forces  attack- 
ing Douaumont  advanced  by  converging  routes  from  a 
concave  section  of  the  German  front.  The  German  com- 
mand was  determined  to  take  Douaumont  at  any  cost,  ap- 
parently regarding  it  as  the  real  key  of  the  entire  situation. 
The  Kaiser,  accompanied  by  the  chief  members  of  the 
German  Staff,  hovered  near  to  animate  the  ardor  of  the 
troops  and  share  in  the  glory  of  the  decisive  victory  now 
believed  to  be  at  hand.  The  Germans  applied  their  familiar 
method  of  endeavoring  to  stop  the  avenues  of  death  by  the 


244  The  Great  War 

mass  and  rapid  succession  of  their  assaulting  waves.  The 
dark  columns  of  advancing  troops  were  relieved  against 
the  white  background  of  the  snow.  Rank  after  rank  went 
down  under  the  withering  fire,  but  others  sprang  forward 
to  take  their  places,  and  the  net  result  of  this  repeated  ebb 
and  flow  was  steady  progress  towards  the  goal.  Finally,  the 
24th  regiment  of  Brandenburgers  penetrated  the  French 
front  and  captured  the  ruined  Fort  Douaumont,  although 
the  French  clung  to  the  village  on  the  west  and  the  redoubt 
on  the  east.  On  the  same  afternoon  the  Germans  took 
Louvemont. 

History  has  recorded  many  an  instance  of  a  critical  situa- 
tion, upon  which  vital  issues  hung,  saved  by  the  timely 
arrival  of  a  leader  of  determined  personality  and  perfect 
self-possession,  who  by  his  moral  influence  revived  the 
energy  and  faith  of  those  about  him. 

General  de  Castelnau  had  inspected  the  situation  at  Ver- 
dun and  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  position  east  of 
the  Meuse  could  and  must  be  held.  He  summoned  to  the 
task  one  of  his  ablest  lieutenants,  a  man  who,  perhaps  more 
fittingly  than  any  other,  may  be  thought  of  as  the  embodi- 
ment of  the  new  spirit  of  France,  sobered  and  transfigured 
by  the  fiery  ordeal. 

General  Petain,  the  hero  of  Verdun,  was  then  approach- 
ing sixty  years  of  age.  He  was  colonel  of  the  33d  regiment 
of  infantry  at  Arras  when  the  war  began  and  was  imme- 
diately put  in  command  of  a  brigade  which  distinguished 
itself  by  its  fierce  rear-guard  actions  during  the  retreat  from 
Charleroi  to  the  Marne.  Just  before  the  Battle  of  the 
Marne  Petain  received  command  of  the  Sixth  Infantry 
Division.  In  the  spring  of  1915  he  returned  to  the  region 
of  Arras  and  as  corps  commander  conducted  the  success- 
ful attack  on  Carency  which  has  already  been  described. 
As  commander  of  the  Army  of  Reserve  in  Champagne, 


The  Crown  Prince  of  Germany  distributing  iron  crosses  on  the  Verdun  front. 


V   %. 


German  heavy  artillery  before  Verdun. 


The  Struggle  for  Verdun  245 

General  Petain  took  part  in  the  September  offensive  and  won 
fresh  distinction  in  the  capture  of  the  "Hand"  of  Massiges. 

His  quiet  manner,  keen  intelligence,  complete  absorp- 
tion in  his  profession,  and  lofty  sense  of  duty  were  essen- 
tial qualities  for  leadership  in  a  warfare  of  science  and 
endurance.  One  of  his  maxims,  as  repeated  by  a  sub- 
ordinate, is  a  fitting  commentary  on  the  leader  of  the 
victorious  defense  of  Verdun : 

"A  troop  becomes  invincible  when,  prepared  in  advance 
to  sacrifice  itself,  it  determines  to  make  the  enemy  pay  for 
its  sacrifice  the  dearest  possible  price." 

General  Petain  arrived  in  Verdun  in  advance  of  his  army 
on  February  25th.  But  the  Germans  had  now  revealed  their 
main  purpose  unmistakably  and  the  French  High  Command 
took  prompt  and  energetic  measures  in  view  of  it. 

As  matters  stood  at  the  beginning  of  the  great  struggle 
for  Verdun,  the  communications  of  the  French  army 
seemed  quite  precarious,  and  this  was  doubtless  one  of 
the  chief  considerations  on  which  the  assailants  built  their 
hopes.  The  railway  line  along  the  Meuse  had  been  cut  at 
St.  Mihiel.  The  main  line  to  Paris  was  exposed  to  the  fire 
of  the  German  long-range  guns  in  the  region  of  St.  Mene- 
hould.  There  remained  only  the  single  track,  narrow- 
gauge  line  to  Bar-le-Duc,  which  in  its  actual  state  was 
entirely  inadequate. 

But  the  question  of  supplying  and  replenishing  an  army 
of  250,000  men  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse  at  Verdun 
without  the  help  of  railways  had  already  been  studied  to 
the  last  detail  by  the  French  Staff.  Within  a  few  hours  of 
the  beginning  of  the  Battle  of  Verdun  nine  or  ten  thousand 
motor-trucks  had  been  assembled  for  the  vital  task  of  con- 
veying men,  ammunition,  and  provisions  from  Bar-le-Duc, 
the  nearest  point  on  an  available  trunk  line,  to  beleaguered 
Verdun,  a  distance  of  somewhat  more  than  twenty  miles. 


246  The  Great  War 

On  February  21st,  the  first  day  of  the  struggle,  the  Bar- 
le-duc-Verdun  highway  was  reserved  exclusively  for  mili- 
tary traffic  and  placed  under  the  control  of  an  officer  as 
Traffic  Regulation  Commissioner  with  his  staff  and  sec- 
tional subordinates.  Circulation  was  regulated  with  the 
strictness  and  precision  that  prevails  in  the  operation  of  an 
important  railway.  For  two  months  there  was  an  uninter- 
rupted procession  day  and  night  along  this  road.  As  many 
as  6,000  motor  vehicles  passed  a  given  point  within  a  single 
period  of  twenty-four  hours.  Without  the  organization 
and  splendid  efficiency  of  this  service  Verdun  would  have 
fallen.  The  Germans  had  thoroughly  organized  the  rail- 
way system  in  their  rear  so  as  to  establish  immediate  com- 
munication between  the  front  and  the  bases  of  supply.  It 
was  a  contest,  therefore,  between  the  automobile  and  the 
locomotive,  in  which  the  former  was  not  found  wanting. 

General  Petain  launched  a  counter-offensive  on  the  26th. 
The  Twentieth  Corps  repulsed  the  Brandenburgers,  but 
the  French  failed  to  dislodge  their  opponents  from  the 
ruins  of  Fort  Douaumont  where  they  clung  with  uncon- 
querable tenacity.  The  German  striking  force  was  now 
directed  chiefly  against  the  center  and  southeastern  ex- 
tremity of  the  sector  of  attack,  where  the  conflict  raged 
with  unabated  fury  on  the  27th  and  28th. 

The  Fifth  Corps  and  the  Bavarian  Third  Corps  strove 
to  drive  in  the  French  right  wing  in  the  Woevre.  But  the 
gains  were  everywhere  incommensurate  with  the  effort  and 
heavy  losses  and  the  beginning  of  March  brought  a  short 
period  of  comparative  calm. 

This  interval  preceded  the  opening  of  the  second  gen- 
eral stage  of  the  conflict.  The  German  command  shifted 
men  and  material  to  the  west  bank  of  the  Meuse  and  pre- 
pared to  strike  concurrently  at  Verdun  from  the  northwest. 
The  progress  of  the  offensive  in  that  quarter  would  soon 


The  Struggle  for  Verdun  247 

clear  the  French  artillery  from  the  positions  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Meuse,  opposite  Poivre  Hill,  and,  if  continued 
further,  would  completely  intercept  the  communications 
of  Verdun  in  the  rear. 

From  the  Meuse  the  French  lines  ran  westward  up  the 
narrow,  marshy  valley  of  Forges  Brook,  along  the  ridge 
north  of  Bethincourt  and  Malancourt,  and  then,  bearing 
off  southwestward,  through  Malancourt  Wood  and  in  front 
of  Avocourt.  The  lower  section  of  the  valley  of  Forges 
Brook,  is  enclosed  on  the  south  by  a  ridge  known  as  the 
Cote  de  l'Oie,  or  Goose's  Crest,  and  near  its  western  ex- 
tremity the  summits  of  Hill  295,  or  Le  Mort  Homme,  and 
Hill  265,  were  two  of  the  tactically  most  important  points  in 
the  vicinity.  The  same  general  line  of  elevations  continues 
westward  beyond  a  southern  affluent  of  Forges  Brook  and 
rises  at  one  point  to  an  altitude  of  304  meters.  The  Ger- 
mans could  only  reach  their  objective  on  the  west  bank  by 
traversing  or  outflanking  this  important  natural  barrier. 

The  preparatory  bombardment  began  on  March  2d  and 
lasted  four  days.  Simultaneously,  the  Germans  made  a  de- 
termined effort  to  gain  Douaumont  village.  The  furious 
tide  of  battle  surged  to  and  fro  through  this  village,  but 
left  it  in  the  hands  of  the  Germans  on  the  4th,  although 
the  French  retained  possession  of  the  ridge  commanding 
it  on  the  south.  The  opening  infantry  attack  on  the  west 
bank  was  executed  by  two  divisions  of  the  Seventh  Ger- 
man Reserve  Corps  on  the  6th.  The  French  soon  evacu- 
ated their  advanced  positions  near  the  river,  because  the 
Germans  already  outflanked  them  on  the  opposite  bank, 
and  fell  back  behind  the  summit  of  the  Goose's  Crest. 
Before  evening  the  Germans  occupied  the  entire  eastern 
portion  of  this  ridge  and  the  French  front  swung  to  the 
southeast  about  a  mile  west  of  Forges  village  and  ran 
obliquely  across  the  Goose's  Crest  to  reach  the  Meuse. 


24S  The  Great  War 

A  furious  contest  raged  on  the  7th  and  8th  for  the  possession 
of  the  Crow's  Wood,  which  occupies  a  central  position  on 
the  Goose's  Crest,  but  the  French  remained  in  possession 
of  the  greater  part. 

The  Germans  allowed  their  opponents  no  respite  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  river.  On  the  night  of  the  8th-9th  the 
Third  German  Corps  with  a  brigade  of  the  Ninth  Reserve 
Division  gained  possession  of  Vaux  village,  southeast  of 
Douaumont,  but  were  quickly  expelled  by  a  French 
counter-attack.  The  Germans  made  repeated  efforts  to 
gain  possession  of  this  village,  the  importance  of  which 
was  due  to  its  position  in  a  narrow  ravine,  opening  east- 
ward into  the  Woevre  plain  and  westward  cutting  deeply 
into  the  plateau.  By  gaining  the  surface  of  the  heights 
up  this  ravine,  the  Germans  could  have  reversed  and  made 
untenable  the  French  positions  on  the  ridge  of  Douau- 
mont. After  several  unsuccessful  efforts  the  Germans 
gained  the  eastern  end  of  the  village  on  the  11th,  but 
failed  to  establish  themselves  upon  the  crest  above. 

The  assailants  realized  that  Hill  295,  or  Le  Mort  Homme, 
was  the  main  supporting  feature  of  the  French  defensive 
operations  west  of  the  Meuse  and  that  the  expulsion  of  the 
defenders  from  this  position  was  absolutely  necessary  for 
the  further  progress  of  the  attack.  A  bombardment  of  the 
French  lines  between  Bethincourt  and  Cumieres  began  on 
the  12th  and  rose  to  the  highest  pitch  of  intensity  on  the 
14th,  when  German  shells  fell  in  the  French  positions  at 
the  rate  of  more  than  120  a  minute.  The  French  artillery 
replied  with  equal  spirit. 

A  force  of  about  25,000  Germans,  immediately  preceded 
and  covered  by  a  moving  barrage,  advanced  from  the  Crow's 
Wood  against  Le  Mort  Homme.  An  outlying  spur  was 
captured,  but  the  French  saved  the  principal  summit  after 
a  desperate  and  heroic  struggle.    A  second  attack  from  the 


The  Struggle  for  Verdun  249 

opposite  direction  two  days  later  was  taken  in  the  flank  by 
the  fire  of  the  French  guns  and  broken  up. 

With  the  failure  of  these  direct  attacks  against  Le  Mort 
Homme  the  German  command  decided  to  overcome  resist- 
ance at  this  point  by  a  turning  operation  further  west.  A 
fresh  bombardment  between  Bethincourt  and  Avocourt 
opened  on  the  17th  and  reached  its  greatest  intensity  at  noon 
on  the  20th.  That  afternoon  a  Bavarian  division  forced  its 
way  through  the  eastern  portion  of  Avocourt  Wood  to  the 
lower  slope  of  Hill  304  west  of  Le  Mort  Homme.  Here  the 
attack  was  renewed  with  larger  forces  on  the  22d.  The  Ger- 
mans steadily  advanced  and  the  situation  on  Hill  304  had 
become  critical,  when  General  Petain  delivered  an  impetu- 
ous counter-attack  on  the  29th,  driving  the  Germans  from 
their  advanced  lines  on  the  slope.  Two  days  later  the  French 
troops  at  Malancourt,  beset  by  greatly  superior  forces  and 
exhausted  by  the  enemy's  repeated  attacks,  abandoned  their 
exposed  position,  and  the  French  front  was  withdrawn  to  a 
new  line  skirting  the  northern  slope  of  Hill  304. 

These  aggressive  operations  on  the  left  bank  were  accom- 
panied by  renewed  efforts  near  the  eastern  border  of  the 
Meuse  Heights,  where  the  Germans  penetrated  to  the 
western  extremity  of  Vaux  village  and  fought  their  way 
up  the  ascent  towards  the  rear  of  the  French  lines  along 
Douaumont  ridge.  The  situation  here  had  become  critical, 
when  the  Germans  were  repelled  by  a  furious  counter- 
attack on  April  3d. 

After  a  few  days'  lull  the  struggle  resumed  its  intensity 
on  the  west  bank,  and  on  the  evening  of  the  7th  the 
French  were  forced  to  abandon  Bethincourt  which  had 
become  a  dangerous  salient  through  the  enforced  recession 
of  the  front  on  both  sides. 

The  German  command  now  believed  that  the  time  had 
come  for  a  culminating  operation  to  bring  their  efforts  on 


250  The  Great  War 

the  left  hank  to  a  victorious  conclusion.  This  took  the 
form  of  a  general  assault  along  the  whole  line  west  of  the 
river,  with  an  attack  on  Poivre  Hill  and  a  general  bom- 
bardment and  pressure  on  the  right  bank,  altogether  the 
most  comprehensive  movement  during  the  entire  struggle 
for  Verdun.  The  principal  attacks,  each  carried  out  by 
two  divisions,  were  to  be  delivered  in  the  directions  of 
previous  attempts,  one  from  Crow's  Wood  against  Le  Mort 
Homme,  the  other  from  the  Avocourt  and  Malancourt 
Wood  against  Hill  304. 

On  the  morning  of  the  9th  this  fresh  storm  broke  against 
the  French  positions,  which  had  become  more  and  more 
compact  under  the  repeated  battering  of  the  assailants  and 
with  the  gradual  flattening  of  the  French  front.  The 
preparations  for  the  new  attack  had  not  escaped  the  atten- 
tion of  the  French,  who  faced  this  supreme  test  with 
unflinching  resolution. 

The  German  troops  attacking  from  Avocourt  Wood 
were  unable  to  debouch  from  cover  of  the  trees,  the  effort 
from  the  Crow's  Wood  was  repelled  with  heavy  losses, 
and  forces  advancing  between  the  Goose's  Crest  and  the 
river  were  thrown  back.  The  Germans  repeatedly  re- 
turned to  the  attack  against  the  principal  objective.  The 
battle  raged  throughout  the  front  on  the  next  day,  but  by 
the  11th  it  became  evident  that  in  spite  of  the  repeated 
intervention  of  fresh  troops  the  German  attack  had  failed. 

The  Germans  had  been  unable  to  force  their  way  through 
to  Verdun  when  they  enjoyed  the  advantage  of  the  confu- 
sion created  by  their  first  whirlwind  onslaught.  They  had 
persisted  week  after  week  in  an  enterprise  which  exacted 
a  heavy  cost  for  every  yard  of  territory  gained.  The  de- 
fensive became  ever  more  consolidated,  the  progress  of 
the  assailants  waned,  and  by  the  second  half  of  April  the 
battle  lapsed  into  insignificant  encounters,  with  a  return  to 


The  Struggle  for  Verdun  251 

inactivity  apparently  at  hand.  But  the  fear  of  losing  prestige 
and  of  having  to  face  the  full  shock  of  a  great  Allied  offen- 
sive impelled  the  German  High  Command  to  renew  the 
effort  against  Verdun,  and  the  fierce  recrudescence  of  the 
struggle  in  May  and  June,  sometimes  called  the  Second 
Battle  of  Verdun,  will  here  be  treated  as  the  fourth  stage 
of  what  was  practically  a  continuous  battle. 

About  this  time  General  Petain  received  a  well-deserved 
tribute  for  his  masterly  defense  of  Verdun  by  promotion 
to  group  commander  of  the  central  sector  from  Soissons  to 
Verdun.  He  was  succeeded  in  the  command  of  the  Second 
Army  defending  Verdun  by  General  Nivelle,  who  had  had 
a  similarly  rapid  advancement  since  the  beginning  of  the 
war.  Nivelle  was  colonel  of  the  5th  artillery  at  Besancon, 
forming  part  of  the  Seventh  Corps,  in  the  summer  of  1914 
and  with  his  unit  participated  in  the  first  invasion  of  Alsace. 
After  the  Seventh  Corps  was  incorporated  in  the  Sixth 
Army  under  General  Maunoury,  Nivelle  won  distinction 
in  the  fighting  on  the  Ourcq  and  was  promoted  succes- 
sively to  the  command  of  a  brigade,  a  division,  and  the 
Third  Army  Corps.  He  was  sent  to  the  Verdun  front  in 
April,  1916,  a  few  weeks  before  he  succeeded  Petain  in 
command  of  the  Second  Army. 

In  consequence  of  the  physical  conditions  and  of  the 
varied  fortunes  of  the  struggle  west  of  the  Meuse,  the  con- 
tour of  the  fronts  had  become  scallop-shaped  so  that  both 
sides  were  exposed  to  flank  attacks  at  different  points.  The 
German  command  decided  to  crush  the  protruding  sections 
of  the  French  front  covering  Hill  304  and  Le  Mort  Homme 
by  a  concentrated  attack  of  great  intensity.  A  terrible  bom- 
bardment beginning  on  May  3d  obliterated  the  trenches  on 
Hill  304  and  was  followed  by  a  massed  infantry  attack  late 
in  the  afternoon  of  the  4th,  which  resulted  in  the  capture 
of  the  French  lines  on  the  northern  slope  of  the  hill. 


252  The  Great  War 

On  the  7th  a  still  more  formidable  assault  was  delivered 
from  three  sides  against  Hill  304,  while  the  German  bar- 
rage  fire  isolated  the  defenders  of  the  elevation  from  com- 
munication with  the  rear.  After  a  heroic  defense  against 
an  enemy  attacking  repeatedly  with  the  strength  of  an 
army  corps,  the  two  French  regiments  defending  the  sum- 
mit were  compelled  to  retire  to  a  line  south  of  the  crest. 

The  fury  of  the  offensive  was  next  turned  against  the 
French  positions  on  Le  Mort  Homme  which  were  now 
exposed  on  both  sides.  A  bombardment  by  more  than 
sixty  batteries  of  heavy  artillery  prepared  the  ground  for 
the  attacking  infantry,  which  gained  the  summit,  May  20-21. 
The  defenders  withdrew  to  positions  on  the  southern  slope. 

The  Germans  attempted  to  turn  the  French  front  west 
of  the  Meuse  by  a  vigorous  forward  thrust  along  the  left 
bank  of  the  river,  taking  Cumieres.  But  the  French  rallied 
and  by  desperate  fighting  at  close  quarters  drove  the  Ger- 
mans from  the  greater  part  of  the  ruins  of  Cumieres  and 
blocked  their  advance  on  the  26th. 

Finally,  a  general  attack  west  of  the  Meuse,  prepared 
with  the  heaviest  bombardment  and  supported  by  five 
fresh  German  divisions,  on  the  29th,  failed  to  make  any 
decisive  gains  or  break  the  French  front,  which  was  now 
established  on  a  more  direct  line  south  of  the  much  con- 
tested crests. 

In  the  meantime,  the  French  had  counter-attacked  east 
of  the  Meuse  at  Douaumont  to  relieve  the  pressure  on  the 
left  bank.  The  artillery  preparation  began  on  the  20th  and 
on  the  morning  of  the  22d  a  French  aeroplane  squadron 
destroyed  a  number  of  the  German  captive  kite-balloons, 
commonly  used  for  observation  purposes,  by  dropping  on 
them  bombs  of  a  new  type,  which,  bursting  in  mid-air, 
scattered  numerous  smaller  bombs  charged  with  a  highly 
inflammable  compound.     The  French  infantry,  attacking 


'•v-T^A- 


>*Vv'A^^v 


*  -   ♦••4H 


%. 


■  mm 


Vieiv  of  Fort  Douaumont  taken  from  an  aeroplane  at  the  altitude  of  /,2c 
May  /g,  /g/6,  before  the  preparation  for  the  French  attack. 


Under  bombardment  by  the  French  artillery  on  the  day  preceding  their  attack,  May  21,  iq/6. 
The  recapture  of  Fort  Douaumont.     From  photographs  by  the  photographic  section  of  the  French  army. 


The  Struggle  for  Verdun  253 

with  great  ardor  on  the  same  day,  won  back  the  greater 
part  of  Fort  Douaumont,  but  was  compelled  to  relinquish 
most  of  its  gains  within  twenty-four  hours.  The  conflict 
was  waged  with  great  fury  within  the  ruins  of  the  fort. 

The  Germans  now  transferred  the  chief  weight  of  their 
offensive  to  the  right  bank  and  tried  to  turn  the  inner  forti- 
fied line  in  front  of  Verdun  by  attacking  it  at  the  same 
time  on  front  and  flank.  The  advance  was  started  from 
the  position  won  by  the  Germans  on  February  26th,  less 
than  five  miles  from  Verdun. 

The  bombardment  of  the  French  position  at  Fort  Vaux 
began  on  May  29th.  The  German  infantry  fought  its  way 
up  the  wooded  slopes  northwest  of  Fort  Vaux  and  ad- 
vanced from  Damloup  on  the  southeast,  converging  from 
two  sides  on  June  1st.  Wave  after  wave  was  mowed  down 
by  the  fire  of  rifles  and  machine-guns,  but  the  French  front 
was  finally  pressed  back  on  the  2d,  leaving  Fort  Vaux  with 
a  small  detachment  of  five  hundred  and  fifty  men  com- 
pletely isolated.  These  maintained  a  heroic  resistance  until 
the  6th,  holding  the  main  building  with  their  machine-guns 
against  the  Germans,  who  had  gained  the  outer  walls,  and 
only  capitulated  when  further  effort  was  impossible. 

The  weight  of  the  attack  was  now  thrown  against  the 
central  section  of  the  French  front  east  of  the  Meuse. 
By  June  12th  the  Germans  had  reached  a  point  west  of 
Thiaumont  within  three  and  three-quarters  miles  of  Ver- 
dun. The  last  great  attack  was  delivered  on  June  23d, 
when  100,000  men  were  flung  against  a  front  of  about 
three  miles.  Fort  Thiaumont  was  taken  and  the  next  day 
the  contest  raged  in  the  streets  of  Fleury,  where  the  French 
held  their  ground  and  stayed  the  advancing  tide.  They 
recovered  Fort  Thiaumont  in  a  counter-attack  on  the  30th. 

The  combined  offensive  of  the  Western  Allies  in  the 
valley  of  the  Somme,  starting  July  1st,  sapped  the  vitality 


254  The  Great  War 

of  the  German  operations  against  Verdun.  There  were 
periodic  outbursts  of  activity  during  July  and  August  but 
these  do  not  concern  us.  A  period  of  stagnation  gradually 
setting  in  on  this  sector  marked  the  termination  of  a  strug- 
gle which  had  been  carried  on  without  interruption  since 
February  21st,  at  the  time  the  longest  continuous  battle 
in  history. 

The  statements  of  the  inspired  German  press,  taxing  its 
ingenuity  to  prove  that  the  purpose  of  the  General  Staff 
had  been  achieved  at  Verdun,  is  refuted  by  the  evidence  of 
obvious  facts.  For  a  period  of  four  months  the  operative 
strength  of  the  empire  had  been  employed  with  frenzied 
energy.  More  than  half  a  million  men  had  eventually 
been  concentrated  against  the  Verdun  sector.  But  the 
methods  which  had  been  so  strikingly  successful  on  the 
Dunajec  and  Biala  failed  to  blast  an  opening  in  the  French 
lines.  The  German  High  Command  had  only  130  square 
miles  of  scarred  and  battered  territory,  two  demolished 
forts,  and  about  forty  ruined  villages  to  show  for  their 
heavy  losses,  certainly  not  less  than  250,000  men,  and  their 
vast  expenditure  of  ammunition.  The  drain  on  Germany's 
mobile  reserves  must  have  been  seriously  felt  throughout 
the  summer.  The  heroism  of  the  defenders,  rallying, 
against  greatly  superior  forces  and  equipment,  to  the  battle- 
cry:  "They  shall  not  pass,"  added  imperishable  pages  to 
the  glorious  military  records  of  France. 


CHAPTER  XI 

Operations  on  the  Austro-Italian  Frontier 

Physical  difficulties  confronting  the  Italians :  barrier  of  the  Alps  and  the 
threatening  salient  of  the  Trentino,  the  important  strategical  positions  in 
the  hands  of  Austria-Hungary.  General  Cadorna.  The  Italian  plan.  Italian 
progress  on  the  Isonzo  and  in  the  north.  Daring  feats  of  the  Alpini.  The 
Austro-Hungarian  attack  in  the  region  of  the  Isonzo.  Disappointing  results 
of  the  first  campaign.  Italy's  anomalous  position.  Underlying  motives  of 
Teutonic  strategy  in  1916.  Preparations  for  the  great  Austro-Hungarian 
offensive  from  the  Trentino.  The  critical  situation  of  the  Italian  forces. 
The  waning  of  the  attack.    Italian  counter  blows.    The  capture  of  Gorizia. 

At  this  point  we  may  appropriately  turn  our  attention  to 
the  operations  on  the  Austro-Italian  frontier,  which  were 
entering  on  a  new  and  more  intensive  stage,  and  were  be- 
coming much  more  closely  correlated  with  the  course  of 
action  in  the  other  fields. 

The  Italians  had  been  confronted  from  the  first  with 
very  formidable  difficulties  due  to  the  geographical  con- 
figuration of  the  zone  of  operations.  The  Austro-Italian 
boundary,  from  the  Stelvio  Pass  at  an  altitude  of  9,000  feet 
to  the  shore  of  the  Adriatic  near  its  northeastern  angle, 
about  500  miles  in  length,  exceeded  in  extent  the  entire 
battle-line  in  France  and  Flanders.  The  Julian  and  Car- 
nian  Alps  enclose  the  Venetian  plain  within  their  arc-shaped 
barrier  on  the  northeast  and  north,  while  further  west  the 
sharp  projecting  wedge  of  hostile  territory  in  the  Trentino 
threatened  the  heart  of  industrial  Italy  and  the  communi- 
cations of  all  the  Italian  armies  in  the  field.  The  demarca- 
tion of  the  Austro-Italian  boundary  at  the  close  of  the  last 
war  in  1866  had  left  the  important  strategical  positions,  the 

255 


256  The  Great  War 

mountain  crests  and  summits  of  the  passes,  for  the  most  part 
in  Austrian  hands;  and  in  consequence  of  her  unfavorahle 
situation  in  this  respect  Italy  had  been  constantly  exposed  to 
sudden  attack  by  her  ancestral  enemy,  and  the  desire  to  ob- 
tain a  secure  military  boundary  found  a  place  beside  the  wish 
t<»  liberate  the  kindred  population  of  "Italia  irredenta"  as  an 
effective  motive  for  Italian  intervention  in  the  Great  War. 

Political  and  sentimental  considerations  made  Trieste  the 
chief  objective  for  an  Italian  offensive.  But  Italy  could 
not  conduct  a  vigorous  and  sustained  offensive  toward  the 
east  until  every  outlet  for  an  Austro-Hungarian  counter- 
offensive  from  the  Trentino  had  been  securely  blocked. 
The  project  for  an  immediate  drive  of  overwhelming  force 
into  the  plains  of  northern  Italy,  planned  by  General  Conrad 
von  Hotzendorff,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Chief  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff,  as  the  opening  and  decisive  maneuver  upon  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities,  could  not  be  executed.  Yet  on  the 
other  hand,  while  Italy  had  learned  many  valuable  lessons 
during  the  nine  months  of  her  neutrality,  no  nation  can  put 
forth  the  maximum  effort  until  it  is  engaged  in  a  struggle 
for  existence.  From  the  nature  of  the  situation  as  described 
above,  the  success  of  an  attack  on  Austria-Hungary  would 
depend  on  the  swiftness  and  extent  of  the  initial  onslaught 
and  the  capture  of  the  keys  to  the  important  mountain 
passes.  The  effect  of  the  first  assault  of  the  Italians  was 
impaired  by  the  incompleteness  of  the  Italian  preparations 
and  equipment  as  well  as  by  the  delay  in  entering  on  hos- 
tilities interposed  at  the  last  moment  through  the  intrigues 
of  von  Biilow  and  Giolitti,  which  enabled  the  enemy  to 
reinforce  his  positions. 

General  mobilization  was  ordered  in  Italy  on  May  22, 
1915,  and  executed  without  confusion  or  interruption  of 
the  normal  activity  of  the  country,  because  a  state  of  partial 
mobilization  already  existed.     King  Victor  Emmanuel  left 


A  big  Italian  gun  screened  from  aeroplane  observation.      From  a  photograph  by  the  official 
photographic  section  of  the  Italian  army. 


A  road  on  the  Italian  Alpine  front  screened  with  matting. 


Operations  on  Austro-Italian  Frontier     257 

Rome  on  May  25th  and  assumed  the  position  of  commander- 
in-chief  of  all  the  armies.  But  the  actual  conduct  of  opera- 
tions was  entrusted  to  Count  Luigi  Cadorna,  whose  father 
had  crowned  a  distinguished  career  in  the  wars  for  the  uni- 
fication of  the  country  by  leading  the  troops  who  captured 
Rome  in  1870.  The  present  Count  Cadorna  was  a  calm 
and  methodical,  but  resourceful  commander.  He  had  won 
an  international  reputation  by  his  writings  on  military  sub- 
jects and  had  supervised  the  reorganization  of  the  army 
during  the  period  of  neutrality.  He  enjoyed  the  absolute 
confidence  of  the  nation. 

The  Italian  plan  of  operations  called  for  a  vigorous  effort 
all  along  the  front,  with  the  chief  attack  eastward  to  force 
the  evacuation  of  Trieste  and  Istria.  In  the  early  days  of 
June  the  war  was  everywhere  carried  into  the  enemy's  ter- 
ritory. The  Italians  secured  the  keys  to  many  passes  and 
the  Austro-Hungarian  forces  retired  to  well-fortified  posi- 
tions further  back.  Just  beyond  the  border  on  the  east, 
the  Isonzo,  flowing  towards  the  Adriatic  in  a  winding 
course,  extended  like  a  moat  before  the  enemy's  mountain 
fastnesses.  Gorizia,  situated  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Isonzo, 
was  the  chief  town  and  fortress  of  this  region.  South  of 
Gorizia  lay  the  barren  limestone  ridge  of  the  Carso,  scarred 
with  caverns  and  depressions.  Converted  by  the  Austrians 
into  a  labyrinth  of  intrenchments,  the  Carso  dominated 
from  the  flank  the  coast  route  to  Trieste. 

By  June  27th  the  Italians  had  gained  a  bridge-head  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Isonzo  and  early  in  July  had  crossed 
the  lower  course  of  the  river  at  all  points.  But  Monte 
Sabatino  and  Monte  Podgora,  respectively  2,000  and  800 
feet  in  altitude  and  strongly  fortified,  remained  in  the  hands 
of  the  Austrians  on  the  right  bank  and  covered  Gorizia. 

The  operations  on  the  northern  border  were  distin- 
guished by  the  brilliant  conduct  of  the  Alpini  or  Italian 


258  The  Great  War 

mountain  troops,  who  scaled  the  sheerest  cliffs  and  carried 
warfare  to  loftj  regions  scarcely  reached  by  the  most  dar- 
ing sportsmen.  The  guerilla  operations  in  these  regions 
of  eternal  ice  and  snow,  on  rocky  ledges  and  solitary  trails, 
in  nooks  and  crannies  over  dizzy  precipices,  abounded  in 
heroic  episodes  that  will  never  be  recorded.  The  Austro- 
I  [ungarian  armies  displayed  remarkable  ingenuity  in  their 
use  of  artillery  for  mountain  warfare.  Heavy  guns  had 
been  mounted  in  permanent  emplacements  with  revolving 
turrets  on  commanding  crests,  while  the  slopes  that  over- 
looked the  passes  were  studded  with  machine-gun  nests 
and  field-gun  posts,  skilfully  concealed  on  ledges  or  in 
natural  recesses. 

The  Italians  strove  with  tireless  energy  to  overcome  the 
advantage  which  the  enemy  had  gained  by  his  elaborate 
preparation.  Roads  had  to  be  constructed  in  the  moun- 
tainous regions  under  conditions  of  great  difficulty  for  the 
movement  of  the  heavy  guns  and  of  the  supplies  of  ammuni- 
tion. Sometimes  a  whole  company,  or  even  a  battalion,  was 
harnessed  to  a  single  gun  to  draw  it  to  the  suitable  position. 
Desperate  engagements  were  carried  on  at  altitudes  of  7,000- 
9,000  feet.  Gradually  the  Italians  gained  the  commanding 
positions  in  the  passes  that  converge  on  Trent. 

During  the  last  week  in  August  the  Austro-Hungarian 
forces  delivered  a  furious  offensive  in  the  region  of  the 
Isonzo.  The  Italians  brought  up  reserves  and  counter- 
attacked with  great  force  and  the  battle  raged  with  varying 
success  for  about  two  weeks,  leaving  the  Italians  in  strong 
positions  near  the  western  summit  of  the  Carso. 

But,  in  general,  operations  settled  down  to  trench  warfare. 
The  Italians  were  greatly  hampered  by  the  scarcity  of  coal 
and  limitation  in  the  output  of  ammunition.  The  results 
of  the  first  campaign  were  rather  disappointing.  The 
Italians  had   gained  no   conspicuous  advantage  and  their 


Operations  on  Austro-Italian  Frontier     259 

action  had  apparently  not  checked  the  course  of  Teutonic 
victories  elsewhere.  There  was  a  feeling  both  at  home  and 
abroad  that  the  Italian  campaign  had  not  been  conducted 
with  the  full  force  of  the  nation. 

The  position  of  Italy  was  in  fact  anomalous,  in  that  she 
was  fighting  Austria-Hungary  alone,  and  not  the  latter's 
ally,  Germany.  Italy  declared  war  against  Turkey  on 
August  21st,  and  against  Bulgaria  in  October,  but  her  offi- 
cial attitude  towards  Germany  remained  the  same.  Diplo- 
matic relations  between  Rome  and  Berlin  had  been  severed 
upon  Italy's  entry  into  the  war,  but  the  rupture  had  been 
preceded  by  an  agreement  in  which  the  Italian  government 
consented  not  to  sequester  German  property  throughout 
the  kingdom  in  return  for  certain  privileges  accorded 
Italians  long  resident  in  Germany. 

The  support  of  a  majority  of  the  Italian  people  had  been 
won  for  war  with  Austria-Hungary.  But  German  influ- 
ence had  penetrated  too  deeply  into  the  intellectual  and 
economic  life  of  the  peninsula  to  be  uprooted  in  a  day. 
The  tendency  to  engage  in  war  with  Germany  was  not 
yet  strong  enough  to  overcome  the  opposition  of  those 
who  were  still  swayed  by  admiration  for  the  powerful  ally 
of  a  generation  or  were  led  by  economical  connections  to 
hope  for  the  return  of  amicable  relations,  or  the  reluctance 
of  others  who  were  awed  by  the  swift  destruction  wrought 
by  German  might.  Germany  who  had  valuable  interests 
at  stake  in  Italy  would  certainly  not  institute  hostilities  her- 
self. During  the  period  of  more  than  a  year  before  the 
pressure  of  events  led  Italy  to  declare  war  on  Germany, 
this  ambiguous  situation  undoubtedly  reacted  unfavorably 
on  the  progress  of  Italian  arms  by  retarding  the  complete 
and  hearty  cooperation  between  Italy  and  her  allies,  and 
by  leaving  the  way  open  for  the  baneful  intrigues  of  Ger- 
man secret  agencies  within  the  kingdom. 


260  The  Great  War 

At  the  opening  of  the  Chamber  on  December  1st  Baron 
Sonnino  announced  that  Italy  had  formally  adhered  to  the 

pact  of  London,  binding  herself  not  to  conclude  a  separate 
peace.  A  visit  of  M.  Hriand,  the  French  Prime  Minister, 
to  Rome  in  February,  1  W>,  was  part  of  an  effort  for  closer 
cooperation  between  the  Allies.  The  Italian  Ministers 
Salandra  and  Sonnino  and  General  Cadorna  attended  the 
Allied  Conference  convened  in  Paris  on  March  27th, 
which  was  an  important  step  in  the  same  direction.  Gen- 
eral Cadorna  also  visited  London  and  Mr.  Asquith  went  to 
Rome  and  visited  the  King  of  Italy  at  the  front.  In  this 
way  mutual  confidence  was  strengthened  and  expression 
given  to  the  desire  for  unity  of  aim  and  effort. 

As  we  have  already  observed,  the  hope  of  the  Central 
Powers  to  bring  the  war  to  a  triumphant  issue  seemed  in 
the  early  part  of  1916  to  depend  upon  their  ability  to  fore- 
stall the  simultaneous  offensive  of  all  their  opponents  by 
dealing  shattering  blows  on  chosen  sectors  of  the  hostile 
fronts.  The  attack  on  Verdun  was  the  most  prominent 
application  of  this  frenzied  strategy.  But  while  the  result 
of  that  effort  was  still  doubtful,  the  Austro-Hungarian 
High  Command  launched  a  great  offensive  southward 
from  the  Trentino  for  the  purpose  of  cleaving  the  main 
trunk  of  northern  Italy. 

The  supposed  incapacity  of  Russia  for  any  serious  aggres- 
sive action  was  regarded  as  a  welcome  opportunity  for  de- 
livering the  decisive  blow  at  Italy.  With  powerful  forces 
concentrated  behind  the  boldly  protruding  front  of  the 
Trentino,  it  seemed  possible  to  overwhelm  the  Italian  lines, 
which  were  poorly  organized  in  this  section,  break  through 
to  the  Venetian  plains,  and  cut  off  all  the  Italian  armies 
operating  on  the  northeastern  front. 

A  glance  at  the  map  will  show  that  Trent,  near  the  south- 
ern extremity  of  the  great  transalpine   route  descending 


Operations  on  Austro-Italian  Frontier     261 

from  the  Brenner  Pass  by  the  valleys  of  the  Eisak  and 
Adige,  was  the  key  to  northern  Italy  by  reason  of  the 
important  highways  radiating  from  it.  Southeastwards  a 
road  runs  through  the  Val  Sugana  to  Vicenza,  Padua,  and 
Venice;  southward  the  main  route  along  the  Adige  con- 
tinues through  the  Val  Lagarina  to  Verona;  and  southwest- 
wards  the  Val  Judicaria  opens  towards  Brescia  and  Milan. 
In  this  region  the  Austro-Hungarian  forces  could  be  safely 
assembled  under  cover  of  the  rounding  barrier  of  moun- 
tains and  could  freely  choose  the  direction  of  their  attack. 

But  at  the  same  time  Trentino  presented  serious  diffi- 
culties as  the  zone  of  departure  for  an  offensive  movement 
on  a  grand  scale.  Southern  Tirol  was  the  most  excentric 
part  of  Austria-Hungary.  Only  two  lines  of  communica- 
tion led  toward  it,  the  railway  routes  over  the  Brenner  and 
through  the  Pusterthal,  and  these  unite,  so  that  from  Fran- 
zenfeste  southward  to  Trent  one  double-track  railway  had 
to  provide  the  necessary  transportation  for  the  supply  and 
evacuation  of  the  attacking  armies.  The  situation  pre- 
cluded any  imitation  of  von  Hindenburg's  sensational 
strategic  feats  achieved  by  shifting  powerful  forces  for  suc- 
cessive unexpected  blows  at  different  points  around  the  peri- 
meter of  Venetia.  Once  the  offensive  had  been  launched, 
the  Austro-Hungarian  army  could  account  itself  fortunate 
if  the  railway  facilities  sufficed  for  sustaining  the  aggressive 
effort  on  the  original  lines  of  operations. 

At  this  time  the  Austro-Hungarian  front  from  the 
Adriatic  Sea  to  Tolmino  was  held  by  the  Fifth  Army  under 
General  Boroevic  von  Bojna,  comprising  the  Seventh  and 
Sixteenth  Corps.  Between  Tolmino  and  Carnia  lay  the 
Tenth  Army  commanded  by  General  von  Rohr.  The 
Fourteenth  Corps,  recruited  in  the  Tirol,  defended  the 
Pusterthal  north  of  Cadore,  and  the  Trentino  was  held  by 
the  armies  of  General  Dankl  and  General  von  Koevess. 


262  T  i  War 

The  Archduke  Charles  Francis  Joseph,  Heir-Apparent 

of  the  Austr. >-]  1  ungarian  throne,  now  assumed  the  supreme 
command  in  theTrentino,  where,  during  the  spring  months 
the  forces  were  increased  in  anticipation  of  the  great  offen- 
sive to  eighteen  divisions,  or  at  least  400,000  effectives,  with 
2,(>oi)  pieces  of  artillery,  800  of  them  being  heavies,  including 
tort\  305-millimeter  Skoda  howitzers,  four  385-millimeter 
naval  guns,  and  four  of  the  famous  420-millimeter  mortars. 

The  line  from  the  Adige  to  the  Val  Sugana,  a  distance 
of  about  thirty  miles,  was  chosen  as  the  sector  for  the 
Austro-Hungarian  attack.  At  this  time  the  Italian  front 
left  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Adi.^e  at  a  point  about  fifteen 
miles  north  of  the  boundary,  skirted  the  northern  slope  of 
the  mountain  mass  of  Pasubio,  ran  from  there  northeast- 
ward just  within  the  Austrian  frontier,  and  then  turning 
northward  from  the  vicinity  of  the  Cima  Manderiolo  to 
Mount  Collo  cut  deep  into  Austrian  territory  west  of 
Borgo.  But  the  main  bulwarks  of  the  defense  were  Mount 
Pasubio,  the  ridge  south  of  the  Val  Posina,  and  the  Sette 
Communi  plateau,  all  behind  this  line.  The  Italian  front 
in  this  region  as  a  whole,  running  as  it  did  athwart  the 
valleys,  was  broken  by  the  intervening  ridges  and  was  thus 
defensively  weak  from  want  of  good  lateral  communica- 
tions. In  many  places  the  first  line  was  only  a  series  of  de- 
tached outposts,  often  situated  at  elevations  where  they  could 
only  be  supplied  by  aerial  cars  suspended  from  cables. 

In  April  General  Cadorna  inspected  the  First  Army  on 
this  sector  and  substituted  General  Pecori-Giraldi  as  com- 
mander for  the  inefficient  General  Brusati. 

The  great  Austro-Hungarian  attack  was  preceded  by  a 
laborious  preparation  in  building  roads;  forming  great 
accumulations  of  ammunition  and  supplies,  replenishment 
depots,  and  transport  parks;  constructing  hospitals,  artil- 
lery  emplacements,   and    the   necessary  additional   trench 


Operations  on  Austro-Italian  Frontier     263 

system.  It  was  intended  to  repeat  the  Dunajec  victory  of 
the  year  before  by  a  concentrated  bombardment  of  similar 
intensity,  followed  by  successive  massed  attacks. 

The  bombardment  opened  along  the  entire  sector  on 
May  14th  and  the  attack  of  the  infantry  was  launched  on 
the  evening  of  the  15th.  The  Italian  left  wing  retired 
until  resistance  rested  on  the  heights  of  Coni  Zugna  and 
Pasubio,  which  commanded  the  road  from  Rovereto  to 
Schio,  a  key  to  the  rear  of  the  Italian  center.  The  des- 
perate conflict  in  this  section  reached  a  climax  on  the  30th 
with  the  Austro-Hungarian  attack  on  the  Buole  Pass, 
which  would  have  opened  a  way  into  the  lower  valley  of 
the  Adige.  The  invaders  were  repulsed,  largely  through 
the  gallant  conduct  of  the  Thirty-seventh  Italian  Division. 
But  the  conflict  raged  around  the  slopes  of  Pasubio  for 
three  weeks  more  before  the  offensive  finally  spent  its  force. 

In  the  center  it  was  impossible  for  the  Italians  to  hold 
their  inadequate  defenses  against  the  crushing  bombard- 
ment. Valuable  strategic  positions  had  to  be  abandoned 
almost  without  a  struggle,  and  the  left  center  withdrew 
behind  the  Posina  on  May  24th.  The  Austro-Hungarian 
forces  descending  the  Val  Posina  occupied  the  small  town 
of  Arsiero,  seven  miles  within  the  Italian  border  and 
assailed  the  position  on  the  ridge  of  Mount  Ciove,  only 
eighteen  miles  from  Vicenza  and  three  miles  from  the 
plain.  The  Italians  clung  to  their  last  mountain  defenses 
with  grim  determination  against  heavy  odds.  To  the  troops 
defending  this  ridge  south  of  Arsiero,  General  Cadorna 
issued  his  memorable  order  on  June  3d:  "Remember  that 
here  we  defend  the  soil  of  our  country  and  the  honor  of 
our  army.  These  positions  must  be  defended  to  the 
death."  One  Italian  brigade  of  6,000  men  fighting  on 
Mount  Ciove  lost  two-thirds  of  its  effective  strength  in 
killed  and  wounded  during  these  crucial  days. 


264  The  Great  War 

But  already  the  Italian  resistance  was  Stiffening.  Orders 
had  gone  forth  for  the  concentration  of  all  available  re- 
serves at  Vicenza,  where  the  formation  of  the  Italian  Fifth 
Army  was  rapidly  accomplished  with  a  complete  equipment 
of  transport  columns,  held  kitchens,  sanitary  service,  heavy 
artillery,  and  abundant  stores  of  ammunition.  By  June  3d 
powerful  reinforcements  from  this  source  were  arriving  at 
the  threatened  points,  and  General  Cadorna  could  announce 
that  the  progress  of  the  invasion  had  been  checked. 

Further  towards  the  Italian  right  the  Austro-Hungarian 
forces  had  reached  Asiago  on  May  28th,  eight  miles  within 
the  border.  Here  the  assailants  gained  the  greater  part  of 
the  Sette  Communi  plateau,  but  on  June  18th  twenty  bat- 
talions flung  as  a  culminating  effort  against  a  front  of  two 
miles  were  driven  back  with  heavy  losses. 

The  tide  had  everywhere  turned  and  the  Italians  were 
pushing  their  counter-offensive  with  increasing  force.  The 
Austro-Hungarian  armies  drew  back  in  good  order  with- 
out relinquishing  all  their  gains,  and  dug  themselves  in  on 
a  new  line  from  three  to  seven  miles  in  advance  of  the  old 
one  and  in  better  positions. 

Meanwhile,  the  Italian  Chamber  had  convened  on  June 
6th  while  popular  feeling  was  still  deeply  affected  by  the 
impressions  of  the  critical  period  from  which  the  nation 
was  just  emerging.  The  hardships  and  privations  of  the 
struggle,  the  disappointment  in  the  hope  of  a  rapid  victory, 
the  revelation  of  defects  in  the  Italian  preparations,  and 
the  anxiety  created  by  the  present  situation  were  reflected 
in  a  general  state  of  restlessness.  The  prime  minister's  ad- 
mission that  General  Brusati,  commander  of  the  First 
Army,  had  been  lax  in  the  preparation  of  defenses  involved 
the  government  in  blame.  The  extreme  parties  joined  in 
an  attack  upon  the  ministry;  a  vote  of  confidence  was  lost 
on  June  10th,  and  Signor  Salandra  resigned  two  days  later. 


I  syilzERL4Vn 


Operations  on  Austro-Italian  Frontier     265 

Signor  Baselli  was  entrusted  with  the  formation  of  a  new 
ministry  in  which  Signor  Sonnino  retained  charge  of  for- 
eign affairs. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  offensive  with  all  its  elaborate 
preparation,  excellent  equipment,  and  superiority  of  fire, 
had  deferred,  but  not  prevented,  the  intended  powerful 
Italian  offensive  on  the  Isonzo  front,  for  which  methodical 
preparations  were  now  under  way.  In  July,  1916,  the  Italian 
front  in  this  sector  still  lay  west  of  the  river  from  Tolmino 
to  below  Gorizia,  except  at  one  point  where  the  Italians 
held  a  bridge-head  on  the  eastern  bank  in  a  bend  of  the 
river  opposite  Plava. 

Gorizia  lies  in  a  recess  of  strongly  fortified  mountains 
and  is  screened  by  the  lesser  heights  of  Monte  Sabotino, 
Oslavia,  and  Podgora  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Isonzo,  which 
were  still  held  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  forces.  The  Italian 
front  crossed  the  Isonzo  southwest  of  Gorizia  and  ran  along 
the  margin  of  the  Carso  to  the  sea.  A  depression  called  the 
Vallone  runs  southward  from  the  plain  of  Gorizia  to  the 
sea,  setting  off  the  rounding  western  extremity  of  the  Carso 
as  a  chord  defines  the  segment  of  an  arc.  At  the  northern 
extremity  of  this  western  segment,  in  the  angle  between 
the  Vallone  and  the  valley  of  the  Isonzo,  rises  Monte  San 
Michele,  the  key  to  the  possession  of  Gorizia.  The  Fifth 
Austro-Hungarian  Army  under  General  Boroevic  von 
Bojna  holding  the  front  from  Tolmino  to  the  sea  was  con- 
fronted by  the  Italian  army  commanded  by  the  Duke  of 
Aosta.  It  is  probable  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  com- 
mander overestimated  the  effect  of  the  offensive  launched 
from  the  Trentino  and  did  not  expect  any  serious  effort 
against  Gorizia  during  the  remainder  of  the  campaign. 

The  Italian  bombardment  commenced  on  August  1st 
along  the  entire  front  from  Monte  Sabotino  to  the  sea. 
By  attacking  near  Monfalcone  on  August  4th,  the  Italian 


266  Thb  Great  War 

right  drew  the  enemy's  attention  to  that  quarter.  Two  days 
later  the  bombardment  was  resumed  with  greater  fury  on  the 
real  front  of  attack  extending  about  ei^ht  miles  from  Monte 
Sabotino  to  Monte  San  Michele.  The  advanced  works  of 
the  enemy  were  largely  demolished  and  at  four  P.M.  the 
Italian  infantry  sprang  to  the  attack  with  great  ardor. 

On  Monte  Sahotino  the  Italian  forces  captured  the  first 
three  trench  lines  in  twenty  minutes  and  within  an  hour 
had  gained  the  summit  1,500  feet  above  the  river.  Podgora 
offered  more  serious  resistance  and  was  only  completely 
won  after  two  days  of  desperate  fighting.  The  storming 
of  San  Michele,  which  presented  very  great  difficulties,  was 
also  accomplished  in  two  days.  By  noon  on  August  8th  all 
the  heights  on  the  west  bank  together  with  San  Michele 
were  in  the  hands  of  the  Italians. 

The  main  part  of  the  Italian  army  crossed  the  Isonzo  on 
the  morning  of  the  9th  and  on  the  same  day  the  King  of 
Italy  and  the  Duke  of  Aosta  made  their  triumphant  entry 
into  Gorizia  while  the  Austro-Hungarian  forces  retired 
eastward. 

The  offensive  was  now  turned  in  the  direction  of  Trieste 
but  waned  by  the  15th  after  the  whole  surface  of  the  Carso 
west  of  the  Vallone  had  been  won.  The  Italians  had  taken 
18,758  prisoners  during  these  operations,  including  1,393 
officers. 

The  capture  of  the  entrenched  camp  of  Gorizia,  the 
chief  Austro-Hungarian  defensive  center  on  the  Isonzo 
front,  was  greeted  with  profound  satisfaction  throughout 
Italy  and  contributed  to  the  renewed  national  spirit  of 
confidence  and  resolution.  Thus  encouraged,  Italy  de- 
clared war  on  Germany,  August  28th,  putting  an  end  to 
an  anomalous  situation  and  removing  a  great  obstacle  to 
the  complete  community  of  interest  with  her  allies. 


CHAPTER  XII 

The  Battle  of  the  Somme 

The  difficulties  of  the  Allies  and  the  need  of  closer  cooperation.  First 
joint  war  council  of  the  Allies  in  Paris,  March  27-28,  1916.  Auspicious 
course  of  Allied  operations  in  1916.  The  situation  in  Picardy  Disposi- 
tions for  the  Allied  offensive  in  the  region  of  the  Somme  Character  of 
the  German  defensive  organization.  Aims  of  the  British  and  French.  Three 
general  stages  of  the  battle.  The  first  stage,  July  1-13 :  the  initial  attack 
by  the  Fourth  British  and  Sixth  French  Armies  and  its  results ;  further  ad- 
vances of  the  British ;  the  progress  of  the  French.  The  second  stage : 
general  attack  on  July  15th  and  the  capture  of  the  second  German  position 
by  the  British ;  the  attack  on  July  23d ;  capture  of  Pozieres ;  French  attack 
north  of  the  Somme ;  the  attack  on  September  3d  and  the  intervention  of 
the  Tenth  French  Army.  The  general  hopeful  situation  for  the  Allies. 
The  third  stage,  September  15-November  18:  general  attack  on  Septem- 
ber 15th  and  first  appearance  of  the  "tanks";  attack  of  September  25th  and 
occupation  of  Combles ;  disappointing  effect  of  the  weather  on  the  Allied 
plans ;  desultory  offensive  operations ;  closing  of  the  battle  with  the  attack 
of  the  Fifth  British  Army.     Results  of  the  battle. 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  successes  of  the  Central 
Powers  were  largely  due  to  a  virtually  unified  supreme 
command,  which  insured  coherent  strategy,  the  strict  sub- 
ordination of  every  effort  to  the  attainment  of  the  crucial 
aims,  and  the  unhesitating  execution  of  the  plans  adopted. 
The  available  operative  forces  were  shifted  and  grouped 
with  singleness  of  purpose  to  dash  with  staggering  effect 
upon  the  more  clumsy  enemy.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Allies  labored  under  the  difficulties  inherent  in  coalitions, 
which  are  familiar  to  every  student  of  European  history. 
Chief  among  them  is  the  demoralizing  effect  of  diverse 
political  ambitions  on  military  policy.  The  aims  of  the 
several   members    of   a   coalition   rarely   coincide    at    the 

267 


268  The  Great  War 

beginning,  and  there  is  still  further  danger  that  discrepancies 
will  be  generated  or  increased  through  the  vicissitudes  of 
a  protracted  struggle.  Confusion  of  ultimate  aims  is  in- 
evitably reflected  in  incoherent  military  efforts.  The  out- 
come  is  rarely  satisfactory  to  all  the  partners  and  even  the 
terms  of  a  victorious  peace  are  apt  to  contain  the  germs  of 
future  strife  between  them. 

The  league  of  the  Central  Powers  was  practically  free 
from  these  distracting  tendencies,  because  the  prominence 
of  Germany  gave  her  a  position  of  unquestionable  superior- 
ity, imposing  her  strategical  conceptions  upon  her  partners. 
In  moments  of  depression  the  Germans  derived  assurance 
from  the  reflection  that  Prussia  had  emerged  unconquered 
from  the  Seven  Years'  War,  when  the  odds  against  her 
were  far  greater  than  the  preponderance  of  Germany's 
opponents  at  the  present  time. 

Lack  of  a  consistent  policy  and  prompt  cooperation  were 
largely  responsible  for  the  misfortunes  of  the  Allies,  such 
as  the  failure  at  the  Dardanelles,  the  diplomatic  reverses 
in  the  Balkans,  the  collapse  of  Serbia,  and  the  defeats  of 
Russia.  The  most  important  lesson  taught  by  the  expe- 
rience of  eighteen  months  of  warfare  was  the  need  of  unity 
in  aim  and  strategy. 

With  this  in  view  the  first  joint  war  council  of  the  Allies 
was  held  in  Paris  on  March.  27-28,  1916.  France,  Great 
Britain,  Italy,  Belgium,  and  Serbia  were  represented  by  their 
premiers  and  foreign  ministers,  and  Russia,  Japan,  Monte- 
negro, and  Portugal  by  their  ambassadors  or  ministers. 
Generals  Joffre,  Castelnau,  Cadorna,  and  Robertson,  Lord 
Kitchener,  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  and  M.  Thomas  were 
present  at  the  council.  It  could  scarcely  be  expected  that 
nations  so  diverse,  so  jealous  of  their  independence,  and 
so  conscious  of  their  individuality  would  sacrifice  their 
egoistic  sensibilities  to  the  point  of  accepting  the  supreme 


h 


"  Le  Cerf  Volant.1 ' 
i(The  Flying  Stag,"  as  the  arrangement  is  called  by  the  French,  is  a  train  of  box-kites 
■ivith  an  obser-vation  basket  suspended  from  the  retaining  rope.       Used  on  days  too  windy  J  or 
balloons  or  aeroplanes. 


Zeppelin  observation  car.  From  a  Zeppelin  brought  down  in  East  Anglia :  it  is  fourteen 
feet  long,  built  of  aluminium  and  weighs  one  hundred  and  twenty-two  pounds.  It  was  sus- 
pended by  a  wire  cable  5,000  feet  in  length,  through  which  ran  a  telephone  wire.  Observa- 
tion windows  are  at  the  front  and  vertical  and  horizontal  stabilizers  at  the  stern. 


The  Battle  of  the  Somme  269 

advantage  of  a  single  high  command.  Yet  undoubtedly  an 
effective  step  in  the  direction  of  closer  cooperation  was 
taken  at  this  meeting,  while  the  general  lines  of  strategy 
were  laid  down  for  the  following  campaign. 

As  a  further  indication  of  the  desire  to  reach  a  common 
policy,  mention  may  here  be  made  of  the  Economic  Con- 
ference of  the  Entente  Powers,  held  in  Paris,  June  14-17 
of  this  same  year,  when  plans  were  approved  for  making  the 
blockade  more  effective  and  prolonging  the  commercial  con- 
test after  the  war  by  a  partial  exclusion  of  German  goods. 

The  first  part  of  1916  was  a  period  of  increasing  promise 
for  the  Allies.  Great  Britain  had  nerved  herself  to  com- 
pulsory service.  France  maintained  the  same  intense  de- 
gree of  effort  without  signs  of  exhaustion.  The  Western 
powers  had  carried  out  a  comprehensive  industrial  mobi- 
lization and  had  enormously  increased  their  output  of 
munitions.  In  Great  Britain,  for  instance,  four  days'  pro- 
duction of  heavy  shells  now  equalled  the  entire  output  of 
the  first  year  of  the  war.  When  the  Germans  were  wast- 
ing their  picked  troops  in  feverish  efforts  to  break  down  the 
defense  of  Verdun,  the  operations  of  the  Allies  began  to 
show  the  rational  sequence  of  a  well-developed  plan.  While 
the  Italians  resisted  the  fierce  onslaught  of  their  opponents 
from  the  Trentino,  and  the  choicest  Austro-Hungarian 
units  were  immobilized  in  an  excentric  corner  of  the  em- 
pire, the  Russian  offensive  was  launched  with  unexpected 
vigor.  Later,  when  the  spare  forces  of  the  Central  Powers 
had  been  diverted  to  the  Eastern  front,  the  gradually 
accumulated  tempest  broke  with  formidable  force  against 
the  German  bulwarks  in  the  West.  From  June  to  Octo- 
ber, 1916,  the  military  organization  of  the  Central  Powers 
labored  under  the  terrible  pressure  on  both  sides. 

By  the  spring  of  1916  the  British  military  system  had 
undergone  a  phenomenal  transformation.  The  four  original 


270  The  Great  War 

divisions  on  the  continent  had  been  increased  to  seventy, 
including  the  Indian  and  colonial  contingents.  There  were 
about  1,500,000  British  troops  in  Belgium  and  France  and 
as  many  more  in  training  and  concentration  camps  and  gar- 
risons at  home.  A  Military  Service  Bill,  which  was  intro- 
duced into  the  House  of  Commons  on  May  3d  and  became 
law  on  the  25th,  extended  the  principle  of  compulsory 
sen  ice  to  all  married  men  between  the  ages  of  eighteen 
and  forty-one.  In  March  the  British  had  taken  over  the 
entire  sector  of  the  Tenth  French  Army,  which  had  so 
long  adjoined  them  on  the  south  in  Artois,  the  French 
being  transferred  to  a  sector  further  south.  Thereafter 
the  British  front  stretched  from  Boesinghe  southward  to  a 
point  slightly  beyond  the  Somme  and  covered  a  distance 
of  twenty-five  miles  in  Belgium  and  sixty-five  in  France. 
They  were  faced  on  this  front  by  about  forty  German  divi- 
sions in  line  and  in  the  local  reserves,  forming,  in  order 
from  north  to  south,  the  Fourth  Army,  formerly  of  the 
Duke  of  Wiirttemberg,  the  Seventh  of  the  Crown  Prince 
of  Bavaria,  and  the  right  wing  of  the  Second,  whose  former 
commander,  General  von  Biilow,  had  been  succeeded  by 
General  Otto  von  Below,  cousin  of  the  General  Fritz  von 
Below  who  commanded  the  Eighth  Army  on  the  eastern 
front  in  Courland.  On  December  15,  1915,  announcement 
had  been  made  of  the  promotion  of  General  Sir  Douglas 
Haig  to  the  post  of  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  British 
Forces  in  France  and  Belgium,  succeeding  Field-marshal 
Sir  John  French,  who,  upon  his  own  request,  was  relieved 
of  the  command  of  the  forces  on  the  continent.  He  was 
created  a  viscount  and  given  the  position  of  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Armies  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Sir  Douglas 
Haig  will  be  recalled  as  commander  of  the  First  British 
Army  Corps  and  subsequently  of  the  First  Army,  and  he  had 
shown  himself  to  be  "a  skilful,  bold,  and  decisive"  general. 


The  Battle  of  the  Somme  271 

All  through  the  spring  of  1916,  while  the  French  were 
struggling  manfully  against  superior  strength  at  Verdun, 
the  British  remained  inactive  or  were  engaged  in  merely 
desultory  incidents  of  trench  warfare.  This  contrast,  upon 
which  German  commentators  dwelt  with  the  obvious  in- 
tention of  sowing  jealousy  and  mistrust  between  the  allies, 
accorded  with  the  mutual  understanding  of  the  French  and 
British  leaders.  The  British  were  intentionally  reserved  for 
the  chief  part  in  the  great  offensive  effort  after  the  Ger- 
mans had  worn  down  their  strength  in  costly  efforts  on  the 
Meuse.  The  British,  furthermore,  were  not  yet  fully  pre- 
pared for  an  operation  of  the  desired  scope,  intensity,  and 
duration. 

To  provoke  a  premature  counter-offensive  by  the  British 
would  have  suited  German  interests,  as  the  Germans  feared 
above  all  a  simultaneous  onslaught  of  their  adversaries.  As 
it  was,  the  combined  British  and  French  offensive  was 
somewhat  hastened  by  the  need  of  relieving  the  severe 
pressure  upon  the  Verdun  sector. 

The  theater  selected  for  the  long  contemplated  blow  was 
the  region  of  Picardy,  where  the  Somme  winds  through  a 
belt  of  green  fields  and  meadows  enclosed  by  irregular 
elevations  of  chalky  formation.  Although  this  sector  lay 
near  the  most  prominent  part  of  the  general  salient  formed 
by  the  German  lines  in  northern  France,  no  important 
fighting  had  occurred  upon  it  since  the  memorable  race 
for  the  North  Sea  in  the  autumn  of  1914.  Throughout 
this  section  the  Germans  held  the  commanding  positions. 
Running  southward  from  Artois,  the  German  front  line 
descended  the  southern  slope  of  the  watershed  and  crossed 
the  Ancre,  a  tributary  of  the  Somme,  about  five  miles  above 
Albert,  bore  off  southeastward  to  the  village  of  Fricourt 
beyond  the  Albert-Bapaume  road,  and  then  turned  sharply 
to  the  east  and  skirted  the   southern  declivity  of  a  high 


272  The  Great  War 

undulating  tract,  known  for  convenience  as  the  Thiepval- 
Morval  ridge,  which  forms  the  watershed  between  the 
Somme  and  the  tributaries  of  the  Scheldt  flowing  northeast- 
ward into  Belgium.  After  running  eastward  for  about  four 
miles  the  line  swung  around  the  northeastern  margin  of  the 
village  of  Maricourt  and  continued  southward  to  the  Sonmie 
near  Curlu,  about  eight  miles  below  Peronne.  South  of 
the  Somme  the  general  course  of  the  line  within  the  battle- 
zone  was  southward.  It  will  be  seen  that  Fricourt  stood  at 
the  apex  of  a  local  salient  in  the  German  front  pointing 
towards  the  southwest,  while  Maricourt  marked  the  inner 
extremity  of  the  southern  reentrant  of  this  salient.  A  short 
time  before  the  battle  the  British  relinquished  to  the  French 
the  southernmost  section  of  their  front,  so  that  Maricourt 
was  now  the  junction  point  of  the  two  allied  armies. 

For  two  years  the  Germans  had  spared  no  pains  to  make 
their  defenses  impregnable  in  this  section.  A  second  de- 
fensive system  ran  along  the  southern  crest  of  the  water- 
shed from  3,000  to  5,000  yards  behind  the  first.  Each 
system  consisted  of  several  parallel  trenches  with  elaborate 
series  of  shelters  hollowed  in  the  chalky  soil.  There  were 
special  strongholds  at  the  most  important  points,  numerous 
redoubts,  and  machine-gun  emplacements  arranged  for 
sweeping  laterally  the  zones  of  approach.  The  front  of 
each  system  was  protected  by  wire-entanglements,  many 
of  them  in  two  belts,  forty  yards  apart.  The  space  be- 
tween the  defensive  systems  was  traversed  in  every  direc- 
tion by  communication  trenches.  Woods  and  villages  had 
been  converted  into  veritable  fortresses.  Deep  cellars,  pits, 
and  quarries  were  utilized  for  trench  mortars.  A  third 
system  of  defense  was  being  organized  during  the  progress 
of  the  battle. 

It  was  clear  that  the  Allies  could  only  succeed  in  breach- 
ing such  an  obstacle  by  a  tedious  battering  process,  requiring 


ap  showing  the  Somme  territory  upon  which  took  place  the  Allied  offensive  in  the  summer  of  1916. 


The  Battle  of  the  Somme  273 

an  enormous  consumption  of  ammunition,  the  frequent 
intervention  of  fresh  troops,  and  unflagging  perseverance. 
The  British  and  French  had  made  their  preparations  on  an 
unprecedented  scale.  Many  miles  of  new  railway  tracks 
were  laid  to  facilitate  the  replenishment  of  supplies  and 
ammunition.  Vast  stores  of  shell  had  been  accumulated 
at  depots  behind  the  front.  But  the  Allied  leaders  in- 
dulged in  no  deceptive  hopes  of  obtaining  sensational  re- 
sults directly.  Their  aims,  according  to  the  words  of  the 
British  commander-in-chief,  were  to  relieve  the  pressure 
on  Verdun,  assist  the  Allies  in  the  other  theaters  by  arrest- 
ing the  transference  of  German  troops  from  the  Western 
front,  and  wear  down  the  strength  of  their  immediate 
opponents.  The  offensive  eventually  developed  upon  a 
front  of  about  thirty  miles  from  Gommecourt  to  a  point 
about  twelve  miles  south  of  the  Somme.  The  great 
Allied  attack  was  undertaken  by  the  Fourth  British  Army 
under  Sir  Henry  Rawlinson,  which  consisted,  in  order 
from  north  to  south,  of  the  Eighth,  Tenth,  Third,  Fif- 
teenth, and  Thirteenth  Corps,  and  the  Sixth  French  Army 
under  General  Fayolle,  composed  of  the  Twentieth,  First 
Colonial,  and  Thirty-fifth  Corps.  Beyond  the  latter  lay 
the  French  Tenth  Army,  in  the  command  of  which  Gen- 
eral d'Urbal  had  been  replaced  by  General  Micheler,  and 
a  Fifth  British  Army  was  forming  behind  the  Fourth. 
Bapaume  served  as  general  objective  for  the  British  and 
Peronne  for  the  French,  while  Combles,  situated  prac- 
tically on  the  line  of  demarcation  of  the  zones  of  opera- 
tion of  the  two  armies,  was  a  sort  of  intermediate  objective 
for  both. 

It  would  be  impractical  to  present  in  detail  the  number 
and  identity  of  the  bodies  of  troops  engaged  on  either  side 
throughout  the  long  continued  struggle  on  the  Somme, 
because  they  changed  so  often. 


274  The  Great  War 

The  struggle  may  be  divided  with  special  reference  to 
the  progress  of  the  British  into  three  general  stages:  the 
first,  in  which  the  assailants  gained  possession  of  the  for- 
w  ard  crest  of  the  plateau;  the  second,  in  which  they  f ought 
for  the  plateau;  and  the  third,  when  they  gradually  drove 
their  opponents  down  the  reverse  slope. 

The  operations  displayed  from  the  first  a  great  advance 
in  the  Allied  equipment  and  technique.  Thus,  before  the 
battle,  a  swarm  of  Allied  "battle-planes"  of  improved  de- 
sign swrept  over  the  enemy  lines,  dispersed  the  German  air 
scouts,  destroyed  the  German  observation  balloons,  and 
brought  back  accurate  photographs  from  which  the  plans 
for  the  artillery  demolition  fire  were  made.  In  spite  of 
their  original  indignation  the  Allies  had  not  only  acquiesced 
in  gas  as  an  accepted  means  of  warfare,  but  even  improved 
upon  the  German  gas  and  liquid  flame  attacks  in  some 
particulars. 

A  steady  bombardment  of  the  German  position  began  on 
June  28th,  while  intense  activity  prevailed  throughout  the 
communication  zone  behind  the  Allied  lines.  The  sun  rose 
bright  and  clear  on  July  1st,  the  most  momentous  day  for 
the  Allies  in  the  West  since  the  close  of  open  warfare  in  the 
autumn  of  1914.  The  "spring  offensive,"  to  which  mil- 
lions had  looked  forward  with  keen  expectancy,  postponed 
a  year  and  then  put  off  until  summer,  was  finally  at  hand. 

The  bombardment  reached  its  highest  pitch  about  7.15 
A.M.  and  at  7.30  the  artillery  lengthened  its  range  and  the 
bombardment  was  transformed  into  a  barrage.  The  British 
and  French  troops  cleared  their  parapets  and  fell  upon  the 
first  German  position. 

In  the  region  of  the  Ancre  the  British  could  scarcely 
make  any  progress.  The  counter-action  of  the  German 
artillery,  accurately  directed  from  observation  posts  on  the 
higher  ground,  was  terribly  effective.     In  some  places  the 


The  Battle  of  the  Somme  275 

foremost  British  trench  was  obliterated  and  the  attacking 
infantry  was  compelled  to  form  on  the  open  ground 
behind  it. 

Further  to  the  right  the  results  were  highly  gratifying. 
Instead  of  assaulting  Fricourt,  the  British  attacked  the  two 
sides  of  the  salient  of  which  this  village  formed  the  apex. 
On  the  left  the  British  fought  their  way  up  to  the  out- 
skirts of  La  Boisselle,  on  the  right  they  captured  Mametz 
and  Montauban,  so  that  the  Germans  were  compelled  to 
relinquish  Fricourt  the  next  day. 

The  French  attacking  on  the  British  right  took  their 
opponents  rather  by  surprise  and  made  rapid  gains.  Thus 
on  the  first  day  from  Mametz  to  Fay  at  the  southern  ex- 
tremity of  the  French  front  of  attack,  a  distance  of  fourteen 
miles,  the  Allies  carried  the  entire  first  German  position, 
consisting  of  three  or  four  parallel  trenches,  and  captured 
6,000  prisoners.  An  announcement  in  the  Berlin  press 
that  the  frequent  sorties  of  the  British  and  French  had 
everywhere  been  repulsed  and  prisoners  and  booty  taken, 
was  followed  by  a  singular  reticence  for  several  weeks,  as 
though  the  conflict  on  the  Somme  were  only  a  minor 
operation. 

The  left  wing  of  the  British  front  from  the  Albert- 
Bapaume  road  northward  was  now  turned  over  to  the 
new  Fifth  Army  commanded  by  Sir  Hubert  Gough,  the 
greater  part  of  which  did  little  more  for  several  months 
than  hold  its  original  position. 

The  problem  now  confronting  the  British  was  to  capture 
a  number  of  fortified  villages  in  the  general  region  of  the 
Albert-Bapaume  road  and  drive  the  Germans  from  an 
intermittent  zone  of  woods  running  along  the  slope  from 
the  vicinity  of  Fricourt  eastward. 

La  Boisselle  was  carried  after  a  fierce  struggle  on  the 
morning  of  the  5th,  and,  in  spite  of  the  presence  of  the 


276  The  Great  War 

Third  Guards   Division  to  stiffen  the  German  resistance, 

Contalmaison  was  overtaken  by  the  same  fate  on  the  10th. 

The  advance  through  the  woods  referred  to  was  attended 

with  unusual  difficulties  by  reason  of  the  dense  under- 
growth, concealed  trenches  and  machine-gun  emplace- 
ments, and  the  intricate  barbed-wire  entanglements.  The 
ground  had  to  he  conquered  yard  by  yard  and  repeatedly 
defended  against  determined  counter-attacks.  But  by  the 
12th  the  British  had  traversed  this  belt  of  woods  and  faced 
the  second  German  position  which  ran  along  or  near  the 
southern  crest  of  the  ridge. 

The  French  meanwhile  had  made  comparatively  rapid 
progress  south  of  the  Somme.  On  the  second  day  of  the 
attack  they  broke  through  the  second  German  position  in 
several  places.  On  the  third  they  penetrated  the  third  line 
in  one  place,  and  by  the  9th  the  point  of  their  wedge  had 
been  pushed  to  within  a  mile  of  Peronne.  In  less  than 
two  weeks  the  French  under  General  Fayolle,  advancing  on 
a  front  of  about  ten  miles,  reached  a  maximum  depth  of 
six  and  one-half  miles  and  took  more  than  12,000  prisoners. 

The  second  stage  of  the  great  offensive  opened  with  a 
British  attack  on  a  section  of  the  second  German  position 
running  from  Pozieres  through  Bazentin-le-Petit,  Bazentin- 
le-Grand,  and  Longueval,  to  Guillemont,  a  distance  of  about 
four  miles. 

The  French  national  holiday,  July  14th,  was  celebrated 
in  Paris  with  exceptional  brilliancy,  rendered  especially  im- 
pressive by  the  parade  of  numerous  troop  detachments 
from  the  front,  including  British,  Belgian,  and  Russian 
combatants,  who  were  reviewed  by  the  president,  minis- 
ters, and  leading  generals.  Circumstances  seemed  to  justify 
this  foretaste  of  the  exaltation  of  a  final  Allied  victory. 

On  the  same  day  and  with  corresponding  enthusiasm  the 
British  forces  near  the  Somme  shattered  the  German  second 


A  British  tank. 


French  observation  balloon  about  to  arise.  The  observer  is  in  the  "nacelle,"  or  basket, 
suspended  underneath  and  communicates  with  the  ground  by  telephone.  The  large  semicircular 
cur  zed  bag  at  the  rear  is  open  at  the  front  to  allow  the  wind  to  Jill  it  and  thus  hold  the  balloon  s 
head  to  the  wind.    A  gasolene  windlass  on  a  truck  hauls  the  balloon  back  to  the  ground  when  desired. 


The  Battle  of  the  Somme  277 

position.  This  attack  was  delivered  by  the  Third,  Fifteenth, 
and  Thirteenth  British  Corps  on  a  front  of  about  four  miles 
in  the  gray  light  of  early  dawn  at  3.25  A.M.,  and  before 
night  the  assailants  had  won  the  second  position  to  a  width 
of  more  than  three  miles  from  Bazentin-le-Petit  to  Lon- 
gueval.  In  this  engagement  British  mounted  cavalry  were 
used  for  the  first  time  in  eighteen  months  to  sweep  up  the 
area  behind  the  captured  trenches.  On  the  next  day  the 
British  on  the  right  began  a  struggle  for  the  possession  of 
Delville  Wood  lasting  thirteen  days,  when  the  Third  Guards 
and  Fifth  Brandenburg  and  other  German  divisions  strove 
in  vain  to  stay  the  gradual  progress  of  the  British. 

Simultaneously  the  British  gave  their  attention  to  cap- 
turing Pozieres  and  Guillemont  at  opposite  extremities  of 
the  hollow  already  made  in  the  German  front.  Two  addi- 
tional corps,  the  Second  Anzac  and  First  Anzac,  arriving 
at  the  battle-front,  took  up  positions  in  the  order  mentioned 
from  north  to  south  between  the  Ancre  and  a  point  just 
south  of  the  Albert-Bapaume  road. 

The  most  important  feature  of  a  general  infantry  attack 
on  July  23d  was  the  operation  against  Pozieres,  lying  in  a 
dominating  position  on  the  ridge  north  of  Fricourt  and 
strongly  fortified.  A  British  Territorial  division  and  an 
Anzac  division  started  about  midnight  from  opposite  sides 
for  a  converging  advance  against  this  place. 

After  a  furious  struggle  the  Australians  gained  a  position 
along  the  edge  of  the  highway  traversing  the  village,  where 
they  were  separated  from  the  enemy  by  the  width  of  the 
road  alone.  Advancing  step  by  step  on  the  24th  and  25th,  the 
assailants  joined  forces  at  the  northern  corner  of  the  village 
on  the  morning  of  the  26th.  On  August  4th  they  gained  a 
section  of  the  German  second  line  northeast  of  Pozieres. 

The  German  High  Command,  compelled  repeatedly  to 
reinforce  the  threatened  sector  in  the  West,  restored  the 


278  THE  Gri  it  War 

First  Army,  which  had  been  abolished  in  the  spring  of 
1915,  placing  it  under  the  command  of  General  von  Below, 
while  General  von  Gallwitz  assumed  the  command  of  the 
Second  Army.  The  First  Army  held  the  hattle  sector 
north  of  the  Somme,  and  the  Second,  that  on  the  south. 

The  French,  after  carrying  the  third  German  position 
and  advancing  almost  to  Peronne  on  the  south  side  of  the 
Somme,  delivered  an  attack  north  of  the  river  on  August 
12th  and  broke  through  the  German  third  position  on  a 
four-mile  front. 

There  was  a  lull  in  the  offensive  during  the  rest  of 
August,  while  the  Allies  moved  forward  their  heavy  artil- 
lery  to  suitable  positions  for  resuming  the  attack.  By 
September  they  were  ready  for  operations  on  an  even 
greater  scale. 

A  severe  bombardment  during  the  night  of  September 
2d  ushered  in  a  fresh  assault  of  the  Allied  infantry  at  noon 
on  the  3d,  when  the  British  gained  possession  of  Guille- 
mont  and  part  of  Gauchy  on  the  Thiepval-Morval  ridge 
beyond  the  already  captured  second  German  position.  The 
French  won  several  villages  between  Maurepas  and  the 
Somme  and  advanced  to  the  outskirts  of  Combles.  The 
advance  was  sustained  with  vigor  and  General  Micheler's 
Tenth  French  Army,  on  the  right  of  the  Sixth,  joined  in 
the  offensive  on  September  5th  and  carried  the  German 
first  position  opposite  its  own  front  on  a  width  of  about 
three  miles.  The  Germans  struggled  resolutely  to  regain 
the  lost  terrain;  but  the  repeated  counter-attacks  on  Sep- 
tember 6-8  were  ineffectual,  despite  the  participation  of 
the  four  divisions  of  the  Prussian  Guard. 

The  intensity  with  which  the  contest  on  the  Somme  had 
thus  far  been  conducted  may  be  measured  by  the  observa- 
tion made  by  the  Allies  that  down  to  the  close  of  the  second 
week  in  September  altogether  sixty-one  different  German 


The  Battle  of  the  Somme  279 

divisions  had  been  engaged,  the  front  in  the  battle-zone 
being  then  held  by  fifteen. 

By  this  time  the  Allies  had  gained  possession  of  the  surface 
of  the  main  part  of  the  ridge  north  of  the  Somme.  The 
Germans  had  already  perfected  their  third  defensive  system 
which  ran  along  the  reverse  side  of  the  main  ridge  and  was 
based  on  a  number  of  fortified  villages  such  as  Courcelette, 
Martinpuich,  Flers,  and  Morval.  They  were  even  preparing 
a  fourth  position  further  to  the  rear.  But  the  course  of 
events  in  all  the  theaters  seemed  to  be  moving  concordantly 
in  the  direction  of  a  great  Allied  success.  Brussiloff  was 
still  assailing  the  Austro-Germans  on  the  Eastern  front,  the 
Roumanians  had  declared  war  and  were  pouring  into  Tran- 
sylvania, Sarrail  had  opened  a  vigorous  offensive  in  the  Bal- 
kans and  the  Italians  were  threatening  the  Carso.  The  time 
was  ripe  to  renew  the  struggle  in  the  West  with  greater 
energy,  and  this  brings  us  to  the  opening  of  the  third  stage  of 
the  Battle  of  the  Somme,  when  the  Allies  pushed  the  Ger- 
mans down  the  reverse  slopes  of  the  Thiepval- Morval  ridge. 

The  new  attack  was  preceded  by  a  general  bombardment 
along  the  British  front  from  Thiepval  to  Ginchy,  beginning 
on  September  12th.  The  cannonading  rose  to  its  highest 
pitch  at  six  on  the  morning  of  the  15th  and  twenty  minutes 
later  the  British  infantry  went  over  their  parapets. 

This  was  the  occasion  for  the  first  appearance  of  the  new 
armored  cars  of  the  Heavy  Section  of  the  British  Machine- 
gun  Corps,  commonly  called  the  "tanks."  These  ponder- 
ous, ungainly  engines,  mounted  on  a  revolving  caterpillar 
tread,  waddled  forward  with  deliberate  indifference  to  the 
hottest  fire  and  the  most  formidable  obstacles,  spitting  right 
and  left  the  deadly  streams  of  lead  from  their  machine- 
guns,  crushing  barbed-wire  entanglements,  and  pausing  at 
times  astride  the  enemy  trenches  to  mow  down  the  rows 
of  the  defenders. 


280  The  Great  War 

Twenty-four  tanks  took  part  in  the  initial  performance. 

They  broke  through  the  enemy  line,  followed  closely  by 
the  first  wave  of  infantry  with  hand  grenades.  The  attack 
met  with  almost  immediate  success.  By  8.40  the  tanks 
were  entering  Flers,  covering  the  advancing  infantry. 
Courcelette  and  Martinpuich  were  taken  in  the  afternoon. 
The  British  advanced  to  an  average  distance  of  more  than 
a  mile  along  a  front  of  six  miles.  Similar  gains  were  made 
by  the  Third,  Fifteenth,  and  Fourteenth  British  Corps  in 
the  next  great  effort  on  the  25th,  while  the  French  pushed 
forward  to  the  Bapaume-Peronne  road.  Combles,  out- 
flanked by  the  Allied  armies  on  both  sides  and  no  longer 
tenable,  was  evacuated  by  the  Germans  on  the  26th. 

The  progress  of  the  offensive  seemed  to  have  reached 
the  eve  of  a  decisive  victory.  The  morale  of  the  Germans 
had  been  seriously  shaken.  They  had  been  driven  back 
upon  their  improvised  fourth  line.  Their  defensive  system 
worn  thin  by  constant  abrasion  threatened  to  give  way  at 
any  time.  But  at  this  propitious  moment  the  radiant  Allied 
prospects  vanished  in  a  long  period  of  bad  weather.  The 
operations  were  impeded  and  the  replenishment  of  am- 
munition and  supplies  was  rendered  very  difficult  across 
the  desolate  zone  behind  the  Allied  front,  where  the  roads 
had  been  worn  out  by  incessant  traffic. 

With  the  loss  of  the  chief  elements  of  their  third  posi- 
tion the  Germans  had  fallen  back  on  the  fourth  which  lay 
behind  the  spurs  debouching  from  the  Thiepval-Morval 
ridge  and  thus  were  screened  from  direct  observation.  The 
immediate  task  of  the  Fourth  British  Army  was  to  gain 
possession  of  the  commanding  spurs  which  were  held  by 
strongly  fortified  German  outposts,  that  of  the  Fifth  Army, 
to  master  the  rest  of  the  high  ground  in  the  vicinity  of 
Thiepval.  But  the  offensive  lapsed  into  partial  intermit- 
tent efforts. 


The  Battle  of  the  Somme  281 

It  took  nearly  a  month  to  overcome  the  stubborn  resist- 
ance of  the  Twenty-sixth  German  Reserve  Division  and 
marines  of  the  Naval  Division  in  the  Schwaben  Redoubt 
and  other  centers  of  defense  north  of  Thiepval,  where  the 
ridge  overlooks  the  valley  of  the  Ancre. 

The  Sixth  and  Tenth  French  Armies  were  cooperating 
with  the  general  view  of  expelling  the  Germans  from 
Peronne.  The  former  was  gradually  working  round  the 
flank  of  Mont  St.  Quentin,  the  chief  defense  of  Peronne 
on  the  north.  At  the  end  of  September  it  pierced  a  sec- 
tion of  the  German  fourth  position  at  St.  Pierre  Vaast 
Wood,  about  two  miles  east  of  Combles. 

From  July  1st  to  November  1st  the  Allies  took  as  pris- 
oners 1,469  officers,  and  71,532  men  and  captured  173  field 
pieces,  130  heavy  pieces,  215  trench  mortars,  and  988 
machine-guns.  At  the  latter  date  the  German  battle-front 
was  held  by  twenty-one  divisions. 

The  closing  events  of  this  gigantic  battle  occurred  chiefly 
on  the  British  left  wing  where  the  Fifth  Army  had  mainly 
served  thus  far  to  hold  the  existing  British  lines.  North 
of  the  Ancre,  between  Beaumont  Hamel  and  Serre,  the 
Germans  still  occupied  their  original  front  position,  which 
was  very  strong  and  provided  shelter  for  whole  battalions 
in  the  subterranean  shelters.  Finally  the  British  under- 
took to  widen  the  hollow  already  created  in  the  enemy's 
front  by  driving  back  their  opponents  in  this  quarter  also. 
The  Fifth  British  Army  stretched  from  Gommecourt  to 
the  Albert-Bapaume  road,  but  the  new  attack  was  confined 
to  the  section  north  of  the  Ancre.  The  artillery  prepara- 
tion began  on  November  11th,  and  the  infantry  attack  was 
launched  in  a  dark  fog  before  dawn  of  the  13th. 

On  the  left  the  attack  was  unsuccessful.  In  the  center 
the  Highland  Territorials  attacked  the  fortified  village  of 
Beaumont  Hamel,  where  four  successive  German  trench 


282  The  Great  War 

lines  were  connected  by  subterranean  passages.  Here  the 
assailants  came  to  desperate  hand-to-hand  encounters  with 
the  enemy  and  many  of  the  Germans  were  trapped  in  their 
own  dug-outs.  By  nightfall  the  British  had  gained  posses- 
sion of  the  village.  On  the  right  the  first  attacking  wave 
swept  over  the  front  and  supporting  trenches,  but  was 
arrested  by  a  strong  machine-gun  redoubt.  This  was  later 
silenced  by  a  tank.  Beaucourt  was  taken  on  the  14th.  But 
the  attack  soon  lost  momentum  and  ceased  on  the  18th. 

Measured  in  geographical  terms  the  results  of  the  Battle 
of  the  Somme  were  small.  The  Allies  nowhere  advanced 
more  than  seven  miles  and  only  conquered  about  120 
square  miles  of  territory.  They  failed  to  reach  Bapaume 
or  Peronne.  But  by  holding  a  part  of  Germany's  avail- 
able forces  in  this  corner  of  the  Western  front  the  offen- 
sive on  the  Somme  removed  the  pressure  on  Verdun  and 
made  possible  the  sweeping  Russian  victories,  while  wear- 
ing down  the  German  strength.  It  did  not  obtain  decisive 
results  or  save  Roumania  from  a  catastrophe.  But  the 
fact  that  Germany  was  held  continually  on  the  defensive 
for  so  many  months  made  generally  a  deep  impression  and 
the  campaign  of  1917  was  eagerly  awaited  by  the  Allies 
with  the  expectation  that  it  would  crown  the  great  efforts 
already  made  with  complete  and  final  victory. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

The   Renewed   Russian   Offensive  and  the   Inter- 
vention and  Collapse  of  Roumania 

Dispositions  on  the  eastern  fronts  in  the  spring  of  1916.  Offensive  of  the 
Second  Russian  Army  between  Lakes  Narotch  and  Vishnevsky.  Opening 
of  Brussiloff's  great  offensive  in  the  south  on  June  4th.  Rapid  successes 
on  the  Volhynian  sector.  Anxiety  and  counter-offensive  of  the  Austro- 
Germans.  Attacks  of  Scherbacheff  against  von  Bothmer  and  of  Lechitsky 
against  von  Pflanzer.  Czernowitz  captured,  June  17th,  and  Bukovina 
cleared.  Lesch's  attack  on  the  sector  adjoining  the  Pripet  marshes  on  the 
south.  Von  Boehm-Ermolli  defeated  by  Sakharoff,  and  fall  of  Brody, 
July  28th.  Converging  operations  against  von  Bothmer.  Fall  of  Stanislaw, 
August  10th.  Critical  situation  of  the  Central  Empires,  transference  of 
troops  from  other  fronts,  revision  of  the  command,  von  Hindenburg  as 
supreme  commander  in  the  East.  Attitude  of  Roumania  and  the  causes  of 
her  entry  into  the  war.  Her  military  and  strategical  situation.  Roumanian 
declaration  of  war  and  mobilization.  General  plan  of  cooperation  with 
the  Allies.  Roumanian  invasion  of  Transylvania.  Measures  of  the  Cen- 
tral Powers,  von  Falkenhayn  in  chief  command.  Situation  in  Greece  and 
on  the  Salonica  front.  Capture  of  Monastir.  The  uncertain  condition 
of  Greece.  Von  Mackensen's  invasion  of  the  Dobrudscha.  Culmination 
and  decline  of  Brussiloff's  offensive.  Austro-German  counter-offensive  in 
Transylvania.  Defective  cooperation  of  the  Russians  and  the  Roumanians. 
The  Tchernavoda-Costanza  railway  cut  by  von  Mackensen,  October  20th. 
Carpathian  passes  forced  by  the  Austro-Germans.  Passage  of  the  Danube 
on  the  south.  Collapse  of  the  Roumanians,  and  fall  of  Bucharest  on  De- 
cember 5th.    Roumanian  retirement  to  the  Sereth.    Close  of  the  campaign. 

The  recovery  of  the  Russian  army  after  the  staggering 
disasters  of  1915  and  the  unexpected  return  to  offensive 
operations  were,  as  we  have  seen,  one  of  the  most  remark- 
able features  of  the  Great  War.  But  the  close  of  the 
Russian  offensive  in  Bukovina,  mentioned  at  the  end  of 
Chapter  VI,  was  followed  on  the  Eastern  front  by  more 
than  two  months  of  comparative  inactivity.  Von  Hinden- 
burg remained  the  chief  commander  of  all  the  forces, 
almost  exclusively  German,  deployed  along  the  Teutonic 
front  from  the  Baltic  Sea  to  the  Pripet  River,  while  the 

283 


284  The  Great  War 

Archduke  Frederick  exercised  the  same  authority  over 
the  forces,  chief!}  Austro-Hungarians,  from  the  Pripet 
to  the  Roumanian  border. 

\  mi  I  [indenburg  commanded  directly  von  Below's  Army 
opposite  Riga,  von  Scholtz's  Eighth  Army  facing  Dvinsk, 
von  Eichhorn's  Tenth  Army  between  Vidzy  and  Smorgon, 
and  von  Fabeck's  Twelfth  Army,  and  through  the  media- 
tion of  Prince  Leopold  of  Bavaria  von  Woyrsch's  Ninth 
Army  and  a  detachment  of  three  infantry  and  two  cavalry 
divisions  in  the  vicinity  of  Pinsk. 

On  the  Russian  front  Kuropatkin,  Ewarts,  and  Ivanoff 
held  the  chief  commands  in  the  north,  center,  and  south, 
respectively.  Ewarts's  command  extended  from  Vidzy  to 
a  point  just  south  of  the  Pripet  River  and  included  from 
north  to  south  the  First,  Second,  Tenth,  Fourth,  and  Third 
Russian  Armies. 

The  armies  under  von  Hindenburg  had  a  combined 
fighting  strength  of  about  1,000,000  men,  and  it  was  be- 
lieved that,  with  the  coming  of  spring,  the  Germans  would 
resume  their  offensive  operations,  either  against  Riga  and 
Dvinsk  or  in  the  drier  region  east  of  Vilna.  But  the  Rus- 
sians forestalled  the  execution  of  a  German  offensive  in 
these  regions  by  a  timely  stroke  delivered  on  Ewarts's  right 
center  in  the  sector  of  the  Second  Russian  Army,  which 
was  commanded  by  General  Smirnoff. 

The  Second  was  the  largest  army  on  the  Russian  front 
and  contained  eleven  army  corps.  The  attack  to  be  de- 
scribed was  executed  by  the  Second  Army's  right  wing, 
which  held  the  pass  between  Lakes  Narotch  and  Vish- 
nevsky, about  fifty  miles  east  by  slightly  north  of  Vilna. 
It  consisted  of  the  Fifth,  Thirty-fifth,  and  Thirty-sixth 
Corps  in  line,  and  the  Third  Siberian  in  reserve,  and  formed 
a  subordinate  command  under  General  Baluieff.  Facing 
them  was  General  von  Eichhorn's  Tenth  German  Army. 


Russian  Offensive  and  Roumania's  Collapse  285 

The  German  front  on  this  sector  was  covered  by  a  great 
marsh  midway  between  the  two  lakes  and  by  a  formidable 
system  of  trenches.  After  a  two  days'  artillery  preparation 
the  Russian  assault  was  launched  on  March  18,  1916,  the 
Fifth  Corps  attacking  on  the  right  where  low  sandy  eleva- 
tions descend  to  Lake  Narotch,  a  division  of  the  Thirty- 
fifth  Corps  between  the  Fifth  Corps  and  the  marsh,  and 
a  division  of  the  Thirty-sixth  on  the  south  side  of  the 
marsh.  In  the  course  of  eight  distinct  attacks  down  to 
April  14th,  the  Fifth  Corps  carried  two  German  lines  and 
advanced  about  a  mile  and  the  troops  of  the  Thirty-fifth  ad- 
vanced about  a  half-mile,  but  those  of  the  Thirty-sixth 
scarcely  made  any  progress  at  all. 

Offensive  operations  were  then  discontinued,  probably 
because  the  purpose  of  thwarting  the  enemy's  aggressive 
schemes  had  seemingly  been  achieved,  while  further  prog- 
ress promised  to  be  too  costly  by  reason  of  the  German 
superiority  in  machine-guns.  Later  the  Germans  took  ad- 
vantage of  the  removal  of  much  Russian  heavy  field  artil- 
lery. After  a  fierce  bombardment  which  demolished  the 
defenses  of  the  Fifth  Russian  Corps  on  April  28th,  the 
Germans  broke  through  their  opponent's  front  to  a  depth 
of  two  and  one-half  to  three  miles.  But  Russian  reserve 
regiments  attacking  the  right  flank  of  the  protruding  Ger- 
man units  drove  them  back  and  the  series  of  operations 
closed  with  the  Russian  front  in  practically  its  original 
position. 

Month  after  month  the  Russians  had  been  accumulating 
their  resources  for  a  great  offensive  in  close  cooperation 
with  the  Allies,  after  Germany  had  been  allowed  to  waste 
her  strength  in  vain  assaults  on  Verdun  and  the  new  British 
armies  had  been  thoroughly  equipped  and  drilled  for  the 
supreme  performance.  The  Russian  battle-line  running 
southward  from  the  Pripet  River  now  followed  the  Styr 


286  .  Tui'.  Great  War 

for  some  distance,  cut  the  Lemberg-Rovno  railway  just 
easl  of  Dubno,  left  Tarnopol  In  Russian  hands,  kept  a  few 

miles  ca>t  of  the  Str\  pa  down  to  the  Dniester  near  Uscieszko, 
followed  the  Dniester  for  a  certain  distance  and  then  cut 
southeastward  across  the  strip  of  territory  between  the 
I  )niester  and  the  Pruth,  terminating  at  the  northern  limit  of 
Roumania.  In  April  Brussiloff  succeeded  Ivanoff  as  Rus- 
sian group  commander  in  the  south,  and  under  his  orders, 
from  right  to  left,  were  ranged  the  Eighth  Army,  then  com- 
manded by  General  Kaledin,  with  headquarters  at  Rovno, 
SakharofFs  Eleventh  Army,  ScherbachefFs  Seventh  Army 
and  Lechitsky's  Ninth  Army.  The  opposing  Austro-Hun- 
garian-German  front  was  well-organized,  but  somewhat 
scantily  manned  by  forces  which  did  not  exceed  an  aggre- 
gate of  1,000,000.  Their  distribution  had  been  somewhat 
changed.  Under  the  general  command  of  the  Archduke 
Frederick  of  Austria  there  were  now  deployed,  from  north 
to  south,  the  First  Austro-Hungarian  Army  of  Puhallo, 
the  Fourth  of  the  Archduke  Joseph  Ferdinand,  the  Second 
of  von  Boehm-Ermolli,  the  mixed  army  of  von  Bothmer, 
and  the  Sixth  of  von  Pflanzer. 

The  critical  situation  for  the  Italians  on  the  Trentino 
front  seems  to  have  hastened  the  inauguration  of  the  in- 
tended Russian  offensive,  but  this  was  launched  with  a 
violence  that  took  the  Austro-Hungarians  entirely  by  sur- 
prise. Brussiloff's  artillery  preparation  began  on  June  3d 
and  the  infantry  attacks  followed  the  next  day  along  prac- 
tically the  whole  front  from  the  Pripet  to  the  Pruth. 

In  the  region  of  the  Volhynian  triangle  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  front  lines  were  swept  away  on  the  first  day  of 
the  attack  by  the  armies  of  Kaledin  and  Sakharoff  and  a 
great  number  of  prisoners  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  vic- 
torious Russians.  Two  days  later  the  Russians  captured 
Lutsk  with  extensive  military  stores.     Dubno  fell  on  the 


Russian  Offensive  and  Roumanian  Collapse  287 

9th  and  by  the  16th  the  Russians  in  this  quarter  had  ad- 
vanced fifty  miles  and  taken  about  70,000  prisoners.  It 
was  the  most  spectacular  Russian  achievement  since  the 
first  weeks  of  the  war.  Again  the  Austro-Hungarian  front 
seemed  like  a  hollow  shell  that  could  be  shattered  into 
fragments  by  well-directed  blows.  Kovel  was  now  the 
critical  point,  since  its  fall  would  interrupt  the  main  line 
of  lateral  communications  serving  the  Austro-German 
front.  The  further  advance  of  the  Russians  in  this  sec- 
tion would  undermine  a  great  part  of  the  Teutonic  defen- 
sive system. 

The  Central  Powers  were  thoroughly  aroused  to  the 
emergency.  Von  Ludendorff  hastened  to  the  threatened 
point  and  several  divisions  were  shifted  thither  from  the 
German  sectors  further  north.  Austrian  troops  were 
brought  from  the  Tirol  and  the  Balkans  and  four  German 
divisions  were  transferred  from  France.  One  German 
corps  was  shifted  from  Verdun  to  Kovel  in  six  days. 
Von  Linsingen  took  over  the  command  in  this  section. 
A  counter-offensive  started  on  the  16th  was  kept  up  until 
the  end  of  the  month.  By  strenuous  effort  Kovel  was 
saved  and  a  sustaining  buttress  lodged  in  the  tottering 
fabric  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  front. 

Further  south  Scherbacheff's  attack  against  von  Bothmer 
was  checked  on  the  right,  but  gained  immediate  successes 
on  the  left,  where  Buczacz  was  carried  on  June  8th  and 
the  Strypa  crossed  in  several  places. 

On  the  extreme  left  of  the  Russian  battle-front  Lechitsky 
fell  upon  von  Pflanzer  from  two  sides  and  defeated  him  in 
the  strip  of  land  between  the  Dniester  and  the  Pruth,  tak- 
ing more  than  18,000  prisoners  by  June  9th.  The  Rus- 
sians occupied  Zaleshchyki,  an  important  bridge-head  on 
the  Dniester,  thus  establishing  convenient  direct  communi- 
cation between  the  armies  of  Scherbacheff  and  Lechitsky. 


288  The  Great  War 

Following  the  routed  masses  of  von  Prlanzer's  army,  the 
Russians  crossed  the  Pruth,  entered  Czernowitz  on  June 
17th,  and  overran  within  a  few  days  practically  the  whole 
of  Bukovina. 

During  the  first  three  weeks  the  Russian  offensive  as  a 
whole  brought  in  nearly  200,000  prisoners,  crushed  the 
Austro-Hungarian  lines  in  several  places,  and  effected  a 
partial  return  to  open  warfare.  Striking  out  towards  the 
northwest,  Lechitsky  entered  Kalomea  on  June  29th  and 
captured  Delatyn  on  July  8th,  cutting  the  railway  running 
from  Halicz  and  Stanislaw  through  the  Jablonica  Pass 
into  Hungary. 

The  Russians  had  now  pushed  forward  two  formidable 
wedges,  one  in  Volhynia  and  the  other  in  Bukovina.  But 
before  penetrating  further  it  was  necessary  to  broaden  and 
consolidate  these  protruding  positions.  Brussiloff's  front 
was  strengthened  by  the  shifting  of  Lesch's  Third  Russian 
Army  to  the  section  directly  south  of  the  Pripet  Marshes, 
adjoining  on  the  right  the  new  position  won  by  General 
Kaledin.  In  this  section  a  sandy  plain  extending  from 
the  Styr  to  the  Stokhod,  a  distance  of  about  thirty  miles, 
offered  a  suitable  theater  for  the  next  attack.  After  a 
heavy  bombardment  Lesch's  army  crossed  the  Styr  on 
July  4th  and  by  the  7th  the  right  wing  had  fought  its 
way  to  the  Stokhod,  while  the  center  and  left  wing 
extended  southward  about  midway  between  the  two 
rivers.  In  four  days  the  Russians  had  pushed  forward 
twenty-five  miles  on  a  front  of  forty.  But  by  the  15th 
the  offensive  lapsed  into  stationary  warfare  and  Kovel  had 
again  been  saved. 

Von  Linsingen  was  now  preparing  a  counter-blow  from 
von  Boehm-Ermolli's  sector  which  ran  across  the  Lemberg- 
Brody  railway,  and  twenty  divisions  were  concentrated  for 
this  purpose.    But  Brussiloff  learned  of  the  enemy's  design 


Russian  Offensive  and  Roumania's  Collapse  289 

and  decided  to  forestall  it.  On  the  15th  Sakharoff's  army 
moved  against  the  threatening  sector  of  the  hostile  front 
and  on  the  next  day  defeated  the  Teutonic  forces,  taking 
nearly  13,000  prisoners,  and  crossed  the  Styr  on  the  21st. 
Brody,  the  former  headquarters  of  von  Boehm-Ermolli 
fell  on  the  28th  after  a  three  days'  contest  in  which  the 
Russians  took  nearly  14,000  prisoners. 

The  situation  was  now  ripe  for  SakharofT  on  the  north 
and  Lechitsky  on  the  south  to  close  in  on  von  Bothmer's 
flanks,  while  Scherbacheff  attacked  his  front  in  the  region 
of  the  Strypa. 

After  a  long  delay  on  account  of  bad  weather,  Lechitsky 
captured  Stanislaw,  a  very  important  center  of  communica- 
tions, on  August  10th.  Scherbacheff,  pushing  forward  his 
left  wing,  crossed  the  Zlota  Lipa  near  its  mouth.  Von 
Bothmer,  assailed  on  the  left  by  SakharofT  and  in  front  by 
Scherbacheff,  his  right  wing  bent  back  in  a  cramped  and 
embarrassing  manner  and  his  communications  threatened 
by  Lechitsky's  encircling  movement  towards  his  rear,  was 
compelled  to  fall  back  to  a  new  position  where  his  right 
wing  rested  more  securely  on  the  Zlota  Lipa. 

The  Central  Empires  quivered  under  the  terrific  pres- 
sure both  on  the  east  and  west  and  there  was  imminent 
danger  that  the  Galician  front  would  collapse.  In  the 
midst  of  the  Battle  of  the  Somme  the  Germans  were 
compelled  to  transfer  reinforcements  from  the  West  to 
restore  the  wavering  Austro-Hungarian  lines.  From  the 
beginning  of  the  Russian  offensive  on  June  4th  until  the 
middle  of  September  as  many  as  sixteen  infantry  divisions 
appear  to  have  been  shifted  from  the  western  to  the  eastern 
front,  while  seven  Austro-Hungarian  divisions  were  trans- 
ferred from  the  hard  pressed  Italian  front,  and  two  divisions 
were  contributed  by  Turkey.  Time  will  probably  reveal 
further  evidence  of  the  intensity  of  this  crisis. 


290  The  Great  War 

The  situation  necessitated  a  general  revision  of  the 
command  without   much   regard   for   Austro-Hungarian 

sensibilities.  The  Archduke  Frederick  of  Austria  relin- 
quished the  chief  command  of  the  southern  half  of  the 

Teutonic  eastern  front  and  on  August  2d  von  Hindenburg 
assumed  the  supreme  control  of  this  entire  front.  Later,  it 
IS  true,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Heir  Apparent,  Archduke 
Charles,  took  over  the  command  of  the  three  southern 
armies.  But  von  Tersztyansky  was  substituted  for  the 
Archduke  Joseph  Ferdinand,  while  von  Pflanzer  and  his 
army  disappeared  and  were  replaced  by  the  Seventh  Austro- 
Hungarian  Army  under  von  Kirchbach.  A  new  army,  the 
Third,  formed  in  Transylvania,  under  von  Koevess,  took 
its  place  on  the  left  flank  of  the  Seventh  and  a  German 
army  under  von  Linsingen  covered  Kovel.  With  these 
adjustments  the  disposition  on  the  eastern  front  from  north 
to  south  under  von  Hindenburg  was  as  follows:  the  general 
command  of  Prince  Leopold  of  Bavaria,  comprising  von 
Eichhorn's  group  made  up  of  the  Eighth  German  Army, 
von  Scholtz's  detachment,  and  the  Twelfth,  Tenth,  and 
Ninth  German  Armies,  and  von  Linsingen's  group  made 
up  of  his  own  Army  of  the  Bug,  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Fourth  Army  under  von  Tersztyansky,  the  First  under 
Puhallo,  and  the  Second  under  Boehm-Ermolli;  and  the 
Archduke  Charles's  general  command,  including  von 
Bothmer's  Army,  von  Koevess's  Third  Austro-Hungarian 
Army,  and  von  Kirchbach's  Seventh  Austro-Hungarian 
Army. 

At  this  momentous  period  of  the  campaign  the  interven- 
tion of  Roumania  was  accepted  by  a  large  part  of  the  world 
as  a  doubly  significant  event:  affording  an  indication  that  a 
deeply  interested  spectator,  viewing  the  struggle  at  close 
range,  believed  that  the  turning  point  had  arrived;  and  an 
addition  of  strength  to  the  cause  of  the  Allies,  with  whom 


Russian  Offensive  and  Roumania's  Collapse  291 

Roumania  cast  her  lot,  that  would  inevitably  insure  the 
triumph  of  the  Allied  armies.  The  causes  of  the  prolonged 
attitude  of  hesitation  on  the  part  of  Roumania  and  of  her 
final  and  fateful  decision  require  some  words  of  explana- 
tion. The  Roumanians  pride  themselves  upon  a  supposed 
unbroken  descent  from  the  Roman  colonists  of  ancient 
Dacia,  citing  the  obviously  Latin  origin  of  their  language 
as  palpable  evidence  of  their  distinctive  character.  This 
remarkable  phenomenon  of  linguistic  continuity  in  the 
midst  of  regions  swept  by  so  many  torrents  of  migration  is 
a  baffling  problem  for  the  philologist.  But  the  essential 
fact  for  the  present  is  the  existence  of  a  strong  conscious- 
ness of  national  individuality  uniting  the  Roumanian  people 
under  different  governments. 

The  principalities  which  were  eventually  combined  to 
form  the  Kingdom  of  Roumania,  as  it  existed  before  the 
present  war,  were  subjected  for  several  centuries  to  Turkish 
suzerainty,  but  this  was  reduced  to  a  mere  shadow  in  the 
first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  The  Treaty  of  Paris 
in  1856,  while  reaffirming  the  existence  of  the  Turkish 
suzerainty,  guaranteed  a  considerable  degree  of  autonomy 
to  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  under  princes  to  be  chosen 
for  life.  The  rising  spirit  of  Roumanian  nationality  led 
to  the  union  of  the  two  principalities  under  Prince  Cuza 
in  1862.  Four  years  later,  he  was  driven  from  power 
by  a  revolution,  Charles  of  Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen 
was  installed  in  his  place  as  Charles  (Carol)  I  at  Bucha- 
rest, and  the  constitution  was  adopted.  Roumania  now 
entered  upon  a  long  period  of  economic  and  political 
development. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  Russo-Turkish  War  in  1877, 
Prince  Charles  (Carol)  I  declared  his  independence  of  Tur- 
key and  joined  forces  with  Russia,  lending  valuable  aid  in 
the  operations  south  of  the  Danube.     But  the  results  for 


292  The  Great  War 

Roumania  were  rather  disappointing.  The  independence 
of  the  country  was  recognized  in  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  and 
the  prince  assumed  the  title  of  king  in  1881,  but  Russia 
took  hack  the  portion  of  the  fertile  province  of  Bessarabia, 
which  she  had  been  compelled  to  cede  to  Moldavia  in 
1856,  although  it  contained  a  large  Roumanian  popula- 
tion, and  Roumania  was  shabbily  compensated  by  receiv- 
ing the  main  part  of  the  comparatively  barren  peninsula 
of  Dobrudscha. 

Estranged  from  Russia  in  consequence  of  this  treatment, 
Roumania  drew  closer  to  the  Teutonic  powers  and  made 
a  secret  agreement  with  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany  in 
1883,  by  which  she  virtually  became  a  member  of  the 
Triple  Alliance.  Teutonic  influence  took  deep  root  in 
Roumania  and  was  especially  prominent  in  commerce  and 
banking,  most  large  undertakings  being  financed  through 
German  institutions.  As  in  many  other  countries  German 
enterprise  and  assiduity  won  rich  rewards,  the  Deutsche 
Bank  and  Disconto-Gesellschaft  became  familiar  symbols 
in  all  important  business  centers,  and  trade  followed  the 
natural  channels  leading  to  the  Central  Powers. 

But  the  intimacy  between  Roumania  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary suffered  a  rude  shock  by  the  intervention  of  Rou- 
mania against  Bulgaria  in  the  Second  Balkan  War,  when 
Roumania  compelled  Bulgaria  to  yield  a  strip  of  territory 
with  an  area  of  2,983  square  miles,  including  the  fortress  of 
Silistria,  along  the  border  of  the  Dobrudscha. 

Upon  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War  the  sentiment  of 
the  Roumanian  people  was  overwhelmingly  in  favor  of  the 
Entente,  partly  from  admiration  for  the  Western  powers 
and  a  sense  of  cultural  community  with  France,  and  partly 
from  the  nature  of  Roumania's  national  aspirations.  There 
was  a  Roumanian  irredentist  problem  of  fundamental  im- 
portance.    The  Kingdom  of  Roumania,  as  it  then  existed, 


Transport  of  Russian  artillery.      By  means  of  small  trucks  running  on  rails  laid  on  flat  cars 
the  handling  of  guns  by  railway  is  greatly  expedited. 


Russian  held  artill 


Russian  Offensive  and  Roumania's  Collapse  293 

with  an  area  of  53,244  square  miles  and  a  population  of 
about  7,500,000,  only  embraced  about  one-half  the  territory 
peopled  by  Roumanians.  Nearly  four  million  Roumanians 
lived  under  the  Austro-Hungarian  Monarchy  in  Bukovina, 
the  Banat  of  Temesvar,  and  especially  Transylvania,  and 
others  were  subjects  of  the  Russian  Empire  in  Bessarabia. 
The  political  union  of  all  these  regions  with  Roumania 
would  form  a  state  of  nearly  12,000,000  souls,  occupying  a 
compact,  oval-shaped  block  of  territory  with  an  area  of 
about  110,000  square  miles,  great  natural  resources,  and  a 
favorable  location. 

But  unfortunately  the  racial  homogeneity  of  such  a  ter- 
ritory would  be  broken  by  considerable  Saxon  and  Magyar 
populations  in  southeastern  Transylvania  and  by  the  pre- 
vailingly Russian  population  of  southeastern  Bessarabia  on 
the  sea. 

In  consequence  of  the  vastly  greater  number  of  Rou- 
manians under  Austro-Hungarian  rule  and  the  manifestly 
oppressive  policy  of  the  Hungarian  government  towards 
Roumanian  nationality,  the  irredentist  instincts  of  Rou- 
mania operated  mainly  as  an  incentive  to  war  with  the 
Dual  Monarchy. 

Aside  from  her  potential  military  strength  as  a  bel- 
ligerent, Roumania's  importance  to  the  contestants  in 
the  Great  War  lay  in  her  agricultural  and  mineral 
wealth  and  her  strategical  position  commanding  the 
lower  section  of  the  Danube.  The  fertility  of  a  large 
part  of  Wallachia  and  almost  all  of  Moldavia  makes 
Roumania  an  important  grain-exporting  country,  while 
the  extensive  oil-fields  in  the  region  north  of  Bucha- 
rest formed  with  those  of  Galicia  the  chief  European 
sources  for  the  petroleum  supply  of  the  Central  Powers. 
Roumania  produced  13,554,768  barrels  of  petroleum  in 
1913. 


2()\  The  Great  War 

The  Danube,  1,750  miles  in  length  and  navigable  for  all 
but  \2?  miles  of  its  course,  is  the  finest  waterway  in  Europe 

and  the  natural  artery  of  traffic  between  the  Central  Em- 
pires on  the  one  hand  and  Southern  Russia  and  the  Near 
East  on  the  other.  The  lack  of  adequate  channels  through 
the  delta  and  the  difficulty  of  navigation  at  the  famous  Iron 
Gate  had  prevented  the  full  development  of  traffic.  The 
stream  was  navigable  for  vessels  of  not  over  two  meters 
draught  from  Galatz  to  Ratisbon.  The  further  improve- 
ment of  the  Danube  and  the  formation  of  an  extensive 
system  of  canals  linking  the  Danube  with  the  chief  Ger- 
man rivers  of  the  north  was  prominent  among  the  plans 
for  the  future  expansion  of  Teutonic  commerce. 

The  Danube  formed  the  southern  boundary  of  Rou- 
mania  for  a  distance  of  about  270  miles.  The  northern 
arm  of  the  delta  through  which  its  waters  reach  the  Black 
Sea  was  part  of  the  Russo-Roumanian  boundary,  the  other 
arms  were  all  in  Roumanian  territory.  Throughout  almost 
her  entire  periphery,  Roumania  was  separated  from  her 
neighbors  by  clearly  denned  natural  boundaries.  The 
Pruth  formed  the  line  on  the  northeast  between  Roumania 
and  Russia.  The  Carpathians,  or  Transylvanian  Alps,  sepa- 
rated her  from  Austria-Hungary  for  a  distance  of  about 
400  miles.  Their  chief  peaks  were  from  7,000  to  8,000 
feet  in  height. 

The  protection  of  the  Danube  on  the  south  was  rein- 
forced by  the  broad  zone  of  marshes  stretching  along  the 
Roumanian  side  of  the  river.  The  only  open  section  of 
frontier  was  the  line  from  the  Danube  to  the  sea  across 
the  Dobrudscha. 

Yet  the  elongated  contour  of  the  country,  stretching 
elbow-like  around  two  sides  of  Transylvania,  involved  a 
serious  strategical  weakness.  While  hostile  forces  operat- 
ing in  Transylvania  enjoyed  the  advantage  of  convenient, 


Russian  Offensive  and  Roumania's  Collapse  295 

interior  lines,  communication  between  the  different  sec- 
tions of  the  Roumanian  border  opposite  was  slow  and  diffi- 
cult. The  Roumanian  railway  system  was  strategically  far 
from  adequate. 

The  long  period  of  uncertainty  as  to  Roumania's  ultimate 
conduct  in  the  Great  War  is  readily  explained.  In  the  first 
place,  many  internal  influences  tended  to  counteract  the 
prevailing  inclination  of  the  Roumanian  people.  The 
propaganda  favorable  to  Teutonic  interests  was  conducted 
with  great  energy  and  the  support  of  some  leading  Rou- 
manian papers  was  purchased  for  this  cause.  To  suit  the 
circumstances,  German  emissaries  strove  to  undermine  by 
threats  the  spirit  of  the  Roumanian  people'  or  to  cajole 
them  by  promising  rewards  for  their  benevolent  neu- 
trality. Intervention  on  the  side  of  the  Allies,  moreover, 
meant  the  loss  of  the  profitable  market  of  the  Central 
Powers. 

Bratianu,  the  prime  minister,  who  had  come  into  power 
in  1914  as  leader  of  the  Liberal  party,  favored  a  policy  of 
circumspection.  Take  Jonescu,  head  of  the  advanced 
Conservatives,  was  the  determined  advocate  of  participa- 
tion in  the  war  on  the  side  of  the  Allies.  Carp,  Majorescu, 
and  Marghiloman  supported  intervention  on  the  Austro- 
German  side.  The  king  favored  the  latter  view,  feeling 
himself  bound  by  the  treaty  of  1883,  but  failed  to  con- 
vince a  crown  council,  summoned  on  August  4,  1914, 
to  consider  Roumania's  attitude.  As  mentioned  already, 
King  Charles  (Carol)  I  died  on  October  10th  of  the 
same  year  and  was  succeeded  by  his  nephew,  Prince 
Ferdinand. 

For  two  years  Roumania  wavered  on  the  brink  of  action. 
By  the  early  summer  of  1915  the  idea  of  eventual  inter- 
vention on  the  side  of  the  Allies  had  practically  prevailed 
in  principle,  and  the  Roumanian  ministry  had  entered  into 


296  The  Great  War 

secret  negotiations  for  the  determination  of  Roumania's 
ultimate  compensation. 

But  before  the  grain  crop  had  been  harvested,  the  dis- 
ruption of  the  Russian  western  front,  followed  by  the  great 
retreat,  created  a  situation  in  which  the  intervention  of 
Roumania  would  have  been  too  perilous,  especially  as  the 
Allies  had  failed  to  gain  any  decisive  advantage  at  the 
Dardanelles.  In  the  same  year,  Bulgaria,  whom  Roumania 
had  mortally  offended,  joined  the  Central  Powers.  Serbia 
was  invaded  and  crushed,  and  Roumania  was  thereafter 
menaced  on  three  sides,  should  she  move  against  the 
Quadruple  Alliance. 

Nevertheless,  the  campaign  of  1916,  as  we  have  seen, 
brought  a  marked  change  in  the  complexion  of  affairs. 
The  Allies,  after  perfecting  their  organization  and  learning 
to  coordinate  their  efforts,  wrested  the  initiative  from  the 
Central  Powers  on  all  fronts.  The  Russian  offensive  ad- 
vanced steadily  into  Austria-Hungary;  by  June,  1916, 
Bukovina,  coveted  by  Roumania,  was  in  Russian  hands. 
The  Roumanians  naturally  believed  that  the  hour  of  their 
nation's  destiny  had  sounded  and  that  the  opportunity 
might  soon  pass,  never  to  return.  Take  Jonescu  had 
striven  persistently  to  consolidate  public  sentiment  in  favor 
of  the  supreme  step  on  the  side  of  the  Allies.  Bratianu 
and  the  government,  at  length  convinced,  completed  the 
negotiations  with  the  Entente.  Action  was  delayed,  ap- 
parently, for  the  gathering  of  the  Roumanian  harvest,  and 
the  decision  was  concealed  from  the  future  hostile  group 
of  powers  until  the  very  last.  Finally,  a  crown  council  of 
all  the  leaders  was  held  in  presence  of  the  king  on  August 
27th  and  on  the  evening  of  the  same  day  the  declaration  of 
war  was  handed  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  minister.  Ger- 
many declared  war  on  Roumania  the  next  day  and  Bulgaria 
followed  on  September  1st. 


Russian  Offensive  and  Roumania's  Collapse  297 

In  August,  1914,  the  military  establishment  of  Roumania 
consisted  of  the  active  army,  the  reserve,  and  the  militia. 
The  first  was  mobilized  in  five  army  corps,  each  composed 
of  two  divisions.  The  remaining  reservists  formed  five 
additional  divisions.  Together  these  categories  constituted 
the  first-line  forces,  numbering  220  battalions,  83  squad- 
rons, and  19  companies  of  fortress  artillery,  250,000  rifles 
and  18,000  sabers.  It  was  hoped  that  five  additional  reserve 
corps  could  be  organized. 

The  rapid  collapse  of  Roumania  was  one  of  the  most 
pathetic  spectacles  of  the  Great  War.  Overflowing  with 
abundance,  courted  by  both  sides,  Roumania  entered  the 
war,  as  was  commonly  believed,  on  the  eve  of  the  glorious 
triumph  of  the  cause  which  she  espoused.  But  in 
reality,  after  a  few  illusory  successes,  she  suffered  an 
uninterrupted  series  of  reverses.  Her  territory  was  in- 
vaded, her  prosperity  turned  to  tribulation,  her  sorrow- 
ing population  compelled  to  subsist  on  a  pittance  of 
their  former  store  accepted  from  the  hands  of  their  stern 
conquerors. 

The  Roumanian  disaster  may  be  largely  attributed  to 
lack  of  insight  and  an  unusual  combination  of  unfavorable 
circumstances.  The  Allies  with  their  new  adherent  un- 
doubtedly overestimated  the  effect  of  the  drain  on  Ger- 
many's resources  in  the  conflict  before  Verdun  and  on  the 
Somme.  They  believed  that  Germany  would  be  unable 
to  send  more  than  sixteen  additional  divisions  to  the  aid  of 
Austria-Hungary,  that  Roumania  could  put  into  the  field 
at  least  twenty-two  divisions  of  excellent  troops,  and  that 
this  would  more  than  turn  the  tide.  In  reality,  however, 
a  large  part  of  the  Roumanian  forces  were  inadequately 
trained  and  defectively  equipped. 

Roumania  counted  upon  the  effective  cooperation  of 
her  allies,  the  plan  for  which  had  been  elaborated.     It  was 


2()s  The  Great  War 

expected  that  a  vigorous  Allied  attack  on  the  Salonica 
front  would  hold  the  hulk  of  the  Bulgarian  army,  while 
at  the  same  time  a  force  of  50,000  Russians  would  aid 
in  the  defense  of  the  Dobrudscha.  BrussilofT  was  to 
push  his  offensive  southwestwards  from  Bukovina  into 
Transylvania,  forming  contact  with  the  right  wing  of 
the  Roumanian  armies  on  the  Carpathian  front.  Russia, 
furthermore,  was  pledged  to  provide  Roumania  with  cer- 
tain necessary  supplies  of  munitions.  One  by  one  the 
expectations  embodied  in  this  plan  were  brought  to 
naught  Bad  luck  pursued  the  Roumanian  operations 
with  such  persistent  regularity  that  every  hopeful  antici- 
pation was  deceived. 

According  to  many  critics,  the  plan  of  campaign  itself 
invited  failure.  The  Roumanians  had  to  choose  between 
two  contrasted  plans,  either  to  rest  on  the  defensive  along 
the  line  of  the  Transylvanian  Alps  and  strike  with  great 
force  from  the  Dobrudscha  southwestwards  into  Bulgaria, 
gradually  extending  the  front  to  keep  the  flanks  of  the  ad- 
vancing forces  covered  by  the  Danube  and  the  sea,  or  to 
hold  to  the  defensive  on  the  Bulgarian  front  and  drive 
at  once  with  full  force  into  the  coveted  province  on  the 
north.  The  first  gave  hope  of  squeezing  Bulgaria  between 
the  opposite  Allied  fronts,  capturing  Sofia,  and  intercepting 
the  Oriental  railway  and  all  connection  between  the  Cen- 
tral Empires  and  Turkey.  But  political  and  sentimental 
motives  made  the  second  plan  prevail. 

Three  Roumanian  armies  were  ranged  along  the  Transyl- 
vanian border.  The  First,  consisting  of  six  divisions  under 
General  Culcer,  formed  the  left  wing,  from  the  Danube  at 
Orsova  to  the  Rother  Turm  Pass.  The  Second,  under 
General  Averescu,  in  the  center,  extended  from  the  above- 
mentioned  pass  around  to  the  Oitoz  Pass.  The  Fourth, 
under  General  Presan,  continued  the  front  as  far  as  the 


Russian  Offensive  and  Roumania's  Collapse  299 

northwestern  extremity  of  Moldavia.  The  Third  Army, 
under  General  Asian,  was  assigned  to  the  defense  of  the 
Dobrudscha. 

As  soon  as  war  was  declared  the  Roumanian  forces 
poured  into  Transylvania.  Columns  of  the  Second  Army, 
advancing  through  the  Torzburg  and  Predeal  Passes,  con- 
verged on  Kronstadt,  which  was  taken  on  August  29th. 
Culcer's  right  wing,  entering  Transylvania  through  the 
Rother  Turm  Pass,  occupied  Hermannstadt  on  September 
10th.   Two  days  later  Orsova  was  taken  on  the  extreme  left. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  covering  troops,  consisting  of 
five  divisions,  fell  back  without  offering  much  resistance 
towards  a  good  line  of  lateral  communications  formed  by 
the  railway  and  highway  through  the  Maros  valley.  By 
so  doing,  they  contracted  their  own  front  and  permitted 
the  Roumanians  to  lengthen  their  lines  of  communica- 
tion through  a  difficult,  mountainous  country.  In  some 
places  the  invaders  penetrated  to  a  depth  of  fifty  miles  into 
Transylvanian  territory. 

While  the  Roumanians  were  rejoicing  in  their  easy 
victories  the  Teutonic  High  Command  was  swiftly  but 
unobtrusively  preparing  its  counter-strokes.  Von  Falken- 
hayn,  who  had  retired  from  the  position  of  German  Chief 
of  Staff  a  few  days  before,  was  placed  in  command  of  the 
new  Austro-Hungarian  Ninth  Army  assembling  in  the 
lower  Maros  valley.  But  the  first  blow  was  delivered 
from  the  south,  despite  the  efforts  of  the  Allies  to  engage 
the  attention  of  Bulgaria  on  the  Salonica  front.  The  cor- 
relation of  events  requires  a  brief  account  of  the  situation 
in  the  latter  region. 

The  uncertain  situation  in  Greece  and  the  pro-German 
intrigues,  acquiesced  in  and  even  fostered  by  the  Athenian 
court,  were  a  constant  menace  to  the  rear  of  the  Allied 
armies  on  the  Macedonian  front.     Since  the  autumn  of 


300  The  Great  War 

1915  constitutional  government  had  practically  ceased  to 
exist  in  ( rreece  ami  the  policy  of  the  country  was  manipu- 
lated by  the  court  and  an  irresponsible  bureaucracy.  After 
the  Bulgarians  had  occupied  Fort  Rupel,  near  the  north- 
eastern frontier,  with  the  connivance  of  the  Greek  court, 
the  British  government  instituted  a  pacific  blockade  of 
Greece  on  June  8th.  Four  days  later  there  were  disturb- 
ances in  Athens  and  the  Allied  embassies  were  insulted. 
This  was  followed  by  an  ultimatum  from  the  Allies,  de- 
manding guarantees  of  good  behavior  on  the  part  of 
Greece,  complete  demobilization  of  the  Greek  army,  the 
substitution  of  an  unbiassed  cabinet,  general  elections  after 
demobilization,  and  the  dismissal  of  certain  obnoxious 
police  officials.  There  was  no  alternative  for  the  Greek 
government  but  to  accede.  Skouloudis  resigned  and  on 
June  21st  was  succeeded  as  prime  minister  by  Zaimis,  who 
accepted  the  Allied  ultimatum.  Unfortunately,  reservists' 
leagues  were  formed  among  the  disbanded  soldiery,  which 
formed  a  hotbed  for  agitation,  perpetuating  the  disturbed 
condition  of  affairs.  Greece  remained  a  distracting  factor 
throughout  the  campaign  of  1916. 

Along  the  Macedonian  front  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance 
were  ranged  from  west  to  east,  the  First  Bulgarian  Army 
under  General  Gueshoff,  the  so-called  Eleventh  German 
Army  (now  reduced  to  a  single  brigade)  under  General 
von  Winckler,  and  the  Second  Bulgarian  Army  under 
General  Teodoroff.  These  were  opposed  by  the  Serbian 
army  under  the  Crown  Prince  Alexander,  the  French  army 
under  General  Sarrail,  and  the  British  army  under  Gen- 
eral Milne.  Eventually,  the  Italian  forces  from  Avlona 
in  Albania  cooperated  with  the  left  wing  of  the  above- 
mentioned  Allied  forces. 

A  general  offensive  on  the  Allied  front  was  planned  for 
the  second  week  in  August  and  General  Sarrail  was  placed 


I 


•If , 

t 


n  \ 

■  'I;.  1 


Russian  Offensive  and  Roumania's  Collapse  301 

in  chief  command.  The  Allies  were  joined  by  a  Russian 
contingent  which  had  made  the  long  journey  by  sea  from 
Vladivostok.  Just  as  the  Allies  were  about  to  move,  their 
plans  were  forestalled  by  a  vigorous  Bulgarian  offensive 
launched  on  August  17th. 

Teodoroff  moved  swiftly  into  the  region  east  of  the 
British  right  flank,  which  was  garrisoned  by  the  neutral 
Greeks,  occupying  the  forts  of  Kavala  on  August  25th 
and  the  town  itself  on  September  14th,  when  the  bulk  of 
the  Fourth  Greek  Corps  surrendered  without  resistance 
and  was  transported  to  Germany  as  "guests"  of  the  Ger- 
man government.  The  suspicion  of  duplicity  rested  on  the 
Greek  government,  in  spite  of  its  assertion  that  the  Fourth 
Corps  had  acted  without  orders. 

Monastir,  near  the  Greek  border  in  the  western  part  of 
the  Macedonian  territory,  claimed,  and  at  that  time  occu- 
pied, by  Bulgaria  was  the  most  practical  objective  for  an 
Allied  offensive  operation.  A  serious  attack  upon  it  was 
sure  to  retain  considerable  Bulgarian  forces  for  its  defense, 
since  it  was  Bulgaria's  most  cherished  conquest.  Conse- 
quently, the  bulk  of  the  French  forces,  the  Serbian  corps, 
and  the  Russian  contingent  were  assigned  for  offensive 
operations  west  of  the  Vardar,  while  the  British  were  to 
exert  a  general  pressure  east  of  this  stream. 

The  Allied  offensive  in  the  direction  of  Monastir  started 
on  September  7th,  while  at  the  same  time  the  Italians  be- 
came active  in  Albania,  east  of  Avlona.  Monastir  lies  in  a 
plain  formed  by  the  expansion  of  the  narrow  valley  of  the 
Tcherna,  about  twenty  miles  in  length  from  north  to  south 
and  ten  in  width,  surrounded  by  mountain  ranges.  The 
route  from  the  Greek  territory  in  the  south  to  Monastir 
by  road  and  railway  crosses  the  watershed  northwest  of 
Lake  Ostrovo  and  descends  past  Fiorina  into  the  Pela- 
gonian  plain  in  which  the  place  is  situated. 


302  The  Great  War 

The  Serbians  crossed  the  dividing  ridge  north  of  Lake 
Ostrovo  and  reentered  their  native  land  on  September  20th, 
while  the  French  and  Russians  operating  further  west 
carried  Fiorina  by  storm  on  the  same  day.  By  October 
5th  the  Serbians  had  crossed  the  Tcherna  southeast  of 
Monastir,  with  the  intention  of  turning  the  Bulgarian  lines 
Stretching  across  the  plain  to  the  north  of  Fiorina,  winch 
were  too  strong  to  be  taken  by  frontal  attacks.  By  the 
middle  of  November  the  advance  of  the  Serbians  on  the 
east  side  of  the  Tcherna  compelled  the  Bulgarians  and 
Germans  to  fall  back  on  another  line  only  four  miles  south 
of  Monastir.  Finally,  Monastir  was  evacuated  on  the  19th, 
when  the  Serbians  had  reached  a  point  to  the  northeast 
threatening  the  Bulgarian  line  of  communications.  The 
Allies  marched  into  the  city  on  the  fourth  anniversary  of 
its  capture  from  the  Turks.  Monastir  was  a  prize  of  con- 
siderable importance,  but  with  its  acquisition  the  offensive 
on  the  Salonica  front  practically  ceased.  The  effort  of  the 
Allies  failed  to  shake  Bulgaria  and  fell  short  of  furnishing 
the  necessary  support  for  Roumania.  The  Allies  did  not 
prevent  Bulgaria  from  actively  participating  in  the  opera- 
tions against  Roumania. 

Von  Mackensen,  who  was  in  Bulgaria  when  Roumania 
declared  war  on  Austria-Hungary,  had  organized  an  army 
of  mixed  forces  with  remarkable  celerity.  By  the  begin- 
ning of  September  he  was  ready  to  enter  the  field  against 
the  Roumanians  in  the  Dobrudscha  with  three  Bulgarian 
infantry  and  two  Bulgarian  cavalry  divisions  and  the  greater 
part  of  a  German  army  corps,  while  two  Turkish  divisions 
were  on  their  way  to  join  him.  His  business  was  to  close 
the  door  against  a  Roumanian  invasion  of  Bulgaria  from 
the  Dobrudscha,  distract  the  attention  of  Roumania  from 
the  operations  in  Transylvania,  and  eventually  form  an 
anvil  upon  which   Roumania  would  be  crushed  by  the 


Russian  Offensive  and  Roumania's  Collapse  303 

sledge-hammer  blows  of  von  Falkenhayn.  In  the  execution 
of  the  first  of  these  intentions  it  was  obviously  good  strategy 
to  reduce  to  a  minimum  the  space  to  be  barricaded  by  ad- 
vancing from  the  existing  Roumanian  boundary,  where  the 
Dobrudscha  is  about  100  miles  in  width,  to  the  line  of  the 
Tchernavoda-Costanza  railway,  where  it  is  only  thirty. 
The  capture  of  this  railway,  furthermore,  would  practically 
sever  Roumania  from 'direct  communication  with  the  sea. 

With  these  purposes  in  view,  the  Bulgarians  crossed  the 
border  on  September  1st  and  six  days  later  compelled  a 
whole  Roumanian  division  to  surrender  with  100  guns  at 
Turtukai  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  only  thirty 
miles  southeast  of  Bucharest.  The  Roumanians  evacuated 
the  fortress  of  Silistria  on  the  9th  and  a  week  later  von 
Mackensen's  forces  held  a  line  across  the  Dobrudscha 
peninsula  only  a  dozen  miles  south  of  the  important 
Costanza  railway. 

The  Roumanians,  thoroughly  alarmed,  weakened  their 
offensive  in  Transylvania  by  hurrying  three  divisions  from 
there  to  the  threatened  region.  At  the  same  time,  Ave- 
rescu,  their  ablest  general,  was  transferred  to  the  Army  of 
the  Danube  in  the  Dobrudscha.  This  army  now  contained 
a  considerable  Russian  contingent. 

The  strength  of  the  opposing  forces  in  the  Dobrudscha 
was  about  equal.  Von  Mackensen  was  superior  in  artillery 
but  the  main  railway  formed  a  good  line  of  communication 
in  Averescu's  rear.  Natural  barriers  precluded  any  out- 
flanking movements.  After  several  days  of  severe  fighting 
von  Mackensen  was  forced  back  about  ten  miles.  The  im- 
mediate danger  to  Roumania  in  this  quarter  was  now  past 
and  activity  in  the  Dobrudscha  waned  for  several  weeks. 

In  the  meantime  the  more  formidable  blow  was  im- 
pending in  the  north.  About  250,000  men  had  been  con- 
centrated in  Transylvania  under  von  Falkenhayn  to  deal 


304  THE  Great  War 

with  the  First  and  Second  Roumanian  Armies,  while  the 
ri«j;ht  wing  of  von  Kirchbach's  Seventh  Austro-Hungarian 
Annv  was  extended  southward  to  ward  off  the  Fourth 
Roumanian. 

In  their  hasty  invasion  of  Transylvania  the  Roumanians 
bad  relied  upon  the  direct  cooperation  of  the  Russians  ad- 
vancing from  Bukovina.  The  brilliant  course  of  Brus- 
siloff's  offensive  has  already  been  described  down  to  about 
the  middle  of  August.  It  remains  to  be  explained  why  the 
Russians  failed  to  cooperate  effectively  with  the  Roumanian 
offensive  in  Transylvania.  About  the  middle  of  August 
results  of  decisive  importance  seemed  clearly  within  reach 
of  the  Russians,  but  soon  their  tide  of  victory  began  to  ebb. 
The  reorganization  of  the  Austro-German  command  was  a 
first  step  in  the  rehabilitation  of  the  southern  sectors  of  the 
Teutonic  eastern  front,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  strength 
of  the  Russians  turned  out  to  be  unequal  to  the  increased 
tasks  before  them.  Russian  cooperation  with  the  Rouma- 
nian offensive  implied  a  twofold  objective  for  the  Russian 
operative  front.  Brussiloff  now  aimed  to  push  Lechitsky's 
Ninth  Army  through  the  Carpathian  Passes  to  establish 
contact  with  the  right  wing  of  the  Roumanian  armies  and, 
at  the  same  time,  to  continue  the  converging  movements 
of  Scherbacheff  and  Sakharoff  towards  Lemberg. 

Scherbacheff's  immediate  objective  was  now  Halicz, 
which  stood  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Dniester,  command- 
ing the  most  important  crossing  point  in  that  region.  The 
capture  of  Halicz  by  the  Russians  would  have  meant  the 
turning  of  the  line  of  the  Gnila  Lipa.  Von  Bothmer's 
right  wing,  which  bent  back  sharply  from  Zawalow  on  the 
Zlota  Lipa  to  the  Dniester  at  Mariampol,  was  defeated  by 
Scherbacheff  in  a  five  days'  battle,  August  30-September  3, 
while  further  north  there  was  a  fierce  struggle  for  Brze- 
zany.     On  the  4th  the  Russians  reached  the  Gnila  Lipa, 


Jon  J.  C.   Bratiano,  Prime  Minister  of  Ron- 
mania  at  the  time  that  country  declared  war. 


General  Averescu,  commander  of  the 
Roumanian  Second  Army. 


Nicu  Filipescu.  Take  Jonescu. 

Pro- Ally  leaders  of  Roumanian  Irredentist  party. 


Russian  Offensive  and  Roumanian  Collapse  305 

but  reinforcements,  including  the  Third  Prussian  Guards 
Division,  were  hurried  to  the  assistance  of  von  Bothmer, 
increasing  his  strength  to  a  total  of  thirteen  or  fourteen 
divisions.  A  counter-attack  delivered  on  the  4th  saved 
Brzezany  for  the  Austro-Germans.  Fighting  continued 
throughout  September  along  the  Narajonka,  a  tributary  of 
the  Gnila  Lipa,  without  definite  gains  for  either  side,  and 
the  conflict  became  stationary. 

Meanwhile,  about  the  middle  of  August,  Lechitsky  won 
the  Jablonica  and  Kirlibaba  Passes  in  Bukovina.  He  was 
in  touch  with  the  Roumanian  right  wing  by  September 
11th;  but  the  early  winter  with  the  deep  snow  in  these 
higher  altitudes  crippled  all  his  efforts,  and  he  was  unable 
to  penetrate  the  mountain  barrier.  In  spite  of  the  enthu- 
siasm inspired  by  their  illusory  victories,  the  Roumanians 
who  invaded  Transylvania  failed  to  reach  the  line  of  the 
Maros,  where  alone  a  coherent  front  might  have  been 
formed  against  the  future  counter-attacks  of  the  enemy. 
The  direct  cooperation  of  the  Russians  on  the  right  flank 
of  the  Roumanians  failed  of  its  effect.  The  unexpected 
incursion  of  von  Mackensen  into  the  Dobrudscha  had 
already  created  an  impression  of  uneasiness  in  Roumanian 
circles  and  the  situation  seemed  ripe  for  von  Falkenhayn 
to  launch  his  main  attack  from  the  side  of  Transylvania. 

The  initial  Austro-German  blow  fell  upon  the  principal 
portion  of  the  First  Roumanian  Army,  which  had  ad- 
vanced through  the  Rother  Turm  Pass  and  was  now  north 
of  Hermannstadt,  having  tenuous  lines  of  communication 
which  threaded  the  winding  valleys  in  the  rugged  territory 
at  its  rear.  Von  Falkenhayn  seized  the  opportunity  to 
turn  its  flank;  a  column  of  Bavarian  Alpine  troops,  starting 
from  the  Austro-German  right  wing  on  September  22d, 
traversed  several  mountain  ridges  and  seized  the  com- 
manding positions  in  the  Rother  Turm  Pass  on  the  26th. 


306  The  Great  War 

On  the  same  day  the  Austro-German  center  began  the 
bombardment  of  the  Roumanian  front  near  Hermann- 
stadt,  while  the  forces  on  the  left  threatened  their  oppo- 
nents' right  Bank.     With  its  main  line  of  communications 

interrupted,  this  portion  of  the  First  Roumanian  Army 
w  as  thus  compelled  to  retreat  in  a  southeasterly  direction 
and  made  its  escape  by  difficult  routes  across  the  frontier 
range,  although  with  comparatively  small  losses. 

The  configuration  of  the  country  and  the  effectiveness 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  strategic  railways  enabled  von 
Falkenhayn  to  move  the  bulk  of  his  forces  successively 
and  unexpectedly  against  the  isolated  groups  of  the  op- 
posing forces.  He  now  proceeded  eastward  against  the 
left  flank  of  the  Second  Roumanian  Army.  The  Second 
and  Fourth  Roumanian  Armies  were  at  this  time  con- 
verging on  Schassburg,  where  the  invasion  reached  the 
deepest  point  of  penetration  on  October  3d.  But  at 
once  the  pressure  of  the  Austro-German  forces  became 
too  great  and  these  two  armies  withdrew  along  divergent 
lines  towards  the  passes  through  which  they  had  entered 
Transylvania. 

Crainiceanu,  who  had  succeeded  Averescu  in  command 
of  the  Second  Roumanian  Army,  retreated  through  Kron- 
stadt  towards  the  Torzburg,  Predeal,  and  Buzeu  Passes. 
The  Austro-German  forces  recovered  Kronstadt  on  Octo- 
ber 7th,  and  by  the  10th  the  Roumanians  were  back  on 
the  frontier.  With  this  sudden  collapse  of  the  Roumanian 
offensive  Averescu  was  recalled  from  the  Dobrudscha  to  the 
command  of  the  Second  Army.  At  the  same  time,  Gen- 
eral Berthelot  with  the  French  military  mission  arrived  in 
Roumania  to  assist  with  their  expert  advice  the  councils  of 
the  Roumanian  General  Staff. 

It  was  necessary  for  von  Falkenhayn  to  force  his  way 
into   Roumania  with  the   least  possible  delay  before  the 


Russian  Offensive  and  Roumania's  Collapse  307 

advent  of  winter  in  the  mountainous  regions  impeded  his 
offensive.  The  first  plan  had  been  to  penetrate  the  moun- 
tain barrier  by  the  central  passes,  so  as  to  debouch  into  the 
oil-region,  cleave  the  heart  of  Wallachia,  and  cut  off  the 
retreat  of  all  the  Roumanian  forces  further  west.  But 
the  Roumanians,  fighting  valiantly,  held  their  opponents  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  Torzburg  and  Predeal  Passes.  The 
Austro-Germans  forced  their  way  through  the  Gyimes 
Pass  on  the  Moldavian  frontier  further  north  but  were 
unable  to  exploit  their  advantage.  Early  in  November 
Lechitsky's  left  wing  was  extended  towards  the  south, 
taking  over  the  front  of  the  Fourth  Roumanian  Army  as 
far  as  the  region  of  this  pass. 

The  renewal  of  activity  late  in  October  by  von  Macken- 
sen,  whose  forces  had  been  reinforced  by  one  German  and 
two  Turkish  divisions,  was  a  prelude  to  von  Mackensen's 
new  departure.  The  mixed  army  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance 
in  the  Dobrudscha  began  an  advance  on  October  20th,  cut 
the  Tchernavoda-Costanza  railway  on  the  next  day,  and 
entered  the  Roumanian  seaport,  Costanza,  on  the  23d.  The 
Roumanians  abandoned  the  famous  Tchernavoda  bridge 
across  the  Danube,  which  is  more  than  1,000  yards  in  length 
and  100  feet  above  the  river,  and  blew  up  one  of  the  spans 
as  they  retreated.  The  Russo-Roumanian  army  of  the 
Dobrudscha  retreated  towards  the  northern  part  of  the 
peninsula.  The  Russian  General  Sakharoff,  with  several 
Russian  divisions,  joined  it  on  November  1st,  assuming  the 
command. 

Von  Falkenhayn  decided  to  shift  his  main  attack  west- 
ward to  the  Vulcan  Pass,  through  which  the  highway 
descends  the  Jiu  valley  to  one  of  the  least  accessible  Rou- 
manian rail-heads  at  Targul  Jiu.  About  the  middle  of 
October  the  Roumanians  had  been  forced  to  retire  through 
this  pass,  but  had  subsequently  turned  upon  their  opponents 


308  The  Great  War 

and  repulsed  them.  To  divert  attention  from  the  decisive 
attempt  to  invade  Roumania  by  this  route,  Austro-Gennan 
activity  was  redoubled  near  the  principal  passes  to  the  east. 
The  main  advance  down  the  valley  of  the  Jiu  began  on 
November  10th  and  on  the  15th  the  Austro-Germans  cap- 
tured the  rail-head  at  Targul  Jiu.  In  a  second  battle  on 
the  17th  Roumanian  resistance  was  shattered  by  superior 
numbers  and  superior  strength  of  artillery  and  two  days 
later  the  Germans  reached  Filiasi  on  the  main  railway  line 
from  Orsova  to  Bucharest,  cutting  off  the  retreat  of  a  Rou- 
manian division  at  the  former  place. 

The  weakness  in  the  situation  of  Roumania  uncovered 
by  the  Austro-German  strategy  soon  proved  fatal.  Rou- 
mania was  unable  to  shift  her  forces  with  rapidity  or  con- 
centrate reinforcements  at  the  threatened  points  in  time  to 
stay  disaster.  The  rapid  retreat  following  the  defeats  in 
the  Jiu  valley  indicated  a  serious  shortage  in  ammunition. 
It  now  appeared,  moreover,  that  the  Allies  had  greatly 
underestimated  the  forces  which  Germany  could  send  to 
the  Roumanian  theater.  The  advent  of  winter  in  the 
northern  portion  of  the  German  eastern  front,  by  greatly 
hindering  the  aggressive  operations  of  the  Russians,  released 
numerous  German  forces  for  the  operations  against  Rou- 
mania. Between  September  1st  and  January  1st  Germany 
sent  no  fewer  than  thirty  divisions  to  participate  in  the 
Roumanian  campaign.  In  the  middle  of  October  about 
eight  to  ten  Russian  army  corps  were  assigned  to  the  sup- 
port of  Roumania;  but  they  arrived  at  intervals,  in  instal- 
ments, which  were  swept  back  by  the  retreating  wave 
without  exercising  any  distinct  influence  on  events. 

After  the  defeats  mentioned  above,  the  First  Roumanian 
Army  hastily  fell  back  eastward,  hoping  to  rally  on  the 
line  of  the  Aluta;  but  this  was  rendered  difficult  by  the 
fact  that  the  railway  runs  on  the  west  bank  of  the  river, 


The  docks  at  Costanza,  the  Roumanian  port  on  the  Black  Sea. 


Oil  region  of  Roumania.      Great  quantities  of  oil  were  set  on  fire  by  th 
retreated  before  the  troops  of  the  Central  Powers. 


Russian  Offensive  and  Roumania's  Collapse  309 

exposed  to  the  attack  of  the  approaching  enemy.  Now 
came  a  second  crucial  blow  for  the  Roumanians.  Von 
Mackensen  crossed  the  Danube  at  two  places  where 
the  presence  of  islands  facilitated  the  placing  of  the 
pontoon  bridges.  This  operation,  to  which  the  Rus- 
sians had  devoted  thirty-three  days  in  1877,  was  now 
accomplished  in  eighteen  hours.  The  passage  of  the 
Danube  below  the  mouth  of  the  Aluta  turned  the  left 
flank  of  the  First  Roumanian  Army  and  made  the  con- 
templated defensive  line  untenable.  In  a  short  time  the 
Bulgaro-German  forces  were  crossing  the  Danube  at 
many  points. 

The  Roumanians  were  powerless  before  the  combined 
strength  of  von  Falkenhayn  and  von  Mackensen  now 
cooperating  in  the  heart  of  Wallachia.  It  was  only  possi- 
ble to  delay  the  enemy's  advance  so  that  the  bulk  of  the 
Roumanian  armies  could  escape  eastward.  The  Rou- 
manians still  held  the  line  of  the  mountains  westward  as 
far  as  the  Predeal  Pass,  so  that  the  right  flank  of  the  re- 
treating army  was  in  part  protected.  On  December  1st 
General  Presan,  striking  southwest  of  Bucharest,  endeav- 
ored to  drive  a  wedge  between  the  chief  masses  of  the  in- 
vading armies,  but  was  repulsed  after  an  initial  success. 

This  effort  was  probably  only  intended  to  gain  time  for 
the  evacuation  of  the  capital.  Experience  had  shown  the 
futility  of  attempting  to  hold  Bucharest,  although  it  had 
been  fortified  by  a  system  of  nineteen  detached  forts  by 
Brialmont  in  the  period  before  the  war.  The  ministers, 
banks,  and  foreign  legations  were  removed  on  December 
1st  to  Jassy,  which  became  the  provisional  capital,  and  von 
Mackensen  entered  Bucharest  on  the  5th. 

As  von  Falkenhayn  advanced  eastward  towards  Ploeshti, 
the  center  of  the  oil-region,  on  a  line  passing  north  of 
Bucharest,  the  retreating  Roumanians  and  Allied  agents 


310  The  Great  War 

sot  fire  to  the  oil-wells,  granaries,  and  military  stores,  sacri- 
ficing  property  of  great  value.  Huge  columns  of  smoke 
heralded  the  progress  of  the  invasion  and  the  highways  were 
crowded  with  fugitives.     The  Predeal  Pass  was  abandoned, 

all  Wallachia  was  doomed,  the  only  course  for  the  Rouma- 
nian armies  was  to  fall  back  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  the 
natural  defensive  line  of  theTrotusand  Sereth,  runningfrom 
the  neighborhood  of  the  Gyimes  Pass  southeastward  to  the 
Danube  just  above  Galatz  and  covering  the  greater  part  of 
Moldavia.  The  security  of  this  line  depended  upon  the 
ability  of  Lechitsky's  Russian  army  to  defend  the  mountain 
barrier  of  Moldavia  from  the  Gyimes  Pass  northward. 

The  Germanic  forces  advanced,  sweeping  Wallachia 
from  the  mountains  to  the  Danube,  wheeling  to  the  left 
in  conformity  with  the  rounding  contour  of  Roumania. 
In  the  meantime,  General  Sakharoff  retired  northward  in 
the  Dobrudscha,  in  general  alignment  with  the  receding 
Roumanian  front  in  Wallachia,  and  crossed  the  Danube  on 
January  4,  1917.  On  the  next  day  the  Germans  and  Bul- 
garians entered  Braila  and  the  first  German  troops  reached 
the  Sereth. 

Upon  the  completion  of  their  retreat,  the  Roumanians 
were  mostly  withdrawn  for  reorganization  under  Averescu 
to  positions  in  the  rear,  and  the  Russians  took  over  the 
main  defense  of  the  new  line.  Reaching  the  natural  ob- 
stacle at  the  mouth  of  the  Sereth,  the  extreme  right  wing 
of  the  Teutonic  armies  became  stationary  and  served  as  a 
pivot  upon  which  the  front  swerved  to  the  right  sufficiently 
to  face  the  new  Allied  position.  Von  Falkenhayn  entered 
Focsani  on  January  8th  and  by  the  middle  of  the  month 
the  Teutonic  forces  were  in  contact  with  their  opponents 
along  the  entire  Moldavian  line.  But  several  attempts  to 
penetrate  the  new  Russo-Roumanian  front  were  unsuc- 
cessful and  major  operations  ceased. 


Russian  Offensive  and  Roumania's  Collapse  311 

Besides  the  bitter  disappointment  to  the  Allies  and  the 
severe  blow  to  Allied  prestige,  the  results  of  the  Rouma- 
nian campaign  brought  very  substantial  advantages  to  the 
Central  Powers.  The  delight  of  certain  German  leaders 
at  the  opportunity  of  returning  to  open  warfare  after  the 
irksome  months  of  purely  defensive  operations  had  turned 
out  to  be  well  founded.  The  German  people  were  heart- 
ened by  a  rapid  series  of  victories.  The  conquest  of 
Wallachia  removed  a  deep  and  awkward  depression  in  the 
eastern  border  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  and  consolidated 
German  communications  with  the  Near  East.  The  Ger- 
mans lost  no  time  in  exploiting  the  economic  possibilities 
created  by  their  victories.  Every  effort  was  made  to  re- 
store Roumanian  agriculture  and  to  improve  its  methods, 
which  had  remained  backward  in  consequence  of  the 
poverty  and  ignorance  of  the  peasantry  and  the  indolence 
of  the  large  proprietors.  The  production  of  grain  crops 
was  stimulated  by  the  rising  prices  and  the  military  ad- 
ministration gave  special  attention  to  encouraging  the 
production  of  oil-seeds  and  the  extraction  of  vegetable 
oils  and  the  development  of  the  fruit  and  vegetable  can- 
ning industry. 

The  population  of  the  larger  towns  was  put  on  rations, — 
225  grams  of  white  flour  and  150  grams  of  corn-meal  daily, 
with  a  weekly  meat  allowance  of  150  grams.  The  railways 
were  quickly  repaired.  The  Danube  was  opened  to  navi- 
gation. A  towing  railway  had  already  been  installed  along 
the  margin  of  the  artificial  channel  through  the  rapids  at 
the  Iron  Gate,  by  which  the  possible  amount  of  up-stream 
tonnage  was  increased  five-fold.  By  these  means  a  con- 
siderable quantity  of  Roumanian  produce  was  made  avail- 
able for  exportation.  Thus,  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
together  received  960,000  tons  of  grain  from  the  Rouma- 
nian crop  of  1916-1917. 


312  The  Great  War 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Roumanian  parliament  convened 
at  Jassy  on  Decemher  22,  1916,  a  coalition  government, 
which  included  Take  Jonescu,  was  installed  on  the  24th, 
and  compensation  for  the  national  calamities  was  sought 
in  a  series  of  legislative  reforms,  such  as  the  introduction 
of  universal  and  direct  suffrage  and  the  extension  of  peas- 
ant proprietorship. 

Early  in  1917  the  Russians,  unable  to  compensate  for  the 
Roumanian  losses  by  a  vigorous  counter-offensive  from  the 
line  of  the  Sereth,  attempted  a  diversion  in  other  quarters. 
Minor  gains  were  made  by  attacks  in  the  vicinity  of  Riga 
and  Dvinsk  on  January  5th  and  9th  respectively,  and  on 
the  28th  Lechitsky  made  a  temporary  breach  in  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  front  near  Kimpolung  in  the  southwestern 
corner  of  Bukovina.  But  these  results  were  inconsiderable. 
Russia's  martial  force  was  waning.  The  patriotism  of  the 
masses  was  too  feeble  to  overcome  their  war-weariness  and 
the  energy  of  the  enlightened  classes  and  the  service  of  the 
armies  were  corroded  by  inefficiency,  corruption,  and  sus- 
picion. Only  a  miracle  could  have  enabled  the  Empire  of 
the  Tsars  to  astonish  the  world  again  by  such  a  powerful 
and  sustained  effort  as  it  put  forth  in  1916. 


Jji 


*  i  .1    v 


CHAPTER  XIV 

The  Operations  in  Asiatic  Turkey 

Strategical  situation  of  Asiatic  Turkey.  British-Indian  expedition  to  Meso 
potamia ;  occupation  of  Basra,  November  21,  I'M  I,  and  of  Kurna,  December 
9th.  Character  of  the  Mesopotamian  plain  and  difficulties  of  the  off. 
operations.  British  capture  of  Kut-el-Amara  and  advance  on  Bagdad 
British  failure  at  Ctesiphon  and  retreat  to  Kut-el-Amara,  which  is  besieged 
Failure  of  the  British  relieving  expedition  to  break  through  in  time  and 
surrender  of  Kut,  April  29,  1916.  Operations  on  the  Russo-Turkish  front 
Complete  failure  of  the  Turkish  offensive  in  the  winter  of  I'M  I  1915.  The 
Armenian  massacres.  The  situation  in  Persia.  Capture  ol  Brzerum  by 
the  Russians,  February  16,  1916,  and  the  Russian  advance  throughout 
Armenia.  Operations  in  Persia.  Action  on  the  British  front  in  Mesopot- 
amia leading  to  the  capture  of  Kut-el-Amara.  Occupation  of  Bagdad  by 
the  British,  March  11,  1917,  and  further  operations  northward.  Turkish 
hopes  in  respect  to  Egypt.  Turkish  attack  on  the  Sue/  Canal  defeated 
February  3-4,  1915.  Revolt  against  Turkish  rule  in  Arabia.  Defeat  of 
the  Turkish  expedition  against  Egypt  on  August  I,  1916.  Advance  of  the 
British  to  the  border  of  Palestine.  Battles  before  Gaza,  March  27th  and 
April  17-19,  1917. 

Asiatic  Turkey  could  be  regarded  as  the  vestibule  of 
three  continents.  It  opened  onto  Africa  in  the  region  of 
the  Suez  Canal,  formed  the  approach  to  Asia,  ami  gave 
access  to  Europe  through  the  Caucasus  and  across  the 
Dardanelles.  Through  it  or  near  it  passed  the  world's 
most  famous  trade  routes  past  and  present.  It  held  a 
naturally  central  situation  in  the  Eastern  Hemisphere.  It 
had  once  contained  the  mightiest  seats  of  power  and  might 
again  become  strategically  a  crucial  area. 

Patiently  and  systematically,  as  we  have  seen,  the  Ger- 
mans had  striven  to  consolidate  their  influence  in  the 
Ottoman  Empire,  chiefly  with  a  view  to  utilizing  the  \:ist 
military   and   commercial    possibilities   of    Asiatic    Turkey 

313 


314  The  Great  War 

which  touched  Egypt  and  the  Persian  Gulf  and  contained 
the  points  of  departure  for  the  great  routes  through  Persia. 
The  seeming  wealth  of  opportunities  made  it  difficult  to 
predict  the  immediate  intentions  of  the  Turkish  leaders 
and  their  German  mentors  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
But  on  the  other  hand,  the  geographical  advantages  of  this 
region,  while  engaging  the  imagination,  still  required  a 
vast  lahor  of  development  and  organization  before  they 
would  become  a  decisive  factor. 

The  great  distances  and  paucity  of  improved  lines  of 
communication  prevented  the  Turks  from  profiting  by 
their  central  position  to  shift  their  own  forces  rapidly  from 
one  front  to  another  so  as  to  overwhelm  their  opponents 
in  detail.  However,  the  isolation  of  the  Allied  forces 
on  the  different  fronts  and  the  lack  of  a  just  appreciation 
of  the  strategical  problem  delayed  the  systematic  execution 
of  a  coherent  plan  for  offensive  operations. 

One  of  the  salient  geographical  features  of  the  situation 
was  the  natural  barrier  of  the  Taurus  Mountains  running 
from  the  northeastern  corner  of  the  Mediterranean  Sea  to 
the  Black  Sea  near  Trebizond.  The  Constantinople-Bag- 
dad railway  still  presented  a  gap  of  forty-five  miles  through 
these  mountains  and  even  the  connecting  highway  by  way 
of  the  famous  Cilician  Gate  was  not  made  practicable  for 
motor  traffic  until  after  the  intervention  of  Turkey  in  the 
Great  War.  The  British  possessed  an  admirable  naval  base 
in  Cyprus  threatening  the  Gulf  of  Alexandretta  and  the 
susceptible  region  of  Adana,  where  the  Constantinople- 
Bagdad  railway  runs  within  a  short  distance  of  the  sea, 
and  the  Italians  held  naval  stations  in  Rhodes  and  other 
islands  near  the  southwestern  extremity  of  Asia  Minor. 
Clearly,  the  question  of  supply  and  the  replenishment  of 
munitions  was  fraught  with  difficulties  and  dangers  for  the 
Turks,  particularly  in   the   early  stages   of  the  struggle. 


The  Operations  in  Asiatic  Turkey  315 

Later  the  situation  was  considerably  improved  through  the 
indefatigable  efforts  of  the  Germans. 

The  Germans  had  counted  on  the  Turks  inflaming  the 
numerous  Moslem  populations  of  the  British  and  French 
dependencies  to  engage  in  a  holy  war  against  their  Christ- 
ian rulers.  Although  the  proclamation  of  the  Jihad  met 
with  practically  no  response,  the  prospect  of  using  Asiatic 
Turkey  as  a  base  for  attacks  against  the  British  Empire  in 
its  most  vulnerable  parts  continued  to  fascinate  the  Ger- 
man imagination,  and  the  German  leaders  expected  at  least 
that  a  demonstration  against  Egypt  or  a  threatened  blow 
at  India  would  divert  the  attention  of  the  British  from  the 
prosecution  of  the  war  in  Europe. 

The  control  of  Mesopotamia  with  a  harbor  on  the 
Persian  Gulf  was  an  essential  part  of  the  plan  for  the 
Greater  Germany.  Mesopotamia  itself  offered  enormous 
possibilities  for  development.  It  was,  moreover,  the  natu- 
ral base  from  which  Persia  could  be  penetrated  by  German 
influence  and  the  secret  activity  of  German  agents  in 
Afghanistan  and  India  could  be  sustained,  directed,  and 
controlled.  The  Germans  securely  established  in  Meso- 
potamia, working  through  subterranean  channels  and 
enlisting  the  fanatical  support  of  the  Mohammedan  popu- 
lations, might  eventually  have  undermined  the  Asiatic 
power  of  both  Great  Britain  and  Russia. 

But  British  influence  had  been  established  in  the  Persian 
Gulf  before  the  Ottoman  Empire  claimed  dominion  on  its 
shores  and  it  was  a  settled  principle  of  Anglo-Indian  policy 
that  the  security  of  these  waters  was  essential  to  the  safety 
of  the  Indian  Empire.  It  was,  naturally,  the  Indian  govern- 
ment which  undertook  to  thwart  the  Turco-German  pro- 
gramme by  sending  a  brigade  under  Brigadier-general 
W.  S.  Delamain,  which  disembarked  at  the  head  of  the 
Persian  Gulf  and  was  shortly  joined  by  Lieutenant-general 


316  The  Great  War 

Sir  Arthur  Barrett  with  two  other  brigades.  This  expedi- 
tionary force  compelled  the  Turks  to  evacuate  Basra  on 
November  21,  1914,  and  erected  the  British  base-camp  at 
that  point.  Kurna,  at  the  confluence  of  the  Tigris  and  the 
old  channel  of  the  Euphrates,  was  captured  on  December 
()th  and  the  British  entrenched  themselves  there  and  at 
Mezera  on  the  opposite  bank  so  as  to  close  the  gateway 
from  the  interior  to  the  sea. 

Still  the  Turkish  forces  greatly  outnumbered  the  British 
in  this  region  and  the  situation  remained  precarious. 
Lieutenant-general  Sir  John  Nixon  arrived  from  India 
with  reinforcements  and  assumed  the  chief  command. 
The  Turks  slowly  gathered  their  forces  around  the  British 
area  of  occupation.  A  series  of  minor  engagements  cul- 
minated in  an  attack  west  of  Basra  by  about  18,000  Turks, 
beginning  on  April  12,  1915,  and  lasting  three  days,  when 
the  Turks  were  defeated  with  severe  losses. 

The  essential  zone  of  Mesopotamia  is  an  alluvial  plain  of 
great  natural  fertility  formed  by  the  Tigris  and  the  Euphra- 
tes, which  approach  to  about  twenty  miles  of  each  other 
near  Bagdad,  then  swing  apart,  and  finally  unite  about  a  hun- 
dred miles  above  the  head  of  the  Persian  Gulf.  This  fruitful 
belt  is  enclosed  on  both  sides  by  deserts.  The  hydrograph- 
ical  conditions  were  a  serious  hindrance  to  the  operations  of 
the  British.  The  extremely  tortuous  course  of  the  rivers 
increased  the  length  of  the  lines  of  communication  several 
fold  and  this  difficulty  was  greatly  increased  by  the  uncer- 
tain conditions  of  the  navigable  channels.  The  melting  of 
the  snow  in  the  Armenian  mountains  in  the  spring  causes 
the  Tigris  and  the  Euphrates  to  overflow  their  banks,  con- 
verting a  large  part  of  the  plain  into  a  morass.  At  other 
times  the  water  falls  to  such  a  low  stage  that  navigation  by 
steamer  is  greatly  impeded  by  the  shallows.  The  ancients 
prevented  inundations  by  means  of  dykes  and  artificial  lakes, 


Lieutenant-general  Sir  John  Nixon,  com- 
mander-in-chief" of  the  early  operations  in 
Mesopotamia. 


Lieutenant-general  Sir  Percy  Lake,  suc- 
cessor to  General  Nixon  as  commander  of 
the  British  forces  in  Mesopotamia. 


Major-general  C.  V.  F.  Townshend, 
commander  of  the  British  forces  captured 
bv  the  Turks  at  Kut-el-Amara. 


Lieutenant-general  Sir  Stanley  Maude, 
commander-in-chief  of  the  British  forces 
which  captured  Bagdad  in  March,  1917- 


The  Operations  in  Asiatic  Turkey  317 

but  their  indolent  successors  neglected  these  works,  which 
gradually  disappeared.  At  all  times  the  plain  is  interrupted 
by  canals,  lagoons,  and  swamps  forming  defensive  barriers. 

Notwithstanding,  these  difficulties  and  the  smallness  of 
the  numbers  of  the  British,  the  forces  from  Kurna  pushed 
on  boldly  up  the  Tigris.  On  June  3d  they  occupied 
Amara,  seventy-five  miles  above  Kurna,  while  the  Turks 
retired  on  Kut-el- Amara,  150  miles  further  up  the  river. 
Kut-el-Amara  was  a  place  of  considerable  strategic  impor- 
tance, because  from  a  point  opposite  a  channel  called  the 
Shatt-el-Hai  leaves  the  Tigris  and  flows  to  the  Euphrates 
at  Nasiriyeh,  the  reputed  site  of  the  Garden  of  Eden, 
situated  about  a  hundred  miles  northwest  of  Basra.  The 
Shatt-el-Hai,  as  long  as  it  was  open  to  the  Turkish  forces, 
offered  an  opportunity  for  threatening  the  British  on  the 
flank  or  in  the  rear.  But  on  July  25th  a  British  force 
sent  out  from  Kurna  took  Nasiriyeh.  It  remained  for 
the  British  to  close  the  entrance  of  the  Shatt-el-Hai  from 
above. 

Early  in  August  a  division  under  Major-general  C.  V.  F. 
Townshend  started  from  Amara  to  attack  Kut-el-Amara. 
The  enemy,  about  10,000  in  number,  awaited  them  about 
seven  miles  below  the  town,  deployed  on  a  front  of  six 
miles  extending  across  the  river.  The  British  attacked  at 
dawn  on  September  28th.  The  chief  attack  was  delivered 
against  the  Turkish  left  flank,  which  was  driven  in  about 
10  A.  M.,  so  that  the  British  turning  the  enemy's  front  dis- 
persed the  reinforcements  advancing  towards  his  center. 
The  Turks  abandoned  the  field  during  the  following  night 
and  the  British  entered  Kut-el-Amara  on  the  29th.  Thus 
far  the  campaign  had  been  brilliantly  conceived  and  exe- 
cuted. 

Soon,  however,  the  effect  of  the  important  events  in 
the  Balkan  peninsula  began  to  be  felt  in  the  campaigns  of 


318  The  Great  War 

Asiatic  Turkey.  The  collapse  of  Serbia  removed  the 
chief  obstacle  to  the  flow  of  German  munitions  to  the 
Turkish  theaters  of  operations  and  the  failure  of  the  Allies 
at  the  Dardanelles  and  their  eventual  withdrawal  from  the 
Gallipoli  peninsula  released  an  army  of  about  200,000 
Turks  for  action  elsewhere.  Notwithstanding  the  inade- 
quacy of  the  British  force  and  the  natural  difficulties 
already  enumerated,  in  spite  of  his  own  misgivings,  Gen- 
eral Townshend  pressed  on  towards  Bagdad  at  the  com- 
mand of  General  Nixon.  The  distance  by  land  is  about  a 
hundred  miles,  but  by  river  vastly  greater,  and  the  treach- 
erous character  of  the  tribesmen,  added  to  the  difficulties 
of  navigation,  made  the  British  communications  very  pre- 
carious. But  the  conquest  of  Bagdad  offered  great  political 
advantages  and  promised  to  restore  British  prestige  in  the 
East,  which  had  been  seriously  shaken  by  the  failure  of  the 
Gallipoli  campaign. 

The  British  advance  began  early  in  October  and  by 
November  12th  General  Townshend  was  encamped  seven 
miles  below  the  Turkish  position  at  Ctesiphon,  or  about 
thirty  miles  below  Bagdad.  The  British  numbered  about 
12,000  combatants,  the  Turks  about  20,000.  The  main 
part  of  the  Turkish  army  was  strongly  intrenched  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Tigris.  The  British  plan,  as  at  Kut-el- 
Amara,  was  to  aim  the  chief  blow  against  the  enemy's  left 
flank.  The  assailants  advanced  to  the  positions  of  attack 
during  the  night  of  November  21st-22d  and  the  engage- 
ment was  begun  about  nine  the  next  morning.  The  main 
Turkish  front  was  pierced  about  1.30  but  the  left  flank  re- 
mained intact  and  the  Turks  retired  to  a  second  position 
which  the  British  attacked  in  vain.  Reinforcements  reached 
the  Turks,  who  turned  upon  their  assailants,  driving  them 
back  to  the  former  Turkish  first-line  trenches.  The  British 
withstood  repeated  attacks  on  the  next  day,  but  their  losses 


The  Operations  in  Asiatic  Turkey  319 

in  the  battle  totalled  about  4,500  and  the  Turks  were  con- 
stantly receiving  additional  reinforcements.  The  situation 
was  perilous  and  General  Townshend  began  a  retreat  at 
midnight  on  the  25th.  After  exhausting  marches  the  ex- 
pedition reached  Kut-el-Amara  on  December  3d  where  it 
was  straightway  invested  by  the  Turks.  The  British  were 
confident  that  it  was  merely  a  question  of  time  before  the 
siege  of  Kut-el-Amara  would  be  lifted  and  General  Towns- 
hend's  forces  would  be  released.  The  two  Indian  divisions 
had  already  been  withdrawn  from  the  Western  front,  where 
the  Anzac  Corps  replaced  them,  and  had  embarked  for 
the  Persian  Gulf.  Kut-el-Amara  is  almost  completely  en- 
closed within  a  bend  of  the  Tigris.  The  British  strongly 
intrenched  the  neck  of  land  forming  the  approach  from 
the  north.  The  blockading  army,  consisting  of  four  divi- 
sions, began  to  bombard  the  British  on  December  7th 
and  attacked  without  success  on  the  11th.  An  additional 
Turkish  division  arrived  from  Gallipoli  on  the  23d,  but  a 
fresh  assault  was  repulsed  on  the  evening  of  the  24th, 
after  which  the  besiegers  abandoned  their  efforts  to  take 
Kut-el-Amara  by  storm  and  resorted  to  the  slower  process 
of  starving  their  opponents  out. 

Meanwhile,  Sir  John  Nixon  resigned  the  post  of 
commander-in-chief  in  Mesopotamia  on  account  of  ill 
health  and  was  succeeded  by  Lieutenant-general  Sir  Percy 
Lake,  Chief  of  the  Indian  Staff,  and  a  relieving  force 
was  sent  to  Kut-el-Amara  consisting  of  the  Lahore 
Division,  part  of  the  Meerut  Division,  and  a  number  of 
British  Territorial  battalions  from  India,  under  General 
Aylmer.  This  force  came  into  touch  with  the  Turks 
about  twenty-five  miles  below  Kut-el-Amara  on  January 
6,  1916. 

The  Germans  were  devoting  close  attention  to  the  course 
of  events  in  Mesopotamia.     The  aged  Marshal  von  der 


320  The  Great  War 

Goltz  had  been  sent  to  conduct  the  Mesopotamian  oper- 
ations. With  experienced  German  assistance  the  Turks 
bad  now  blocked  the  lines  of  approach  to  Kut-el-Amara 
by  successive  strongly  fortified  positions,  particularly  on 
the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris.  Partial  successes  won  by  the 
British  relieving  force  on  January  7th,  8th,  and  21st  were 
followed  by  a  period  of  stagnation. 

Finally,  General  Aylmer  determined  to  make  a  sudden 
advance  across  the  desert  on  the  right  bank  along  the  seg- 
ment of  the  broad  arc  formed  by  the  general  course  of  the 
river  east  of  Kut-el-Amara  and  surprise  Es  Sinn,  a  position 
commanding  the  Turkish  right  wing,  seven  miles  below 
the  beleaguered  British  camp.  The  march  was  successfully 
performed  on  the  night  of  February  7th-8th,  but  the  attack 
was  fruitless  and  the  British  were  compelled  to  fall  back  to 
their  old  position. 

There  was  another  period  of  inaction  for  about  a  month, 
until  Lieutenant-general  Sir  G.  P.  Gorringe,  who  had  suc- 
ceeded General  Aylmer,  delivered  a  frontal  attack  on  the 
left  bank  on  March  13th  with  the  Thirteenth  Division, 
which  had  arrived  as  reinforcements.  The  British  carried 
five  successive  lines  while  the  Lahore  Division  cleared  up 
the  corresponding  enemy  positions  on  the  right  bank,  but 
the  spring  floods  coming  on  made  further  advance  impos- 
sible. 

The  situation  of  the  British  force  shut  up  in  Kut-el- 
Amara  became  daily  more  critical  from  the  depletion  of  their 
stores.  Resistance  was  a  continual  struggle  against  famine. 
An  attempt  to  bring  supplies  by  steamer  failed,  as  might 
have  been  expected.  Aeroplanes  occasionally  brought  pro- 
visions, but  the  amount  was  insignificant.  After  holding 
out  to  the  extreme  limit  of  endurance,  the  troops  under 
General  Townshend,  now  reduced  to  about  8,000,  6,000  of 
whom  were  Indians,  laid  down  their  arms  on  April  29th. 


The  great  arch  at  Ctesiphon.      Remains  of  the  palace  of  Takhti  Khesra,  built  by  Chosroes  I, 
A.  D.  JJO     The  arch,  built  of  brick,  is  eighty-three  feet  wide  and  ninty-five  feet  high. 


Kut-el-Amara.  After  the  British  first  expedition  against  Bagdad  ivas  repulsed  at  Ctesiphon, 
they  retreated  to  Kut-el-Amara,  -where  they  entrenched,  but  finally  surrendered  to  the  Turks  in 
April,  iq/6. 


The  Operations  in  Asiatic  Turkey  321 

The  impression  made  by  the  surrender  to  the  Turks  of  a 
considerable  British  force  appeared  all  the  more  signifi- 
cant, of  course,  because  it  followed  the  Franco-British 
failures  at  the  Dardanelles.  But  the  British,  taught  by 
disappointment,  now  applied  themselves  to  the  task  of 
creating  a  systematic  material  organization  for  the  prose- 
cution of  the  campaign.  They  dredged  the  lower  Euphra- 
tes, established  wharves  for  ocean-going  steamers  at  Basra, 
and  began  the  construction  of  a  railway  towards  the  theater 
of  action.  Supplies  were  accumulated  for  a  fresh  advance 
towards  Bagdad.  The  critical  point  in  the  British  cam- 
paign had  now  been  passed  and  as  operations  advanced  it 
became  more  and  more  evident  that  the  British  and  Rus- 
sian forces  in  Asiatic  Turkey  should  eventually  cooperate, 
form  a  continuous  front,  and  together  sweep  their  oppo- 
nents westward.  We  should  therefore  turn  our  atten- 
tion to  the  Russo-Turkish  border  in  Armenia  and  trace 
the  progress  of  the  Russian  army  towards  this  expected 
consummation. 

The  Russian  province  of  Transcaucasia  is  mainly  a  great 
trough  extending  nearly  across  the  isthmus  from  the  Black 
Sea  to  the  Caspian,  confined  on  the  north  by  the  Caucasus 
range,  with  the  loftiest  peaks  in  Europe,  and  on  the  south 
by  the  vast  mountainous  mass  of  Armenia.  The  Turks 
were  eager  to  recover  the  fortress  of  Kars  and  the  port 
of  Batum,  which  had  been  taken  from  them  by  the 
Russians  in  1878;  the  Germans  hoped  that  an  invasion 
of  Transcaucasia  would  distract  the  Russians  from  oper- 
ations on  their  European  front;  and  Germans  and  Turks 
alike  were  lured  by  the  prospect  of  controlling  the  natural 
resources  of  this  province,  particularly  the  rich  oil-wells 
of  Baku. 

Kars  guarded  the  route  from  Erzerum,  the  Turkish  ad- 
vanced base,  to  the  heart  of  Transcaucasia.     A  main  railway 


322  The  Great  War 

line  traverses  the  province  from  the  Black  Sea  to  the  Cas- 
pian, sending  off  branches  on  both  sides,  one  of  which  runs 
southwestward  from  Tiflis  and  forks  at  Alexandropol,  one 

arm  extending  through  Kars  to  Sari  Kamish,  fifteen  miles 
from  the  Turkish  frontier,  the  other  bearing  off  to  the 
southeast  through  Erivan  and  running  for  a  considerable 
distance  along  the  border  of  Persia.  Erzerum,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  Turkish  fortress  facing  Kars,  was  about 
500  miles  from  the  railhead  on  the  most  direct  land  route 
to  Constantinople. 

Late  in  1914  the  Turks  had  concentrated  the  Ninth, 
Tenth,  and  Eleventh  Corps,  with  three  other  divisions,  on 
the  Russian  border,  an  army  of  about  150,000  men  in  all, 
under  the  command  of  Hassan  Izzet  Pasha,  when  Enver 
Pasha,  who  was  also  present  with  a  large  German  staff, 
conceived  the  bold  project  of  seizing;  Kars  and  cutting  off 
the  Russian  army  by  a  series  of  rapid  maneuvers  in  defi- 
ance of  the  rigorous  winter  climate  of  these  lofty  regions. 
His  plan  was  to  recede  before  the  Russians  on  his  right, 
drawing  them  as  far  as  possible  from  their  railhead,  while 
with  his  left  he  executed  an  enveloping  movement  against 
Sari  Kamish,  Kars,  and  the  connecting  railway. 

The  Russians  crossed  the  frontier  and  occupied  Keupri- 
koi  on  November  20,  1914,  when  the  execution  of  the 
Turkish  plan  began.  While  the  Eleventh  Turkish  Corps 
occupied  the  attention  of  the  Russians  in  front,  the  Nintli 
and  Tenth  on  the  left  advanced  against  Sari  Kamish  and 
Kars,  and  the  First,  which  had  landed  at  Trebizond, 
marched  on  Ardahan  with  the  view  eventually  of  cutting 
the  railway  back  of  Kars. 

The  Eleventh  Corps  withstood  and  even  drove  back  their 
opponents  until  by  December  25th  the  Ninth  and  Tenth 
Corps  had  made  their  way  over  the  storm-swept  ridges  and 
were  descending  on  Sari  Kamish  and  the  railway  and  the 


The  Operations  in  Asiatic  Turkey  323 

First  Corps  had  reached  the  vicinity  of  Ardahan.  But  the 
problems  of  supplying  the  Turkish  armies  and  maintaining 
communication  by  primitive  routes,  rendered  almost  im- 
passable by  snow,  presented  enormous  difficulties.  The 
more  concentrated  position  of  the  Russian  forces  enabled 
them  to  deal  with  their  adversaries'  columns  in  detail.  They 
defeated  the  Tenth  Corps  in  a  fierce  struggle  at  the  end  of 
December.  The  retreat  of  the  Tenth  Corps  exposed  the 
left  flank  of  the  Ninth,  which  was  surrounded  and  captured 
near  Sari  Kamish.  The  Turkish  First  Corps  entered  Arda- 
han on  January  1st,  but  was  driven  out  and  routed  three 
days  later.  Finally,  the  Eleventh  Corps  was  defeated  and 
put  to  flight  with  heavy  losses  on  the  17th.  Enver's  plan 
resulted  in  a  complete  failure  and  Transcaucasia  was  freed 
from  the  danger  of  invasion.  The  campaign  subsided  into 
desultory  operations  while  the  Russians  cleared  the  whole 
frontier  region  of  the  enemy. 

These  events  were  followed  in  the  adjoining  Armenian 
provinces  of  the  Turkish  Empire  by  the  most  appalling 
tragedy  of  the  whole  war.  With  the  removal  of  the 
restraining  influences  exercised  through  the  international 
intercourse  of  peace  times,  the  latent  ferocity  of  the  Turks 
burst  forth  against  the  defenseless  Armenian  race,  charged 
collectively  with  treason,  and  easily  eclipsed  in  ghastly  hor- 
ror the  sanguinary  work  of  Abdul  Hamid  in  1895-1897  and 
the  atrocities  of  the  Young  Turks  in  the  Adana  massacres 
of  1909.  This  wholesale  slaughter  was  largely  carried  out 
by  bands  of  irregular  soldiery,  some  of  whom  were  fired  by 
ancestral  hatred  for  their  victims.  Hundreds  of  towns  and 
villages  were  plundered  and  laid  waste.  Thousands  of  Ar- 
menians were  butchered  with  the  most  revolting  cruelty. 
The  women  and  children  were  dragged  off  into  slavery. 
Thousands  perished  of  starvation.  About  250,000  Arme- 
nians escaped  into  Russia  after  suffering  untold  privations, 


324  The  Great  War 

reduced  to  utter  destitution.  The  total  number  of  victims 
was  probably  more  than  half  a  million.  The  world  shud- 
dered at  tales  of  unspeakable  savagery.  This  crime  was 
instigated  by  Enver  Pasha  and  Talaat  Pasha  and  it  is  sig- 
nificant that  the  German  and  Austro-Hungarian  ambas- 
sadors at  Constantinople  refused  to  join  with  the  American 
ambassador  in  a  strong  protest  to  the  Porte,  on  the  ground 
that  they  could  not  interfere  in  the  domestic  affairs  of 
Turkey.  There  were  not  lacking  publicists  in  Germany 
who  defended  the  work  of  destruction  as  deserved  by  the 
Armenians.  But  widespread  opinion  in  many  lands  there- 
tofore inclined  to  condone  the  Turks  as  victims  of  misrep- 
resentation was  now  convinced  that  Turkish  rule  had  been 
a  blight  and  curse  to  the  fairest  regions  of  the  earth. 

The  unsettled  condition  of  Persia  and  the  presence  of 
Russian  forces  in  some  parts  of  the  country  before  the  war 
made  it  a  theater  of  the  general  conflict.  The  Turks  had 
captured  Tabriz  in  northwestern  Persia  early  in  January, 
1915,  but  the  Russians  brought  troops  from  Kars  and  retook 
it.  During  the  spring  the  Russian  forces  gradually  occupied 
the  province  of  Azerbaijan.  But  the  German  Minister  in 
Teheran,  the  Prince  of  Reuss,  was  working  indefatigably 
to  bring  Persia  into  alignment  with  the  Central  Powers 
and  had  won  over  a  large  part  of  the  Persian  gendarmerie, 
which  had  been  established  by  Great  Britain  and  Russia 
and  placed  under  Swedish  officers.  A  detachment  of  the 
Russian  army  of  the  Caucasus  marched  on  Teheran  in 
November.  The  Austro-Hungarian  and  German  Ministers 
left  the  capital  on  November  14th,  after  vainly  endeavoring 
to  persuade  the  boy-ruler,  Ahmed  Shah,  to  accompany 
them,  and  the  Prince  of  Reuss  raised  the  standard  of  revolt 
and  undertook  to  hold  strategical  points,  such  as  Hamadan 
and  Kum,  with  a  force  of  6,000  of  the  Persian  gendarmerie, 
about  3,000  Turkish  irregulars,  and  the  disaffected  Persian 


The  Sheich-ul-Islam  in  Constantinople  proclaiming  the  Jihad,  or  Holy  War. 


Troop  of  Kurds.     Turkish  irregulars  ivith  a  reputation  for  lawlessness  and  cruelty.    Inhabitants 
of  Kurdistan,  a  territory  lying  south  of  Lake  Van  and  north  of  the  Tigris  River. 


The  Operations  in  Asiatic  Turkey  325 

tribesmen,  about  15,000  in  all.  By  the  end  of  the  month 
Teheran  had  been  taken  by  the  Russians  and  in  December 
the  shah  was  induced  to  appoint  a  new  pro-Ally  cabinet 
with  Prince  Firman  Firma  at  its  head. 

The  appointment  of  the  Grand-duke  Nicholas  to  the  vice- 
royalty  of  the  Caucasus  with  command  of  operations  on  the 
Russo-Turkish  frontier  foreshadowed  a  vigorous  prosecu- 
tion of  the  Russian  offensive  in  Armenia.  The  Turkish 
forces,  then  numbering  about  100,000  men,  extended  on 
a  long  front  from  the  Black  Sea  to  Lake  Van.  The  su- 
premacy of  the  Russian  fleet  in  the  Black  Sea,  the  lack  of 
Turkish  railways,  and  the  inadequacy  of  the  highways  in 
these  rugged  regions  made  it  difficult  to  keep  the  Turks 
supplied  with  stores  and  munitions.  They  were  de- 
pendent on  the  land  route  from  the  railhead  at  Angora, 
through  Erzingan  in  the  upper  valley  of  the  Euphrates, 
to  Erzerum,  a  distance  of  about  500  miles,  largely  over  in- 
different roads.  The  Russian  railhead  was  only  eighty 
miles  from  Erzerum,  although  the  intervening  country 
was  very  mountainous. 

Erzerum  is  situated  at  an  altitude  of  6,000  feet.  Its  outer 
ring  of  fortifications,  running  along  the  horseshoe  ridge  of 
Deve  Boyun,  which  covered  the  city  on  the  east,  was  well 
equipped  with  artillery. 

The  number  of  Turkish  troops  on  the  Erzerum  front 
had  risen  to  about  150,000  by  January  1,  1916,  and  there 
was  the  prospect  of  a  very  great  additional  increase  in  con- 
sequence of  the  withdrawal  of  the  Allies  from  the  Gallipoli 
peninsula.  The  Grand-duke  decided  to  strike  at  Erzerum 
before  the  additional  Turkish  forces  could  be  shifted  thither 
from  the  Dardanelles.  The  immediate  command  of  the 
Russian  army,  at  this  time  of  similar  strength  to  that  of 
the  Turks,  was  vested  in  General  Nicholas  Yudenitch,  to 
whom  is   due  the   chief  credit   for  the  execution  of  the 


326  The  Great  War 

difficult  project     The  commander  of  the  opposing  Third 
Turkish  Army  was  Kiamil  Pasha. 

The  advance  of  the  Russian  forces  on  a  broad  front  for 
the  converging  operation  against  Erzerum  was  started  on 
January  11.  1916,  in  spite  of  the  severity  of  the  Armenian 
winter.  The  main  column  in  the  center  reached  Keupri- 
koi  on  January  16th  and  routed  the  Third  Turkish  Divi- 
sion two  days  later,  and  by  the  20th  the  Russians  stood 
before  the  ridge  of  Deve  Boyun.  Meanwhile,  the  column 
on  the  right  had  penetrated  to  the  upper  valley  of  the 
Western  Euphrates,  threatening  the  defenses  of  Deve 
Boyun  in  the  rear.  One  by  one  the  forts  on  this  ridge 
were  forced  to  yield.  The  last  works  were  evacuated  on 
the  morning  of  February  16th  and  before  noon  the  Cos- 
sacks rode  into  Erzerum,  where  the  three  Russian  columns 
met.  The  Russians  took  235  officers  and  12,753  unwounded 
men  prisoners  and  captured  323  guns.  It  was  a  brilliant 
achievement,  although  the  greater  part  of  the  Turkish 
army  escaped  with  its  equipment. 

Yudenitch  continued  the  advance.  His  right  wing  was 
directed  against  Trebizond,  although  the  greater  part  of 
the  assaulting  troops  were  brought  by  sea.  Trebizond  was 
the  goal  of  the  Ten  Thousand  Greeks  under  Xenophon 
in  their  famous  march  to  the  sea.  In  the  Middle  Ages  it 
became  one  of  the  most  important  centers  for  the  trade 
between  the  East  and  Europe.  Having  the  best  harbor 
on  the  coast  it  would  afford  the  Russians  an  extremely 
valuable  additional  base  of  communications,  as  a  good  road 
connected  it  with  Erzerum. 

A  Russian  force  was  disembarked  about  sixty  miles  east 
of  Trebizond  on  March  4th  and,  after  another  landing  had 
been  effected  west  of  the  city,  Trebizond  was  occupied  by 
the  Russians  on  April  18th.  The  Russians  occupied  Van, 
150  miles  southeast  of  Erzerum,  on  May  23d.    Progress  in 


The  Operations  in" Asiatic  Turkey  327 

the  center  was  slower;  but  on  July  15th  the  important 
town  of  Baiburt  was  taken  and  ten  days  later,  Erzingan, 
on  the  western  edge  of  the  mountainous  country  of  Ar- 
menia. The  Turks  replied  by  an  offensive  directed  against 
the  Russian  left  wing  and  took  Mush  and  Bitlis,  but  the 
Russians  in  their  turn  dispersed  the  Fourth  Turkish  Divi- 
sion near  Rayat  on  August  25th,  and  this  enabled  them  to 
resume  their  advance  westwards. 

A  Russian  force  of  about  one  division  had  been  sent  to 
western  Persia  in  December,  1915.  It  drove  the  Turks 
and  insurgents  before  it,  occupied  Hamadan  in  January, 
1916,  and  reached  the  Turkish  frontier,  150  miles  from 
Bagdad,  by  the  middle  of  May.  It  was  expected  that  this 
unit  would  eventually  effect  a  juncture  with  the  British 
army  in  Mesopotamia.  In  fact  a  Cossack  company  of  five 
officers  and  110  men  left  the  Russian  encampment  on 
May  8th,  rode  southward  a  distance  of  about  180  miles 
through  the  territory  of  disaffected  tribesmen,  crossing 
several  mountain  passes  at  an  altitude  of  8,000  feet,  and 
reached  the  British  front  on  the  Tigris  on  May  18th. 

In  the  meantime  the  situation  of  the  British  in  Mesopot- 
amia was  steadily  improving,  particularly  after  Lieutenant- 
general  Sir  Stanley  Maude  took  over  the  chief  command 
in  August.  The  immediate  problem  was  to  overcome  the 
Turkish  resistance  in  the  vicinity  of  Kut-el-Amara. 

Very  thorough  preparations  were  made  for  the  new 
offensive.  The  wharves  were  completed  at  Basra  where 
steamships  coming  direct  from  India  could  discharge  vast 
cargoes  directly;  the  railway  was  constructed  along  the 
Tigris  by  laborers  from  the  tropics,  accustomed  to  the 
excessive  heat;  and  strong  reinforcements  were  brought 
from  India. 

The  British  operated  in  two  parts:  that  on  the  right, 
under  Lieutenant-general  Sir  A.  S.  Cobbe,  was  to  hold  the 


328  The  Great  War 

enemy  Oil  the  left  hank  of  the  Tigris  in  the  position  ;it 
Sanna-i-yat,  fifteen  miles  below  Kut-el-Amara,  while  that 
on  the  left,  under  Lieutenant-general  W.  R.  Marshall,  was 

to  win  a  position  on  the  Shatt-el-Hai,  south  of  the  Tigris, 
ami  eventually  threaten  the  enemy's  communications  in 
the  rear.  It  was  essentially  an  enveloping  maneuver  by 
the  British  left  wing. 

The  British  forced  the  passage  of  the  Shatt-el-Hai  on 
December  13th  and  after  repeated  attacks  succeeded  in 
enclosing  the  part  of  the  Turkish  army  on  the  right  bank 
of  the  Tigris,  opposite  Kut-el-Amara,  by  February  11, 1917. 
A  few  days  later  the  Turks  evacuated  this  bank  altogether, 
and  on  the  23d  the  British  effected  the  crossing  of  the  Tigris 
above  Kut-el-Amara.  On  the  same  day  General  Cobbe 
stormed  the  Turkish  lines  at  Sanna-i-yat.  These  operations 
forced  the  Turks  to  abandon  Kut-el-Amara  and  the  British 
entered  it  unopposed.  The  Turks  lost  at  Kut-el-Amara  and 
during  the  subsequent  retreat  20,000  men  and  many  guns. 

The  British  pushed  their  advantage  vigorously,  passed 
Ctesiphon  on  March  6th,  and  on  the  next  day  were  in  con- 
tact with  the  Turks  along  the  line  of  the  Diala,  which 
joins  the  Tigris  from  the  east,  eight  miles  below  Bagdad. 
The  British  prepared  a  turning  movement  on  the  right 
bank  as  at  Kut-el-Amara.  The  Tigris  was  crossed  by  a 
pontoon  bridge  below  the  mouth  of  the  Diala  and  one 
column  advanced  on  the  right  bank,  British  cavalry  reach- 
ing the  Bagdad  railway  station  just  before  dawn  on  the  11th. 
Meanwhile,  the  passage  of  the  Diala  had  been  forced,  and 
General  Marshall  also  reached  Bagdad  a  few  hours  later  on 
the  11th.  Six  important  roads  converged  at  Bagdad,  one 
of  them,  the  historic  route  to  Persia,  running  up  the  valley 
of  the  Diala  to  Khanikin  and  thence  eastward,  over  the 
Persian  tableland,  through  Kermanshah  and  Hamadan.  By 
this  route  the  Russian  division  under  General  Baratoff  had 


X    v   id    y  ,  t-' 


1377 


The  Operations  in  Asiatic  Turkey  329 

retreated  to  beyond  Hamadan,  followed  by  the  Thirteenth 
Turkish  Corps,  after  the  Turkish  capture  of  Kut-el-Amara 
had  destroyed  the  hope  of  uniting  with  the  British.  But 
the  renewed  British  advance  in  Mesopotamia  reversed  the 
situation,  and  by  the  time  that  Bagdad  fell  the  Thirteenth 
Turkish  Corps  had  retreated  to  Kermanshah  and  it  was  a 
vital  question  whether  it  could  pass  through  Khanikin  and 
cross  the  Diala  before  the  British  intercepted  its  retreat. 

General  Maude  divided  his  forces  at  Bagdad  into  four 
columns,  one  to  advance  along  each  bank  of  the  Tigris,  a 
third  to  proceed  westward  against  Feluja,  the  nearest  im- 
portant point  on  the  Euphrates,  and  the  fourth  to  ascend  the 
valley  of  the  Diala  and  if  possible  reach  Khanikin  ahead  of 
the  retreating  Thirteenth  Turkish  Corps.  Feluja  was  cap- 
tured on  March  19th  and  at  first  rapid  progress  was  made 
up  the  valley  of  the  Tigris  in  the  direction  of  Samarra,  the 
northern  extremity  of  the  completed  terminal  section  of 
the  Bagdad  railway.  The  eastern  column  left  Bagdad  on 
March  15th  and  crossed  the  Diala  two  days  later.  The  situ- 
ation of  the  Turkish  corps  retreating  from  Persia  was  now 
desperate;  but  its  rearguard  succeeded  in  holding  the  Piatak 
Pass  against  the  advancing  Russians  while  an  advance  guard 
occupied  a  ridge  obstructing  the  British  line  of  advance  in 
the  Diala  valley  until  the  corps  had  escaped  from  the  trap, 
gaining  contact  with  the  Eighteenth  Corps,  which  had  re- 
treated from  Bagdad  up  the  Tigris  valley.  Together  they- 
turned  southward  to  counter-attack  the  British.  The  latter 
withdrew  in  the  Diala  valley  to  concentrate  their  position, 
while  the  column  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Tigris  turned 
eastward,  attacking  the  Turkish  flank  on  April  11th.  The 
battle  lasted  until  the  13th,  when  the  Turks  were  defeated 
and  compelled  to  resume  their  retreat  northward.  Con- 
tinuing their  march  up  the  Tigris,  the  British  crossed 
the  Shatt-el-Adhaim,  an  affluent  of  the  Tigris  from   the 


330  The  Great  War 

northeast,  on  the  17th,  defeating  the  Turks  on  its  right  bank, 
and  entered  Samarra  on  the  24th.  The  Thirteenth  Turkish 
Corps,  which  still  threatened  the  right  rlank  of  the  British, 
was  repulsed  in  engagements  on  April  24th  and  30th.  The 
advance  up  the  Tigris  was  continued  and  on  Septemher 
28th  the  British  defeated  the  Turks  at  Ramadje,  about 
sixty-five  miles  northwest  of  Bagdad,  taking  3,800  men 
and  thirteen  guns.  These  events,  in  connection  with  the 
advance  of  the  British  forces  from  Egypt  into  Palestine, 
encouraged  the  expectation  that  the  Allied  armies  would 
soon  converge  with  overwhelming  forces  from  three  direc- 
tions to  crush  the  remaining  Turkish  power  in  Asia. 

Allusion  was  made  in  the  Third  Volume  to  the  formal 
establishment  of  a  British  protectorate  over  Egypt  on 
December  17th,  1914,  when  Lieutenant-general  Henry 
MacMahon  was  appointed  High  Commissioner  and  Prince 
Hussein  Kernel,  eldest  son  of  Ismail,  ascended  the  throne 
with  the  title  of  Sultan.  The  Turks  were  naturally  eager  to 
invade  the  country,  cut  the  Suez  Canal,  foment  a  native  up- 
rising, and  recover  this  former  valuable  dependency,  and 
the  prospect  of  severing  the  vital  artery  of  British  power 
was  repeatedly  invoked  in  Germany  to  animate  popular 
enthusiasm. 

Egypt  still  holds  the  keys  both  of  sea  and  land  and  is 
still  most  difficult  of  access,  as  she  was  once  characterized 
by  the  greatest  of  the  Roman  historians. 

More  than  a  hundred  miles  of  waterless  desert  intervened 
between  the  Turkish  outposts  and  the  Suez  Canal  and  the 
canal  itself  constituted  a  very  effective  defensive  line  which 
it  was  difficult  to  approach  across  the  expanse  of  sand  with- 
out cover  except  for  a  few  dunes  in  certain  places. 

Egypt  became  a  central  clearing  camp  and  distribution 
center  for  the  Indian,  Australian,  and  New  Zealand  forces 
of  the  British  Empire,  and  the  protectorate  was  already 


The  Operations  in  Asiatic  Turkey  331 

guarded  by  the  Australian  and  New  Zealand  contingents 
and  a  number  of  British  Territorial  units,  besides  the  regu- 
lar Egyptian  army.  Nevertheless,  the  Turks  concentrated 
a  numerous  force  in  Syria  under  Djemal  Pasha,  the  Minis- 
ter of  Marine,  with  the  evident  intention  of  undertaking  a 
campaign  against  the  canal.  Three  routes  traversed  the 
Sinai  desert.  The  northernmost  ran  along  the  northern 
coast  from  Rafa  to  El  Kantara  on  the  canal,  a  distance  of 
120  miles;  the  central  route  extended  from  Beersheba  to 
Ismailia,  140  miles;  and  the  southern  reached  from  Akaba 
at  the  head  of  the  eastern  arm  of  the  Red  Sea  to  Suez,  150 
miles.  There  was  a  track,  moreover,  connecting  Nakhl  on 
the  southern  road  diagonally  with  the  central  route,  run- 
ning for  a  part  of  its  course  along  the  Wadi-el-Arish,  or 
"River  of  Egypt,"  a  dry  watercourse. 

The  Turks  made  a  reconnaissance  in  force  in  February, 
1915.  Advancing  mainly  by  the  central  route,  about  12,000 
Turks  approached  the  canal  in  two  detachments,  one  near 
Ismailia  and  the  other  opposite  Toussum.  The  battle 
began  on  the  night  of  the  3d-4th  and  continued  throughout 
the  4th.  A  few  of  the  assailants  who  got  across  the  canal 
were  slain  or  taken  prisoners,  every  attempt  to  place  in 
position  pontoon  bridges  failed,  and  the  Turks  were  finally 
driven  from  the  eastern  bank  with  heavy  losses. 

During  the  winter  of  1915-1916  the  forces  in  Egypt  were 
permanently  strengthened  in  consequence  of  the  with- 
drawal of  the  British  from  the  Gallipoli  peninsula,  not- 
withstanding one  British  division  was  eventually  transferred 
to  Mesopotamia  and  the  Anzac  Corps  to  the  western 
battle-front.  But  the  Turks,  assisted  and  urged  on  by  the 
Germans,  were  making  elaborate  preparations  in  Syria  for 
an  offensive  on  a  much  greater  scale. 

The  execution  of  their  plans  was  delayed  by  a  serious 
revolt  against  Turkish  sovereignty,  secular  and  spiritual,  in 


332  The  Great  War 

Hedjaz.  The  Arabians  had  never  been  entirely  reconciled 
to  the  overlordship  of  the  Turks,  whom  they  regarded  as 
upstarts.  The  pretensions  of  the  Sultans  as  successors  of 
the  Prophet  were  particularly  galling.  Accordingly,  the 
Grand  Sherif  of  Mecca,  the  most  powerful  prince  of  cen- 
tral and  western  Arabia,  took  advantage  of  the  international 
situation  to  proclaim  the  independence  of  Arabia  on  June 
9,  1°16.  It  was  particularly  embarrassing  for  the  Pan- 
Islamic  propaganda,  conceived  and  largely  engineered  by 
Germany,  that  the  Holy  City  of  Islam  abjured  the  move- 
ment. Mecca  was  immediately  occupied  and  Medina  was 
closely  invested  by  the  insurgents. 

But  the  Turks  persevered  in  their  designs  on  Egypt. 
An  attacking  force  of  18,000  Turks,  led  by  the  German 
General  von  Kressenstein,  fell  upon  the  Fifty-second  British 
Territorial  Division  twenty-three  miles  east  of  the  Suez 
Canal  about  midnight  on  August  3,  1916,  and  the  battle 
lasted  throughout  the  following  day.  Receiving  reinforce- 
ments, the  British  counter-attacked  about  5  P.  M.  and  put  the 
Turks  to  flight  with  a  loss,  in  killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners, 
of  about  half  their  total  strength.  The  result  of  this  engage- 
ment was  the  abandonment  of  the  Turkish  expedition. 

During  the  following  autumn  Sir  Archibald  Murray,  the 
British  commander  in  Egypt,  constructed  a  railway  from 
El  Kantara  eastward  across  the  desert.  On  the  night  of 
December  19th  the  Turks  abandoned  their  elaborately 
fortified  position  at  El  Arish  before  the  British  advancing 
in  front  of  their  railway.  The  latter  immediately  built  a 
pier  there  and  within  a  few  days  ships  were  unloading 
supplies  at  this  place,  which  became  the  advanced  base 
of  the  British  operating  forces.  On  January  9,  1917,  the 
British  took  Rafa,  about  thirty  miles  northeast  of  El  Arish, 
and  defeated  a  Turkish  detachment  in  the  vicinity,  thus 
gaining  a  foothold  on  the  eastern  margin  of  the  desert. 


View  of  Erzerum  from  the  citadel.     Showing  the  snoiv-co-vered  city  still  on  fire  after 
capture  by  the  Russians. 


Street  in  Trebizond.     Armenians  being  forcibly  taken  from  their  homes.      Those  not  killed  at 
once  were  collected  into  groups  with  no  regard  for  family  ties,  men  in  ■  ft  and  children 

in  another,  and  marched  into  the  interior,  where  those  not  dying  of  star  vati  n  wi  re  sold  as  slaves. 


The  Operations  in  Asiatic  Turkey  333 

The  western  part  of  Palestine  is  an  open  plain  border- 
ing on  the  Mediterranean,  enclosed  on  the  east  by  the 
hills  of  Hebron.  The  coast  region  in  the  southwest, 
which  the  British  were  now  approaching,  had  been  re- 
peatedly the  arena  of  conflict  for  the  great  empires  of 
history;  Egyptians,  Assyrians,  Macedonians,  Crusaders,  and 
Turks  had  here  contended.  Napoleon  had  advanced  from 
Egypt,  like  the  British,  before  his  unsuccessful  siege  of 
Gaza. 

The  British  expedition,  known  as  the  Eastern  Force,  was 
under  the  immediate  command  of  Lieutenant-general  Sir 
Charles  Dobell  and  consisted  of  five  infantry  divisions, 
two  mounted  divisions,  and  the  Camel  Corps.  The  two 
mounted  divisions  and  one  infantry  division  formed  the 
Desert  Column,  a  subordinate  command  under  Sir  Philip 
Chetwode.  The  British  advanced  to  the  river  Wadi 
Ghuzze,  about  five  miles  southwest  of  Gaza. 

There  was  a  Turkish  garrison  of  considerable  strength 
in  Gaza  and  a  line  of  Turkish  posts  extended  from  Gaza 
southeastward  to  Beersheba.  The  Turkish  forces  in  this 
region  were  commanded  by  General  von  Kressenstein,  a 
competent  officer,  under  the  superior  authority  of  the 
Turkish  Minister  of  Marine,  Djemal  Pasha,  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  Army  of  Syria. 

The  British  command  planned  a  surprise  attack  on  Gaza, 
which  almost  succeeded.  The  cavalry  of  the  Desert  Col- 
umn was  ordered  to  encircle  the  city  on  the  east  and 
northeast,  so  as  to  intercept  Turkish  reinforcements  ad- 
vancing from  those  directions.  The  Fifty-third  Division 
was  to  attack  the  town,  while  the  Fifty-fourth  covered  its 
right  wing.  The  operating  troops  set  out  before  dawn 
on  March  27th,  and  although  their  advance  was  at  first 
impeded  by  a  dense  fog,  the  cavalry  screen  was  success- 
fully thrown  around  the  town. 


334  The  Great  War 

The  Fifty-third  Division  attacked  the  Turkish  position 
on  Ali  Muntar  Hill,  which  covers  the  town,  about  noon, 
and  later  one  of  the  mounted  divisions  was  sent  to  sup- 
port it.  The  Ali  Muntar  position  was  captured  and  the 
British  were  already  fighting  in  the  streets  on  the  outskirts 
of  the  town  when  darkness  intervened  before  their  task 
had  been  completed.  Turkish  columns  were  now  con- 
verging on  Gaza  from  the  northeast  and  east  and  the  Brit- 
ish withdrew  under  cover  of  the  night.  On  the  next  day 
the  British  resisted  the  fierce  counter-attacks  of  the  Turks, 
but  withdrew  on  the  following  night  behind  the  Wadi 
Ghuzze. 

Thus  the  British  lost  the  opportunity  of  taking  Gaza  by 
a  sudden  attack.  The  Turkish  forces  confronting  them 
were  increased  to  at  least  five  infantry  divisions,  with 
several  cavalry  divisions  and  a  strong  force  of  artillery,  and 
the  Turkish  front  was  now  systematically  organized.  The 
problem  of  breaking  into  Palestine  became  very  much 
more  difficult. 

Nevertheless,  the  British  railway  was  extended  to  Deir- 
el-Belah  near  the  Wadi  Ghuzze,  measures  were  taken  for 
providing  an  adequate  supply  of  water,  and,  although  the 
British  no  longer  possessed  a  preponderance  of  strength, 
the  offensive  was  resumed  on  April  17th.  The  preliminary 
attacks  progressed  favorably  on  the  17th  and  18th,  but  in 
the  main  attack  delivered  on  the  19th  the  British  suffered 
heavy  losses  and  made  only  minor  gains.  After  this,  oper- 
ations waned  and  the  fronts  remained  practically  stationary 
throughout  the  summer;  the  British  retaining  the  salient 
which  they  had  won  north  of  the  Wadi  Ghuzze. 


CHAPTER    XV 
The  Allied  Offensives  of  1917  in  the  West 

Brilliant  operations  of  the  French  at  Verdun,  October,  November,  and 
December,  1916.  Plans  and  preparations  for  a  great  Allied  offensive  in 
1917.  Winter  operations.  Von  Hindenburg's  strategic  retreat  to  the 
"Siegfried"  line.  The  devastation  of  the  relinquished  territory.  The 
revised  plans  of  the  British  and  French.  Battle  of  Arras :  the  attack  of 
April  9th  and  rapid  progress  for  three  days;  increasing  resistance  of  the 
Germans;  the  new  "Stosstruppen."  Plans  of  General  Nivelle.  Second 
Battle  of  the  Aisne,  beginning  April  16th:  Aisne  Heights,  Craonne  and 
the  Miette  Valley,  Maronvilliers  Heights;  changes  in  the  French  High 
Command  ;  capture  of  Craonne ;  results.  The  capture  of  Messines  Ridge 
by  the  British,  June  7th.  Successful  local  attack  by  the  Germans  near  the 
North  Sea  coast.  Third  Battle  of  Ypres :  great  Allied  attacks  on  July  31st, 
August  10th  and  15th,  and  in  the  autumn.  Italian  offensives:  situation  on 
the  Isonzo  front;  Cadorna's  plan  in  May,  1917;  struggle  north  of  Gorizia 
for  the  Bainsizza  plateau;  great  attack  between  the  Carso  and  the  sea; 
results  of  the  May  offensive. 

It  remains  for  us  to  consider  a  brilliant  closing  episode 
of  the  campaign  of  1916  in  the  West  before  passing  to  the 
events  of  1917,  the  series  of  operations  by  which  the  French 
recovered  in  a  few  weeks  and  with  a  comparatively  small 
expenditure  of  men  practically  all  the  gains  in  the  Verdun 
sector  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Meuse  for  which  the  Ger- 
mans had  lavished  so  many  lives  throughout  a  four  months' 
struggle.  The  French  were  unwilling  to  leave  their  enemy 
in  tranquil  possession  of  those  desolate  ridges  which  had  been 
hallowed  by  the  heroism  and  graves  of  their  defenders. 

In  October,  1916,  General  Nivelle  commanded  the  Sec- 
ond French  Army  which  at  that  time  held  the  front  from 
the  Argonne  to  Lorraine.  The  proposed  attack  against 
the  German  positions  on  the  heights  northeast  of  Verdun 

335 


336  The  Great  War 

was  assigned  to  a  group  of  divisions  under  General  Charles 
Mangin,  who  had  commanded  the  8th  brigade  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war,  had  shared  in  the  Battle  of  the  Marne 
as  commander  of  the  Fifth  Division,  had  come  to  Verdun 
in  March,  1916,  and  had  been  promoted  to  the  command 
of  the  Third  Colonial  Corps  the  following  June. 

It  was  proposed  to  drive  the  foe  from  Douaumont  and 
Fort  Vaux  with  three  divisions.  These  divisions  were 
withdrawn  from  the  battle-front  for  a  period  of  rest  and 
special  training  for  the  attack  on  a  piece  of  ground  model- 
led to  represent  the  actual  terrain.  Provision  was  made 
for  the  application  of  all  the  lessons  derived  from  the  sum- 
mer's fighting  on  the  Somme  and  no  operation  was  ever 
prepared  with  more  accurate  foresight.  Ammunition  was 
accumulated  in  great  quantities,  light  railways  were  con- 
structed, new  trenches  and  shelters  were  dug,  and  the 
systems  of  replenishment  and  evacuation  were  thoroughly 
organized. 

The  Germans  had  fifteen  divisions  on  the  entire  Verdun 
front  from  Avocourt  to  Les  Eparges,  eight  of  them  in  the 
first  lines.  They  had  already  covered  the  captured  emi- 
nences on  the  right  bank  with  the  usual  maze  of  trenches. 
The  French  command  proposed  to  assail  the  German  lines 
on  a  front  of  about  four  miles.  The  artillery  preparation 
began  on  October  21st  and  the  infantry  attacked  just  before 
noon  on  the  24th,  with  Generals  Joffre,  Nivelle,  and  Petain 
present  as  eye-witnesses  of  their  prowess.  By  three  the 
French  were  in  Fort  Douaumont  and  by  nightfall  they 
had  gained  practically  all  the  intended  objectives  and  had 
taken  4,500  prisoners,  although  resistance  in  Fort  Douau- 
mont was  not  entirely  vanquished  until  the  next  morning. 

The  struggle  continued  along  Vaux  Ridge  on  the  26th. 
A  fresh  bombardment  of  Fort  Vaux  led  to  its  abandonment 
by  the  Germans  on  November  2d.     On  the  next  day  the 


Allied  Offensives  of  1917  in  the  West      337 

French  occupied  Vaux  village,  which  had  been  so  fiercely- 
contested  eight  months  before,  and  fought  their  way  up 
Hardaumont  Ridge. 

Nivelle  now  planned  to  push  back  the  Germans  to  the 
north  of  Douaumont,  where  their  positions  had  been  rapidly 
strengthened  and  where  the  defenders  were  echeloned  in 
depth,  with  five  divisions  on  a  front  of  about  six  miles  and 
about  9,000  defenders  on  the  first  line. 

Four  French  divisions  were  assigned  for  the  fresh  attack 
and  these  were  especially  trained  as  before  on  ground 
which  was  the  counterpart  of  the  actual  terrain.  The 
artillery  preparation  was  begun  on  December  11th  and 
General  Nivelle,  who  was  shortly  to  assume  his  new  duties 
as  commander-in-chief  in  the  West,  remained  to  direct  the 
execution  of  the  final  operation  which  he  had  himself  con- 
ceived. The  infantry  attack  was  launched  on  the  15th  at 
10  A.  M.  from  Poivre  Hill  to  Hardaumont  Wood.  The 
attacking  front  swung  forward,  pivoting  on  the  left  flank. 
The  crest  of  Poivre  Hill  was  quickly  won;  Louvemont 
was  taken  in  the  center;  but  the  right  wing,  which  had  a 
far  greater  distance  to  traverse,  encountered  a  more  serious 
task.  Here  the  French  were  held  up  by  the  German 
second-line  trenches,  which  they  carried  the  next  day, 
making  good  their  hold  against  desperate  counter-attacks. 
This  operation  gave  the  French  11,387  prisoners  and 
brought  the  French  front  to  the  position  it  had  held  on 
February  24th,  the  fourth  day  of  the  great  Battle  of 
Verdun. 

The  Allied  commanders,  conferring  in  November,  1916, 
decided  on  the  general  plan  for  a  combined  offensive  in  the 
spring  of  1917,  to  follow  up  the  successes  of  the  campaign 
just  closing,  and  all  through  the  ensuing  winter  the  British 
and  French  engineers  directed  their  energies  to  the  prep- 
arations on  a  vast  scale,  the   repairing  and  extension   of 


338  The  Great  War 

the  system  of  highways,  the  construction  of  a  network  of 

light  railways,  the  transference  of  the  heavy  artillery  to 
new  emplacements,  and  the  elaboration  of  the  trench  and 

shelter  organizations.  Major-General  Sir  Eric  Geddes,  the 
Director-general  of  Transportation  in  the  British  army, 
distinguished  himself  particularly  by  his  unsparing  efforts 
to  improve  the  communications  behind  the  front.  British 
resources  in  material  were  taxed  to  the  utmost;  some  rail- 
ways in  Great  Britain  and  Canada  were  even  stripped  of 
their  metal  to  supply  the  necessary  rails.  At  the  same  time 
great  activity  in  training,  organization,  and  staff  work  was 
constantly  in  progress.  The  Allies  were  animated  by  the 
expectation  that,  barring  unforeseen  complications,  their 
united  efforts  would  achieve  the  victorious  consummation 
of  the  war  in  1917. 

The  British,  whose  natural  inclination  was  to  drive  the 
Germans  from  their  submarine  bases  on  the  Flemish  coast, 
yielded  to  the  desire  of  their  allies  that  the  first  blows  be 
delivered  against  the  foe  in  northern  France.  It  was  de- 
cided that  the  British  should  first  attack  the  German  sali- 
ent between  the  Scarpe  and  the  Ancre  and  cooperate  with 
the  French  in  consummating  the  projects  of  the  previous 
summer,  turning  later  to  the  contemplated  operations  in 
Flanders.  During  the  winter  the  British  gradually  fought 
their  way  up  the  valley  of  the  Ancre  in  a  series  of  minor 
engagements.  On  January  11th  they  captured  1,500  yards 
of  trenches  along  the  crest  of  the  ridge  east  and  northeast 
of  Beaumont  Hamel  village.  On  the  night  of  February 
3d-4th,  Grandcourt  fell  into  their  hands.  As  a  result  of 
attacks  on  the  17th  and  18th  the  British  gained  the  high 
ground  commanding  the  German  artillery  positions  in  the 
upper  Ancre  Valley,  so  that  the  Germans  abandoned  all 
their  positions  in  front  of  the  Le  Transloy-Loupart  line, 
the  defensive  position  covering  Bapaume,  on  the  night  of 


Allied  Offensives  of  1917  in  the  West      339 

the  21st-22d,  and  this  line  itself  on  March  12th-13th.  On 
February  26th  the  British  had  extended  their  battle-line  on 
the  right  as  far  as  Roye,  making  their  entire  front  in  the 
West  110  miles  in  length. 

Soon  after  the  close  of  the  Battle  of  the  Somme  the 
rumor  had  become  current  that  the  Germans  were  creat- 
ing a  new  defensive  line  in  the  West  far  to  the  rear  of  their 
actual  positions  and  it  had  now  become  evident  that  they 
intended  to  execute  a  systematic  withdrawal  of  their  front. 
Von  Hindenburg,  who  was  now  responsible  for  the  higher 
German  strategy,  had  been  the  natural  leader  of  the  eastern 
school  of  strategists,  those  who  looked  for  the  crucial  issues 
of  the  war  in  the  struggle  with  the  Russians.  He  was 
doubtless  convinced  that  the  Allies  now  possessed  a  distinct 
preponderance  of  strength  in  the  West  and  that,  therefore, 
pending  favorable  developments  in  Russia,  the  Germans 
should  confine  themselves  to  a  generally  defensive  strategy 
in  France  and  Flanders,  shortening  their  battle-front  and 
thus  economizing  in  their  use  of  man-power,  but  at  the 
same  time  retaining  all  points  that  were  essential  for  the 
conduct  of  the  war.  The  wonderful  confidence  bestowed 
on  von  Hindenburg  by  the  German  people  made  it  easier 
for  him  to  abandon  deliberately  a  portion  of  the  conquered 
territory.  The  retirement,  moreover,  and  the  adoption  of 
a  generally  defensive  strategy  would  not  preclude  a  sudden 
return  to  the  offensive  whenever  the  circumstances  offered 
an  especially  favorable  opportunity.  In  fact,  the  theory 
was  quite  generally  held  among  the  Allies  that  von  Hin- 
denburg's  main  purpose  was  to  turn  upon  them  from  a 
carefully  selected  and  prepared  position  before  they  had 
organized  a  new  front  in  advance  of  their  old  one. 

The  new  "Siegfried"  line,  as  it  was  named,  although  now 
more  commonly  known  as  the  "Hindenburg"  line,  diverged 
from   the   old   front  near   Arras   and   ran   southeastward^, 


340  The  Great  War 

passing  a  few  miles  west  of  Queant,  St.  Quentin,  and 
La  Fere,  and  joined  the  old  line  on  the  heights  above 

the  Aisne,  northeast  of  Soissons.  The  fighting  front 
from  which  the  Germans  retreated  was  about  120  miles 
in  length,  including  all  its  sinuosities,  two-thirds  of  it  op- 
posite the  British  and  the  remainder  opposite  the  French. 
The  change  reduced  the  total  length  of  the  German  west- 
ern front  by  about  forty  miles. 

The  British  and  French  began  a  general  advance  on  the 
entire  front  from  Arras  to  the  vicinity  of  Soissons  on 
March  17th.  During  their  retirement  the  Germans  left 
machine-gun  units  in  selected  positions  to  delay  the  ad- 
vance of  the  Allies  and  devastated  the  country  in  a  ruthless 
manner,  not  only  impeding  or  destroying  the  lines  of  com- 
munication, but  pillaging  and  burning  towns  and  villages 
and  committing  many  senseless  acts  of  barbarism  not  justi- 
fied by  military  expediency. 

By  the  night  of  the  17th  the  Australians  of  the  Fifth 
British  Army  had  entered  Bapaume  and  the  troops  of  the 
Sixth  French  Army  had  entered  Roye.  The  British  occu- 
pied Peronne  and  the  French,  Noyon,  on  the  next  day,  and 
by  April  1st  the  Allies  confronted  the  new  "Hindenburg" 
line  at  nearly  all  points.  They  had  recovered  about  1,000 
square  miles  of  French  territory  and  had  penetrated  to  a 
maximum  depth  of  about  twenty  miles. 

The  plans  of  the  British  and  French  were  greatly  altered 
by  the  German  retreat.  Throughout  the  larger  part  of 
the  front  affected  by  it,  they  were,  for  the  time,  rendered 
incapable  of  wielding  a  serious  blow.  Their  elaborate  prep- 
arations for  the  proposed  offensive,  narrow-gauge  tracks, 
heavy-gun  emplacements,  magazines,  shelters,  assembling 
centers,  were  left  high  and  dry  by  the  receding  tide  of 
battle.  For  this  and  other  reasons  the  British  and  French 
undertook  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  the  pivotal  positions 


Excavation,  thirty-two  feet  deep,  made  by  the  French  to  unearth 
unexpioded  15-inch  German  shell. 


Crater  made  by  the  explosion  of  a  big  she 


Allied  Offensives  of  1917  in  the  West      341 

at  the  respective  extremities  of  the  "Hindenburg"  line, 
where  the  existing  organization  of  the  Allied  front  could 
still  be  used  by  the  attacking  troops,  and  this  resulted  in 
the  Battle  of  Arras  and  the  Second  Battle  of  the  Aisne. 

The  British  armies  were  now  deployed  as  follows  from 
the  North  Sea  southwards:  the  Second,  under  Sir  Herbert 
Plumer,  in  Flanders;  the  First,  under  Sir  Henry  Home, 
facing  La  Bassee  and  Lens;  the  Third,  under  Sir  Edmund 
Allenby,  in  the  region  of  Arras;  the  Fifth,  under  Sir  Hubert 
Gough,  in  the  upper  valleys  of  the  Cojeul  and  the  Sensee; 
the  Fourth,  under  Sir  Henry  Rawlinson,  in  the  sector  op- 
posite St.  Quentin.  The  army  group  of  the  Crown  Prince 
of  Bavaria,  confronting  the  Allies  between  the  coast  and  the 
river  Oise,  contained  about  sixty  divisions  and  formed  three 
armies :  the  Fourth,  under  von  Arnim,  stretching  from  the 
sea  to  the  Lys;  the  Sixth,  under  Otto  von  Below,  from 
the  Lys  to  the  Sensee;  and  the  Second,  under  von  der 
Marwitz,  from  the  Sensee  to  south  of  the  Oise. 

Between  Lens  and  the  northern  point  of  deviation  of  the 
"Hindenburg"  line  from  the  old  front,  the  German  de- 
fenses were  very  strong,  consisting  in  depth  of  three  main 
positions,  each  formed  by  four  parallel  lines  of  trenches. 
As  an  additional  protection  for  the  vital  points,  Douai  and 
Cambrai,  the  Germans  designed  an  additional  fortified  line 
in  the  rear,  from  Drocourt,  southeast  of  Lens,  to  the 
"Hindenburg"  line  near  Queant.  The  key  to  the  battle- 
zone  between  Arras  and  Lens  was  believed  to  be  Vimy 
Ridge,  on  the  western  side  of  which  the  British  held  a 
foothold.  The  sector  chosen  for  the  main  British  offen- 
sive in  the  Arras  region  was  about  twelve  miles  in  length. 
Along  this  front  from  north  to  south  stood  the  Canadian, 
the  Seventeenth,  Sixth,  and  Seventh  Corps.  The  battle  was 
preceded  by  the  greatest  aerial  contest  ever  fought,  in 
which  the  attacking  British  airmen  established  a  superiority 


342  The  Great  War 

over  their  opponents.  Beginning  with  the  cellars  and 
sewers  of  the  city,  the  British  had  developed  a  great  system 
of  subterranean  shelters,  assembly  stations,  and  galleries 
under  Arras,  by  which  the  troops  who  were  to  attack  on 
that  section  of  the  front  could  reach  the  first-line  trenches 
practically  without  exposure  to  hostile  fire. 

The  British  bombardment  began  on  April  4th  and 
eventually  rose  to  a  degree  of  destructive  intensity  far 
surpassing  the  preparation  on  the  Somme  in  the  previous 
summer.  The  cannonading  ceased  for  a  day,  deceiving 
the  enemy,  who  expected  an  immediate  assault  to  follow, 
and  was  resumed  on  the  morning  of  April  9th  with  even 
greater  fury  as  the  immediate  prelude  to  the  attack. 

The  infantry  attacked  at  5.30  A.  M.  and  captured  the  first 
German  position  in  forty  minutes.  By  nine,  the  Canadians 
held  nearly  all  of  Vimy  Ridge,  the  Seventeenth  Corps  was 
advancing  on  Thelus,  and  the  Sixth  had  taken  Blangy. 
Further  south  the  assailants  had  captured  an  intricate 
mass  of  trenches  known  as  the  Harp.  A  half-hour  later 
the  whole  of  the  second  German  position  had  been 
taken,  except  a  short  length  west  of  Bailleul,  and  by  night 
the  third  position  had  been  breached  in  several  places. 
The  British  took  about  6,000  prisoners  on  the  first  day  of 
the  offensive. 

The  water-soaked  condition  of  the  ground  impeded  the 
advance  of  the  British  guns  and  retarded  the  progress  of 
the  offensive.  On  the  10th  the  Canadians  completed  the 
conquest  of  Vimy  Ridge  and  the  British  reached  the  out- 
skirts of  Monchy-le-Preux,  five  miles  east  of  Arras.  This 
village,  where  every  house  had  been  converted  into  a 
machine-gun  nest,  was  cleared  of  the  Germans  on  the 
next  day.  But  in  the  evening  of  the  11th  the  advance  came 
to  a  halt.  After  the  British  had  shattered  all  the  Ger- 
man positions  on  a  front  of  twelve  miles,  a  period  of  bad 


Allied  Offensives  of  1917  in  the  West      343 

weather  gave  the  Germans  time  to  recover  their  equi- 
librium, reconstitute  their  front,  bring  up  reserves,  and 
deliver  a  number  of  severe  counter-attacks,  in  which, 
however,  they  were  not  successful  in  recovering  the  lost 
ground. 

On  the  23d  the  attack  was  resumed  on  both  banks  of 
the  Scarpe,  on  an  eight-mile  front,  and  after  desperate 
fighting  the  British  had  advanced  from  one  to  two  miles 
by  the  evening  of  the  25th.  They  had  now  covered  half 
the  distance  from  Arras  to  Douai  and  only  the  Drocourt- 
Queant  line  lay  before  the  latter.  The  original  pivotal 
sector  at  the  northern  extremity  of  the  "Hindenburg" 
line  had  thus  been  destroyed. 

The  fighting  in  the  Arras  sector  consisted  henceforth 
of  local  efforts  chiefly  for  the  purpose  of  broadening  the 
conquered  zone.  On  May  3d  the  Australians  captured 
Bullecourt  with  the  junction  of  the  Drocourt-Queant  and 
main  "Hindenburg"  lines.  The  new  German  organi- 
zation of  the  "Sturm-,"  or  "Stosstruppen,"  made  its  first 
appearance  in  this  battle.  Theretofore  whole  divisions  or 
army  corps  had  been  selected  for  special  preparation  in 
view  of  an  important  offensive  operation,  as  for  the  great 
attack  on  Verdun.  A  new  and  permanent  special  class  of 
assaulting  troops  was  now  established  on  the  basis  of  a 
searching  process  of  selection.  Individuals  preeminent  in 
the  required  qualities  of  moral  and  physical  vigor  were 
henceforth  picked  from  different  units,  assembled  in  new 
groups,  and  trained  in  all  the  newest  methods  of  attack. 
A  battalion  of  these  elite  "Stosstruppen,"  or  shock  troops, 
was  attached  to  each  army  corps  and  consisted  of  four 
companies  of  assault,  each  with  100  men,  a  machine-gun 
company  with  six  machine-guns,  a  company  of  bombers, 
a  company  of  flame-throwers,  and  a  battery  of  assault. 
The  inactivity  on  the  eastern  front  had  enabled  Germany 


344  The  Great  War 

to  strengthen  her  forces  on  the  western  front,  where  she 
had  170  divisions  at  the  end  of  April,  seventy  against  the 
British  and  the  same  number  against  the  French,  with 
thirty  as  a  strategic  reserve. 

Genera]  Nivelle,  whose  plans  at  Verdun  in  the  early 
winter  had  been  realized  with  such  unfailing  exactitude, 
proposed  to  accomplish  the  main  task  of  the  campaign 
of  \()\7  by  a  single  impetuous  movement,  smashing  the 
German  positions  between  Soissons  and  Reims,  capturing 
Laon,  turning  the  "Hindenburg"  line  from  the  south,  and 
thus,  in  conjunction  with  the  British,  disrupting  the  entire 
German  front  in  northern  France.  The  Germans  still 
held  the  heights  north  of  the  Aisne,  to  which  they  had 
retreated  after  the  Battle  of  the  Marne,  and  von  Kluck's 
attack  in  January,  1915,  had  given  them  a  footing  on  the 
south  bank  from  Missy-sur-Aisne  to  a  point  east  of  Cha- 
vonne.  There  had  been  no  important  operations  in  this 
region  for  more  than  two  years  and  the  Germans  had 
developed  their  defensive  organization  in  every  way,  mak- 
ing the  most  of  the  favorable  natural  features,  such  as  the 
caverns  in  the  limestone  rocks,  which  afforded  excellent 
shelter. 

The  Northern  French  army  group  was  now  under  the 
command  of  Franchet  d'  Esperey,  the  Central  under  that 
of  Petain,  and  the  Eastern  under  that  of  de  Castelnau. 
A  fourth  group  was  formed  under  General  Micheler,  who 
had  commanded  the  Tenth  French  Army  in  the  Battle  of 
the  Somme.  Nivelle  planned  to  use  the  center  and  the 
right  wing  of  Micheler's  group  from  the  river  Ailette  to 
Reims,  consisting  of  the  Sixth  Army  under  Mangin,  and 
the  Fifth  under  Mazel,  with  the  Tenth  Army  in  reserve. 
The  army  group  of  the  German  Crown  Prince  covered 
the  front  from  the  Oise  to  Verdun,  with  the  Seventh 
Army   under   von    Boehn,    extending   from    La   Fere   to 


Allied  Offensives  of  1917  in  the  West      345 

Craonne,  and  the  First,  under  Fritz  von  Below,  from 
Craonne  to  Champagne,  guarding  the  proposed  objectives 
of  the  French.  About  350,000  infantry  held  this  portion 
of  the  German  front. 

The  French  artillery  preparation  began  on  April  6th  and 
increased  in  fury  until  the  15th,  when  every  gun  thundered 
along  a  front  of  about  fifty  miles.  The  infantry  attacked 
at  six  on  the  morning  of  the  16th.  Two  army  corps  ad- 
vanced along  the  crest  of  the  plateau  and  another  captured 
Hurtebise  Farm,  where  the  Heights  of  the  Aisne  con- 
tract to  a  neck  scarcely  a  hundred  yards  broad  between 
the  valleys  of  the  Aisne  and  the  Ailette. 

The  village  of  Craonne  stands  at  the  eastern  extremity 
of  the  heights  and  of  the  famous  Chemin-des-Dames, 
which  runs  along  their  crest,  and  commands  the  low 
ground  to  the  east,  where  the  valley  of  the  Miette  forms  a 
natural  highway  from  the  Aisne  at  Berry-au-Bac  north- 
westward towards  Laon.  Craonne  and  two  isolated  hills, 
the  Bois  des  Buttes  and  the  Bois  des  Baches,  which  bristled 
with  machine-gun  positions,  guarded  this  opening  from 
the  valley  of  the  Aisne  into  the  plain  of  Laon.  The 
French  reached  the  outskirts  of  Craonne  on  the  first  day 
of  the  attack.  They  stormed  the  Bois  des  Buttes,  but  did 
not  advance  much  beyond  it.  Some  progress  was  made 
further  to  the  right  between  the  Aisne  and  Reims.  The 
results  of  the  first  day,  although  considerable,  fell  far  short 
of  expectations. 

On  the  next  day,  besides  resuming  the  battle  along  the 
same  sectors,  the  French  extended  the  offensive  to  the 
sector  east  of  Reims.  After  an  artillery  preparation,  which 
had  been  in  progress  for  two  weeks,  two  French  corps 
attacked  the  German  positions  in  the  Moronvilliers  hills, 
which  were  very  strongly  fortified  and  held  mainly  by  the 
Fourteenth  Corps  of  the  First  German  Army.     The  first 


346  The  Great  War 

position  of  the  Germans  had  already  been  practically  ob- 
literated by  the  bombardment.  The  center  of  the  attack- 
ing forces  pushed  well  into  the  hills,  but  the  wings  were 
held  at  the  enemy's  second  position. 

On  the  18th  the  Germans  lost  most  of  their  salient  in 
the  western  portion  of  the  Heights  of  the  Aisne.  The 
French  stormed  the  Bois  des  Baches  and  repulsed  fierce 
counter-attacks.  On  the  next  day  the  salient  held  by  the 
Germans  since  January,  1915,  was  completely  swept  away. 
There  was  desperate  fighting  in  the  Moronvilliers  sector, 
where  the  Germans  repeatedly  counter-attacked  in  vain. 

At  this  point  the  battle  subsided.  The  French  had  taken 
20,780  prisoners.  The  Germans  had  been  entirely  driven 
from  the  banks  of  the  Aisne  between  Soissons  and  Berry- 
au-Bac  and  from  all  the  spurs  of  the  heights,  and  the 
French  held  the  center  of  the  table-land.  But  the  Ger- 
mans still  commanded  the  gateway  to  Laon  from  their 
position  at  Craonne.  None  of  the  major  objectives  had 
been  attained. 

There  was  general  disappointment,  an  impression  that 
the  losses  of  the  French  troops  were  out  of  all  proportion 
to  the  results  obtained,  and  a  revulsion  of  feeling  against 
Nivelle's  drastic  generalship.  These  convictions  resulted 
in  important  changes  in  the  chief  command.  It  was  an- 
nounced on  April  30th  that  the  post  of  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff  at  the  Ministry  of  War  had  been  revived  and 
conferred  on  General  Petain.  But  on  May  15th  Petain 
succeeded  Nivelle  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  French 
Armies  of  the  North  and  Northeast.  Fayolle  succeeded 
to  Petain's  group  command  of  the  Center  and  Foch  suc- 
ceeded Petain  as  Chief  of  the  General  Staff. 

Nevertheless,  the  offensive  had  been  resumed.  On  May 
4th  the  French  captured  Craonne  and  gained  a  footing  on 
the  eastern  section  of  the  Chemin-des-Dames.     In  spite  of 


Allied  Offensives  of  1917  in  the  West      347 

fierce  counter-attacks,  the  Germans  were  gradually  driven 
from  the  ridge.  But  the  impetus  of  the  French  offensive 
waned  and  the  battle-lines  in  the  region  north  of  the  Aisne 
remained  practically  stationary  all  the  summer. 

The  German  losses  during  the  Allied  offensive  down  to 
May  5th  were  estimated  at  about  213,000,  about  53,000 
having  been  taken  prisoners  and  160,000  put  out  of  action, 
while  the  aggregate  losses  of  the  British  were  given  as 
about  80,000  and  those  of  the  French  93,000. 

In  June  the  British  initiated  their  offensive  operations  in 
Flanders  with  one  of  the  most  spectacular  and  thrilling 
performances  of  the  whole  war.  An  elevation  known  as 
the  Messines-Wytschaete  Ridge,  included  within  a  salient 
of  the  hostile  front  south  of  Ypres,  had  served  the  Germans 
as  an  important  observation  center  since  the  autumn  of  1914 
and  formed  one  of  the  bulwarks  of  their  front  in  Flanders. 
The  Germans  had  left  nothing  undone  to  make  this  posi- 
tion impregnable  and  it  was  defended  by  an  elaborate 
trench  system  about  a  mile  deep. 

But  for  nearly  two  years  Anzac  and  British  sappers  had 
burrowed  under  this  range  of  hills  without  betraying  the 
secret  of  their  presence  there,  and  had  laid  nineteen  great 
mines  with  600  tons  of  ammonite,  a  very  powerful  explo- 
sive. Finally,  after  the  ridge  had  been  subjected  to  bom- 
bardment for  about  two  weeks,  the  preparation  culminated 
on  June  7th  at  3.10  A.  M.  in  the  explosion  of  this  tre- 
mendous magazine.  The  crest  of  the  ridge  was  rent  as  by 
a  stupendous  volcanic  upheaval.  An  eye-witness  describes 
it  as  "the  most  terrible,  beautiful,  thing;  the  most  diabolical 
splendor"  he  had  ever  seen.  "Out  of  the  dark  ridges  of 
Messines  and  Wytschaete  and  that  ill-famed  Hill  60,  for 
which  many  of  Britain's  best  have  died,  there  gushed  up 
enormous  volumes  of  scarlet  flame  from  exploding  mines 
and  of  earth  and  smoke,  all  lighted  by  flame  spilling  over 


348  The  Great  War 

into  fountains  of  fierce  color,  so  that  the  countryside  was 

illuminated  by  the  red  light."  The  report  was  heard  by 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  in  his  country  home  near  London, 
140  miles  away. 

At  once  the  British  artillery  poured  a  veritable  torrent 
of  shell  upon  the  torn  and  lacerated  heights.  The  infantry 
of  Sir  C.  O.  Plumer's  Second  British  Army  carried  the 
vestiges  of  the  first  German  position  on  a  front  of  ten 
miles  in  a  few  minutes  and  captured  the  entire  ridge  within 
three  hours.  Fierce  resistance  was  encountered  when  they 
attacked  the  rear  defenses  late  in  the  day,  but  by  nightfall 
these  also  had  been  taken. 

In  July  the  Germans  scored  a  local  success  at  the  north- 
ern extremity  of  the  Allied  front  in  Flanders,  where  the 
trenches  of  the  first-line,  held  by  the  British,  ran  on  the 
right  bank  of  the  Yser  for  a  distance  of  about  three  miles, 
beginning  at  the  coast.  This  position  involved  danger  to 
the  communications  at  the  exposed  crossing  points  along 
the  river.  The  Germans  concentrated  a  strong  force  of 
artillery  on  the  sector  opposite  and  began  a  bombardment 
of  great  intensity  on  July  11th,  destroying  the  parapets  and 
at  the  same  time  isolating  the  British  front.  The  German 
infantry  attacked,  killing  or  capturing  nearly  all  their  oppo- 
nents northeast  of  the  river,  about  3,000  in  number.  This 
success  added  to  the  security  of  the  German  hold  on  the 
Flemish  coast. 

The  middle  of  summer  passed  before  the  Allies  under- 
took the  main  operation  in  Flanders  for  intercepting  the 
German  lines  of  communication  and  thereby  rendering 
the  submarine  bases  on  the  Belgian  coast  untenable.  The 
series  of  engagements  in  which  the  British  and  their  Allies 
strove  to  carry  out  this  purpose  are  known  as  the  Third 
Battle  of  Ypres.  During  the  last  ten  days  of  July  the 
German   front   in    Flanders   was   subjected   to  a   terrible 


Sand  shoes.  Equipment  used  by  the  British 
troops  in  Palestine  to  make  easy  marching  across 
the  desert  sand. 


im'i;»hiuj>^aire__ 

DHKIKM 


Apparatus  used  by  the  French  for  taking 
photographs  from  aeroplanes. 


Alaskan  dogs  used  by  the  French  army  in  the  Vosges  Mountains. 


Allied  Offensives  of  1917  in  the  West      349 

bombardment,  which  rose  to  a  pitch  of  intensity  that  was 
said  to  have  exceeded  anything  previously  witnessed.  This 
was  followed  on  the  31st  by  a  gigantic  attack  of  the  British, 
with  a  French  contingent  on  their  left,  along  a  front  of 
nearly  twenty  miles,  from  Dixmude  southward  to  Warne- 
ton,  on  the  Franco-Belgian  border.  The  French  captured 
Bixschoote  and  Steenstraate  and  drove  back  the  Germans 
to  a  depth  of  about  two  miles.  The  British  quickly  cleared 
the  first  and  second  German  positions  and  penetrated  the 
third  in  places,  taking  Langemarck  and  St.  Julien,  besides 
other  villages.  But  they  were  soon  driven  from  the  places 
mentioned  by  the  furious  counter-attacks  of  the  Germans, 
who  fought  with  desperate  determination  to  preserve  their 
opportunity  for  employing  effectively  an  engine  of  destruc- 
tion on  which  their  ultimate  hopes  now  rested.  The  bat- 
tle was  waged  with  much  fury  on  August  1st,  but  the 
offensive  was  impeded  by  a  very  heavy  rain  which  lasted 
fifty  hours  continuously. 

The  British  captured  Westhoek,  east  of  Ypres,  in  a  sharp 
attack  on  August  10th.  Five  days  later  the  French  and 
British  attacked  northeast  and  east  of  Ypres,  the  latter  tak- 
ing Langemarck.  The  Allies  attacked  at  intervals  and  in 
great  force  in  Flanders  during  the  autumn,  but  their 
superiority  in  artillery  and  numbers  was  largely  neutralized 
by  the  technical  resourcefulness  of  their  opponents,  and 
particularly  by  the  enemy's  defensive  organization  in  great 
depth.  The  Germans  held  their  front  lines,  which  were 
liable  to  complete  destruction  by  the  tremendous  bom- 
bardments, with  comparatively  inconsiderable  forces,  while 
their  stronger  rear  lines  absorbed  the  shock  of  the  attack- 
ing infantry  before  the  assaulting  waves  overwhelmed  the 
defensive  system.  Thus  the  offensive  operations  launched 
with  such  vast  preparations  and  high  hopes  in  Flanders 
remained  inconclusive. 


y?0  The  Great  War 

Gradually,  as  we  have  seen,  a  closer  coordination  was 

being  realized  between  the  efforts  of  the  Italians  and  those 
of  their  Allies,  ami  the  plans  for  1917  called  for  a  combi- 
nation of  offensives  by  all  the  Allies  in  the  West.  The 
spring  offensive  was  launched  considerably  later  by  the 
Italians  than  by  the  French  or  the  British,  probably  for 
premeditated  reasons. 

Herculean  tasks  still  lay  before  the  Italian  armies  along 
the  Isonzo  before  they  could  expect  to  advance  to  their 
chief  goal,  Trieste.  With  the  exception  of  the  single 
Italian  bridgehead  at  Plava,  the  Austro-Hungarian  forces 
still  held  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Isonzo  from  Monte 
Santo  above  Gorizia  north  to  Tolmino.  Here  the  steep 
wooded  cliffs  form  the  western  face  of  the  lofty  Bainsizza 
plateau.  This,  together  with  the  heights  east  of  Gorizia, 
and  the  Carso  east  of  the  Vallone,  had  still  to  be  won 
before  the  Italians  could  march  upon  their  ultimate  ob- 
jectives. 

The  first  important  effort  of  the  Italians,  after  the  offen 
sive  which  gave  them  Gorizia,  as  described  in  Chapter  XI, 
had  been  an  attack  on  the  stony  ridge  of  the  Carso  by  the 
Third  Army  under  the  command  of  the  Duke  of  Aosta.  A 
great  bombardment  from  Vippaco  to  the  sea  opened  on  the 
morning  of  September  14,  1916,  and  the  infantry  advanced 
to  the  assault  at  four  in  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day. 
The  battle  lasted  four  days.  The  Austro-Hungarians  re- 
sisted with  great  tenacity  and  the  Italians  made  only  slight 
gains.  Some  further  gains  in  the  same  region  were  made 
during  the  four  days,  October  10th-14th,  but  the  Italians 
were  hampered  by  bad  weather.  Finally,  after  a  terrific 
bombardment  on  October  31st,  the  Italians  shattered  the 
enemy  front  for  a  distance  of  more  than  two  miles,  and 
on  the  following  days  secured  a  considerable  salient  near 
Castagnevizza. 


Allied  Offensives  of  1917  in  the  West      351 

Both  sides  prepared  with  feverish  energy  for  the  cam- 
paign of  1917.  There  were  about  thirty-six  Austro- 
Hungarian  divisions  on  the  Italian  front  and  the  Italians 
expected  a  furious  combined  offensive  by  German  and 
Austro-Hungarian  forces. 

General  Cadorna  proposed  to  forestall  the  enemy's  attack. 
His  plan  was  to  hide  the  direction  of  his  principal  effort 
by  a  vigorous  preliminary  bombardment  along  the  entire 
Isonzo  front.  He  proposed  to  strike  first  with  his  left  and 
then,  when  the  Austro-Hungarian  reserves  had  been  drawn 
to  the  points  thus  threatened,  to  deliver  the  principal  attack 
against  the  southern  part  of  the  Carso,  where  the  elevation 
of  Hermada,  projecting  towards  the  sea,  commanded  the 
coast  road  to  Trieste. 

The  Italian  bombardment  began  on  May  12th  and  was 
supported  by  British  artillery.  The  Second  Italian  Army 
delivered  the  first  attack  north  of  Gorizia  on  a  front  of 
about  twenty  miles.  Slowly  the  assailants  struggled  up 
the  steep  slopes  east  of  the  river  about  2,000  feet  high. 
By  the  15th  they  had  gained  the  western  margin  of  the 
plateau  and  advanced  gradually  until  the  22d,  when  they 
had  taken  7,113  prisoners  and  considerable  equipment. 

The  main  blow  was  delivered  by  the  center  and  the  right 
wing  of  the  Third  Army  between  the  Carso  and  the  sea. 
That  the  enemy  should  have  no  warning,  the  bombard- 
ment was  furious  but  short.  It  opened  at  6  A.  M.  on  May 
23d  and  at  4  P.  M.  the  infantry  attacked.  Before  nightfall 
they  had  carried  the  Austro-Hungarian  first  and  second 
positions  from  Castagnevizza  to  the  sea  and  taken  9,000 
prisoners.  The  battle  continued  on  the  following  days 
with  the  left  wing  of  the  Third  Italian  Army  pressing 
southward  from  the  salient  which  the  Italians  had  won 
early  in  the  previous  November.  By  the  25th  the  Italians 
had  reached  the  outskirts  of  Hermada.     There  was  a  lull 


352  The  Great  War 

in  the  conflict  on  the  30th.  The  Italians  had  taken  16,568 
prisoners  and  had  gained  a  footing  on  the  slopes  of  Her- 
inada,  hut  the  main  position  of  the  enemy  still  held. 

Early  in  June  the  Austro-Hungarians  launched  a  series 
of  counter-hlows.  For  several  days  fierce  local  conflicts 
raged  at  different  points  along  the  front.  But  the  only 
permanent  gain  made  by  the  counter-assailants  was  in  the 
southern  section,  where  they  expelled  the  Italians  from 
their  advanced  positions  on  the  slopes  of  Hermada  along  a 
front  of  about  three  miles.  These  efforts  ceased  and  the 
battle  died  away  after  June  5th. 

Measured  in  square  miles  of  conquered  terrain,  the  re- 
sults of  this  Italian  offensive  were  slight.  But  only  one 
who  is  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  rugged  nature  of  the 
Austro-Italian  front,  the  most  arduous  of  all  the  theaters 
of  hostilities,  can  rightly  appraise  the  toil  and  the  intrepid 
exploits  of  the  operations  in  those  regions.  The  Italians 
had  stormed  elaborately  fortified  positions  of  great  natural 
strength  in  the  face  of  determined  resistance  and  had 
effected  an  appreciable  advance  in  the  direction  of  their 
goal.  The  enemy,  reinforced  by  divisions  from  their  stag- 
nant eastern  front,  receded,  but  still  presented  a  coherent 
defensive  organization.  The  Italians  had  still  to  feed  their 
courage  on  the  engrossing  but  impalpable  possibilities  of 
subsequent  offensive  operations.  Repeated  efforts,  sus- 
tained by  the  same  means  and  by  unflinching  resolution, 
must  eventually  surmount  every  obstacle  and  exhaust  all 
the  resources  of  resistance. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

The  Russian  Revolution  and  Military  Collapse 

Ministerial  changes  in  Russia.  Remarkable  career  and  assassination  of  the 
miracle-worker,  Rasputin.  Allied  conference  in  Petrograd,  February  1, 
1917.  Critical  food  situation.  Popular  demonstrations  in  Petrograd,  result- 
ing in  bloodshed  on  March  11th.  Rodzianko's  telegram  to  the  Tsar.  The 
Duma  refuses  to  disperse  and  is  declared  the  sole  constitutional  authority. 
The  troops  join  the  revolution.  An  Executive  Committee  of  the  Duma  as 
Provisional  Government.  Fall  of  the  Admiralty,  March  13th.  Abdication 
of  the  Tsar  on  the  15th.  The  new  ministry.  Attitude  of  the  Socialists: 
Social  Revolutionary  and  Social  Democratic  Parties;  Maximalists  and 
Minimalists,  Bolsheviki  and  Mensheviki.  The  Soviet  or  Council  of 
Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Delegates.  Neither  Duma  nor  Soviet  truly 
representative  of  the  Russian  people.  Kerensky.  Disintegrating  forces. 
Arrival  of  Lenin.  The  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets.  The  increasing 
power  of  the  Socialists  and  the  reorganization  of  the  cabinet.  The  renewal 
of  the  Russian  offensive  in  Galicia,  July  1,  1917.  Capture  of  Halicz,  July 
10th.    The  sudden  panic  seizing  the  Russians  on  the  19th  and  the  collapse. 

The  only  tangible  effect  of  the  outcry  against  the  Russian 
administration  in  November,  1916,  was  the  substitution  of 
TrepofT  as  prime  minister  in  place  of  Sturmer,  who  had  been 
suspected  of  a  treasonable  understanding  with  the  Germans. 
To  preclude  further  embarrassing  discussions,  the  Tsar  sus- 
pended the  session  of  the  Duma  on  December  29th.  A 
few  days  later,  on  January  9,  1917,  Trepoff  resigned  and 
was  succeeded  by  Prince  Golitzin,  who  was  charged  with 
improving  the  food  conditions.  Protopopoff  remained 
throughout  these  changes  as  the  principal  representative 
and  agent  of  the  reactionary  elements.  Russia  was  appar- 
ently calm,  but  beneath  the  surface  the  disruptive  forces 
were  daily  gaining  strength.  The  course  of  political  events 
in  the  autumn  of  1916  had  drawn  together  the  moderate, 
reasonable  elements  in  the  Duma,  and  with  this  combination 

353 


354  The  Great  War 

the  military  chi  \  fortunately  in  sympathy,  wliile  cer- 

tain sinister  elements  at  court  and  in  the  higher  bureaucracy, 
dominated  by  anxiety  tor  the  security  of  their  own  influence 
and  privileges,  indifferent  to  every  consideration  of  patriot- 
ism, looked  forward  with  hope  to  a  popular  uprising  which 
might  he  easily  crushed  and  would  serve  as  a  pretense  for  re- 
pressive measures  strengthening  their  own  tenure  of  power, 
event  of  extraordinary  dramatic  interest  was  a  sort  of 
forerunner  of  the  Russian  revolution,  the  assassination  of 
the  charlatan  Rasputin,  who  had  exercised  a  potent  mys- 
terious influence  over  the  imperial  pair.  Gregory  Novik, 
born  of  a  peasant  family  fifty  years  before  in  the  Siberian 
district  of  Tobolsk,  received  the  uncomplimentary  epithet 
Rasputin  from  his  neighbors.  Like  many  holier  leaders, 
he  suddenly  renounced  a  life  of  irregular  habits,  made  pro- 
fession of  intense  religious  zeal,  and,  in  spite  of  frequent 
lapses  into  drunkenness  and  immorality,  impressed  society 
by  his  extreme  asceticism  and  devotion.  He  gained  a  repu- 
tation as  a  miracle-worker,  found  a  way  into  the  leading 
social  circles,  and  became  a  favorite  of  devout  women  of 
high  rank,  over  whom  he  exercised  a  hypnotic  influence. 

Admitted  to  the  intimacy  of  the  court  through  the 
medium  of  a  lady-in-waiting,  he  gained  an  enormous  influ- 
ence over  the  Tsarina,  particularly,  by  his  supposed  miracu- 
lous power  of  healing,  as  it  was  believed  that  the  preservation 
of  the  life  of  the  Tsarevitch,  who  was  always  delicate  in 
health,  depended  upon  his  intervention.  Rasputin,  while 
tall  and  well-proportioned,  ostentatiously  affected  a  slovenly, 
unkempt  appearance,  wearing  only  peasants'  clothes. 

The  ruling  passions  of  the  man  were  avarice  and  love  of 
power.  His  personal  influence  at  court  was  exploited  with 
great  profit  to  himself.  At  the  same  time,  he  was  the  con- 
federate of  the  extreme  reactionaries,  who  desired  imme- 
diate peace  because  they  foresaw  that  the  continuation  of 


Russian  Revolution  and  Military  Collapse  355 

the  war  would  result  in  the  destruction  of  the  existing 
order  and  who  regarded  the  influence  of  Germany  as  less 
dangerous  for  the  Russian  autocracy  than  that  of  France 
and  Great  Britain.  Rasputin  became  the  center  of  a  court 
camarilla  made  up  of  the  bureaucratic  clique.  By  his  cor- 
rupting influence  and  licentious  habits  he  made  himself 
obnoxious  to  the  enlightened  and  liberal  elements.  His 
intrigues  and  arrogance  aroused  the  jealousy  and  disgust  of 
many  leading  members  of  the  aristocracy. 

On  the  night  of  December  29, 1916,  Rasputin  was  invited 
to  a  supper-party  at  the  house  of  Prince  YusupofF,  where 
the  other  guests  were  the  Grand-duke  Dmitri  Pavlovitch 
and  Purishkevitch,  a  conservative  member  of  the  Duma 
from  Bessarabia.  The  party  locked  themselves  in  a  salon 
and  gave  the  miracle-worker  the  choice  between  suicide 
and  execution.  With  the  revolver  handed  him  he  fired  at 
the  grand-duke  and  missed,  whereupon  the  others  shot 
him  dead.  His  body  was  thrust  through  an  ice-hole  in 
the  Neva,  but  was  subsequently  recovered  and  interred  in  a 
silver  coffin  in  the  presence  of  the  Tsar  and  Tsarina  at  Tsar- 
skoye-Selo.  The  news  of  the  assassination  of  Rasputin 
was  received  with  enthusiasm  throughout  the  country. 
The  conspirators  were  put  under  domiciliary  arrest  and 
subsequently  relegated  to  remote  districts  in  the  country 
or  to  the  front,  but  were  never  placed  on  trial. 

Protopopoff,  who  was  the  leading  agent  in  the  reaction- 
ary plots,  had  originally  been  a  liberal,  but  after  his  visit  to 
Western  Europe  in  the  summer  of  1916,  he  had  identified 
himself  with  the  extreme  bureaucratic  clique.  Since  he  was 
a  man  of  extravagantly  romantic  temperament,  the  change 
may  have  been  partly  due  to  the  glamor  of  the  court. 

There  was  a  meeting  of  representatives  of  the  Allied 
powers  in  Petrograd  on  February  1st,  Foreign  Minister 
Doumergue  coming  from  France  and  Lord  Milner  from 


356  The  Great  War 

England.  The  Allies  urged  the  Tsar  to  conciliate  the  Duma 
by  summoning  a  liberal  ministry.  At  this  time  the  Paris 
Temps  declared  that  the  domestic  policy  of  Russia  was 
controlled  by  the  extreme  Right,  who  were  opposed  to 
further  cooperation  with  the  Western  Powers,  because 
they  feared  that  this  would  lead  to  liberal  reforms.  But 
the  Tsar  refused  to  be  persuaded  and  prolonged  the  proro- 
gation of  the  Duma.     His  obstinacy  was  fatal. 

The  food  situation  was  rapidly  approaching  a  crisis.  In 
consequence  of  the  inadequacy  of  the  transportation  sys- 
tem, as  well  as  the  inefficiency  of  the  administration,  food 
conditions  displayed  the  sharpest  contrasts,  with  abundance 
in  some  localities  and  famine  in  others.  In  Odessa,  for  in- 
stance, the  people  were  without  bread  two  days  a  week 
and  without  meat  three.  By  March  1st  there  was  no 
bread  to  be  had  in  Petrograd. 

The  sessions  of  the  Duma  were  finally  resumed  on  Feb- 
ruary 27th.  The  disturbances  which  grew  into  the  revo- 
lution in  Petrograd  are  directly  traceable  to  the  shortage  of 
food.  They  began  as  rather  aimless  demonstrations,  but 
the  reactionaries  were  apparently  determined  to  exasperate 
the  people  for  furthering  their  own  nefarious  designs.  The 
Nevsky  Prospect,  the  leading  artery  of  Petrograd,  was  the 
scene  of  popular  demonstrations  on  March  9th  and  10th, 
the  soldiers  showing  an  inclination  to  fraternize  with  the 
populace.  With  the  fine  weather  on  the  afternoon  of 
March  11th  the  thoroughfare  was  crowded  from  end  to 
end.  The  government  had  summoned  reinforcements  for 
the  Petrograd  garrison  and  the  police  mounted  machine- 
guns  on  the  roofs  of  buildings  at  important  points.  Shortly 
after  3  P.  M.  the  military  were  ordered  to  clear  the  Nevsky 
Prospect.  A  company  of  the  Pavlovsky  Guards  Regiment 
took  its  stand  at  a  central  point  on  this  broad  avenue  near 
the  Sadovaya  and  fired  several  volleys  in  the  direction  of  the 


Russian  Revolution  and  Military  Collapse  357 

Anitchkoff  Palace,  the  residence  of  the  dowager  empress. 
Altogether  about  200  persons  were  killed. 

On  the  same  afternoon  Rodzianko,  President  of  the 
Duma,  telegraphed  the  Tsar  as  follows : 

"Situation  serious.  Anarchy  reigns  in  the  capital.  Gov- 
ernment is  paralyzed.  Transport,  food,  and  fuel  supplies  are 
utterly  disorganized.  General  discontent  is  growing.  Dis- 
orderly firing  is  going  on  in  the  streets.  Various  companies 
of  soldiers  are  shooting  at  each  other.  It  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  invest  someone  who  enjoys  the  confidence  of  the  peo- 
ple with  powers  to  form  a  new  government.  No  time  must 
be  lost.  Any  delay  may  be  fatal.  I  pray  God  that  at  this 
hour  responsibility  may  not  fall  on  the  wearer  of  the  Crown." 

The  text  of  this  message  describes  exactly  the  situation. 
Copies  of  it  were  sent  to  the  different  commanders-in- 
chief,  whose  support  was  invited  and  received.  Prince 
Golitzin  prorogued  the  Duma,  but  this  body  refused  to 
disperse,  and  Rodzianko  announced  that  it  was  now  the 
sole  constitutional  authority. 

On  the  morning  of  March  12th  the  Preobrayensky 
Guards  Regiment,  when  ordered  to  fire  on  the  people, 
mutinied,  and  their  example  was  followed  by  the  Volynsky 
and  other  regiments.  The  revolting  troops  captured  the 
Arsenal  and  supplied  the  populace  with  weapons.  One  by 
one  the  strong  points  of  the  city  fell.  About  noon  the  Tsar 
telegraphed  that  he  was  coming  and  was  bringing  troops 
from  the  northern  front  to  quell  the  insurrection.  In  the 
afternoon  the  Duma  chose  an  executive  committee  of 
twelve  men  to  act  as  a  provisional  government,  among  them 
being  Rodzianko,  Prince  Lvoff,  Miliukoff,  and  Kerensky. 

The  police  were  everywhere  hunted  down  and  made  the 
victims  of  popular  fury.  About  midnight  Protopopoff  sur- 
rendered voluntarily  to  the  Duma  guards.  The  regiments 
sent  to   check    the    movement    in    Petrograd   joined   the 


358  The  Great  War 

revolution  as  soon  as  they  reached  the  capital.  The  Admi- 
ralty, the  last  stronghold  of  the  government,  surrendered 
to  the  revolutionaries  on  the  morning  of  March  13th  after 
a  siege  of  thirty-six  hours  and  Stunner  and  Sukhomlinotl 
were  arrested. 

On  the  14th  the  Tsar  attempted  to  reach  Petrograd  by 
rail,  hut  the  railway  had  been  cut  at  Bologoi  and  he  turned 
hack  to  Pskoff.  At  2  A.  M.  on  the  15th  he  informed  General 
Russky  that  he  had  decided  to  grant  a  responsible  ministry, 
hut  the  latter,  after  communicating  with  the  Duma  and 
other  generals,  advised  abdication  as  the  only  possible  course. 
This  view  was  sustained  by  Alexeieff,  Brussiloff,  Ewarts,  and 
the  Grand-duke  Nicholas.  On  the  following  evening,  in  the 
presence  of  delegates  of  the  Duma  in  his  special  train,  Tsar 
Nicholas  II  drew  up  and  signed  the  historic  document  de- 
claring that,  for  the  good  of  the  country,  he  abdicated  the 
throne  in  favor  of  his  brother,  the  Grand-duke  Michael 
Alexandrovitch,  not  wishing  to  be  separated  from  his  son. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  Miliukoff  had  made  a 
speech  in  the  Duma  announcing  the  composition  of  the 
new  ministry,  with  Prince  George  Lvoff  as  Prime  Minister 
and  Minister  of  the  Interior,  Miliukoff  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
Guchkoff  for  War  and  Marine,  Kerensky  for  Justice, 
Terestchenko  for  Finance,  and  Shingareff  for  Agriculture. 
The  ministry  contained  Cadets,  a  Liberal  Nationalist,  Octo- 
brists,  Liberals,  and  a  Social  Revolutionary. 

But  it  was  soon  evident  that  the  authority  of  the  Duma, 
chosen  as  it  had  been  by  an  indirect  and  complicated  sys- 
tem of  elections,  did  not  rest  upon  a  broadly  representative 
basis  and  that  the  aspirations  of  the  lower  classes  would 
inevitably  seek  expression  through  other  channels. 

Although  the  sternly  dogmatic  doctrines  of  Karl  Marx 
were  not  entirely  suited  to  the  temper  of  Russian  Social- 
ism with  its  individualistic  tendencies,  a  large  part  of  the 


Russian  Revolution  and  Military  Collapse  359 

industrial  workers  of  Russia  belonged  to  the  Social  Demo- 
cratic party,  which  had  been  formed  in  1884  and  professed 
the  arbitrary  German  tenets.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Socialist 
Revolutionary  party,  which  came  into  prominence  about 
1900,  was  a  distinctively  Russian  development,  perpetuating 
the  spirit  of  the  former  Nihilists  and  numbering  among  its  ad- 
herents many  intellectuals  and  idealists  of  the  middle  and  up- 
per classes.  The  distinction  between  the  Social  Democrats 
and  the  Socialist  Revolutionaries  corresponded  roughly  to  the 
distinction  between  the  aspirations  of  the  industrial  prole- 
tariat and  those  of  the  peasants.  The  former  aimed  to  transfer 
the  control  of  industry  and  distribution  from  capital  to  labor, 
the  latter  to  place  the  peasants  in  full  possession  of  the  land. 
The  notion  of  a  strongly  centralized  state  was  generally  dis- 
tasteful to  the  Social  Revolutionaries,  whose  ideal  was  the  full 
development  of  the  individual,  and  whose  scheme  of  society 
was  based  on  the  local  autonomy  of  the  small  community. 

Disagreement  at  a  convention  in  1903  divided  the  Social 
Democratic  party  into  the  Bolsheviki  and  Mensheviki,  so- 
called  because  they  represented  at  that  time,  respectively, 
the  majority  and  minority  divisions  of  the  party.  Similarly 
the  Socialist  Revolutionaries  were  split  into  factions  known 
as  Maximalists  and  Minimalists.  The  Bolsheviki  and 
Maximalists,  being  the  extremist  wings  of  the  two  parties, 
made  common  cause  in  the  early  stages  of  the  revolution, 
so  that  the  original  distinction  between  them  was  naturally 
quite  often  overlooked. 

The  Bolsheviki  were  inflexibly  opposed  to  any  form  of 
cooperation  with  the  bourgeoisie  and  demanded  a  govern- 
ment exclusively  of  workmen  and  peasants.  Trotsky  trans- 
ferred his  allegiance  from  the  Mensheviki  to  the  Bolsheviki 
at  the  time  of  the  revolution. 

The  Mensheviki  regarded  a  workmen's  government  as 
a  practical  impossibility  and  advocated  cooperation  with 


360  The  Great  War 

the  bourgeoisie  for  the  establishment  of  a  republic.  The 
Bolsheviki,  who  were  uncompromising  internationalists, 
demanded  the  immediate  termination  of  the  war,  so  as  to 
clear  the  held  for  the  fundamental  struggle  between  the 
classes,  to  be  waged  throughout  the  world.  The  Menshe- 
viki,  less  fanatically  addicted  to  abstract  doctrine,  aiming  at 
definite,  practical  reforms,  were  willing  to  work  within  the 
existing  organization  of  society,  and  were  not  adverse  to  con- 
tinuing the  war  until  an  honorable  peace  had  been  attained. 

Coincidently  with  the  assumption  of  sovereign  power  by 
the  Duma,  the  Socialists  formed  a  rival  organization,  based 
on  the  model  invented  at  the  time  of  the  revolution  of  1905 
and  then  known  as  the  Council  of  Labor  Delegates.  The 
new  council,  or  Soviet,  consisting  of  delegates  supposedly 
elected  by  the  workmen  of  the  Petrograd  factories,  sum- 
moned representatives  of  the  garrison  to  join  it,  and  thus  be- 
came the  Council  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Delegates. 

In  the  face  of  a  moderate,  hesitating  Duma,  fearful  above 
all  things  lest  the  nation  lapse  into  a  state  of  chaos  in  the 
midst  of  a  great  war,  the  Soviet  was  far  more  positive  and  de- 
termined in  its  attitude.  The  new  regime  not  only  started 
with  a  divided  sovereignty,  but  the  Soviet,  the  organ  of  the 
workmen,  was  no  more  representative  than  the  Duma  of 
the  Russian  people,  three-fourths  of  whom  are  peasants. 

The  Council  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Delegates  con- 
sisted mainly  of  Social  Democrats  with  only  a  few  Social 
Revolutionaries.  Lenin  was  now  the  leader  of  the  Bol- 
sheviki. Hopes  for  a  successful  prosecution  of  the  war  by 
Russia,  based  upon  a  supposed  analogy  with  revolutionary 
France,  were  bound  to  be  misleading;  for  while  the  ex- 
tremists in  Russia  were  antinational,  the  extremists  in  revo- 
lutionary France  had  never  ceased  to  be  national  in  spirit. 

Kerensky  was  one  of  the  vice-presidents  of  the  Soviet; 
but  his  manifest  patriotic  zeal  won  for  him  the  confidence 


Russian  Revolution  and  Military  Collapse  361 

of  the  conservative  factions  in  the  Duma.  It  was  largely 
his  task  to  bridge  the  chasm  between  the  Soviet  and  the 
Provisional  Government.  Disagreement  in  regard  to  the 
form  of  government  occurred  at  once,  as  the  Soviet  de- 
manded the  immediate  establishment  of  a  republic.  But 
Kerensky  in  an  address  of  impassioned  eloquence  persuaded 
them  that  for  the  present  unity  was  the  one  supreme  neces- 
sity, and  that  they  would  obtain  the  republic  after  the  crisis 
had  been  passed  and  victory  was  achieved.  The  Soviet  adopted 
a  resolution  supporting  the  Provisional  Government.  On 
March  16th  the  Grand-duke  Michael  resigned  all  power  into 
the  hands  of  the  Provisional  Government  until  a  Constituent 
Assembly  should  decide  on  the  future  form  of  government. 

Russia  was  especially  susceptible  to  disintegrating  tenden- 
cies. The  autocracy  had  collapsed  from  inherent  decay 
rather  than  from  any  premeditated  assaults  by  its  opponents. 
The  revolution  had  come  as  a  surprise  to  the  country  at 
large,  which  was  bewildered  and  without  positive  aims. 
The  middle  class  was  relatively  small  and  the  consciousness 
of  nationality  among  the  masses  weak.  The  new  govern- 
ment did  not  respond  to  the  passionate  sentiment  of  any 
large  body  of  the  people.  Local  Soviets,  with  particularistic 
tendencies,  patterned  after  the  Council  of  Workmen's  and 
Soldiers'  Delegates  at  Petrograd,  sprang  up  in  all  the  towns 
and  larger  villages.  Mismanagement  and  corruption  had 
undermined  the  economic  structure  of  the  nation,  and  aver- 
sion for  the  war  was  the  one  feeling  common  to  the  masses. 

The  Provisional  Government  abolished  the  death  penalty 
on  March  22d.  Military  discipline  was  soon  relaxed,  the 
Soviets  insisting  that  all  matters  relating  to  discipline  must 
be  left  to  company  or  regimental  committees  chosen  by  the 
soldiers.  The  armies  were  invaded  by  a  swarm  of  itinerant 
demagogues  preachingthe  doctrines  of  pacifism  and  the  social 
revolution.     A  systematic  agitation  intended  to  demoralize 


362  The  Great  War 

the  nation's  fighting  power  was  organized  by  German  emis- 
saries anil  maintained  by  German  money.  The  peasants 
deserted  the  armies  in  great  numbers,  wishing  to  share  in 
the  distribution  of  land  which  was  believed  to  be  at  hand. 

Vladimir  [lietch  I'lyanoff,  commonly  known  as  Lenin, 
the  leader  of  the  Bolsheviki,  a  fanatic,  determined  to  de- 
stroy the  existing  order,  was  conveyed  by  Germany  with 
thirty  of  his  followers,  from  his  place  of  exile  in  Switzer- 
land to  Sweden,  whence  he  made  his  way  to  Petrograd. 

The  All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets,  which  convened 
in  Petrograd  on  April  13th,  voted  for  the  continuation  of 
the  war  until  an  honorable  peace  could  be  obtained,  "with- 
out annexations  or  indemnities,"  and  demanded  that  the 
Allies  should  accept  this  policy.  But  the  minority,  led  by 
Lenin,  demanded  the  immediate  cessation  of  hostilities. 

The  Soviet  was  greatly  incensed  because  a  Russian  note  to 
the  Allies  dated  on  May  2d  reaffirmed  the  determination  to 
carry  on  the  war  to  a  "decisive  victory"  without  mentioning 
the  formula  of  "no  annexations  or  indemnities."  Upon  the 
promise  that  the  note  would  be  explained  in  a  sense  satisfac- 
tory to  the  delegates,  the  Soviet  by  only  a  narrow  majority 
passed  a  vote  of  confidence  in  the  Lvofr"  ministry.  But  it 
was  henceforth  evident  that  the  Provisional  Government, 
deriving  its  authority  from  the  Duma,  was  no  longer  the 
dominating  power.  After  a  few  days  Miliukoff  resigned, 
Gutchkoff  refused  to  be  responsible  any  longer  for  the  army 
and  navy,  where  his  authority  was  disputed,  and  General  Kor- 
niloff",  who  had  striven  to  maintain  order  in  the  capital,  relin- 
quished his  post  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  Petrograd 
military  district  and  received  the  command  of  the  Eighth 
Army.  The  trend  of  events  led  to  the  reorganization  of  the 
cabinet  with  a  strong  representation  of  Socialists  on  May  16th. 
Noteworthy  changes  were  the  substitution  of  Terestchenko 
as  Foreign  Minister  and  of  Kerensky  as  Minister  of  War. 


Russian  Revolution  and  Military  Collapse  363 

This  coalition  cabinet  issued  a  new  announcement  of 
policy  on  the  19th,  declaring  for  a  peace  in  common  with 
the  Allies,  "without  annexations  or  indemnities,"  and  based 
on  the  rights  of  nations  to  decide  their  own  affairs ;  govern- 
mental control  of  the  production,  transportation,  exchange, 
and  distribution  of  the  necessary  commodities;  and  the 
calling  together  of  a  Constituent  Assembly.  The  Allies 
sent  special  missions  to  Russia,  M.  Albert  Thomas  repre- 
senting France;  M.  Vandervelde,  Belgium;  Mr.  Arthur 
Henderson,  Great  Britain;  and  Senator  Root,  the  United 
States,  which  had  now  joined  in  the  war  against  Germany. 
But  the  representatives  of  the  orderly  socialistic  movement 
in  the  Western  European  countries  found  little  sympathy 
among  the  majority  of  the  Russian  Soviets,  who  classed 
them  as  "imperialists,"  and  were  being  enticed  by  German 
machinations  to  support  the  idea  of  a  Stockholm  Confer- 
ence of  International  Socialism,  which  would  "permit  the 
working  classes  of  the  whole  world  to  struggle  in  concert 
for  the  general  peace,"  without  regard  to  the  nationalistic 
aims  and  policies  which  had  occasioned  and  still  prolonged 
the  war.  Nevertheless,  the  Coalition  Government  obtained 
the  precarious  endorsement  of  the  All-Russian  Congress 
of  Soviets,  which  opened  in  Petrograd  on  June  16th,  for 
its  policy  of  continuing  the  war  until  Russia  could  obtain 
peace  concurrently  with  the  Allies. 

The  saner  elements  in  Russia  believed  that  the  only 
effective  means  for  restoring  discipline  in  the  armies  and 
insuring  an  orderly  regime  under  the  revolutionary  gov- 
ernment was  to  fuse  the  discordant  sentiments  in  the  fervor 
of  a  renewed  attack  against  the  foreign  enemy.  Kerensky 
visited  the  different  armies,  haranguing  the  troops  with  fever- 
ish eloquence.  His  exhortations,  combined  with  the  firm- 
ness of  Brussiloff's  staff  and  the  influence  of  the  officers  of 
the  Allied  powers,  who  were  present  with  the  Russian  forces 


364  The  Great  War 

in  considerable  numbers,  prevailed  upon  the  committees  in 
the  armies  of  Galicia  to  accept  the  idea  of  a  new  offensive. 

Germain  and  Austria-Hungary  had  transferred  many  of 
their  most  effective  fighting  elements  from  their  eastern 
front  to  the  critical  battle-zones  in  France  and  Italy,  in- 
tending to  bide  their  time  in  Russia,  aiding  the  internal 
disruptive  forces  of  that  country  by  an  elaborate  system  of 
intrigue.  The  easy-going  methods  of  the  Russians  favored 
the  clandestine  operations  of  the  German  agents.  The  pris- 
oners of  war  at  KiefT,  for  instance,  were  subject  to  practically 
no  control  and  circulated  freely  day  or  night,  engaging  in 
various  occupations,  as  coachmen,  gardeners,  valets,  tram- 
way conductors,  and  even  employees  of  banks.  Thus  the 
hosts  of  Austro-Hungarian  prisoners  in  Russia  could  con- 
veniently supply  an  army  of  secret  Teutonic  agents. 

For  several  months  there  had  been  no  important  engage- 
ments along  the  Russian  front.  The  disposition  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian-German  forces  was  practically  the  same 
as  at  the  close  of  1916,  with  the  German  army  group  under 
Prince  Leopold  extending  from  the  Baltic  to  a  little  south 
of  Brzezany  and  the  Austro-Hungarian,  under  the  Arch- 
duke Joseph  Ferdinand,  from  there  to  von  Mackensen's 
Roumanian  command.  The  Russian  lines  in  Galicia  cov- 
ered Brody,  fell  short  of  Brzezany  and  Halicz,  and  just 
included  Stanislaw.  Alexeieff*  had  retired  from  the  High 
Command  early  in  June  and  had  been  succeeded  by  Brus- 
siloff,  whose  command  of  the  southern  army  group  had  been 
conferred  on  General  Gutor.  The  Eleventh  Russian  Army, 
now  under  General  Erdelli,  extended  from  Brody  to  the 
vicinity  of  Zborow.  South  of  it,  as  far  as  the  Dniester,  lay 
the  Seventh  Army  under  Tcheremisoff.  The  Eighth  under 
General  Korniloff  continued  the  front  southward  to  the 
mountains.  The  plan  of  the  coming  attack  was  mainly 
the  work  of  Brussiloff.     He  proposed  to  deliver  the  first 


An  assembly  of  over  three  thousand  members.      Delegates  of  the  soldiers  to  the  Workmen  s 
and  Soldiers"  So-viet  sitting  in  Tauride  Palace,  Petrograd. 


Gregory  Novik,  railed  Rasputin.       The  peasant  Rasputin  was  introduced  to  the  Russian 
court  by  a  lady-in-waiting  and  he  soon  gained  great  influence  over  the  Tsarina,      th- 
ing influence  and  licentious  habits  nvere  obnoxious  to  the  enlightened  and  liberal  elements. 


Russian  Revolution  and  Military  Collapse  365 

blow  north  of  the  Dniester  and  subsequently  to  make  the 
crucial  attack  against  Stryj  with  a  view  to  outflanking  Lem- 
berg  and  eventually  forcing  its  evacuation. 

The  first  attack  was  made  by  the  Seventh  Army  on  a  front 
of  eighteen  miles  in  the  sector  opposite  Brzezany.  The  artil- 
lery preparation  began  on  the  morning  of  June  29th  and 
just  after  midday  on  July  1st  the  infantry  attacked.  Three 
Austro-Hungarian  positions  were  carried  before  nightfall 
and  on  the  next  day  the  passage  of  the  Zlota  Lipa  was 
forced  below  Brzezany.  More  than  18,000  prisoners  were 
taken  during  the  first  two  days  of  the  offensive  on  this  sector. 

The  Eleventh  Russian  Army  went  into  action  on  July  3d 
north  of  the  Tarnopol-Lemberg  railway,  drawing  to  this 
portion  of  its  opponents'  front  reserves  which  might  other- 
wise have  been  useful  in  reinforcing  the  Austro-Hungarian 
lines  south  of  the  Dniester. 

Finally,  while  the  battle  raged  on  the  portion  of  the 
front  already  mentioned,  General  Korniloff's  Eighth  Army 
opened  its  bombardment  along  the  Bistritza  on  the  7th 
against  the  Fourth  Austro-Hungarian  Army  under  von 
Tersztyansky.  The  Russian  infantry  attacked  the  next 
day,  breached  the  enemy's  line,  pursued  their  opponents 
eight  miles,  and  took  about  7,000  prisoners.  Halicz  fell 
on  July  10th  before  the  converging  attack  of  the  Seventh 
and  Eighth  Russian  Armies  and  on  the  11th  Korniloff 
entered  Kalusch,  west  of  the  Lomnica. 

But  just  as  the  Russians  were  on  the  eve  of  great  achieve- 
ments, their  effort,  dependent  as  it  was  on  the  fitful  revolu- 
tionary spirit,  suddenly  waned.  The  advance  of  the  Russian 
armies  was  impeded  by  floods,  while  at  the  same  time  the 
Teutonic  armies  consolidated  their  resistance.  On  July  16th 
Korniloff  found  it  necessary  to  relinquish  Kalusch  and  retire 
to  the  right  bank  of  the  Lomnica.  The  Austro-Germans 
directed  a  main  counter-attack  against  the  Eleventh  Russian 


366  The  Great  War 

Army  on  the  high  ground  between  the  headwaters  of  the 
Sereth  ami  the  /lota  Lipa,  intending  to  create  a  diversion 
for  relieving  the  pressure  on  their  own  lines  further  south. 

Suddenly,  on  the  19th,  the  607th  Russian  regiment  aban- 
doned its  position  in  the  battle-line.  A  panic  ensued,  the 
disruptive  effect  spread  quickly,  and  immediately  the  in- 
hrmities  which  had  been  undermining  the  military  estab- 
lishment of  Russia  made  their  baneful  presence  felt.  The 
system  of  communications  had  long  been  in  a  state  of 
deterioration,  confusion  prevailed  along  the  lines  of  sup- 
ply, and  it  was  impossible  to  replenish  the  armies  or  transfer 
reinforcements  promptly.  Disorganization  had  destroyed 
the  flexibility  of  the  Russian  armies.  Indifference,  lassitude, 
visionary  expectations,  treachery,  failure  of  confidence  and 
discipline,  all  contributed  to  the  sudden  development  of  the 
fatal  crisis.  The  Austro-German  forces  were  soon  pouring 
through  a  gap  twenty-five  miles  in  width  and  the  Russian 
command  was  powerless  to  bring  together  reinforcements 
in  sufficient  strength  for  stemming  the  headlong  current. 
Characteristic  of  the  general  enervation  of  the  Russian 
armies  was  the  supineness  shown  generally  by  the  officers  in 
the  face  of  the  advancing  disaster.  The  professional  officer 
corps,  depleted  by  three  years  of  fighting  and  replenished 
by  heterogeneous  elements,  frequently  deficient  in  educa- 
tion and  morale,  in  some  cases  chosen  by  the  soldiers'  com- 
mittees, had  lost  its  solidarity,  prestige,  and  authority. 

The  flight  of  the  Eleventh  Russian  Army  involved  the 
retirement  of  the  Seventh  and  Eighth.  On  July  20th  the 
Germans  were  in  Tarnopol.  In  two  or  three  days  prac- 
tically all  the  gains  of  1916  were  swept  away.  The  hopes, 
which,  almost  in  defiance  of  reason,  had  sprung  from  the 
shattered  prospects  of  1915  and  had  brightened  and  ex- 
panded, were  suddenly  extinguished.  The  Russian  Empire 
ceased  to  be  an  active  combatant. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

The  British  Blockade  and  the  German  Submarine 
Offensive 

The  struggle  for  command  of  the  sea.  The  naval  strategy  of  Great  Britain 
and  Germany.  The  British  blockade.  Its  standing  in  international  law. 
Its  effect  on  the  United  States  and  other  neutral  powers.  The  German 
submarine  campaign.  Its  legality.  The  submarine  as  an  instrument  of 
warfare.  Frightfulness  on  the  sea.  Methods  of  defense  against  sub- 
marines.    Armed  merchantmen. 

From  the  beginning  of  hostilities  the  Great  War,  in  its 
last  analysis,  has  been  a  struggle  between  the  land  power 
of  Germany  and  the  sea  power  of  Great  Britain.  That 
such  would  be  the  effect  was  long  foreseen  by  German 
statesmen  and  military  leaders.  Even  such  advocates  of 
the  "Mailed  Fist"  policy  as  Prince  von  Biilow  and 
Count  von  Reventlow  warned  their  people  of  the  results 
to  be  anticipated  from  the  British  navy.  Whether  disin- 
genuous or  not,  this  is  expressed  in  an  article  by  von 
Reventlow,  published  in  The  Navy  League  Annual,  1909- 
1910:  "Should  war  break  out  sooner  or  later  between 
England  and  Germany  we  should  be  unable,  even  assum- 
ing conditions  most  favorable  to  us,  directly  to  protect 
German  commerce  so  long  as  the  war  lasted.  Our  trading 
vessels  on  the  ocean  would  be  a  prey  to  the  British  cruisers, 
and  we  should  have  no  means  of  doing  anything  for  their 
protection.  The  few  German  foreign  cruisers  would  not 
exist  for  long,  and  besides,  they  would  have  no  stations  at 
which  they  could  coal  and  execute  repairs." 

367 


368  The  Great  War 

It  is  probable,  however,  that  in  case  of  Great  Britain's 
early  entry  into  active  hostilities,  the  German  Admiralty 
had  counted  on  taking  advantage  of  the  wide  distribution 
of  various  units  of  the  British  fleet  in  foreign  waters  to 
make  a  sudden  stroke  against  the  home  fleet,  crippling  it  as 
far  as  possible  at  the  outset.  But  the  British  Admiralty  had 
foreseen  this  contingency,  and  by  the  mobilization  of  the 
fleet  at  Spithead  had  parried  the  blow.  The  effect  of  this 
maneuver  was  to  place  the  German  battle  fleet  upon  the 
defensive, — a  situation  that  the  most  strenuous  endeavors 
have  been  unable  to  modify.  Simultaneously  with  the 
declaration  of  war  came  the  announcement  that  Great 
Britain  would  observe  the  rules  of  the  Declaration  of 
London  in  maritime  war,  and  the  British  navy  instituted 
its  blockade  of  the  German  Empire. 

The  great  force  of  British  sea  power  immediately  be- 
came operant,  and  Germany  found  herself  a  besieged  for- 
tress. Great  Britain,  by  her  control  of  the  English  Channel 
and  the  passage  between  Scotland  and  Norway,  converted 
the  North  Sea  into  a  British  lake.  With  the  German  fleet 
safely  locked  up  in  its  bases  at  Kiel  and  Wilhelmshaven,  the 
attention  of  the  British  navy  could  be  concentrated  on  rid- 
ding the  oceans  of  portions  of  the  German  fleet  in  foreign 
seas  and  in  suppressing  German  commerce  destroyers.  The 
return  of  the  Mowe  to  Wilhelmshaven  on  March  5,  1916, 
marked  the  last  of  the  German  raiders,  all  the  others  having 
been  destroyed  or  interned  in  neutral  ports. 

There  could  be  no  stronger  demonstration  of  the  potency 
of  sea  power  than  that  evidenced  by  the  situation  at  the 
close  of  1916.  The  British  navy  had  shut  up  in  its  home 
bases  a  fleet  second  only  to  itself,  had  destroyed  or  driven 
to  cover  all  its  detached  units,  and  had  swept  out  of  exist- 
ence the  commerce  of  four  nations  which  aggregated,  in 
1913,  three  and  one-half  billions  of  imports  and  over  three 


The  Blockade  and  the  Submarine  Offensive  369 

billions  of  exports.  Virtually  the  only  supplies  that  entered 
the  Central  Powers  went  through  the  ports  of  neutral 
nations  and  a  continuously  increasing  pressure  was  exerted 
by  Great  Britain  and  her  allies  to  bring  this  trade  to  an  end. 

It  was  an  American,  Admiral  Mahan,  who  first  pointed 
out  the  tremendous  role  played  by  sea  power  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  British  Empire.  From  the  facts  of  history  he 
drew  certain  conclusions  that,  in  the  main,  have  been  justi- 
fied by  the  events  of  the  Great  War.  Of  these,  the  funda- 
mental one  is  that  the  nation  in  possession  of  control  of 
the  sea  cannot  be  defeated. 

The  consciousness  of  this  fact  was  undoubtedly  responsi- 
ble for  the  rapid  and  almost  hysterical  expansion  of  the 
German  navy — an  expansion  that,  according  to  the  state- 
ments of  German  naval  leaders,  was  far  from  complete  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  war.  This  fact  also,  as  can  be  per- 
ceived by  the  most  casual  study  of  events,  has  had  a  most 
profound  influence  upon  the  military  situation  of  both  the 
Allies  and  the  Central  Powers. 

Writers  on  naval  strategy  recognize  three  types  or  gra- 
dations of  command  of  the  sea:  absolute,  virtual  or  relative, 
and  disputed.  During  the  first  months  of  the  war  the 
Allied  sea  power  was  disputed  by  the  German  cruiser  war- 
fare, early  submarine  activities,  and  by  the  threat  of  the 
high  seas  fleet.  The  situation  was  steadily  improved  by  the 
Allied  fleets  until  the  British  obtained  virtual  command 
of  the  sea,  which  could  not  become  absolute  until  the 
German  main  fleet  had  been  defeated  and  the  submarine 
activities  brought  to  a  standstill. 

The  effect  of  British  command  of  the  sea  upon  the 
strategy  of  Great  Britain  and  Germany  has  been  most 
admirably  defined  by  a  contributor  to  The  New  York  Times 
(January  3,  1915)  writing  under  the  pseudonym  of  "Naval 
Officer."     This  may  be  summarized  as  follows: 


370  The  Great  War 

The  British  navy  has  kept  control  of  the  sea  and  so  far  lias 
prevented  the  defeat  of  the  Allies  and  will  eventually  force 
Germany  to  terms.  England's  strategy  has  been  of  a  high 
order.  She  has  blockaded  the  North  Sea;  prevented  surprise 
attacks;  convoyed  British  troops  and  supplies  to  France; 
watched  neutral  ports;  prevented  the  invasion  of  England; 
guarded  the  Belgian  coast;  and  kept  trawlers  engaged  in 
dragging  for  mines  and  in  laying  them  off  the  German  coast. 

The  German  naval  strategy  was  simpler.  The  Germans 
realized  that  eventually  their  main  fleet  would  have  to  fight. 
Hence,  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  war  it  would  remain 
under  cover  of  its  coast  fortifications  and  strive  to  do  as 
much  damage  as  possible  to  British  units  by  sudden  raids, 
mines,  submarines,  Zeppelins,  etc.  At  the  same  time,  fast 
cruisers  would  endeavor  to  paralyze  shipping  and  cut  com- 
munications. 

During  the  year  1915  there  were  only  two  naval  actions 
of  importance  in  European  waters:  the  Dogger  Bank 
affair  (January  24,  1915)  and  the  attack  on  the  Darda- 
nelles fortifications.  Otherwise,  the  British  and  Allied 
naval  forces  were  concerned  with  strengthening  the 
blockade  and  with  suppressing  the  enemy  commerce- 
destroyers.  The  destruction  of  the  German  Pacific  fleet 
under  von  Spee  at  Falkland  Islands  gave  a  fatal  stroke  to 
German  plans  on  the  high  seas:  hence,  by  the  end  of  1915, 
barring  a  few  exceptions,  German  cruisers,  even  the  most 
daring  and  successful,  in  the  end  were  sunk  or  driven  into 
neutral  ports.  A  few,  like  the  Emden,  by  means  of  disguises 
were  able  to  run  a  longer  and  more  romantic  course  of 
destruction  of  commerce,  but  the  infinite  eyes  and  ears  of 
Great  Britain  made  their  ultimate  fate  certain. 

The  entry  of  Italy  into  the  war  (May  23,  1915)  had  a  far- 
reaching  effect  upon  the  naval  situation,  for  it  devolved 
upon  her  to  assume  control  of  the  Adriatic  Sea  and  to  shut 


The  Blockade  and  the  Submarine  Offensive  371 

up  or  destroy  the  Austro-Hungarian  fleet.  This  permitted 
rearrangement  of  the  Allied  forces,  the  French  fleet  as- 
suming still  more  responsibility  in  other  portions  of  the 
Mediterranean,  with  an  according  strengthening  of  the 
British  blockade  of  the  North  Sea.  The  Russian  fleet  with 
the  aid  of  a  few  British  submarines  maintained  control 
of  the  Baltic,  in  spite  of  a  somewhat  ambitious  attack  by 
the  Germans  against  the  Riga  fortifications  (August  16, 
1915).  In  the  Black  Sea,  the  situation  was  quite  similar, 
the  Russian  Black  Sea  fleet  dominating  its  waters,  yet 
powerless  to  accomplish  anything  against  the  Turkish  de- 
fenses at  the  Bosphorus.  The  losses  to  the  Allied  fleets  had 
been  serious  and  were  mainly  due  to  torpedoes  and  mines, 
although  the  Italian  battleship  Benedetto  Brin  (September 
28,  1915)  was  probably  blown  up  through  treachery. 

As  has  been  noted,  on  the  same  day  that  Great  Britain 
declared  war  against  Germany  (August  4,  1914)  a  King's 
Proclamation  announced  that  the  rules  of  the  Declaration 
of  London  would  be  observed  in  the  blockade,  save  that 
aeroplanes  and  aeronautic  equipment  would  be  transferred 
from  the  list  of  conditional  contraband  to  that  of  absolute 
contraband.  Similar  rules  were  adopted  by  Germany, 
France,  and  Russia.  The  adherence  to  the  provisions  of 
the  Declaration  of  London  by  Great  Britain  came  as  some- 
what of  a  surprise,  for  it  had  failed  to  be  ratified  by  the 
House  of  Lords  on  the  ground  that  it  constituted  a  virtual 
abandonment  of  everything  that  would  tend  to  render  sea 
power  efficient  through  commercial  blockade. 

The  Declaration  of  London  was  the  first  well-defined  en- 
deavor to  draw  up  a  code  for  maritime  war  satisfactory  to  a 
nation  either  in  the  status  of  a  belligerent  or  that  of  a  neu- 
tral. It  is  easy  to  see  that  such  an  arrangement  could  be  only 
a  compromise  at  the  best,  for  the  same  nation  that  in  time  of 
peace  would  be  inclined  to  favor  liberal  extensions  in  the 


372  The  Great  War 

rights  of  neutrals,  would,  during  the  course  of  a  war,  if  itself 
involved,  he  equally  determined  to  restrict  those  very  rights 
if  they  tended  to  interfere  with  the  chance  for  victory. 

The  truth  of  this  has  been  abundantly  verified  by  the 
events  of  the  Great  War.  The  first  few  months  of  hos- 
tilities were  marked  by  successive  British  Orders  in  Council 
modifying  the  provisions  of  the  Declaration,  until  finally, 
on  March  15,  1915,  it  was  modified  fairly  out  of  existence, 
and  the  British  blockade  of  the  North  Sea  was  conducted 
under  the  earlier  rules  of  international  law  as  defined  by  the 
Rule  of  1756  and  the  Declaration  of  Paris  (1856).  The 
former  denied  to  neutrals  the  right  to  enjoy  trade  with 
belligerents  that  in  time  of  peace,  owing  to  tariff  and  other 
restrictions,  did  not  appertain  to  them.  The  latter,  which 
in  fact  was  the  only  statement  of  rules  for  the  conduct  of 
maritime  war  prior  to  the  Declaration  of  London,  was  very 
vague,  contenting  itself  with  the  following  general  pro- 
nouncements: (1)  Privateering  is  and  remains  abolished; 
(2)  The  neutral  flag  covers  enemy's  goods,  with  the  ex- 
ception of  contraband  of  war;  (3)  Neutral  goods,  with 
the  exception  of  contraband,  are  not  liable  to  capture; 
(4)  Blockades,  in  order  to  be  binding,  must  be  effective. 

The  modifications  in  the  Declaration  of  London  con- 
sisted mainly  in  the  transfer  of  commodities  defined  in  it  as 
conditional  or  non-contraband  to  the  list  of  absolute  con- 
traband. Thus,  for  instance,  under  the  provisions  of 
the  Declaration,  raw  material,  such  as  cotton,  wool,  rub- 
ber, etc.,  were  non-contraband,  while  food,  fuel,  money, 
clothing,  flying  machines,  etc.,  were  classed  as  conditional 
contraband.  It  was,  therefore,  on  the  definition  of  con- 
traband that  the  issues  of  the  British  blockade  turned. 

Prior  to  February,  1915,  foodstuffs  had  been  permitted 
to  enter  Germany  through  the  blockade,  but  on  January 
26,  1915,  the  Bundesrath,  or  Federal  Council,  announced 


Sinking  of  a  torpedoed  steamer.  Some  of  the  crew  are  in  a  lifeboat,  one  man  is  seen 
sliding  down  a  line  from  the  vessel' s  taffrail,  while  the  splash  on  the  left  is  where  another  has 
dropped  into  the  tvater. 


Passengers  and  crew  of  the  torpedoed  French  steamer  Sontay  taking  to  the  lifeboats. 
Out  of  a  total  of  425,  jg  persons  ivere  lost. 


The  Blockade  and  the  Submarine  Offensive  373 

that  the  German  government  would  assume  control  of  all 
stocks  of  flour  and  grain  in  the  country.  Arguing,  there- 
fore, that  these  commodities  when  imported  into  Germany 
would  be  commandeered  and  pass  directly  into  the  hands 
of  the  government  and  hence  to  the  military  authorities, 
the  British  government  placed  them  on  the  list  of  absolute 
contraband. 

It  was  soon  apparent  that  the  blockade  would  be  a  farce 
if  the  restrictions  placed  by  the  Declaration  of  London 
upon  the  activities  of  the  British  fleet  were  observed,  par- 
ticularly with  respect  to  the  neutral  powers,  such  as  Hol- 
land and  the  Scandinavian  states,  which  were  still  in  a 
position  to  trade  directly  with  Germany.  Each  of  these 
had  a  considerable  merchant  marine,  and  the  result  was 
that  their  ports  were  made  bases  and  clearing  houses  for 
the  provisioning  of  Britain's  enemy.  Nor,  indeed,  could 
any  exception  be  taken  to  this  trade  so  long  as  food  was 
conditional  contraband  and  only  subject  to  seizure  when 
destined  directly  for  the  enemy  forces,  and  raw  materials 
were  not  contraband  at  all. 

The  blockade  originated  in  the  idea  of  the  siege,  the 
first  commercial  blockade  being  the  closing  of  the  ports  of 
Flanders  by  the  Dutch  in  1584.  The  Declaration  of  Paris 
(1856)  was  the  first  compilation  of  rules  for  maritime  war- 
fare. This  is  still  the  basis  of  the  so-called  law  of  blockade, 
modified,  however,  by  new  conditions.  One  of  these 
modifications  is  the  doctrine  of  continuous  voyage,  under 
which  the  principle  is  held  that  neutral  rights  cannot  be 
used  as  a  cloak  for  covering  unneutral  transportation  of 
munitions  and  supplies  through  non-belligerent  states  ad- 
joining countries  at  war. 

The  doctrine  of  continuous  voyage  therefore  carries  the 
pressure  of  the  blockade  into  neutral  ports,  and  there  can 
be  no  question  that  Great  Britain  has  applied  this  principle 


374  The  Great  War 

of  international  law  with  steadily  increasing  thoroughness,  in 

spite  of  the  most  strenuous  resistance  of  neutrals.  Further- 
more, she  has  made  considerable  extensions  of  the  principle. 
Thus,  the  Order  in  Council,  August20, 191 4,  renders  a  neutral 
ship  "liable  to  capture  for  whatever  port  the  ship  is  bound, 
and  at  whatever  port  the  cargo  is  to  be  discharged,  if  it  is 
shown  to  he  destined  for  the  use  of  the  armed  forces  or  of  a 
Government  department  of  the  Enemy  State,  or  to  or  from 
an  agent  of  the  Enemy  State  or  to  a  merchant  or  other  person 
under  the  control  of  the  authorities  of  the  Enemy  State." 

Great  Britain's  justification  of  this  supervision  of  neutral 
shipping  was  that  it  was  known  that  Germany  had  planned 
to  make  a  vast  use  of  Dutch,  Scandinavian,  and  other  neu- 
tral ports  for  evading  the  blockade.  These  measures  called 
forth  vigorous  protests  from  neutral  exporting  powers,  and 
in  addition  it  subjected  the  neighboring  neutrals  to  the 
accusation  by  Germany  of  aiding  the  enemy,  accompanied 
by  threats  of  retaliatory  action.  In  reply  to  the  note  of 
Secretary  Bryan,  December  26,  1914,  in  justification  of  the 
British  policy,  Sir  Edward  Grey  said: 

"The  British  claim  to  stop  supplies  entering  Germany  through  neutral 
countries  was  not  challenged."    (Notes  of  January  7and  February  io,  1915.) 

Again,  in  his  note  of  July  23,  1915: 

"  We  are  taking  the  utmost  care  not  to  interfere  with  commerce  genu- 
inely destined  for  or  proceeding  from  neutral  countries.  If  we  are  suc- 
cessful in  the  efforts  we  are  making  to  distinguish  between  the  commerce 
of  neutral  and  enemy  countries,  there  will  be  no  substantial  interference 
with  the  trade  of  neutral  ports,  except  in  so  far  as  they  constitute  ports 
of  access  to  and  exit  from  enemy  territory." 

The  German  government,  of  course,  bitterly  protested 
against  the  increases  in  the  list  of  absolute  contraband.  It 
was  joined  in  this  protest  by  the  neutrals,  especially  the 
United  States,  for  they,  too,  were  beginning  to  feel  the 


The  Blockade  and  the  Submarine  Offensive  375 

economic  pressure  of  the  British  sea  power.  Rubber,  cop- 
per, chemicals,  and,  finally,  cotton  and  wool  were  declared 
to  be  contraband,  and  each  Order  in  Council  brought  on  a 
storm  of  disapproval  which  was  followed  by  further  diffi- 
culties arising  from  efforts  to  smuggle  these  commodities 
to  the  Germans.  The  inclusion  of  mineral  oils  and  copper 
in  the  contraband  list  (October  31,  1914)  aroused  also  the 
powerful  industrial  interests  of  America  and  the  pressure 
they  brought  to  bear  upon  Congress  resulted  in  a  consider- 
able exchange  of  notes  between  the  Department  of  State 
and  the  British  government.  There  was  no  yielding  in 
principle,  however,  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain,  but  she 
consented  to  modify  certain  details  in  her  methods  of  ap- 
plying the  blockade  to  which  exception  had  been  taken. 

It  is  probable  that  sympathizers  with  the  German  cause 
played  a  very  considerable  part  in  the  agitation  in  America 
regarding  the  British  blockade.  At  any  rate,  it  appeared 
as  if  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
might  become  strained  on  the  question  of  neutral  trade 
and  the  examination  of  the  mails.  The  feeling  in  neutral 
countries,  however,  was  mild  in  comparison  with  that  in 
Germany.  The  force  of  sea  power  thus  continually  and 
inexorably  exerted  was  beginning  to  make  itself  felt  in  no 
uncertain  way,  and  the  German  leaders  were  seeking  some 
means  of  relieving  the  tension.  The  cry  of  " starvation  war  " 
was  raised  in  Germany  and  was  echoed  by  her  sympathizers 
in  neutral  countries.  Seeking  for  a  means  of  reply  to  British 
sea  power,  as  exerted  through  the  blockade,  Germany  found 
it  in  the  submarine,  the  potency  of  which  had  already  been 
revealed  in  a  most  startling  manner  by  the  sinking  of  British 
and  French  battleships  and  merchant  vessels. 

The  first  expression  of  a  policy  of  ruthless  submarine  war- 
fare came  from  High-admiral  von  Tirpitz,  who,  in  an  inter- 
view with  Karl  von  Wiegand,  a  newspaper  correspondent, 


376  The  Great  War 

December  2,  L914,  expressed  himself  as  follows:  "America 
has  not  raised  her  voice  in  protest  and  has  taken  little 
or  no  action  against  England's  closing  the  North  Sea 
to  neutral  shipping.  What  will  America  say  if  Germany 
declares  submarine  war  on  all  enemy  merchant  ships? 
Win  not?  England  wants  to  starve  us.  We  can  play  the 
same  game.  We  can  bottle  her  up  and  torpedo  every 
English  or  Allies'  ship  which  nears  any  harbor  in  Great 
Britain,  thereby  cutting  off  large  food  supplies." 

This  threat  on  the  part  of  the  famous  naval  leader  was 
destined  soon  to  be  realized,  for  on  February  4,  1915, 
Admiral  von  Pohl,  Chief  of  the  Admiralty  Staff  of  the 
German  Navy,  issued  a  statement  involving  a  new  form 
of  naval  warfare,  declaring  as  follows: 

"I.  The  waters  surrounding  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  including  the 
whole  English  Channel,  are  hereby  declared  to  be  war  zone.  On  and 
after  the  i8th  of  February,  19 15,  every  enemy  merchant  ship  found  in 
the  said  zone  will  be  destroyed  without  its  being  always  possible  to  avert 
the  dangers  threatening  the  crews  and  passengers  on  that  account. 

u  2.  Even  neutral  ships  are  exposed  to  danger  in  the  war  zone  as  in 
view  of  the  misuse  of  neutral  flags  ordered  on  January  31st  by  the  British 
Government  and  of  the  accidents  of  naval  war,  it  cannot  always  be  avoided 
to  strike  even  neutral  ships  in  attacks  that  are  directed  at  enemy  ships. 

"  3.  Northward  navigation  around  the  Shetland  Islands,  in  the  eastern 
waters  of  the  North  Sea  and  in  a  strip  of  not  less  than  30  miles  width 
along  the  Netherlands  coast,  is  in  no  danger." 

That  the  policy  outlined  in  this  proclamation  had  no 
foundation  in  international  law  is  tacitly  acknowledged  in 
the  accompanying  memorandum,  for  it  states  that  the  action 
is  taken  in  retaliation  for  the  British  blockade.  It  was,  in 
essence,  a  notification  to  the  world  that  German  submarines 
would  sink  enemy  and  neutral  vessels  under  conditions  that 
rendered  it  impossible  to  provide  for  the  safety  of  passen- 
gers and  crews.  This  announcement  brought  forth  the 
solemn  warning  from  the  American  government  (February 


The  Blockade  and  the  Submarine  Offensive  377 

10,  1915)  which  called  attention  to  the  possibility  of  the 
destruction  of  American  ships  and  the  endangering  of  lives 
of  citizens  of  the  United  States. 

The  doctrine  of  reprisals,  however,  is  one  that  can  be 
adopted  by  both  sides  in  a  controversy,  and  the  British 
government  soon  indicated  that  it  was  thoroughly  awake 
to  its  opportunities.  Hence,  on  March  1,  1915,  the  British 
Premier  made  a  statement  in  the  House  of  Commons  fore- 
shadowing a  still  more  rigid  application  of  the  blockade. 

Mr.  Asquith  said  in  substance: 

Germany  declares  that  enemy  ships  will  be  destroyed  and  neutral 
ships  exposed  to  danger — in  effect  a  claim  to  torpedo  at  sight,  without 
regard  for  safety  of  crew  and  passengers.  It  is  not  within  the  power  of 
the  German  Admiralty  to  maintain  any  surface  craft  within  these  waters, 
but  it  can  attack  only  by  means  of  submarines — a  method  of  warfare 
entirely  without  the  scope  of  any  of  the  international  instruments  regula- 
ting operations  against  commerce  in  time  of  war.  The  German  decla- 
ration substitutes  indiscriminate  destruction  for  regulated  capture.  Her 
opponents  are,  therefore,  driven  to  frame  retaliatory  measures  in  order,  in 
their  turn,  to  prevent  commodities  of  any  kind  from  reaching  or  leaving 
the  German  Empire.  These  measures  will,  however,  be  enforced  by  the 
British  and  the  French  governments  without  risk  to  neutral  ships  or  to  neu- 
tral or  non-combatant  lives,  and  with  strict  observance  of  the  dictates  of 
humanity.  The  British  and  the  French  governments  will,  therefore,  hold 
themselves  free  to  detain  and  take  into  port  ships  carrying  goods  of  presum- 
ably enemy  destination,  ownership,  or  origin.  It  is  not  intended  to  confis- 
cate such  vessels  or  cargoes  unless  they  be  otherwise  liable  to  confiscation. 

The  proclamation  of  a  new  blockade  policy  was  given 
effect  by  the  Order  in  Council,  March  11,  1915,  and  pub- 
lished in  the  Gazette,  March  15,  1915. 

Thus  was  the  Declaration  of  London  revoked,  condi- 
tional contraband  passed  out  of  existence,  and  economic  war 
between  the  Allies  and  the  Central  Powers  was  based  quite 
frankly  upon  the  doctrine  of  retaliation  or  reprisals.  This  is 
defined  in  international  law  as  one  of  the  modes  by  which  bel- 
ligerents obtain  redress  for  violations  of  the  laws  of  warfare. 


378  The  Great  War 

It  must  be  granted  that  the  purpose  of  Great  Britain  was 
to  starve  ( rermany  into  submission.  Any  endeavor  to  i 
this  is  a  childish  shutting  of  the  eyes  to  a  very  palpable  fact. 
Vet  the  blockade,  as  a  means  of  overcoming  the  enemy,  is 
universally  acknowledged  in  international  law  as  a  bellig- 
erent right,  and  it  must  also  be  granted  that  Great  Britain, 
even  in  her  abrogation  of  the  Declaration  of  London,  has 
never  departed  from  the  principle  of  the  blockade;  the 
abuses  complained  of  against  her  were  against  property  and 
things,  not  against  human  lives,  especially  the  lives  of  neu- 
tral non-combatants.  The  pressure  brought  to  bear  upon 
the  German  civil  population  was  indeed  distressing  from 
the  higher  and  absolutely  humanitarian  point  of  view,  but 
according  to  the  doctrine  of  war  as  taught  by  German 
military  thinkers  it  was  but  an  unfortunate  result  of  bellig- 
erency, and  one  that  Germany  would  undoubtedly  have 
inflicted  upon  Great  Britain  had  it  been  in  her  power. 

Nor  could  the  United  States  government  offer  a  protest 
grounded  in  international  law,  for  one  of  the  precedents 
offered  by  Great  Britain  in  justification  of  the  blockade  was 
the  action  of  the  Federal  government  against  the  Southern 
Confederacy  and  the  capture  and  confiscation  of  blockade- 
runners.  The  legality  of  these  seizures  was  adjudicated  by 
the  Supreme  Court  (Cases  of  The  Circassian  and  The  Admiral) . 

From  the  viewpoint  of  naval  strategy,  the  British  block- 
ade of  Germany  differs  in  scope  and  character  from 
previous  operations  of  the  kind.  Writers  on  naval  science 
distinguish  two  classes  of  blockade,  the  military  and  the 
commercial,  the  former  consisting  of  shutting  up  the 
enemy  battle  fleet  in  its  harbor,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Spanish 
fleet  at  Santiago ;  the  latter,  the  suppression  of  the  maritime 
commerce  of  a  port  or  of  an  enemy  as  a  whole,  as  was 
exemplified  by  the  blockade  of  the  Southern  States.  In 
reality,  however,  such  distinction  is  difficult  to  make,  for 


The  Blockade  and  the  Submarine  Offensive  379 

in  general  a  blockade,  if  effective,  accomplishes  both  ob- 
jects at  the  same  time.  It,  therefore,  becomes  a  question  of 
which  phase  is  relatively  more  important,  the  military  or 
the  commercial.  In  the  case  of  the  British  blockade, 
judging  from  the  situation,  it  would  appear  that  the  com- 
mercial phase  is  the  primary  and  the  enemy  fleet  the 
secondary  consideration.  The  latter,  so  long  as  it  main- 
tains its  position  in  its  bases,  is  as  effectually  negatived  as  it 
would  be  if  destroyed.  It  is  true,  that  as  a  ''fleet  in  being" 
it  constitutes  a  menace;  the  British  command  of  the  sea  is 
only  relative  until  it  is  destroyed,  yet  until  it  on  its  part 
defeats  the  British  naval  forces  it  is  powerless  to  unclasp 
the  strangle-hold  of  British  sea  power. 

That  the  protection  of  British  commerce,  and,  inversely, 
the  suppression  of  that  of  the  enemy  is  the  main  objective 
of  the  British  fleet  is  indicated  in  a  memorandum  drawn 
up  by  Admiral  Sir  Arthur  Wilson,  First  Sea  Lord  in  1910, 
in  which  he  stated  that  the  real  danger  for  Great  Britain  to 
guard  against  was  not  invasion  but  the  destruction  of  her 
merchant  shipping,  hence,  the  main  object  of  the  British 
fleet  was  to  prevent  any  ship  of  the  enemy  from  getting  to 
sea  far  enough  to  do  any  mischief. 

A  blockade  is  necessarily  determined  by  geographic 
conditions, — a  coast  is  assumed  with  ports  used  by  the  ves- 
sels of  the  enemy.  But  national  maritime  frontiers  differ, 
hence,  the  nature  of  each  blockade  will  differ  according  to 
the  geographic  problems  presented.  It  would  be  easier 
to  blockade  a  harbor  with  a  small  entrance  than  one  with 
a  very  wide  one;  easier  to  shut  out  the  commerce  of  a 
country,  like  Germany,  whose  shores  lie  upon  enclosed 
seas,  such  as  the  Baltic  and  the  North  Sea,  than  that  of  the 
United  States  with  great  coast-lines  on  two  oceans. 

Geographic  conditions,  therefore,  were  ideal  for  the 
establishment  of  a  blockade  such  as  that  of  Great  Britain 


380  The  Great  War 

against  the  German  Empire.  The  position  of  the  British 
Islands  has  also  been  of  tremendous  advantage.  Great 
Britain's  excellent  eastern  ports  have  permitted  her  to 
establish  bases  at  strategic  points,  and  by  closing  the  English 
Channel  at  the  south  and  the  passage  at  the  north,  between 
Scotland  and  Norway,  she  has  bottled  up  the  German  navy 
as  effectually,  as  far  as  it  might  affect  Allied  communica- 
tions or  come  to  the  aid  of  the  German  colonies,  as  if  each 
German  port  were  surrounded  by  a  cordon  of  battleships. 
It  is  true  that  the  submarines  have  been  able  to  elude  their 
enemies  and  do  an  enormous  amount  of  damage,  but  they 
have  not  been  able  to  impair  British  naval  supremacy  to  a 
serious  degree.  It  is  also  true  that  the  German  fleet  has  a 
certain  freedom  of  action  within  the  North  Sea  itself,  yet 
there  is  a  strategic  justification  for  this,  as  one  of  the  ob- 
jectives of  the  British  navy  is  to  bring  the  German  fleet  to 
battle  and  defeat  it  if  possible,  a  thing  presenting  almost 
insuperable  difficulties  as  long  as  the  latter  remains  within 
the  protection  of  its  coast  defenses.  The  chances  would 
be  reversed  if  the  German  fleet  could  be  met  on  the  open 
sea,  for  in  that  case  the  overwhelming  superiority  of  the 
British  fleet  might  prove  decisive. 

The  maritime  strategy  of  Great  Britain  has  been  severely 
criticised  by  its  own  press  as  being  unworthy  of  the  highest 
traditions  of  the  navy  of  Hawke,  Rodney,  and  Nelson.  Ad- 
miral Beresford  in  the  House  of  Lords  made  the  statement 
that  if  the  navy  had  been  given  a  free  hand  the  war  would 
have  been  over  in  eighteen  months.  But  it  must  be 
admitted  that  the  land  and  sea  operations  of  the  British 
Empire  are  interrelated  and  the  blockade  has  permitted 
the  mobilization  of  an  army  without  risking  the  fleet  itself. 
Vastly  more  rapid  and  sensational  results  might  be  obtained 
by  an  attack  on  the  German  fleet  in  its  bases,  providing  it 
were  destroyed,  but  what  if  the  British  fleet  suffered  an 


The  Blockade  and  the  Submarine  Offensive  381 

equal  fate  ?  The  Dardanelles  affair  supplied  some  very  im- 
portant information  on  that  subject  which  was  soon  to  be 
emphasized  by  the  Battle  of  Jutland  in  the  open  sea.  The 
British  navy  has  "played  safe,"  as  it  was  perfectly  justified 
in  doing,  and  the  ultimate  result  of  this  policy,  if  slower,  is 
certainly  more  sure,  for  upon  it  more  than  any  other  one 
influence  will  depend  Germany's  defeat  on  land. 

Prince  von  Biilow  in  his  Deutsche  Politik  states  that  the 
British  fleet  is  manacled  in  the  North  Sea  and  cannot  reach 
the  submarines ;  hence,  for  the  first  time  in  a  hundred  years 
is  the  British  command  of  the  sea  disputed.  This  assertion 
is  true  up  to  a  certain  point,  for  the  Germans  can  organize 
raids  of  fast  vessels  against  British  ports,  can  attack  indi- 
vidual units  of  the  navy  and  enemy  and  neutral  merchant 
fleets,  and  also,  owing  to  the  fact  that  when  the  Belgian 
army  retired  from  Zeebrugge  and  Ostend  these  harbors 
were  left  intact  and  the  Germans  have  been  able  to  use  them 
as  new  and  very  dangerous  submarine  bases;  yet  to  say  that 
these  operations  have  broken  the  Allied  sea  power  is  to 
make  a  statement  that  events  have  apparently  not  verified. 

As  has  already  been  suggested,  it  was  the  recognition  of 
this  very  fact  that  determined  Germany  to  undertake  a 
new  onslaught  on  the  laws  of  so-called  civilized  warfare, 
throwing  aside  all  those  restrictions  upon  absolute  lawless- 
ness on  the  part  of  belligerents  that  humanitarian  instincts 
have  exacted.  Germany  now  proposed  to  make  another 
experiment  of  this  kind  and,  therefore,  declared  war  on 
every  nation  that  was  not  actively  on  her  side.  With  the 
advent  of  ruthless  submarine  warfare  the  principle  of  neu- 
trality disappeared  in  a  twinkling. 

It  was  the  resort  of  desperation.  Its  proximate  result  was 
the  aligning  of  some  fifteen  neutral  powers,  including  the 
United  States,  on  the  side  of  the  Allies,  and  its  ultimate  result 
is  conceivably  not  only  the  defeat  of  German  Weltpolitik  but 


382  The  Great  War 

also  the  establishment  of  such  restrictions  upon  Germany  in 
the  peace  arrangements  that  her  rehabilitation  among  world 

powers  will  he  deferred  for  decades,  perhaps  generations. 

What  was  it  that  Germany  hoped  to  gain  by  the  adop- 
tion of  this  policy,  and  what  was  her  justification?  The 
main  objective,  of  course,  was  the  stoppage  of  men  and 
supplies  to  the  Allied  forces  and  to  compel  Great  Britain 
to  relax  the  pressure  of  her  blockade.  These  ends  were  to 
he  achieved  not  only  through  the  destruction  of  ships  of  the 
Allies  but  also  by  the  methods  adopted  in  their  destruction. 
It  was  clearly  Germany's  policy  to  establish  such  a  reign  of 
terror  on  the  sea  that  the  morale  of  British  and  neutral  sea- 
men would  be  so  broken  down  that  all  shipping  would 
disappear  from  the  seas.  This  plan  was  not  a  bad  one,  and 
had  it  not  been  for  a  certain  streak  of  obstinacy  in  the 
British  and  their  Allies  it  might  have  met  with  better 
success.  The  immediate  result,  therefore,  was  that  the 
challenge  of  Germany  was  accepted,  the  blockade  was 
still  more  rigidly  applied  under  the  doctrine  of  reprisals 
and  the  Allies'  fleets  set  to  work  to  hunt  submarines. 

Germany's  justification,  as  stated  in  Admiral  von  Pohl's 
manifesto,  was  that  Great  Britain  had  instituted  a  "starva- 
tion war"  by  means  of  her  blockade,  had  armed  her  mer- 
chantmen, and  had  flown  neutral  flags  over  her  ships  in 
order  to  give  them  immunity  from  attack.  In  addition, 
she  had  abrogated  the  Declaration  of  London  and  closed  the 
North  Sea  to  neutral  trade.  "The  starvation  war  is  the  most 
serious  violation  of  the  rights  of  nations,  which  will  be 
indignantly  condemned  by  neutral  states." — (Vthma  Frem- 
denblatt.)  The  armed  merchantmen,  in  spite  of  the  fact  of 
their  admitted  right  to  defend  themselves  if  they  saw  fit  to 
run  the  risk,  were  called  pirates,  and  threats  were  made  to 
treat  them  as  such,  and,  in  spite  of  the  German  official  memo- 
randum of  February  11,  1916,  to  the  effect  that  the  crews 


The  Blockade  and  the  Submarine  Offensive  383 

of  armed  merchantmen  were  to  be  treated  as  prisoners  of 
war,  a  captain  of  an  English  merchant  vessel,  Captain  Charles 
Fryatt,  was  put  to  death  (July  28,  1916)  on  these  grounds. 

The  instrument  that  Germany  selected  to  accomplish 
her  ends  was  comparatively  untried  in  modern  warfare, 
and  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War  had  found 
little  favor  in  the  minds  of  the  naval  leaders  in  Germany. 
In  1911  Admiral  von  Tirpitz  asserted  that  submarines  were 
still  in  the  experimental  stage  of  their  development  and 
that  the  German  government  was  not  at  all  convinced  that 
they  would  form  an  essential  or  conspicuous  part  in  future 
naval  programmes.  This  statement  might  be  considered  a 
form  of  camouflage  destined  to  mislead  other  naval  powers, 
did  we  not  know  that  Germany's  submarine  flotilla  was 
relatively  insignificant  at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  The 
German  Admiralty  is  very  reticent  regarding  naval  con- 
structions, but  there  is  every  reason  for  believing  that  the 
following  statement  formulated  by  the  British  Admiralty 
gives  with  substantial  accuracy  the  submarines  available  in 
Germany  during  1914:  24  submarines  in  service,  14  sub- 
marines in  construction,  8  submarines  to  be  finished  in  1914, 
6  (Nos.  33-38)  commenced  in  1913,  5  under  construction 
for  Austria,  1  under  construction  for  Norway,  or  38  in 
commission  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. — (Laubeuf,  Sous- 
mar  ins  et  submersibles.) 

The  first  German  submarine,  the  U 1  (Untersee-boot  1), 
was  launched  August  30,  1905,  at  the  Krupp-Germania 
shipbuilding  plant  and  was  constructed  wholly  upon 
French  models. 

There  is  a  group  of  men  among  the  naval  leaders  of  the 
various  countries  who  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  sub- 
marine marks  the  end  of  the  battleship.  It  was  only  two 
months  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  that  Admiral  Sir 
Percy  Scott,  Great  Britain's  greatest  expert  in  naval  gunnery, 


384  The  Great  War 

announced  in  The  Times  (June  6,  1914)  that  the  submarine 
had  superseded  all  other  craft  save  light  cruisers  and  aero- 
planes.    I  lis  argument  was  as  follows: 

"  The  submarine  causes  to  disappear  three  out  of  five  of  the  functions, 
defensive  and  offensive,  of  a  vessel  of  war — i.  c,  port  bombardment,  block- 
ade, and  convoy  of  a  landing  party,  or  the  prevention  of  all  three — as  no 
man-of-war  will  dare  to  come  even  within  sight  of  a  coast  that  is  ade- 
quately  protected  by  submarines.  The  fourth  function  of  a  battleship  is 
to  attack  an  enemy's  fleet,  but  there  will  be  no  fleet  to  attack,  as  it  will 
not  be  safe  for  a  fleet  to  put  to  sea.  The  fifth  function  is  to  attack 
an  enemy's  commerce  or  to  prevent  attack  on  our  own. 

"If  by  submarines  we  close  egress  from  the  North  Sea  and  Mediter- 
ranean, it  is  difficult  to  see  how  our  commerce  can  be  much  interfered 
with.  Submarines  and  aeroplanes  have  entirely  revolutionized  naval  war- 
fare, no  fleet  can  hide  itself  from  the  aeroplane  eye,  and  the  submarine 
can  deliver  a  deadly  attack  even  in  broad  daylight.  .  .  .  Naval  officers 
of  the  future  will,  therefore,  live  either  above  the  sea  or  under  it.  It  will  be 
a  navy  of  youth,  for  we  shall  require  nothing  but  boldness  and  daring.  .   .   . 

"  What  we  require  is  an  enormous  fleet  of  submarines,  airships,  and 
aeroplanes,  and  a  few  fast  cruisers,  provided  we  can  find  a  place  to  keep 
them  in  safety  during  war  time." 

Hardly  less  emphatic  is  Rear-admiral  Degouy,  a  distin- 
guished officer  of  the  French  navy,  who  says : 

"We  have  allowed  ourselves,  through  false  conceptions  as  much  as 
through  timidity,  to  be  led  into  a  reactionary  policy  regarding  our  sub- 
marine fleet.  Let  us  not,  to-day,  vaguely  dwell  upon  the  responsibilities 
of  others,  and  let  us  ignore  the  past  in  order  to  fix  our  attention  upon  the 
future.  Let  us  construct  submarines  and  hurry  up  about  it !  Who  knows 
how  much  service  they  will  render  in  this  war?" — {La  Guerre  Navale  et 
V  Offensive,  19 17.) 

Yet  Admiral  Degouy  does  not  admit  the  supremacy  of  the 
submarine  in  the  present  conflict,  for  he  says,  in  his  preface : 

"For  it  is  not  truly  possible  for  us  to  admit  that  the  submarine  block- 
ade will  ever,  through  hunger,  force  the  Allies  to  throw  down  their  arms." 

The  proponents  for  the  battleship  are  equally  assured 
that  the  dreadnought  is  destined  for  no  such  ignoble  fate. 
To  them,  "The  cornerstone  of  naval  power  is  the  gun; 


Smoke  screen  evolutions.      Torpedo  boat  destroyers  practising  screening  of  convoy  by  means  of 
smoke,  which  is  gi'ven  off  by  the  oil  burners  under  the  boilers. 


The  Blockade  and  the  Submarine  Offensive  385 

and  the  measure  of  a  nation's  sea  power  is  the  strength  of 
her  battleship  fleet." — (Gill,  Naval  Power  in  the  War,  1918.) 
Such  is  the  position  also  of  Bernotti,  one  of  the  best  known 
among  Italian  writers  on  naval  science,  but  he  is  not  so  as- 
sured regarding  the  future  of  the  battleship,  for  he  says: 
"Of  the  two  types  of  armored  ships — the  battle-cruiser  and 
the  dreadnought — it  is  the  former  whose  future  must  be 
considered  more  secure." — (Previsioni  e  Realta  nella  Guerra 
Marittima. — Revista  Marittima,  Agosta,  1917.) 

At  any  rate  the  submarine  is  recognized  as  a  very  real 
menace,  and  in  the  hand  of  the  Germans  it  has  given  the 
Allied  Powers  some  moments  of  lively  concern.  Because 
of  its  limitations,  being  unable  to  bring  its  captures  into 
port,  or  supply  them  with  prize-crews,  or,  in  case  it  be- 
came necessary  to  sink  them,  it  could  not  provide  for  the 
safety  of  passengers  and  crew,  the  submarine  could  not  be 
used  under  the  restrictions  prescribed  by  international  law, 
but  Germany  insisted  upon  so  using  it.  The  Allied  navies 
were  confronted  by  a  condition,  not  a  hypothesis. 

Germany's  submarine  offensive  falls  into  three  distinct 
phases:  1.  During  the  earlier  months  of  the  war  when,  in 
general,  she  used  it  legitimately  and  in  consonance  with 
the  laws  of  war;  2.  When  she  instituted  a  submarine  reign 
of  terror,  during  which  the  Lusitania  and  other  great 
passenger  vessels  were  sunk  for  a  psychological  effect; 
3.  When  failing  to  destroy  Ally  morale,  she  determinedly 
went  to  work  to  sink  everything  she  could. 

It  has  been  said  that  submarine  warfare  is  one  of  the 
improvisations  of  the  war.  This  would  appear  to  be  true, 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  earlier  operations  of  the  sub- 
marines were  relatively  legitimate,  and  evidence  seems  to 
justify  the  conclusion  that  Germany  had  not  planned  to 
use  this  instrument  in  the  manner  later  adopted.  Its  earlier 
successes  in  sinking  the  Pathfinder  (September  5,  1914)  and 


386  The  Great  War 

the  remarkable  exploit  of  Lieutenant-commander  Wed- 
digen  of  the  (/  9  in  destroying  three  British  cruisers,  the 
Cressy,  Hogtie,  and  Aboukir,  during  one  attack  (September 
22,  1914)  perhaps  gave  a  clue  to  the  German  Admiralty 
regarding  a  mode  of  combating  the  British  blockade.  Ad- 
miral von  Tirpitz's  statement,  already  referred  to,  and  other 
premonitory  activities  indicated  that  Germany  was  develop- 
ing a  new  form  of  attack  on  the  rules  governing  warfare. 

The  proclamation  of  Admiral  von  Pohl  (February  4, 
1915)  was  the  first  official  statement  of  Germany's  cam- 
paign of  lawless  submarine  operations.  The  fact  that  the 
policy  of  sinking  at  sight  would  not  permit  any  adjudica- 
tion of  the  innocence  of  the  vessel  and  cargo,  and  would 
submit  passengers  and  other  non-combatants  to  the  ordeal 
of  battle  was  of  minor  consequence.  Germany  was  mak- 
ing international  law  to  suit  herself. 

This  was  a  stroke  against  the  rights  of  neutrals  that  the 
United  States,  the  most  important  nation  not  involved  in 
the  war,  could  not  afford  to  ignore.  Hence,  even  while 
she  was  endeavoring  to  persuade  Great  Britain  to  modify 
her  blockade  methods,  she  was  no  less  interested  in 
Germany's  threat  to  endanger  neutral  property  and  lives. 
It  was  to  this  effect,  therefore,  that  Secretary  Bryan  issued 
the  warning  of  February  10,  1915 : 

"  It  is,  of  course,  not  necessary  to  remind  the  German  Government  that 
the  sole  right  of  a  belligerent  in  dealing  with  neutral  vessels  on  the  high 
seas  is  limited  to  visit  and  search,  unless  a  blockade  is  proclaimed  and 
effectively  maintained,  which  this  Government  does  not  understand  to  be 
proposed  in  this  case.  To  declare  or  exercise  a  right  to  attack  and 
destroy  any  vessel  entering  a  prescribed  area  of  the  high  seas  without  first 
certainly  determining  its  belligerent  nationality  and  the  contraband  char- 
acter of  its  cargo  would  be  an  act  so  unprecedented  in  naval  warfare  that 
this  Government  is  reluctant  to  believe  that  the  Imperial  Government  of 
Germany  in  this  case  contemplates  it  as  possible.    .    .    . 

"If  such  a  deplorable  situation  should  arise,  the  Imperial  German 
Government  can  readily  appreciate  that  the  Government  of  the  United 


The  Blockade  and  the  Submarine  Offensive  387 

States  would  be  constrained  to  hold  the  Imperial  German  Government  to 
a  strict  accountability  for  such  acts  of  their  naval  authorities  and  to  take 
any  steps  it  might  be  necessary  to  take  to  safeguard  American  lives  and 
property  and  to  secure  to  American  citizens  the  full  enjoyment  of  their 
acknowledged  rights  on  the  high  seas." 

On  February  20,  1915,  in  an  endeavor  to  establish  a  modus 
vivendi  that  would  be  satisfactory  to  neutrals  as  well  as 
belligerents,  Secretary  Bryan  addressed  a  note  to  Germany 
and  Great  Britain  proposing  that  foodstuffs  might  be 
allowed  to  enter  Germany  for  the  sole  use  of  non-com- 
batants, and  restrictions  were  to  be  laid  upon  the  use  of 
mines,  the  use  of  neutral  flags  to  be  abandoned,  and  the  rules 
of  international  law  respecting  visit  and  search  to  be  obeyed 
by  submarine  commanders.  This  was  refused  by  Great 
Britain  on  the  basis  that  it  would  not  improve  the  situation, 
and  by  Germany  as  it  did  not  cause  a  sufficient  relaxation 
of  the  blockade  nor  did  it  permit  the  importation  of  raw 
materials,  of  which  she  was  in  great  need.  The  American 
effort  to  establish  a  compromise  was  thus  a  failure  and  the 
issue  was  squarely  met  by  the  issuance  of  the  British  Order 
in  Council  of  March  15,  1915. 

The  adoption  of  the  policy  of  ruthless  submarine  war- 
fare was  a  victory  for  the  militarist  elements  in  the  German 
Empire,  but  their  triumph  was  not  gained  without  oppo- 
sition. There  is  no  doubt  that  the  German  Chancellor, 
von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  and  perhaps  Emperor  William 
himself,  opposed  such  methods  of  extremism,  and  for  a 
while  the  decision  hung  trembling  in  the  balance.  The 
issue  apparently  turned  upon  the  question,  would  it  pay  ? 
]  The  German  Admiralty  stated  most  emphatically  that  it 
/  would.  "Give  us  three  months,"  they  said,  "and  we  will 
bring  England  to  her  knees." 

That  America  would  not  tamely  submit  to  such  a  rever- 
sion to  barbarism  was  well-known  to  the  German  leaders, 


388  The  Great  War 

but  they  acted  upon  the  presumption  that  the  many 
German  sympathizers  in  the  United  States  would  tend  to 
encourage  a  temporizing  policy,  or,  even  in  case  of  a  bel- 
ligerent attitude  on  the  part  of  America,  they  assumed  that 
she  was  not  sufficiently  prepared  to  be  a  disturbing  factor 
before  the  realization  of  the  German  aims.  Such  appar- 
ently was  the  decision  made,  for  the  German  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs  in  a  note,  February  16,  1915,  while  admit- 
ting that  the  methods  proposed  might  work  to  the  injury 
of  neutrals,  insisted  upon  carrying  them  out  unless  the 
United  States  intervened  to  force  Great  Britain  to  relax 
the  blockade.  The  use  of  neutral,  particularly  the  United 
States,  flags  by  British  ships  was  again  referred  to,  and  the 
demand  was  made  that  Great  Britain  be  required  to  con- 
form to  the  provisions  of  the  Declaration  of  London. 
The  American  government  was  also  asked  to  prevent  its 
merchant  vessels  from  entering  the  British  seat  of  mari- 
time war  lest  they  be  subjected  to  injury. 

The  attitude  of  President  Wilson  from  the  beginning  of 
the  war  had  been  one  of  consistent  neutrality.  Through- 
out the  controversies  with  Great  Britain  and  Germany  he 
had  insisted  upon  separating  the  issues  which  the  German 
government  endeavored  in  every  way  to  confuse.  America 
had  very  just  complaints  against  Great  Britain,  but  the 
United  States  preferred  to  settle  that  matter  directly  with 
Great  Britain.  President  Wilson  saw  clearly  that  for  him 
to  bind  the  government  of  the  United  States  to  a  promise 
to  coerce  Great  Britain  into  a  change  of  policy  regarding 
Germany  would,  in  itself,  have  constituted  an  unneutral  act. 

Thus,  for  the  time  being,  the  diplomatic  memoranda 
shuttled  back  and  forth,  yet,  as  the  submarine  sinkings 
grew  more  and  more  numerous  and  more  inhumane,  the 
controversy  with  Great  Britain  became  less  and  less  impor- 
tant in  comparison  with  the  larger  question  of  whether 


The  Blockade  and  the  Submarine  Offensive  389 

Germany  could  apply  her  doctrine  of  frightfulness  to  neutral 
nations  trading  on  the  high  seas.  It  was  an  issue  that  con- 
cerned the  lives  of  American  citizens  who  were  engaged  in 
exercising  the  rights  of  trade  granted  neutrals  from  imme- 
morial times.  It  was  Germany's  duty  as  a  belligerent  to 
break  the  British  blockade,  not  that  of  the  United  States, 
even  though  Great  Britain  had  departed  from  the  rules  for 
maritime  war  she  had  adopted  on  her  own  initiative.  That 
such  attitude  on  the  part  of  America  had  the  effect  of  aiding 
the  Allies  was  one  of  the  chances  and  decisions  of  the  mili- 
tary situation.  There  is  no  reason  for  assuming  that  Ger- 
many would  not  have  benefited  equally  from  American 
trade  could  it  have  been  directed  towards  her.  In  fact,  there  j 
can  be  no  doubt  that  she  did  receive  a  considerable  per- 
centage of  American  commerce  through  neutral  countries 
and  by  various  indirect  means.  The  benefits  adhering  to 
the  Allies  was  a  by-product  and  could  not  be  avoided 
unless  America  departed  from  the  attitude  of  strict  neu- 
trality and  favored  Germany.  The  further  alternative  of 
foregoing  her  European  commerce  entirely  was  unthink- 
able. It  would  have  constituted  a  sweeping  abandonment 
of  all  neutral  rights  with,  doubtless,  little  advantage  to  the 
situation  of  America. 

President  Wilson  endeavored  to  solve  the  submarine 
problem  by  diplomacy,  and  his  failure  to  do  so  cannot 
close  our  eyes  to  the  brilliancy  of  his  effort,  for  it  must 
be  confessed  that  the  situation  presented  difficulties  that 
only  the  highest  statesmanship  could  meet.  The  relations 
of  the  United  States  with  Germany  constitute  a  drama,  with 
numberless  acts,  each  with  its  particular  climax  or  crisis,  all 
tending  inexorably  towards  the  final  catastrophe  of  war. 

The  first  of  these  acts  was  the  destruction  of  the  Elder- 
Dempster  liner  Falaba,  which  sailed  from  Liverpool, 
Saturday  evening,  March  27,  1915.     On  board  were  140 


390  The  Great  War 

passengers  and  a  crew  of  100  men.  She  was  halted  in 
St.  George's  Channel,  off  the  coast  of  Pembrokeshire,  by 
a  ( rerman  submarine,  which  tired  a  torpedo  while  the  life- 
boats were  being  launched.  Sixty-three  passengers  and 
forty-three  of  the  crew  were  killed,  among  the  former  an 
American  citizen,  Leon  C.  Thrasher,  an  engineer,  who  was 
returning  home  after  a  year's  absence  in  British  West  Africa. 

One  after  another  the  episodes  in  this  drama  of  nations 
followed  in  rapid  succession,  each  creating  diplomatic 
interchanges  that  ended  nowhere.  Thus,  on  March  10, 
1915,  the  German  cruiser  Prinz  Eitel  Friedrich  berthed  in 
Norfolk  harbor  and  interned  herself  after  a  career  of 
depredation  on  the  high  seas,  during  which  she  had  sunk 
an  American  vessel,  the  Wm.  P.  Frye  (January  28,  1915). 
A  claim  for  indemnity  was  instituted  by  the  Department 
of  State,  March  31,  1915,  which  was  denied  by  von  Jagow, 
the  German  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  (April  5,  1915) 
the  controversy  dragging  along  until  Secretary  Lansing 
(August  10,  1915)  proposed  that  the  question  be  settled  by 
a  court  of  arbitration,  pursuant  to  Article  38  of  The  Hague 
Convention  (1907). 

The  next  act  was  the  sinking  of  an  American  vessel,  the 
dishing,  by  an  aeroplane  (April  28th),  followed  by  the  tor- 
pedoing of  the  American  tanker  Gulflight  (May  1st),  finally 
culminating  in  the  crowning  deed  of  German  Schrecklichkeit, 
the  destruction  of  the  Lusitania  (May  7,  1915). 

Those  who  thought  that  there  was  a  limit  to  Germany's 
plan  to  terrorize  the  seas  received  a  rude  awakening  on 
May  8th,  when  the  morning  papers  announced  the  loss  of 
the  great  Cunard  steamer  on  the  day  before.  That  she 
was  marked  for  destruction  the  world  had  been  advised  by 
notices  inserted  in  the  daily  press  on  May  1st,  signed  by  the 
German  Ambassador  himself,  warning  American  citizens 
from  taking  passage.     She  sailed,  however,  with  1978  souls 


The  Blockade  and  the  Submarine  Offensive  391 

on  board,  and  had  arrived  off  the  coast  of  Ireland,  when 
she  was  struck  by  two  torpedoes,  fired  by  an  unseen  sub- 
marine. Owing  to  the  list  of  the  great  40,000-ton  vessel, 
the  lifeboats  on  one  side  could  not  be  launched,  hence, 
many  lives  were  lost,  due  to  the  impossibility  of  accom- 
modating all  who  had  leaped  from  the  sinking  vessel. 

The  sinking  of  these  vessels  and  the  loss  of  American  lives 
resulted  in  the  note  of  Secretary  Bryan  of  May  13,  1915, 
in  the  course  of  which  he  said : 

"  The  Government  of  the  United  States,  therefore,  desires  to  call  the 
attention  of  the  Imperial  German  Government  with  the  utmost  earnest- 
ness to  the  fact  that  the  objection  to  their  present  method  of  attack  against 
the  trade  of  their  enemies  lies  in  the  practical  impossibility  of  employing 
submarines  in  the  destruction  of  commerce  without  disregarding  those 
rules  of  fairness,  reason,  justice,  and  humanity  which  all  modern  opinion 
regards  as  imperative.    .    .    . 

"American  citizens  act  within  their  indisputable  rights  in  taking  their 
ships  and  in  traveling  wherever  their  legitimate  business  calls  them  upon 
the  high  seas,  and  exercise  those  rights  in  what  should  be  the  well-justified 
confidence  that  their  lives  will  not  be  endangered  by  acts  done  in  clear 
violation  of  universally  acknowledged  international  obligations,  and  cer- 
tainly in  the  confidence  that  their  own  Government  will  sustain  them  in 
the  exercise  of  their  rights. 

41  There  was  recently  published  in  the  newspapers  of  the  United  States, 
I  regret  to  inform  the  Imperial  German  Government,  a  formal  warning, 
purporting  to  come  from  the  Imperial  German  Embassy  at  Washington, 
addressed  to  the  people  of  the  United  States,  and  stating,  in  effect,  that 
any  citizen  of  the  United  States  who  exercised  his  right  of  free  travel 
upon  the  seas  would  do  so  at  his  peril  if  his  journey  should  take  him 
within  the  zone  of  waters  within  which  the  Imperial  German  Navy  was 
using  submarines  against  the  commerce  of  Great  Britain  and  France, 
notwithstanding  the  respectful  but  very  earnest  protest  of  his  Govern- 
ment, the  Government  of  the  United  States.  I  do  not  refer  to  this  for 
the  purpose  of  calling  the  attention  of  the  Imperial  German  Government 
at  this  time  to  the  surprising  irregularity  of  a  communication  from  the 
Imperial  German  Embassy  at  Washington  addressed  to  the  people  of  the 
United  States  through  the  newspapers,  but  only  for  the  purpose  of  point- 
ing out  that  no  warning  that  an  unlawful  inhuman  act  will  be  committed 
can  possibly  be  accepted  as  an  excuse  or  palliation  for  that  act  or  as  an 
abatement  of  the  responsibility  for  its  commission.     .    .    . 


392  The  Great  War 

" Expressions  of  regrel  and  offers  of  reparation  in  case  of  the  destruc- 
tion of  neutral  ships  sunk  by  mistake,  while  they  may  satisfy  international 
obligations,  if  no  loss  of  life  results,  cannot  justify  or  excuse  a  practice, 
the  natural  and  necessary  effect  of  which  is  to  subject  neutral  nations  and 
neutral  persons  to  new  and  immeasurable  risks." 

The  third  American  note  on  the  Lusitania  case  (July  21, 
1915)  was  in  no  wise  a  settlement,  yet  it  was  believed  that 
( Jermany  would  abstain  from  similar  activities.  Germany's 
reply  was  the  sinking  of  the  Arabic  on  August  19,  1915. 
The  Arabic  had  sailed  from  Liverpool,  on  the  way  to  New 
York,  hence  could  not  have  been  carrying  contraband. 
Thirty  lives  were  lost,  including  two  Americans.  The  Ger- 
man reply  to  the  American  protest  was  to  the  effect  that 
the  attack  was  justified  as  the  Arabic  attempted  to  ram  the 
submarine  which  was  operating  against  another  vessel,  the 
Duns  ley.  This  was  denied  by  survivors  of  the  Arabic,  and 
all  evidence  supported  their  denial. 

The  sinking  of  the  Arabic  brought  on  another  crisis  in 
the  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Germany.  The 
President  apparently  took  the  attitude  that  all  controversy  had 
been  closed  with  the  final  Lusitania  note  and  nothing  further 
could  be  attained  by  diplomacy.  If  Germany  persisted  in 
committing  acts  defined  by  him  as  unfriendly,  no  other  in- 
terpretation could  be  placed  upon  them  save  that  she  was 
willing  to  run  the  risk  of  war  with  America  rather  than  yield. 

Germany,  however,  was  not  willing  at  this  moment. 
Warned  by  the  hostile  spirit  of  American  public  opinion, 
the  German  Ambassador  made  the  following  statement  to 
the  Secretary  of  State,  which  was,  in  fact,  a  direct  appeal 
to  the  American  people : 

"So  far  no  official  information  about  the  sinking  of  the  Arabic  is  avail- 
able. The  Imperial  Government  trusts  that  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  will  not  take  a  definite  stand  after  only  hearing  the  reports 
coming  from  one  side,  which,  according  to  the  opinion  of  my  Government, 
cannot   possibly  correspond   with  the   facts,  but   will  give   the    Imperial 


The  Blockade  and  the  Submarine  Offensive  393 

Government  a  chance  to  be  heard  equally.  Although  my  Government 
does  not  doubt  the  good  faith  of  the  witnesses  whose  statements  have 
been  published  by  the  newspapers  in  Europe,  my  Government  thinks  that 
it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  such  statements  have  naturally  been  made 
in  great  excitement  which  might  easily  produce  a  wrong  impression.  In 
case  Americans  should  actually  have  lost  their  lives  this  would  naturally  be 
contrary  to  the  intention  of  the  German  Government,  who  would  deeply 
regret  this  fact  and  has  instructed  me  to  extend  its  sincerest  sympathy  to 
the  Government  of  the  United  States." 

This  was  apparently  a  concession  to  those  in  Germany 
who  still  believed  that  it  was  desirable  to  keep  at  peace 
with  the  United  States.  That  von  Tirpitz  and  other  ex- 
tremists did  not  propose  to  be  guided  by  it  was  evident,  for 
they  continued  their  efforts  in  favor  of  unrestricted  sinking 
of  merchant  vessels.  The  destruction  of  the  Ancona  in  the 
Mediterranean  (November  10,  1915)  by  an  Austrian  sub- 
marine, which  was  partly  disavowed,  and  that  of  the  Persia 
by  a  German  U-boat  (December  30,  1915)  in  which  an 
American  consular  officer,  R.  M.  McNeely,  was  killed, 
rendered  the  situation  still  more  strained,  which  was 
brought  to  a  crisis  by  the  sinking  of  the  Channel  pas- 
senger ship,  the  Sussex,  (March  24,  1916)  the  episode  that 
preluded  the  entry  of  the  United  States  into  the  war. 

The  naval  forces  of  the  Allies,  even  before  the  initiation 
of  the  first  campaign  of  unlimited  submarine  warfare,  had 
developed  plans  of  defense  against  the  undersea  boats,  but 
these  were  concerned  mainly  with  the  protection  of  naval 
units  and  bases.  That  the  submarine  would  be  used  in  com- 
merce destruction  in  the  manner  announced  by  the  German 
Admiralty,  even  if  foreseen,  had  certainly  not  been  provided 
for.  The  problem  presented  increased  the  labors  and  re- 
sponsibilities of  the  Allied  fleets  tenfold.  The  new  sea-going 
submersible,  with  a  radius  of  action  of  several  thousand  miles, 
could  penetrate  any  port  on  the  coasts  of  Europe  or  operate 
on  the  lanes  of  commerce  hundreds  of  miles  from  port. 


394  The  Great  War 

The  appointment  of  Admiral  Lacaze  as  the  Chief  of  the 
Naval  Staff  in  France  and  the  adoption  of  a  definite  system 
of  defense  by  the  British  Admiralty  proved  to  be  a  palliative 
at  least,  yet  the  sinkings  continued  each  week  with  monoto- 
nous regularity.  The  defenses  consisted  of  steel  nets,  in 
some  cases  carrying  explosive  mines  stretched  across  harbor 
openings;  the  improvement  of  mechanical  means  of  de- 
tecting the  presence  of  submarines;  the  use  of  small  but 
very  fast  craft  armed  with  rapid-fire  guns;  and  of  depth- 
bombs,  or  mines,  that  explode  at  a  determined  depth  under 
the  water  when  dropped  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  sub- 
marine. In  addition  thousands  of  British  fishing  boats  and 
similar  small  craft  were  called  into  the  service  to  act  as 
patrols  and  trawlers  for  mines. 

Efforts  were  also  made  to  discover  and  destroy  secret 
bases  of  supplies,  for  it  had  been  ascertained  that  Germany 
was  so  using  certain  islands  in  the  Grecian  seas  and  harbors  in 
Spain.  Vessels,  disguised  as  neutrals,  acted  as  mother-ships, 
supplying  the  submarines  with  fuel  and  provisions,  usually 
during  the  night. 

These  activities,  however,  still  failed  to  protect  the  mer- 
chant vessel,  the  safety  of  which  was  quite  as  important 
as  that  of  the  warship.  One  of  the  methods  proposed  was 
that  of  arming  them  with  quick-firing  guns.  The  plan 
of  arming  merchant  vessels  against  attack  was  not  a  new 
one,  for  in  his  famous  speech  in  Parliament  (March  26, 
1913)  in  the  course  of  which  he  proposed  the  inaugura- 
tion of  a  naval  holiday,  or  a  year's  cessation  of  warship 
construction,  Mr.  Winston  Churchill  suggested  also  that 
provision  be  made  for  arming  merchant  vessels. 

During  the  eighteenth  and  first  half  of  the  nineteenth 
century  the  right  of  defense  on  the  part  of  a  merchant 
ship  was  unquestioned.  With  the  suppression  of  piracy  and 
privateering,  however,  the  custom  had  fallen  into  disuse. 


The  Blockade  and  the  Submarine  Offensive  395 

It  was  soon  evident  that  the  right  to  arm  merchantmen 
would  have  to  be  reasserted  if  Germany  adhered  to  her 
methods  of  submarine  warfare. 

A  few  merchant  vessels  were  armed  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  as  was  evidenced  by  the  controversy  that  arose  between 
Great  Britain  and  Holland.  Holland  decided  that  armed 
merchant  ships  were  warships,  hence,  refused  to  admit  them 
into  her  ports  save  under  the  conditions  prescribed  by  inter- 
national law  for  vessels  of  that  class.  This  position  was  not 
receded  from,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  her  contention  was  in 
opposition  to  nearly  every  authority  in  the  law  of  nations. 

That  the  practice,  however,  did  not  become  universal 
until  the  summer  of  1915  is  indicated  by  the  many  pleas 
for  its  adoption  that  appeared  in  the  English  press  during 
the  early  months  of  unrestricted  submarine  warfare. 

Rear-admiral  Lord  Bristol  at  a  meeting  of  the  Institute 
of  Naval  Engineers  (March  25,  1915)  was  apparently  one 
of  the  first  to  recommend  the  universal  arming  of  merchant 
ships,  for  which  he  was  subjected  to  criticism  by  a  writer 
in  The  Times  (March  31,  1915)  who  said  that  "the  idea  that 
trading  vessels  should  be  armed  with  light  guns  is  one  that 
has  received  general  support.  There  is  this,  however,  to 
be  said  about  such  a  proposal,  that  since  the  waters  in  which 
the  submarines  operate  are  limited  in  area,  these  guns  if 
placed  on  board  vessels  would  be  locked  up  and  useless. 
The  number  required  is  also  against  the  feasibility  of  the 
plan.  .  .  .  After  all  prevention  is  better  than  the  cure. 
Why  is  it  that  merchant  ships  will  go  to  sea  in  the  daytime  ? 
The  distance  they  have  to  run  in  submarine  infested  waters 
is  not  great,  and  while  passing  through  them,  in  many  cases 
the  dark  hours  might  be  chosen." 

The  fact  that  the  vessels  of  some  lines  carried  guns  even 
in  time  of  peace  is  indicated  by  the  Report  of  the  Royal 
Mail  and  Steam  Packet  Company  {The  Times,  May  5,  1915* 


396  The  Great  War 

in  which  it  was  stated  that  the  relative  immunity  from  sub- 
marine attack  enjoyed  by  its  ships  had  been  due  to  the  guns 
they  had  carried  tor  years. 

Among  those  who  wrote  in  favor  of  such  a  policy  was 
Sir  Cyprian  Bridge,  Admiral  Fitzgerald,  and  Sir  George 
Sherston  Baker.  The  latter  said:  "There  is  nothing  in  the 
law  of  nations  which  forbids  them  to  be  armed.  ...  In 
the  past,  when  dealing  with  enemy  vessels  who  observed 
ordinary  humanity,  a  ship  probably  would  not  be  armed 
unless  she  desired  a  capture.  Now  it  is  different;  it  is  a 
matter  of  life  or  death.     Let  all  merchant  ships  be  armed." 

Another  method  proposed  for  the  protection  of  mer- 
chant vessels  was  that  of  the  convoy,  which  was  not  adopted 
during  the  earlier  stages  of  the  submarine  offensive  on  the 
plea  that  ships  would  be  less  liable  to  attack  if  sent  out 
singly,  as  Germany  did  not  possess  sufficient  submarines 
and  torpedoes  to  attack  more  than  a  small  percentage  of 
the  vessels  sailing  to  and  from  ports  of  the  Allies.  Further- 
more, in  case  of  successful  attack  on  a  convoy,  the  losses 
would  be  more  severe.  Another  reason,  and  perhaps  the 
decisive  one,  was  the  disinclination  of  Great  Britain  to 
weaken  her  naval  forces  in  the  North  Sea  by  assigning  her 
most  valuable  blockade  units,  the  fast  cruisers  and  destroyers, 
to  the  convoying  of  merchant  shipping  on  the  high  seas. 

There  can  be  little  doubt  but  that  the  submarine  came 
perilously  near  attaining  its  goal.  There  were  moments 
when  it  seemed  as  if  the  losses  of  merchant  vessels  would 
so  decrease  Allied  tonnage  that  maritime  communications 
would  be  seriously  disturbed.  To  such  a  degree  was  this 
true  that  the  British  Admiralty  threw  a  veil  over  the  losses, 
contenting  itself  with  vague  reports,  which  were  no  ade- 
quate reply  to  the  vast  claims  of  Germany. 

Early  in  the  campaign,  British  leaders  warned  the  public 
that  it  must  face  a  very  serious  situation.     Thus  Admiral 


The  Blockade  and  the  Submarine  Offensive  397 


Jellicoe,  in  an  address  at  Hull,  said:  "I  am  afraid  we  are  in 
for  a  bad  time  for  a  few  months;  but  I  have  confidence. 
I  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  business  now;  but  I  know 
what  is  ready,  and  what  is  in  preparation,  and  I  have  con- 
fidence that  by  the  summer — the  late  summer,  for  I  will 
not  put  it  too  soon — about  August,  if  the  nation  hold  out 
until  then  we  really  shall  be  able  to  say  that  the  submarine 
menace  is  killed." 

In  one  respect,  however,  the  campaign  failed  utterly. 
This  was  the  endeavor  to  break  down  the  morale  of  the 
merchant  seaman.  Instead  of  becoming  panic-stricken,  the 
sailors  of  Great  Britain  only  stiffened  their  resolution  and  put 
forth  to  sea  in  face  of  the  tragedies  that  were  happening  to 
their  comrades  day  by  day.  The  record  of  the  obscure  and 
nameless  heroes  of  the  trawling  fleets  and  of  the  merchant 
marine  will  stand  in  history  with  a  special  crown  of  glory. 

According  to  the  Official  Report  of  the  British  Admiralty, 
March  21,  1918,  the  maritime  losses  and  shipbuilding 
output  were : 


Loss  by  Enemy  Action  and  Marine  Risk. 

Mercantile  Shipbuilding  Output. 

(Gross  Tonnage.) 

(Gross  Tonnage.) 

Quarter. 

United 
Kingdom. 

Foreign. 

Total. 

United 
Kingdom. 

Foreign. 

Total. 

August  ist  to  end  of  year  .    . 
1915. 

468,728 

215,905 
223,676 
356,659 
307,139 

325,237 
270,690 
284,358 
617,563 

911,840 

1,361,870 

952,938 

782,889 

212,635 

104,542 
156,743 
172,822 
187,234 

198,958 
251,599 
307,681 
541,780 

707,533 
875,064 
541,535 
489,954 

681,363. 

32o.447 
380,419 
529,481 
494.373 

S24.I95 

522,289 

592,039 

1,159,343 

i,6i9,373 
2,236,934 
'.494,473 
1,272,843 

675,610 

266,267 
146,870 
145,070 
92,712 

95,566 
107,693 
124,961 
213,332 

246,239 
249,331 
248,283 
419,621 

337,3io 

1,012,920 

Fourth 

1916. 

551,081* 

I,202,000f 

1,146,448* 

282,200 
377.109 
368,170 
512,402 

i,688,ooot 

1917. 

First 

Second 

Third 

528,439 
626,440 

616,453 

Totals 

7,079,492 

4,748,080 

",827.572 

3.031,555 

3,574,720 

6,606,275 

Foreign  total  for  year. 


t  Grand  total  for  year. 


398  The  Great  War 

In  spite  of  the  tremendous  damage  clone  to  their  enemy, 
the  submarine  campaign  did  not  appear  to  realize  the  TO8t 
results  so  fondly  anticipated  by  the  Germans.  As  early  as 
August  4,  1915,  the  famous  naval  critic,  Captain  Persius 
wrote:  "At  the  commencement  of  February  last,  the  sub- 
marine war  gave  us  vast  hopes,  yet  when  we  consider  that 
during  the  week  ending  August  4th,  a  thousand  ships  are 
entering  Britannic  ports,  and  our  gains  only  six  merchant 
vessels  and  nine  fishing  boats,  this  does  not  satisfy  the  popu- 
lace, who  had  conceived  the  most  extravagant  anticipations." 

Another  writer  on  naval  affairs  shows  an  equal  pessimism 
in  an  article  which  appeared  in  the  Berliner  Tageblatt,  August 
10,  1915. 

11  It  is  to  be  recalled,"  he  says,  "  that  at  the  beginning  of  February, 
hopes  in  the  submarine  warfare  rose  high,  and  it  was  widely  believed  that 
just  as  the  British  fleet  had  cut  off"  our  imports  from  overseas,  so  our 
submarines  would  have  little  difficulty  in  doing  the  same  to  England. 
A  part  of  our  press,  unfortunately,  is  responsible  for  the  exaggerated 
expectations  which  the  public  frequently  attached  to  the  submarine  war- 
fare on  merchant  shipping.  It  was  often  emphasized  here  that  with  an 
expert  estimate  of  the  submarine  weapon,  and  particularly  with  consider- 
ation of  the  quantity,  etc.,  of  our  submarine  fighting  forces,  the  results 
and  effect  of  the  new  method  of  warfare  could  be  gathered  only  after  a 
considerable  time.      Ever  and  again  we  counseled  patience  !     .     .     . 

"At  the  beginning  of  the  war  our  submarines  laid  low  a  series  of  war- 
ships, and  now  we  hardly  ever  hear  of  anything  of  that  sort.  So  speak  at 
times  *  naval  heroes  of  the  seashore.'  There  is  no  better  school  than  war. 
Only,  it  is  regrettable  that  it  is  not  we  alone  who  learn  in  it." 

To  the  dismay  of  Germany,  England  semed  to  be  "doing 
business  as  usual,"  and  voices  arose  in  Germany  inquiring 
about  the  German  fleet.  When  was  the  day  of  battle  to 
have  its  dawning?  This  was  the  question  most  asked 
around  German  dinner  tables  and  by  the  firesides.  It  was 
soon  to  be  answered. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

The  Battle  of  Jutland 
{May  31-June  1,  1916) 

Emperor  William  II  and  the  expansion  of  the  German  navy.  The 
Deutscher  Flotten  Verein.  Premonitions  of  a  German  naval  offensive. 
The  battlefield.  Phases  of  the  day  battle.  The  night  battle.  Losses 
and  results.  Lessons  of  the  battle.  The  loss  of  the  Hampshire  and  the 
death  of  Earl  Kitchener.  The  German  raiders,  the  Mowe  and  the  Greif. 
The  submarine  Dentschland's  voyages  to  America.  The  treacherous  visit 
of  the  U-53.     Effect  of  her  raids  on  the  spirit  of  Americans. 

The  coronation  of  William  II  as  Emperor  of  Germany 
on  June  15,  1888,  marked  the  beginning  of  a  new  epoch  in 
the  naval  history  of  the  German  Empire.  Prior  to  that 
event  the  German  people  were  content  with  their  position 
as  the  leading  land  power  in  Europe.  As  yet  they  had  not 
heard  the  call  that  "  Germany's  destiny  lies  on  the  seas." 
Their  fleet  was  scarcely  on  a  parity  with  those  of  second- 
class  naval  powers,  and  the  policy  of  placing  army  officers 
at  the  head  of  the  Admiralty  combined  with  the  disinclina- 
tion of  the  Reichstag  to  vote  large  appropriations  for  battle- 
ships conspired  to  keep  it  in  this  position.  The  accession 
of  the  present  emperor,  however,  changed  all  that.  Ever 
interested  in  sea-life  he  immediately  set  to  work  to  build  up 
a  navy,  which,  if  not  to  be  the  equal  of  the  British,  should 
at  least  be  sufficiently  strong  to  give  British  statesmen  cause 
for  thought.  Yet  for  a  decade  he  found  himself  confronted 
by  almost  insuperable  difficulties,  the  most  important  being 
the  lack  of  interest  on  the  part  of  the  German  people. 

It  was  necessary  to  bring  them  to  his  viewpoint  and  to 
this  end  the  Deutscher  Flotten  Verein,  or  Navy  League,  was 

399 


400  The  Great  War 

founded  in  April,  1898.  This  marked  the  transformation 
of  German  naval  policy.  Through  the  propaganda  under 
the  leadership  of  an  emperor  who  had  said  (June  16,  1896) 
that  "the  German  Empire  has  become  a  world-empire," 
the  new  German  fleet  was  born. 

The  underlying  purpose  of  Germany's  naval  policy  was 
clear.  In  spite  of  vehement  assertions  that  the  sole  aim 
of  the  fleet  was  the  defense  of  her  merchant  marine  and 
colonial  trade,  Great  Britain  was  not  blind  to  the  fact  that 
it  was  a  distinct  threat  against  her  maritime  supremacy. 

The  entry  of  the  British  Empire  into  the  great  conflict 
now  brought  the  day  near  when  the  test  of  that  supremacy 
would  be  made,  and  the  officers  and  men  on  both  sides 
were  keen  for  the  decisive  hour.  The  earlier  naval  en- 
gagements— Coronel,  Falkland,  Dogger  Bank — were  but 
incidents  and  preliminary  to  the  great  event.  That  it  did 
not  come  earlier  than  May  31,  1916,  was  due,  it  would 
appear,  to  the  facts  of  the  concentration  of  the  British 
fleet  in  the  North  Sea,  the  mobilization  at  Spithead  and 
the  blockade. 

These  operations  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  neutralized, 
for  the  time  being,  the  German  fleet,  and  minimized  the 
accomplishment  of  really  important  results  from  cruiser 
warfare.  Without  the  support  of  the  Battle  Fleet,  the  fate 
of  the  German  commerce-destroyers  was  but  a  question  of 
time,  as  events  have  proved.  Through  the  blockade,  Great 
Britain  retained  the  virtual  command  of  the  sea,  which 
was  little  short  of  absolute  as  long  as  the  German  navy 
hugged  its  bases.  The  German  naval  leaders  knew  that 
some  time  it  must  come  to  an  issue  with  the  British,  but 
when  the  gage  would  be  flung  down  was  a  subject  upon 
which  there  was  wide  variance  of  opinion.  Their  eyes 
were  open  to  the  handicaps  which  they  would  have  to  over- 
come, and  they  were  well  aware  of  the  fatal  consequences 


Vice-admiral  Sir  David  Beatty,  commander  of  the  British  cruiser  fleet  in  the  Battle  of  Jutland. 


The  Battle  of  Jutland  401 

of  a  decisive  defeat.  Some,  indeed,  among  them  probably 
High-admiral  von  Tirpitz,  did  not  favor  an  early  offensive 
on  the  part  of  the  Battle  Fleet,  advocating  instead  the  policy 
of  wearing  down  the  British  by  torpedo  and  mine  attacks 
upon  separate  units.  They  reasoned  that  in  time  the 
enemy  force  could  be  reduced  to  such  an  extent  that  the 
German  fleet  would  be  in  a  position  to  meet  it  on  more 
nearly  equal  terms. 

The  military  situation,  however,  was  complicated  by  the 
political.  The  failure  at  Verdun  and  the  consequent  stag- 
nation on  the  western  front  conspired  with  the  economic 
pressure  of  the  blockade  to  direct  the  attention  of  the  Ger- 
man public  to  the  apparent  inactivity  of  the  fleet.  The 
Allies  had  practically  suppressed  cruiser  operations,  of  which 
much  had  been  anticipated,  and  now  the  only  noteworthy 
successes  of  the  navy  were  the  submarine  operations — the 
legitimacy  of  which  still  lingered  as  a  doubt  in  some  Ger- 
man minds.  It  became  more  and  more  clear  to  the  Ad- 
miralty that  the  people  expected  the  navy  to  justify  itself, 
and  the  course  of  events  during  the  early  months  of  1916 
indicated  that  it  was  endeavoring  to  respond  to  the  popular 
demand. 

Thus  on  December  31,  1915,  the  Admiralty  announced 
that  the  German  fleet  had  advanced  into  the  North  Sea  in 
search  of  the  British,  but  without  success.  In  February, 
the  Archduke  Karl,  Chief  of  the  Austrian  navy,  visited 
Berlin,  evidently  to  consider  plans  for  naval  cooperation; 
furthermore,  the  German  press  contained  articles  regard- 
ing "surprises"  to  be  sprung  by  the  German  navy,  of 
17-inch  guns,  unsinkable  ships,  still  greater  Zeppelins,  tor- 
pedoes, etc.  In  March  the  ships  which  had  been  stripped 
of  crews  and  material  to  equip  the  forts  of  the  Belgian 
coast  were  again  made  ready  for  service,  and  70,000  naval 
reservists  were  called  to  active  duty. 


402  The  Great  War 

The  most  impressive  indication  of  a  major  operation  of 
the  fleet,  however,  was  the  resignation  (March  16,  1916) 
of  High-admiral  von  Tirpitz,  who  was  apparently  a  deter- 
mined opponent  of  an  offensive  in  force  against  the  Britisli 
navy  at  that  time.  He  advocated,  rather,  as  has  been  indi- 
cated, the  policy  of  attrition  and  commerce-destroying. 
Staking  all  upon  the  submarine,  an  instrument  of  warfare 
that,  publicly,  at  any  rate,  he  had  dismissed  a  few  years  before 
as  impracticable.  Von  Tirpitz  was  succeeded  by  Admiral 
von  Capelle  as  the  Chief  of  the  Admiral  Staff,  while  Ad- 
miral Scheer,  who  had  been  temporarily  in  command  of 
the  High  Seas  Fleet  since  the  death  of  Admiral  Hugo 
von  Pohl  in  February,  1916,  was  confirmed  in  that  posi- 
tion. These  appointments  offered  another  indication  of 
more  energetic  action  on  the  part  of  the  German  navy,  for 
both  von  Capelle  and  Scheer  were  known  to  be  strong 
advocates  of  an  immediate  offensive. 

Another  symptom  of  offensive  operations  by  the  Ger- 
man fleet  was  the  bombardment  of  the  English  coast  towns, 
Lowestoft  and  Yarmouth,  April  25, 1916,  at  4.10  to  4.40  A.  M., 
in  which  four  persons  were  killed,  twelve  wounded,  and 
considerable  damage  was  done.  The  attacking  squadron, 
which  comprised  twenty  swift  vessels,  sank  the  steamer 
King  Stephen  during  the  raid,  escaping  to  its  bases  unchal- 
lenged by  British  warships. 

The  officers  on  both  sides,  therefore,  anticipated  a  pitched 
battle  in  the  near  future,  yet  just  when  it  would  occur  no 
one  could  say.  In  it  the  Germans  must  assume  the  initia- 
tive, for  the  British  fleet  would  not  undertake  an  enter- 
prise so  hopeless  as  to  attack  the  Germans  behind  their 
powerful  coast  defenses.  It  was  equally  evident  that  the 
German  admiral  would  not  essay  battle  unless  he  had 
some  reasonable  assurance  of  meeting  the  enemy  on 
equal  terms.      This  he  could  do  only  by  engaging  units 


The  Battle  of  Jutland  403 

of  the  British  fleet,  destroying  them  separately  by  swift, 
hard  blows. 

Whether  or  not  this  was  the  mission  of  Rear-admiral 
Scheer  when  he  left  his  bases  at  daybreak,  May  31st,  is  not 
yet  determined.  The  German  accounts  are  silent  on  the 
objective  of  the  fleet.  They  content  themselves  with  stat- 
ing that  the  German  fleet  set  out  upon  an  enterprise  to  the 
north, — according  to  them,  one  of  many  similar  operations. 
There  has  been  much  speculation  regarding  the  real  aim 
of  the  German  High  Command.  Distinguished  French 
authorities,  like  Admiral  Degouy,  have  advanced  the  theory 
that  the  sortie  was  directed  towards  the  stoppage  of  muni- 
tions and  supplies  en  route  to  Russia  by  way  of  Archangel; 
others  hold  that  it  was  to  break  the  blockade  and  release 
swift  cruisers  upon  Allied  trade  routes  and  lines  of  commu- 
nication ;  while  another  theory  is  that  Scheer  was  informed 
of  the  position  of  Beatty's  squadron  of  battle-cruisers  and 
thought  the  time  and  conditions  favorable  to  defeat  it.  If 
this  were  done  before  the  Battle  Fleet  could  come  to  Beatty's 
support,  the  German  navy  would  strike  a  most  serious  blow 
against  Britain's  sea  power,  and  could  herald  it  as  a  deci- 
sive victory.  It  might  well  be  that  all  these  purposes 
entered  into  the  movement  of  the  German  fleet.  At  any 
rate,  seemingly  for  the  first  time  since  the  outbreak  of  the 
war,  the  German  ships  sought  the  British  fleet  with  the 
obvious  intention  of  bringing  it  to  battle. 

The  question  has  also  been  asked  whether  Beatty's  ships 
were  not  placed  in  their  position  as  a  bait  to  the  German 
fleet  (cf.  Guiheneuc,  "La  Bataille  Nava/e  du  Jutland"},  but 
this,  too,  is  a  point  upon  which  the  reports  throw  no 
light.  The  naval  strategy  of  both  sides  is  so  shrouded  in 
mystery  that  it  cannot  be  discussed  with  assurance  until 
more  data  is  offered.  It  is,  however,  known  that  the  British 
Battle  Fleet  did  not  leave  its  bases  until  some  time  during 


404  The  Great  War 

the  day  of  May  30th.  (Wallace,  Premonition  in  War.  A 
Story  of  Jutland.    National  Review,  June,  191 S.)    The  main 

body  of  the  British  Battle  Fleet  apparently  had  its  base  at 
this  time  at  Scapa  Flow  in  the  Orkney  Islands,  north  of 
Scotland,  while  the  battle-cruiser  units  were  stationed  at 
Rosyth  on  the  Firth  of  Forth.  The  Fifth  Squadron,  con- 
sisting of  ships  of  the  Queen  Elizabeth  type,  may  have  put 
to  sea  from  Scarborough  (Scottish  Herald,  June  2d). 

The  only  official  information  on  these  points  is  the  intro- 
ductory statement  of  Admiral  Jellicoe's  report,  which  reads : 
"The  ships  of  the  Grand  Fleet,  in  pursuance  of  the  general 
policy  of  periodical  sweeps  through  the  North  Sea,  had 
left  its  bases  on  the  previous  day,  in  accordance  with  in- 
structions from  me."  As  Admiral  Beatty's  squadron  was 
capable  of  steaming  twenty-eight  knots  an  hour,  he  could 
have  covered  the  350  miles  from  Rosyth  to  a  point  off  the 
coast  of  Denmark  in  twelve  hours,  hence  he  was  doubtless 
on  the  field  of  battle  by  nightfall,  May  30th.  That  Scheer 
was  aware  of  this  fact  is  undoubted,  and  that  he  thought 
Beatty  too  far  from  the  British  Battle  Fleet  to  be  rein- 
forced by  it  is  probable.  At  any  rate,  after  all  other  ob- 
jectives of  the  German  fleet  are  given  due  weight,  it  is 
impossible  to  believe  that  the  entrapping  and  destruction 
of  Beatty's  group  of  battle-cruisers,  the  most  splendid  war- 
ships in  the  world,  was  preeminently  the  aim  of  Hipper 
and  Scheer. 

We  can  assume,  therefore,  that  both  sides  knew  with 
more  or  less  exactness  the  positions  of  the  various  units. 
Whether  Admiral  Scheer  was  aware  that  the  British  Battle 
Fleet  was  within  striking  distance  is  open  to  question.  At 
any  rate,  it  would  appear  that  he  hoped  to  dispose  of 
Beatty's  ships  before  they  could  be  reinforced. 

What  were  the  positions  just  before  the  battle  began? 
The  field  of  the  battle  was  near  Jutland  Bank,  about  one 


The  Battle  of  Jutland  405 

hundred  miles  west  of  Hanstholm  on  the  northern  coast 
of  Denmark.  The  British  Grand  Fleet,  under  command  of 
Admiral  Sir  John  Jellicoe,  was  apparently  off  the  coast  of 
Norway,  while  the  cruiser  fleet,  under  Sir  David  Beatty, 
was  some  fifty  miles  to  the  south,  protected  by  a  screen  of 
light  cruisers  and  destroyers,  from  ten  to  twenty  miles  in 
advance.  According  to  Admiral  Jellicoe's  report,  "the 
First  and  Second  Battle-Cruiser  Squadrons,  First,  Second, 
and  Third  Light  Cruiser  Squadrons,  and  destroyers  from 
the  First,  Ninth,  Tenth,  and  Thirteenth  Flotillas,  supported 
by  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  were,  in  accordance  with  my 
directions,  scouting  to  the  southward  of  the  Battle  Fleet, 
which  was  accompanied  by  the  Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squad- 
ron, First  and  Second  Cruiser  Squadrons,  and  Fourth  Light 
Cruiser  Squadron,  Fourth,  Eleventh,  and  Twelfth  Flotillas." 
The  most  probable  composition  of  Admiral  Hipper's 
Battle-Cruiser  Squadron  was: 

Liitzow,  eight  1 2-inch  and  twelve  6-inch  guns,  28,000  tons;  Derf- 
fiinger,  eight  12-inch  and  twelve  6-inch  guns,  28,000  tons;  Seydlitz, 
ten  11-inch  and  twelve  6-inch  guns,  24,640  tons;  Moltke,  ten  11-inch 
and  twelve  6-inch  guns,  22,600  tons;  Von  der  Tann,  eight  11-inch  and 
ten  6-inch  guns,  19,400  tons;  New  Salamis,  eight  14 -inch  and  twelve 
6-inch  guns,  19,200  tons.  The  highest  speed  would  have  been  about 
twenty-five  or  twenty-six  knots  as  a  fleet. 

The  German  Battle  Fleet,  under  Admiral  Scheer,  appears 
to  have  been  composed  somewhat  as  follows : 

Grosser  Kurfiirst,  Markgraf,  and  Kbnig,  each  ten  1 2-inch  (or  14-inch)  and 
fourteen  6-inch  guns,  25,000  tons,  twenty-one  knots;  Kaiser  Friedrich  der 
Grosse,  Kaiserin,  Kbnig  Albert,  and  Prinz  Regent  Luitpold,  each  ten  12-inch 
and  fourteen  6-inch  guns,  24,700  tons,  twenty-one  knots;  Helgoland, 
Thuringen,  Ostfriesland,  and  Oldenburg,  each  12-inch  and  fourteen  6-inch 
guns,  22,800  tons,  twenty-two  knots;  Nassau,  IVestfalen,  Rbeinland,  and 
Posen,  each  twelve  11-inch  and  twelve  6-inch  guns,  18,900  tons,  twenty 
and  a  half  knots;  Deutschland,  Pommern,  Hannover,  Schlesien,  Scbleswig- 
Holstein,  and  Lothringen,  pre-dreadnoughts,  each  four  1  i-inch  and  fourteen 


406  The  Great  War 

6.7-inch  guns,  13,000  tons,  eighteen  ami  a  half  knots.  All  the  above 
ships  have  two  funnels,  except  the-  six  prc-drcadnoughts  and  the  four  ships 
of  the  Helgoland  class,  which  have  three. 

Vice-admiral  Sir  D.  Beatty's  Battle-Cruisers  were: 

Lion,  eight  13.5-inch  and  sixteen  4-inch  guns,  26,350  tons;  Princess 
Royal,  eight  1  3.5-inch  and  sixteen  4-inch  guns,  26,350  tons;  ghieen  Mary, 
eight  13.5-inch  and  sixteen  4-inch  guns,  27,000  tons;  Tiger,  eight  13.5- 
inch  and  twelve  6-inch  guns,  28,000  tons;  Indefatigable,  eight  12-inch 
and  sixteen  4-inch  guns,  18,750  tons;  New  Zealand,  eight  12-inch  and 
sixteen  4-inch  guns,  18,800  tons.  The  highest  speed  as  a  fleet  would  be 
slightly  in  excess  of  twenty-six  knots. 

Rear-admiral  Hood's  Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron  was 
made  up  of: 

Invincible,  Inflexible,  and  Indomitable,  each  eight  1 2-inch  and  sixteen 
4-inch  guns,  17,250  tons,  twenty-five  knots. 

Rear-admiral  Evan-Thomas's  Fifth  Battle-Cruiser  Squad- 
ron comprised: 

Barham,  Valiant,  JVarspite,  and  Malaya,  each  eight  15-inch  and  twelve 
to  sixteen  6-inch  guns,  27,500  tons,  twenty-five  knots. 

The  British  Battle  Fleet,  so  far  as  its  units  are  given,  was 
as  follows: 

Cruiser  Squadrons — First,  Rear-admiral  Sir  R.  K.  Arbuthnot;  and 
Second,  Rear-admiral  H.  L.  Heath.  Light  Cruiser  Squadrons — First, 
Commodore  E.  S.  Alexander-Sinclair;  Second,  Commodore  W.  E.  Good- 
enough;  Third,  Rear-admiral  T.  D.  W.  Napier;  and  Fourth,  Commodore 
C.  E.  Le  Mesurier. 

The  battle  squadrons  mentioned  as  present  with  Admiral 
Sir  J.  Jellicoe,  the  Commander-in-Chief,  whose  flag  was 
hoisted  on  the  Iron  Duke,  placed  in  the  Fourth  Squad- 
ron, were: 

First,  Vice-admiral  Sir  C.  Burney;  Second,  Vice-admiral  Sir  M.  Jerram  ; 
and  Fourth,  Vice-admiral  Sir  D.  Sturdee. 


The  Battle  of  Jutland  407 

The  destroyer  flotillas  mentioned  as  present  were : 
First,  Fourth,  Ninth,  Tenth,  Eleventh,  Twelfth,  and  Thirteenth. 

According  to  Vice-admiral  Beatty's  despatch,  the  Battle- 
Cruiser  Fleet  was  steering  to  the  northward  to  join  the 
Battle  Fleet.  At  2.20  P.  M.  reports  were  received  from  the 
light  cruiser  Galatea  (Commodore  Sinclair),  which  was 
scouting  in  advance,  announcing  that  enemy  vessels  had 
been  sighted.  The  German  light  cruisers  Elbing  and 
Frankfurt  were  the  first  to  sight  the  British  ships.  At  2.30, 
therefore,  the  course  of  Beatty's  division  was  altered  to  the 
S.  S.  E.,  the  direction  of  Horn  Reef,  in  order,  as  his  report 
states,  "to  place  my  force  between  the  enemy  and  his 
base."  It  soon  became  evident  that  the  Germans  were 
out  in  considerable  force.  To  gain  further  information  a 
scouting  seaplane  was  sent  up  from  the  aeroplane  mother- 
ship,  the  Engadine,  formerly  the  Cunarder,  Campa?iia. 

At  3.30  P.  M.  Beatty  increased  speed  and  formed  for  battle 
in  line  of  bearing,  i.e.,  the  ships,  instead  of  being  directly 
astern  of  each  other,  were  slightly  in  echelon,  thus  avoid- 
ing the  smoke  of  the  preceding  vessel  and  the  danger  of 
collision.  Ahead  of  the  battle-cruisers,  and  forming  a  pro- 
tective screen,  was  the  First  Light  Cruiser  Squadron,  while 
the  Second  Light  Cruiser  Squadron  and  the  destroyers  of 
the  Ninth  and  Thirteenth  Flotillas  fell  in  astern  of  the 
battle-cruisers.  N.  N.  W.,  at  a  distance  of  10,000  yards,  was 
the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron,  four  ships  of  the  magnificent 
Queen  Elizabeth  type,  under  command  of  Rear-admiral 
Evan-Thomas,  consisting  of  the  Barham,  Warspite,  Malaya, 
and  Valiant,  the  Queen  Elizabeth  being  in  dock  at  Rosyth 
for  repairs.     (Copplestone,  The  Silent  Watchers) 

The  German  forces  were  under  command  of  Rear- 
admiral  Hipper,  Beatty's  old  foe  in  the  cruiser  engage- 
ments off  Helgoland  and  at  Dogger  Bank.    They  consisted 


408  The  Great  War 

of  the  entire  battle-cruiser  fleet  of  Germany,  with  the 
exception  of  the  Goeben,  nominally  sold  to  Turkey,  namely: 
the  Lutzow  (flagship),  Seydlite,  Derfflinger,  Mo/tie,  and  Von 

der  Tann.  This  powerful  division  also  had  its  supporting 
force  of  small  cruisers  and  destroyer  flotillas. 

The  Bring  began  at  3.48,  almost  simultaneously,  at  a 
range  of  approximately  18,500  yards.  The  battle  continued 
on  a  southerly  course,  the  two  fleets  steaming  in  parallel 
lines  at  a  speed  of  about  twenty-five  knots,  or  nearly  thirty 
miles  an  hour. 

Beatty  was  now  approaching  the  German  High  Seas 
Fleet  at  a  speed  of  twenty-five  knots  plus  the  speed  of  the 
German  fleet,  in  all  forty-five  knots,  about  fifty  miles  an 
hour.  Similarly,  though  in  less  degree,  he  was  leaving  the 
support  of  the  Grand  Fleet  under  Jellicoe.  Furthermore, 
conditions  of  visibility  were  against  him,  for,  although  the 
weather  was  good  and  the  sea  calm,  his  vessels  were  sil- 
houetted against  the  western  sky,  while  Hipper's  fleet  was 
somewhat  obscured  by  a  mist  which  was  forming  in  the  east. 

In  the  meantime,  the  ships  of  the  Fifth  Battle  Squadron 
were  rushing  at  the  height  of  their  speed  to  the  support  of 
the  battle-cruisers.  In  fifteen  minutes  they  would  be  in  a 
position  to  deliver  effective  fire  upon  the  enemy.  Yet  dur- 
ing these  fifteen  minutes  a  tragic  event  occurred  in  the 
British  line.  Ten  minutes  after  the  action  began,  the  Inde- 
fatigable, the  last  ship  in  Beatty 's  squadron,  blew  up  with 
the  loss  of  her  entire  crew  of  900  men,  two  excepted. 
This  was  followed  a  few  minutes  later  (4.30  P.M.)  by  the 
loss  of  the  Queen  Mary,  which  exploded  and  sank  so  quickly 
that  the  ships  astern  steamed  over  her.  Thus,  almost  at  a 
single  stroke,  Beatty 's  force  was  reduced  by  a  third,  and 
the  British  navy  lost  two  of  its  most  splendid  units. 

The  official  reports  are  not  clear  on  the  cause  of  these 
disasters,  but  we  are  led  to  believe  that  they  were  due  to 


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The  Battle  of  Jutland  409 

the  accurate  gunfire  of  the  German  ships,  which  was  con- 
centrated upon  the  vessels  that  went  down.  Naval  authori- 
ties, especially  those  in  France,  are  inclined  to  believe  that 
Hipper  so  maneuvered  that  he  led  Beatty  into  a  mine-field 
or  a  submarine  ambuscade.  The  German  reports  strenu- 
ously deny  that  any  submarines  were  present,  but  some  of 
the  British  are  equally  insistent  that  they  were,  stating, 
indeed,  that  one  was  destroyed  during  the  course  of  the 
battle.  The  question,  therefore,  is  one  of  relative  veracity, 
but  even  if  decided  in  favor  of  the  British  reports,  the 
cause  of  the  sinkings  is  not  explained,  for  neither  Jellicoe  nor 
Beatty  admits  that  torpedoes  were  in  any  way  responsible. 

The  Queen  Elizabeths  came  into  action  at  4.08  P.M. 
directing  an  ineffectual  fire  against  the  Germans  at  a  range 
of  20,000  yards.  They  formed  astern  of  Beatty's  ships  and 
when  their  great  15-inch  guns  began  to  take  effect,  the 
German  firing,  which  up  to  that  time  had  been  excellent, 
began  to  show  signs  of  deteriorating.  At  4.18  the  third 
battle-cruiser  in  Hipper's  line  was  seen  to  be  on  fire.  In 
the  meanwhile  attacks  were  made  by  both  sides  with  de- 
stroyers and  other  light  craft — the  first  daylight  operations 
of  the  kind  in  the  history  of  naval  warfare.  The  Germans 
had  long  been  trained  in  this  maneuver  by  Admiral  von 
Koester  and  his  disciples,  but  that  the  British  would  attempt 
it  had  not  been  foreseen.  Nevertheless,  at  4.15  British  de- 
stroyers advanced  to  attack  the  enemy  line.  These  were 
the  Nestor,  Nomad,  Nicator,  Narborough,  Pelica?i,  Petard, 
Obdurate,  Nerissa,  Moorsom,  Morris,  Turbulent,  and  Terma- 
gant, of  the  Ninth,  Tenth,  and  Thirteenth  Flotillas.  These 
vessels  were  met  by  a  force  of  fifteen  German  destroyers 
supported  by  the  light  cruiser  Regensburg.  A  desperate  en- 
counter at  short  range  ensued,  and  the  German  vessels  were 
driven  back  to  their  main  body  without  firing  their  torpe- 
does, losing  two  destroyers.    The  British,  however,  pushed 


410  The  Great  War 

bome  their  attack  and  Tired  torpedoes  at  the  German  battle- 
cruisers.  The  Xt'stor  and  the  Nomad  were  sunk,  however, 
and  the  Nicator  regained  her  flotilla,  badly  damaged  but 
still  afloat  Apparently  no  hits  were  made  by  either  side, 
although  Beatty's  report  states  that  a  torpedo  from  the 
Nerissa  struck  a  rear  ship  of  the  enemy  line. 

"  From  4.15  to  4.43  P.  M.  the  conflict  between  the  oppos- 
ing battle-cruisers  was  of  a  very  fierce  and  resolute  charac- 
ter. The  Fifth  Battle  Squadron  was  engaging  the  enemy's 
rear  ships,  unfortunately  at  a  very  long  range.  Our  fire 
began  to  tell,  the  accuracy  and  rapidity  of  that  of  the 
enemy  depreciating  considerably.  At  4.18  P.M.  the  third 
enemy  ship  was  seen  to  be  on  fire.  The  visibility  to  the 
northeastward,  and  the  outline  of  the  ships  very  indistinct." 
(Vice-admiral  Beatty's  despatch.) 

At  4.38  P.  M.  the  purpose  of  Hipper's  maneuver  became 
clear,  for  the  report  came  from  the  Southampton  that  the 
German  Battle  Fleet  had  been  sighted  in  the  S.  E.  Beatty 
was  threatened  by  a  concentration  of  the  whole  German 
navy.  His  problem  now  was  to  change  his  course  to  the 
north  and  lure  the  German  fleet  to  the  British  Battle  Fleet 
without  himself  being  destroyed.  The  odds  were  strongly 
against  him.  He  had  already  suffered  heavy  losses,  and  to 
turn  his  fleet  right-about  in  the  face  of  the  fire  of  battle- 
ships was  courting  still  further  disaster.  There  were  now 
nineteen  capital  ships  against  his  eight.  There  is  little 
doubt  that  the  German  leaders,  in  fancy's  eye,  saw  Beatty 
annihilated.  He  had,  however,  one  advantage — a  few  knots' 
superiority  of  speed  which  permitted  him  to  keep  just  out 
of  range  of  the  heavier  vessels,  fighting  at  the  same  time  a 
holding  action  with  the  German  battle-cruisers,  thereby 
keeping  in  contact  with  the  German  fleet  until  he  could 
form  a  juncture  with  his  battle  fleet,  arraying  the  two  com- 
bined forces  against  each  other.     It  was  a  daring  move,  for 


The  Battle  of  Jutland  411 

the  laming  of  a  single  vessel  would  have  meant  its  destruc- 
tion, a  fate,  indeed,  that  might  befall  his  whole  force. 
That  it  succeeded  is  a  tribute  to  Beatty's  skill  as  a  leader. 

How  was  it  achieved?  As  soon  as  he  was  assured  of  the 
presence  of  the  High  Seas  Fleet,  Beatty  turned  his  squad- 
ron, in  column,  sixteen  points  to  the  starboard,  or  directly 
on  an  opposite  course.  The  second  phase  of  the  battle 
was  therefore  fought  on  a  northerly  course  over  the  same 
waters  as  the  first.  The  smoke  of  the  previous  gunfire  was 
a  contributive  influence  in  decreasing  the  visibility.  Beatty's 
force  turned,  probably,  before  it  came  under  the  fire  of  the 
German  Battle  Fleet,  but  the  Queen  Elizabeths  continued 
on  the  southerly  course,  screening  the  battle-cruisers,  and  at 
the  same  time  engaging  Hipper's  force.  Still  further  in  ad- 
vance, forming  a  reconnaissance  force  was  the  Second  Light 
Cruiser  Squadron.  This  came  under  fire  from  the  leading 
German  squadron  before  it  put  about  to  the  north.  The 
Queen  Elizabeths  turned  north  at  4.57  apparently  to  the 
port,  coming  under  heavy  fire  at  the  "windy  corner,"  or 
point  of  turning,  but  the  range  was  long  and  the  squadron 
seems  not  to  have  experienced  any  material  injuries.  Dur- 
ing the  northward  course  of  the  battle  the  German  gunnery, 
which  had  been  excellent,  showed  further  signs  of  deteriora- 
tion, although  visibility  conditions  were  unfavorable  for 
the  British,  their  ships  being  silhouetted  against  the  western 
sky,  while  the  German  fleet  was  more  or  less  obscured  by 
the  smoke  and  haze  on  the  eastern  horizon. 

At  5  P.  M.  Admiral  Scheer  took  over  the  command  of 
the  entire  German  fleet  and  from  that  hour  until  6  P.M. 
the  action  continued  on  the  northerly  course.  At  5.35  P.  M., 
Beatty,  aware,  doubtless,  of  the  proximity  of  Jellicoe's  force 
and  trusting  to  his  superior  speed,  essayed  the  tactical  ma- 
neuver known  as  "Crossing  the  T."  That  is,  he  attempted 
to  throw  his  fleet  directly  across  the  van  of  the  German 


412  The  Great  War 

line.  This  operation  was  only  in  part  successful,  for  Hipper 
also  sheered  off  to  the  northeast  and  then  to  the  east,  keep- 
ing his  vessels  relatively  in  the  same  position  with  respect 
to  the  British.  Nevertheless,  the  German  van  was  consid- 
erably disorganized,  and  Hipper  was  forced  to  maneuver 
in  order  to  escape  torpedo  attacks  delivered  at  5.45  P.  M.  by 
British  destroyers. 

At  5.50  P.M.  the  leading  vessels  of  the  British  Battle 
Fleet  were  sighted.  These  were  the  ships  of  the  Third 
Battle  Squadron,  under  command  of  Rear-admiral  Hood, 
consisting  of  the  battle-cruisers  Invincible,  Indomitable,  and 
the  Inflexible,  accompanied  by  the  First  and  Second  Cruiser 
Squadrons.  The  advent  of  this  powerful  reinforcement  ex- 
tricated Beatty  from  a  situation  that  was  threatening  to  be- 
come critical.  Rushing  at  full  speed  in  front  of  the  German 
fleet  and  obliged  to  close  in  upon  the  enemy  in  order  to 
permit  the  British  Battle  Fleet  room  to  deploy,  thus  for  a 
time  blanketing  the  fire  of  a  good  portion  of  the  ships  of  the 
Battle  Fleet,  Beatty's  force,  unsupported  as  it  now  was  by  the 
Queen  Elizabeths,  could  easily  have  been  totally  destroyed 
were  the  Germans  permitted  to  concentrate  their  gunfire 
against  it.  The  coming  of  Hood's  squadron  accordingly 
saved  Beatty,  but  at  a  fearful  cost,  the  Invincible  going  down 
with  virtually  all  on  board,  including  Rear-admiral  Hood. 

Hood's  squadron  entered  into  action  at  6.20,  but  about  an 
hour  before  he  had  sent  the  light  cruiser  Chester  (Captain 
Lawson)  ahead  to  reconnoiter.  At  5.45,  this  vessel  became 
engaged  with  four  or  five  enemy  light  cruisers,  escaping 
from  the  unequal  contest  with  heavy  damage.  It  was 
during  this  action  that  the  heroic  boy,  John  Cornwall, 
though  mortally  wounded  and  with  all  the  gun  crew  dead, 
served  his  gun  to  the  moment  of  his  death. 

In  moving  to  the  support  of  Beatty,  Hood  apparently 
had  advanced  too  far  south,  hence  was  forced  to  retrace 


BRITISH  BATTLE  FLEET 


BRITISH  BATTLE  CRUISERS-'' 


LITTLE      FISHER 
m  BANK 

Iron  Duhe' 


JUTLAND 


tlOTt 
Thu  cnart  mint  tie  taken  ml  diagrimmati 
only,  and 81  agent  fit indication  oFUie 
cojrie  of the  Battle 


Diagrams  showing  tin-  location  of  the  Battle  of  Jutland  and  tlu-  courses  of  the  fleets 

during  the  action. 


The  Battle  of  Jutland  413 

his  course  to  the  northwest,  taking  his  place  ahead  of 
Beatty  at  6.20,  bringing  his  squadron  into  action,  as  Beatty 
reports  "in  a  most  inspiring  manner,  worthy  of  his  great 
naval  ancestors."  The  range  was  very  short,  8,000  yards, 
and  the  squadron  immediately  became  the  target  for  a 
furious  fire.  The  Invincible  engaged  a  ship  of  the  Derfflinger 
class,  probably  the  Lutzow,  which  was  rendered  liors  de 
combat,  the  Invincible  being  sunk  at  the  same  time.  The 
great  ship  was  broken  in  two,  the  stern  and  bow  project- 
ing from  the  water.  Only  six  survivors  were  saved  from  a 
personnel  of  more  than  700.  It  was  doubtless  during  these 
events  that  Rear  Admiral  Hipper  transferred  his  flag  from 
the  hopelessly  damaged  Lutzow  to  the  Derfflinger. 

It  seems  to  have  been  Beatty's  plan  for  the  Queen  Eliza- 
beths to  follow  him  in  the  dash  across  the  German  van,  but 
when  the  moment  came,  their  commander,  Rear-admiral 
Evan-Thomas,  perceived  the  advancing  squadrons  on  the 
right  flank  of  the  Battle  Fleet.  He  therefore  abandoned  the 
effort  to  pass  in  front  and  directed  his  course  to  the  north, 
in  order  to  fall  in  astern  of  the  Battle  Fleet.  This  incident 
indicates  that  the  concentration  of  the  two  British  forces 
produced  a  tactical  problem  requiring  the  utmost  naval 
skill  to  solve.  As  has  been  indicated,  the  units  under 
command  of  Vice-admiral  Beatty  were  passing  between 
Jellicoe  and  the  German  fleet.  It  was,  therefore,  neces- 
sary for  him  to  clear  the  intervening  area  in  order  to  per- 
mit the  Grand  Fleet  to  deploy  into  action.  Furthermore, 
the  poor  visibility  made  the  greatest  caution  necessary,  lest 
British  ships  be  mistaken  for  those  of  the  enemy.  It  is 
very  probable,  indeed,  that  this  error  was  committed  dur- 
ing the  course  of  the  battle.  At  any  rate,  in  order  to  clear 
the  field  for  Jellicoe,  Beatty  increased  his  speed  and  closed 
in  upon  the  enemy  to  a  distance  of  about  8,000  yards,  a 
very  short  range  for  modern  guns.     It  was  nearly  6  P.  M., 


414  The  Great  War 

therefore,  when  the  Grand  Fleet  entered  into  action,  the 
leading  vessels  Bring  upon  the  Germans  at  a  distance  of 
six  miles.  Just  what  tactics  Jellicoe  employed  in  deploy- 
ing into  hattle  line  is  purposely  withheld  in  the  reports, 
yet  the  diagram  in  Gill's  Naval  Power  in  the  War  repre- 
sents a  mode  of  deployment  that  may  have  been  used. 

While  these  larger  events  were  taking  place  occurred 
the  disastrous  episode  of  Rear-admiral  Arhuthnot's  division, 
consisting  of  the  armored  cruisers  Defence,  Warrior,  Black 
Prince,  and  the  Duke  of  Edinburgh.  The  position  of  this 
unit  and  the  purpose  of  its  maneuver  is  another  mystery 
not  cleared  up  by  the  reports.  It  would  appear  that  the 
squadron  either  did  not  originally  form  a  part  of  the  Battle 
Fleet,  or  that  Arbuthnot,  in  repelling  an  attack  of  German 
light  cruisers  and  destroyers,  misled  by  the  smoke  and  fog, 
found  himself  in  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy  capital  ships. 
At  any  rate,  his  vessels  were  cruising  in  a  westerly  direc- 
tion between  the  battle  lines  and  less  than  8,000  yards  from 
the  High  Seas  Fleet — almost  suicide  for  such  lightly  armed 
and  armored  vessels.  The  Defe?ice  was  sunk  with  Rear- 
admiral  Arbuthnot  on  board,  the  Black  Prince  put  out  of 
action  and  the  Warrior  rendered  helpless,  the  Duke  of  Edin- 
burgh escaping  and  later  joining  the  Second  Cruiser  Squad- 
ron. Captain  Phillpotts,  of  the  Warspite,  observed  the  con- 
dition of  the  Warrior  and  went  to  her  assistance,  receiving  a 
most  withering  fire  while  covering  the  drifting  vessel.  The 
Warspite,  on  her  part,  received  a  shot  in  her  steering-gear 
that  rendered  her  helpless  for  the  time  being.  The  Ger- 
mans thought  that  the  Warspite  was  sunk  and  so  reported, 
but  her  commanding  officer  steered  her  out  of  danger  by 
means  of  the  engines  and  she  eventually  reached  her  base. 
The  Warrior,  however,  was  not  so  fortunate.  Fatally 
wounded,  she  sank  during  the  night,  after  having  been 
towed  by  the  Engadine  and  abandoned,  the  crew  being 


The  Battle  of  Jutland  415 

transferred.  The  Black  Prince,  likewise,  did  not  sink  im- 
mediately but  struggled  on  until  night  when  she  probably 
blew  up.     Search  for  her  the  next  day  was  fruitless. 

The  cruiser  action,  however,  had  not  been  without  its 
disasters  to  the  German  fleet.  The  new  light  cruiser  Wies- 
baden was  crippled  and  left  hopeless  between  the  battle 
lines.  She  sank  later,  one  member  of  the  crew  being 
rescued.  The  Germans  during  this  phase  of  the  battle, 
lost  two  more  torpedo  boats,  while  the  British  destroyer 
Shark  was  sunk,  and  the  destroyer  Defender  injured.  The 
light  cruiser  Chester  suffered  further  damage  at  this  time. 

At  6.17  the  British  Battle  Fleet  entered  into  action,  the 
first  shots  being  fired  by  the  First  Battle  Squadron,  under 
command  of  Vice-admiral  Sir  Cecil  Burney,  on  the  Marl- 
borough. These  were  directed  against  the  Third  German 
Battle  Squadron,  consisting  of  vessels  of  the  Kaiser  class,  one 
of  which,  and  one  also  of  the  Konig  class,  being  so  severely 
handled  that  they  turned  out  of  line.  The  gunnery  of  the 
Marlborough  was  particularly  effective,  which  was  all  the 
more  remarkable  as  she  was  damaged  by  a  torpedo  during 
the  action  (6.54  P.M.).  The  range  varied  from  8,000  to 
11,000  yards,  but  even  then  the  mist  and  smoke  were  so 
thick  and  the  light  so  poor  that  the  battle  targets  were  but 
dimly  seen.  Ships  appeared  and  disappeared  so  rapidly  that 
range-finding  was  difficult  and  it  was  almost  impossible  to 
ascertain  the  effect  of  the  firing.  This,  to  a  certain  extent, 
also  explains  the  discrepancy  between  the  reports  issued  by 
the  two  sides. 

The  period  of  heaviest  fighting  lasted  from  6.20  to 
6.40  P.  M.,  a  brief  twenty  minutes,  during  which  time  only 
a  portion  of  the  two  battle  fleets  were  in  a  position  to  de- 
liver effective  fire.  The  German  fleet,  however,  was  far 
more  concentrated  than  the  British  and  its  salvos,  espe- 
cially those  directed  against  the  battle-cruisers,  were  most 


416  The  Great  War 

destructive.  The  British  firing,  however,  improved  to  such 
an  extent  that  the  German  leaders  found  themselves  in  a 
serious  predicament  The  tactics  that  they  had  found  so 
effective  of  picking  out  particular  units  of  the  British  fleet 
and  concentrating  upon  them  could  no  longer  be  carried 
out.  In  fact,  they  were  compelled  to  yield  the  initiative 
to  the  British.  No  more  could  they  batter  up  individual 
ships  of  the  enemy  with  a  modicum  of  damage  on  their  own 
part.  It  was  now  a  question  of  saving  the  entire  German 
fleet,  which  was  in  grave  danger  of  being  enveloped  and 
perhaps  destroyed  by  a  vastly  superior  enemy. 

That  Scheer  accomplished  the  task  with  great  skill  can- 
not be  gainsaid.  The  British  leaders  attribute  his  escape 
to  chance,  unfavorable  weather  conditions,  and  approach- 
ing darkness,  which  may  have  had  great  influence,  yet  it  is 
not  impossible  that  these  elements  may  all  have  entered 
into  the  plan  of  German  strategy.  To  disengage  his  forces, 
Scheer  ordered  his  destroyer  flotillas  to  attack  and  at  the 
same  time  to  form  a  smoke-screen  to  conceal  the  movements 
of  his  main  fleet.  This  maneuver  was  fairly  successful,  the 
smoke-screen  perhaps  saving  the  Germans  from  envelop- 
ment, for  it  formed  a  barrier  through  which  Jellicoe  did 
not  attempt  to  penetrate,  contenting  himself  with  encircle- 
ment and  long-range  action.  It  would  appear  that  during 
a  great  part  of  the  time,  the  ships  were  unable  to  continue 
firing  owing  to  the  smoke  and  mist.  We  are  informed 
that  the  German  fleet  was  wholly  invisible  from  6.50  to 
7.14  p.m.,  from  7.45  to  8.20  p.m.,  and  from  8.38  thereafter. 
Thus  during  three  hours  of  the  main  action  (6  to  9  P.  M.) 
the  British  gunners  had  sight  of  their  targets  for  three- 
quarters  of  an  hour,  all  told. 

It  should  also  be  kept  in  mind  that  from  6  to  6.50  P.  M., 
the  Battle-Cruiser  Fleet  was  passing  across  the  van  of  the 
Germans,  hence  between  them  and  the  Grand  Fleet.   Beatty 


U  J^nfex. 


The  German  battle-cruiser  Seydlitz. 


Shell  holes  in  the  side  of  a  British  warship  after  the  Battle  of  Jutland. 


The  Battle  of  Jutland  417 

thus  blanketed  the  fire  of  a  considerable  portion  of  Jellicoe's 
ships.  It  was,  therefore,  not  until  approximately  7  P.M. 
that  the  intervening  space  was  cleared  and  Jellicoe  was  in 
a  position  to  close  in  upon  the  High  Seas  Fleet.  That  the 
British  admiral  did  not  do  this  resolutely  has  subjected  him 
to  criticism,  but  it  would  appear  that  his  decision  to  circle 
around  the  German  forces,  tailing  on  to  Beatty  and  closing 
in  gradually,  was  justified  by  conditions.  To  have  thrown 
his  ships  into  the  pall  of  smoke  and  mist  might  have  been 
suicidal.  That  by  so  doing  he  could  have  compassed  the 
destruction  of  the  German  fleet  must  be  weighed  with  the 
consequences  of  such  a  move  and  the  penalty  that  might 
be  exacted.  That  the  enemy  had  been  already  dreadfully 
punished  he  well  knew,  but  he,  on  his  part,  had  expe- 
rienced appalling  disasters.  These,  however,  were  not  yet 
sufficient  to  threaten  British  supremacy  on  the  sea.  Should 
he,  therefore,  risk  this  for  a  somewhat  barren  victory  ?  In 
other  words,  would  the  result  justify  the  risk?  Sir  John 
Jellicoe  thought  not,  and  his  decision  has  been  confirmed 
by  the  British  Admiralty. 

The  British  forces,  therefore,  at  6.50  P.  M.  were  concen- 
trated in  one  body,  an  array  of  ships  that  stretched  in  a 
single  line  for  a  distance  of  perhaps  fifty  miles.  Moving 
in  the  direction  of  the  hands  of  the  clock,  it  formed  a  vast 
semicircle,  within  which  cruised  the  German  fleet  on  a 
shorter  radius.  There  was  only  one  avenue  of  escape  for 
the  latter, — to  the  west  and  still  further  from  its  bases.  It 
was  the  one  that  was  taken  and  the  German  ships  escaped 
the  net  thrown  around  them  to  limp  back  to  Cuxhaven 
and  Wilhelmshaven,  in  scattered  sections  and  perhaps  by 
neutral  waters. 

The  attack  of  the  German  destroyers  was  countered  by 
British  vessels  of  the  same  type,  supported  by  the  Fourth 
Light  Cruiser  Squadron.     These  drove  the  German  light 


4is  The  Great  War 

craft  back  to  the  battleships,  with  the  loss  of  a  destroyer 
in  the  operation.  No  damage,  apparently,  was  done  to  the 
British  vessels.  Behind  its  smoke-screen  the  German  fleet 
accordingly  made  its  way  to  the  westward,  and  touch  be- 
tween  the  capital  ships  was  lost  after  7.45  P.  M.  Both  Beatty 
and  Jellicoe  advanced  cruiser  forces,  consisting  of  the  First, 
Third,  and  Fourth  Light  Cruiser  Squadrons,  to  find  the 
enemy.  These  encountered  German  battleships  at  8.10  P.  M. 
and  fought  with  them  a  furious  but  unequal  contest  for 
ten  minutes.  The  British  vessels  were  driven  back,  and 
when  Beatty  rushed  the  battle-cruisers  to  their  support  it 
was  too  late.  The  German  fleet  had  disappeared  in  the 
gathering  darkness. 

It  is  almost  impossible  to  obtain  a  clear  idea  of  the  events 
of  the  night  battle.  It  would  seem  that  the  German  fleet 
was  thoroughly  disorganized,  its  different  units  seeking 
their  bases  as  best  they  could.  The  British  battleships, 
likewise,  withdrew  from  active  participation,  but  remained 
on  the  field  after  taking  precautions  against  torpedo  attack, 
trusting,  according  to  the  report,  that  the  enemy  could  be 
located  and  brought  "to  battle  on  the  succeeding  morning. 
Therefore,  after  9  P.  M.  the  operations  were  carried  on  by 
the  flotilla  forces.  The  battlefield  at  night  was  a  scene  of 
awful  splendor.  The  sea  was  lit  up  by  flames  of  burning 
vessels.  Great  ships  appeared  and  disappeared  in  the  smoke 
which  lay  heavy  upon  the  water,  the  surface  of  which,  as 
an  English  officer  expressed  it,  "was  lit  up  like  marble  over 
which  the  destroyers  moved  like  cockroaches  on  a  floor." 

According  to  Vice-admiral  Beatty's  despatch,  the  heaviest 
fighting  was  done  by  the  Fourth,  Eleventh,  and  Twelfth 
Flotillas,  led  by  Commodore  Hawkesley  and  Captains  Win- 
tour  and  Stirling  respectively.  Of  these,  the  Fourth  suf- 
fered the  severest  losses,  among  them  the  flotilla  leader, 
Tipperary,  a  destroyer  of  the  latest  and  most  powerful  type. 


The  Battle  of  Jutland  419 

When  it  sank  it  carried  down  the  greater  part  of  the  crew, 
and  with  them  the  body  of  the  brave  Captain  Wintour,  who 
had  been  killed  earlier  in  the  action.  Torpedoes  from 
two  destroyers  of  the  Fourth  Flotilla,  the  Spitfire  and  the 
Ardent,  were  observed  to  take  effect  on  enemy  ships. 

A  large  number  of  torpedoes  were  fired  by  the  Twelfth 
Flotilla,  a  ship  of  the  Kaiser  class  was  seen  to  blow  up,  and 
the  Maenad,  in  a  second  attack,  obtained  a  hit  on  one  of 
the  five  remaining  ships. 

Attached  to  Admiral  Beatty's  force  were  the  First,  Second, 
and  Third  Light  Cruiser  Squadrons,  and  the  First,  Ninth, 
Tenth,  and  Thirteenth  Destroyer  Flotillas.  The  light 
cruisers  were  almost  continually  in  touch  with  the  enemy 
battle-cruisers  and  at  10.20,  the  Southampton  and  the  Dublin 
were  engaged  for  fifteen  minutes  in  a  hot  fight  with  five 
German  cruisers,  experiencing  heavy  injuries. 

It  would  appear  that  the  German  fleet  suffered  its  sever- 
est losses  during  the  night,  some  of  which  have  probably 
not  been  revealed.  We  know  from  the  German  accounts 
that  the  Elbing  was  lost  by  collision,  that  the  Pommern,  the 
Frauenlob,  and  the  Rostock  were  torpedoed,  and  that  the  hope- 
lessly damaged  flagship  of  Admiral  Hipper,  the  Liitzow, 
was  blown  up  by  her  own  crew  when  it  became  evident 
that  she  was  in  a  sinking  condition.  It  is  the  opinion  of 
naval  authorities  that  some  of  the  vessels  named  were 
Ersatz,  or  new  ships  given  old  names.  In  the  case  of  the 
Pommern,  this  suspicion  appears  to  be  well-grounded,  for 
the  original  Pommern  was  reported  sunk  by  a  British  sub- 
marine during  the  month  of  July,  1915,  in  the  Gulf  of 
Dantzig.  The  British  claim  of  further  losses  by  the  enemy 
includes  two  dreadnoughts  of  the  Kaiser  class,  one  or  two 
of  the  Helgoland  class,  and  the  battle-cruisers,  Seydlitz  and 
Von  der  Tann.  It  is  probable,  however,  that  these  claims 
are  excessive,  as  the  German  ships  appear  to  have  been 


420  The  Great  War 

constructed  with  such  skill  from  the  defensive  viewpoint 
that  they  were  able  to  undergo  an  extraordinary  amount  of 
punishment  without  sinking.  There  can  be  little  doubt, 
however,  in  view  of  corroborative  evidence,  that  the  Ger- 
mans have  much  understated  their  losses  on  May  31st. 
Such  a  policy  is  quite  in  line  with  the  general  military  and 
naval  policy  of  the  German  General  Staff,  and  it  is  likely 
that  no  loss  has  been  admitted  that  could,  conceivably,  have 
been  impossible  of  positive  proof.  A  case  in  point  is  that 
of  the  Liitzow,  the  loss  of  which  was  not  officially  admitted 
until  several  days  after  the  event.  In  further  corrobora- 
tion of  these  losses,  the  British  Admiralty  announced  on 
July  13,  1915,  that  positive  evidence  had  been  obtained  to 
the  effect  that  the  Kaiser  and  the  Kro?ipri?iz  were  sunk  by 
torpedoes. 

However  severe  the  German  naval  losses  may  have  been 
they  were  more  than  offset  by  those  of  Great  Britain. 
These  were  published  in  the  earliest  reports  of  the  battle 
and  struck  the  people  with  dismay.  The  announcement 
was  made  suddenly  without  an  accompanying  statement  of 
the  situation.  This  afforded  an  opportunity  of  which  the 
German  Naval  Staff  was  quick  to  take  advantage,  herald- 
ing, as  it  did,  a  decided  victory  over  Britain's  mighty  navy. 
The  delay  in  the  issuance  of  the  official  despatches  of  Jel- 
licoe  and  Beatty  (July  6th)  lent  color  to  the  German  claims; 
hence  when  these  appeared  they  did  not  serve  to  dispel  the 
idea  in  neutral  states  and  even  among  Great  Britain's  own 
allies  that  her  fleet  had  suffered  a  very  serious  check.  Only 
time  and  the  manifest  inability  of  Germany  to  show  any 
advantage  from  her  so-called  victory  have  revealed  the 
true  situation.  At  the  best,  however,  Britain's  losses  were 
grievous. 

Was  the  reward  worth  the  cost?  This  is  a  question 
upon  which  the  opinions  of  the  highest  authorities  differ. 


The  Battle  of  Jutland  421 

Assuming  that  the  losses  were  correct  as  given  by  each 
side  the  British  preponderance  was  undisturbed.  In  fact, 
the  losses  experienced  by  Germany  were  relatively  more 
damaging  than  those  of  Great  Britain.  The  truth  of  this 
statement  is  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  the  German  navy 
remained  at  its  bases  during  the  whole  interval  before  the 
suspension  of  hostilities.  Though  still  a  "fleet  in  being," 
its  offensive  power  had  been  neutralized. 

Of  the  strategy  of  the  battle,  as  has  already  been  indi- 
cated, no  statement  can  be  made  that  will  not  be  subject 
to  correction  when  the  complete  story  is  obtained  from 
official  sources.  Without  knowledge  of  the  mission  of  the 
German  fleet  it  is  impossible  to  determine  how  nearly  its 
objective  was  obtained,  and  without  a  clearer  statement 
regarding  the  reasons  for  the  dispositions  we  are  unable  to 
say  whether  Beatty  was  rash  in  attacking  battleships  with 
battle-cruisers  or  whether  Jellicoe  was  dilatory  in  deploy- 
ing into  battle  line  or  at  fault  in  not  closing  in  upon  the 
German  fleet  and  attempting  to  destroy  it.  It  may  be  that 
some  of  these  points  in  doubt  can  never  be  solved,  for  the 
facts  upon  which  their  solution  depends  may  have  sunk 
with  the  brave  leaders  who  perished. 

With  regard  to  the  tactics  of  the  battle  it  would  appear 
that  both  fleets  were  maneuvered  with  great  skill.  Ad- 
miral Hipper's  handling  of  his  units  in  the  battle-cruiser 
action,  his  maneuvers  in  uniting  with  the  German  Battle 
Fleet,  and  the  manner  in  which  he  parried  Beatty's  maneu-- 
ver  in  "Crossing  the  T"  were  exceptional  examples  of 
seamanship  and  naval  skill.  The  same  may  be  said  of 
Beatty  who,  confronted  with  problems  quite  similar  but 
vastly  more  comprehensive,  brought  them  to  a  successful 
conclusion.  It  was  clear  to  his  mind  that  to  bring  the 
entire  German  fleet  into  action  with  the  British  Battle 
Fleet  would  require  large  risks,  perhaps  sacrifices,  and  he 


422  The  Great  War 

met  the  situation  in  the  traditional  spirit  of  the  British 
navy.  That  Admiral  Jellicoe  and  he  did  not  gain  the 
laurel  of  a  decisive  victory  may  have  been  due  to  chance 
or  to  the  nicely-timed  strategy  of  the  German  leaders,  yet 
whatever  the  cause,  it  was  not  due  to  lack  of  daring  or  initia- 
tive on  the  part  of  the  leaders  and  men  of  the  British  fleet. 

This  greatest  naval  battle  the  world  has  seen  will  be 
studied  by  naval  strategists  during  the  years  to  come  and 
yet  it  so  far  has  revealed  nothing  essentially  new  in  mari- 
time warfare.  The  dreadnought  and  the  big  gun  remain 
in  ascendancy  despite  Sir  Percy  Scott's  prophecy  to  the 
contrary.  Submarines  and  mines  undoubtedly  had  a  great 
influence  upon  the  conduct  of  the  battle,  but  that  their 
influence  was  not  determining  is  unquestioned.  The  Ger- 
man legends  of  strange  and  terrible  modes  of  warfare  were 
dissipated  by  the  cold  fact  that  every  success  they  achieved 
was  obtained  by  the  ancient  method  of  straight  shooting 
and  skilful  management  of  their  fleet  units.  Submarines, 
Zeppelins,  and  perhaps  mines  played  their  part,  but  there 
can  be  little  question  that  it  was  a  part  profoundly  disap- 
pointing to  the  German  Naval  Staff. 

One  thing  that  was  new  was  the  extraordinary  use  of 
destroyers  and  other  light  craft,  not  only  as  defensive 
screens  to  the  capital  ships,  but  also  as  arms  of  offense 
against  them.  Their  attacks  by  day,  the  first  in  the  his- 
tory of  naval  warfare,  and  by  night,  are  the  outstanding 
facts  of  this  amazing  event. 

Light  was  also  thrown  on  another  question  that  has  dis- 
turbed naval  experts  for  a  decade  or  more.  This  is  the 
value  of  the  battle-cruiser.  It  would  appear,  in  spite  of 
the  grievous  losses  experienced  in  this  type  of  warship, 
that  the  battle-cruiser  has  demonstrated  its  peculiar  fitness 
as  a  useful  arm  of  the  navy.  This  fact  has  been  officially 
recognized  by  America's  foremost  naval  leaders,  Admiral 


The  Battle  of  Jutland 


423 


Sims  and  Admiral  Knight,  in  their  reports  to  Congress 
upon  this  subject. 

Summing  up,  the  battle  was  inconclusive.  This  is  ad- 
mitted by  both  sides.  The  fact  remains  that  a  good  part 
of  the  German  fleet  escaped  to  its  bases  damaged,  it  would 
appear,  to  the  last  degree,  yet  still  a  fleet,  and  still  possessed 
of  a  potency  that  might  reveal  itself  later.  If  so,  it  could 
never  be  under  conditions  so  favorable  as  the  day  of  May 
31,  1916,  for  later  the  British  navy  and  the  American  navy 
stood  together  and  awaited  with  supreme  confidence  the 
coming  of  a  second  day  of  battle.  The  months  that  fol- 
lowed the  Battle  of  Jutland  showed  no  indication  of  an 
intention  on  the  part  of  the  German  Battle  Fleet  to  re- 
new the  offensive.  In  the  meanwhile,  the  blockade,  the 
supreme  naval  operation  of  the  Great  War,  continued  its 
inexorable  clutch  upon  the  German  Empire. 


BRITISH    FLEET— THE    GRAND    FLEET 
Types  of  Ships 


NAME. 

Royal  Sovereign  . 

Queen  Elizabeth 

(Fifth  Squadron). 

Iron  Duke 
(  First  Squadron) . 

Orion 
(Second  Squadron) 


Dreadnought 
(Fourth  Squadron) 


Lion 
(First  Squadron)  . 

New  Zealand 
(Second  Squadron) 

Indomitable 
(Third  Squadron) 


DATE.         TONS.      SPEED. 
.  1916  .     .  25,750  .     .  21   . 


BATTLESHIPS 

ARMAMENT.  BELT  ARMOR.  SISTER  SHIPS. 

8  15-in.,  16  6-in 13-in.  .   .  Revenge,  etc. 

1915  .   .27,500.    .  25  .    .    8  15-in.,  12  to  16  6-in.    .13-in..   .  Warspite,    Valiant,    Bar- 
ham,  Malaya. 

1914  .   .25,000.   .21.    .  10  13.5-in.,  126-in.  .   .    .12-in..   .  Marlborough,  Emperor  of 

India,  Benboiu. 

1912  .   .  23,000  .    .  21  .    .10  13.5-in.,  16  4-in.  .    .    .  12-in.  .    .  Conqueror ,  Monarch, 

Thunderer ,  King  George 
V,  Ajax,  Audacious, 
Centurion. 

1906  .   .  17,900  .   .  21  .   .  10 12-in., 22 4-in. ori2-pr. .  11-in.  .   .  Bellerophon,      Temeraire, 

Superb,  St.  Vincent,  Cot- 
lingwood,  Vanguard, Nep- 
tune, Colossus,  Hercules. 
BATTLE-CRUISERS 

1912  .    .26,350.    .28.    .  8  13.5-in.,  16  4-in.     .    .    .  9-in.    .    .Princess      Royal,      Queen 

Mary,  Tiger. 


1912  .    .  18,800  .    .  25  .    .8  12-in.,  16  4-in. 
1908  .    .  17,250  .    .  25  .   .8  i2-in.,  16  4-in. 


7-in.    .    .  Indefatigable ,  Australia. 
7-in.    .   .  Inflexible,  Invincible. 


424 


Thk  Great  War 


ARMORED  CRUISERS 

MAMK.                    DATE.  AKMAMBNT.               BELTAKMOR.                   SISTBR  SHIPS. 

rce 

(Vtat  Squadron) .    .1909.  .  14.600  •    ■  23  •    .  4  9-2-'n-.  IO  7-5-'u-   •    •    .  6-in,    .    .  Minotaur,  Shannon. 
Ackii 

i.idron)  .  1907  .    .13,550.    .  22J4  .  6  9.2-in.,4  7.5-in 6-in.    .    .  Cochrane ,  Warrior . 

Princ* 
(lust  .-quadron)  .    .1906.    .13,550.    .  22}^  .  6  9.2-in.,  10  6-in 6-in.    .    .  Duke  0/ Edinburgh.. 


LIGHT  CRUISERS 
dilatea 
( First  Squadron)  .    .1915-    •    3,750  .    .29.    .  2  6-in.,  8  4-in.    .    .    . 


Southampton 
(Second  Squadron)  .  1913  .   .    5,400  .   .  21%  .  8  or  9  6-in.  .   . 

Falmouth 
(Third  Squadron)   .1911.    .    5,250.    .  25^  .  8  6-in.  .    .    .    , 

Calliope 
(Fourth  Squadron)  .  1915  .   .    3,800  .    .  30  .   .2  6-in.,  8  4-in. 


Fearless 
(First  Flotilla)  .    .    .1913.   .    3,440.    .  25^  .  10  4-in. 


Aurora,  Inconstant,  Roy- 
alist, Penelope,  J'haelon, 
Undaunted. 


Chatham,  Dublin,  Bir 
ham,  Lowestoft,  Notting- 
ham. 

Dartmouth,  Weymouth, 
Yarmouth. 

Caroline,  Carysfort,  Cham- 
pion, Cleopatra,  Com  us, 
Conquest,  Cordelia. 

Active,  Blanche,  Blonde, 
Bellona,  Boadicea. 


Tipperary . 


1914  .    .    1,850. 


DESTROYERS 
6  4-in 


Pelican 1915  .    .  Particulars  unknown 

Onslow 1916  .    .  Particulars  unknown 

Nestor 191 5  .    .  Particulars  unknown 

Moresby 1914-    .  Particulars  unknown 


Landrail 1913  .    .    .   965  .    .  29  .    .3  4-in 

Acasta("¥L"  type)  .  1912  .   .    .   935.   .29.   .  3  4-in 

Badger  {"I"  type)  .  1911  .   .   .   780.   .29.   .  2  4-in.,  2  12-pdrs.  . 


Botha,   Turbulent,  Terma- 
gant, and  others. 
,  Petard,  etc. 

,  Onslaught,  Obdurate,  etc. 
Nomad,   Nicator,  Nar bor- 
ough, Nerissa,  etc. 
Manly,  Mansfield,  Mastiff, 
Matchless,    Mentor,   Me- 
teor,  Milne,  Minor,   Mi- 
randa,Moorsom,  M 'orris, 
Murray,  Myngs,  etc. 
Lydiard,  Laforey,  Lookout, 

Legion,  etc. 
Ardent,  Fortune,  Garland, 
Ambuscade ,  Shark,  Spar- 
roiuhaivk.  Spitfire,  etc. 
.  Defender,  Attack,  Hornet, 
Phoenix,  etc. 


MISCELLANEOUS 


Abdul Particulars  unknown. 

Jingudine Seaplane  carrier. 


The  Battle  of  Jutland 


425 


GERMAN    FLEET— THE   HIGH    SEAS    FLEET 
Types  of  Ships 


BATTLESHIPS 

NAME. 

DATE. 

TONS. 

SPEED. 

ARMAMENT.              BELT  ARMOR.                   SISTER  SHIPS. 

Wilkelm    II    (ex- 

Worth)    .    .    . 

.  1916  . 

.  29,000  . 

.   21   . 

8  15-in.,  16  5.9-in.    .   . 

.  . 

.  "T." 

"N"(ex-Sala7>iii 

)  .  1916  . 

.  19,200  . 

.23. 

8  14-in.,  12  6-in.  .   .   . 

.  10-in.  . 

.  Unknown. 

K'onig 

.  1914 . 

•  25,387  • 

•  21  ■ 

10  12-in.,  14  5.9-in.  .   . 

.  14-in.  . 

.  Markgraf,  Grosser  Kur- 
furst,  Kronprim. 

Kaiser    .... 

•  1913  • 

•  24,3I<>  • 

.  21   . 

10  12-in.,  14  5.9-in.  .   . 

.  14-in.  . 

.  Kaiser  in,  Friedrick  der 
Grosse,  K'onig  Albert, 
Prim  Regent  Luitpold. 

Helgoland .  .   . 

.  1911 . 

.  22,500  . 

.   20% 

.  12  12-in.,  14  5.9-in.  .   . 

.  12-in.  . 

.  Ost/riesland,  Tkiiringen, 
Oldenburg. 

Nassau  .... 

.  1909. 

.  l8,60O  . 

.  20% 

12  n-in.,  12  5.9-in.  .   . 

.  12-in.  . 

.  IVestfalen,  Rheinland 
Rosen. 

Deutschland    . 

.  1906  . 

•  I3,04<>  • 

.I8J* 

4  11-in.,  14  6.7-in.  .   . 

.  9^-in. 

.  Hannover  ,Pommern,SchU- 
sien,  Schleswig- Holstein. 

Braunschweig . 

.  1904. 

•  12,907  • 

.   18. 

4  11-in.,  14  6.7-in.  .   . 

.    9-in.  . 

.  Elsass,  Rreussen,  Lothrin- 
gen,  Hessen. 

BATTLE-CRUISERS 

Hindenburg .   . 

.  1916  . 

.  28,000  . 

•  27- 

8  15-in.,  14  5.9-in.  .   . 

.  . 

.  Unknown. 

Lutzow  .... 

•  i9'5  • 

.  28,000  . 

.  27. 

.    8  12-in.,  12  5.9-in.  .   . 

.  11-in.  . 

.  Derjflinger. 

Seydlitz  .... 

■  1913  • 

.  24,640  . 

.  26. 

.  10  n-in.,  12  5.9-in.  .   . 

.  11-in.  . 

.  Moltke. 

Von  der  Tann  . 

.  1911  . 

•  I9,400  . 

•   25- 

8  11-in.,  10  5.9-in.  .   . 

.    6-in.  . 

.  None. 

ARMORED  CRUISER 

Roon 

•  *9°5. 

•     9,350. 

.  21  . 

4  8.2-in.,  10  5.9-in.  .   . 

.    4-in. 

The  British  public  had  hardly  reacted  from  the  depres- 
sion produced  by  the  garbled  accounts  of  the  Battle  of 
Jutland  before  it  received  another  shock,  this  time  of  a 
nature  most  unforeseen  and  startling.  On  June  10,  1916, 
the  British  Admiralty  announced  that  the  cruiser  Hamp- 
shire was  mined  on  June  5th,  just  west  of  the  Orkneys, 
and  all  on  board  save  twelve  perished,  including  Lord 
Kitchener  and  his  staff,  who  were  on  a  voyage  to  Russia 
to  consult  with  Tsar  Nicholas  and  the  Russian  govern- 
ment on  military  and  financial  affairs.  The  death  of  Great 
Britain's  greatest  military  leader  was  a  heavy  blow  and  the 
whole  country  was  plunged  into  mourning.  There  were 
none,  even  those  who  had  criticised  some  of  his  policies 
during  the  early  stages  of  the  war,  who  did  not  acknowledge 


426  The  Great  War 

the  tremendous  debt  Great  Britain  owed  to  Kitchener. 
This  sorrow  was  hardly  lightened  by  the  knowledge  that 
the  best  of  his  work  for  the  Allied  cause  had  been  done, 
and  that  others  stood  ready  to  assume  the  great  burdens 
he  had  borne.  It  is  one  of  the  ironies  of  the  war  that 
Lloyd  George  was  to  have  been  a  member  of  the  delegation 
to  Russia,  but  was  detained  by  the  critical  state  of  affairs  in 
Ireland.  This,  perhaps,  saved  for  Great  Britain  the  one 
man  capable  of  successfully  carrying  out  the  work  begun 
by  Kitchener  of  Khartoum. 

At  the  Battle  of  Jutland  the  British  navy  lost  its  supreme 
opportunity  to  establish  absolute  command  of  the  sea.  The 
situation  accordingly  resumed  its  previous  status  and  Great 
Britain  turned  her  attention  to  strengthening  the  blockade. 
The  cordon  of  steel  around  the  North  Sea  was  steadily 
drawn  tighter  and  tighter;  immense  mine-fields  were  laid 
from  the  British  Isles  to  Norway;  and  the  Channel  was 
still  more  strongly  defended  by  all  known  means,  so  that  it 
became  almost  impossible  for  enemy  surface  craft  to  escape 
to  the  high  seas. 

In  fact  there  were  only  two  efforts  on  the  part  of  the 
Germans  to  accomplish  this  most  difficult  task,  that  of  the 
Mowe  and  that  of  the  Greif.  The  former,  a  converted 
fruit  trader,  the  Ponga,  was  so  ingeniously  disguised  that 
she  was  in  appearance  still  a  harmless  merchant  vessel  fly- 
ing the  flag  of  Sweden.  In  a  moment,  however,  the  sides 
of  the  false  forecastle  would  fall  to  the  deck,  revealing  a 
powerful  armament  of  6-inch  guns.  The  Mowe,  it  seems, 
slipped  through  the  blockade  during  a  dark  night  of  De- 
cember, 1915,  and  reached  the  Atlantic,  where  she  inaugu- 
rated a  career  of  commerce  destroying  that  cost  Great 
Britain  twelve  merchant  ships  valued  at  $10,000,000,  to 
which  should  be  added  three  neutral  and  Allied  vessels. 


The  Battle  of  Jutland  427 

Among  the  ships  captured  was  the  Appam,  which  the 
commanding  officer  of  the  Mowe  sent,  in  charge  of  a 
prize  crew,  to  port  at  Norfolk,  Virginia,  where  it  was 
interned.  The  presence  of  the  Appam  in  the  waters  of  the 
United  States  added  to  the  complexity  of  the  already  diffi- 
cult situation  under  the  status  of  neutrality.  Only  one 
vessel  attacked  by  the  Mowe  was  armed  and  able  to  resist 
capture.  This  was  the  Clan  MacTavish,  whose  3-inch 
guns,  however,  were  of  small  avail  against  the  heavier 
armament  of  the  enemy.  Throughout  its  career,  how- 
ever, the  commander  of  the  Mowe  acted  humanly  and  his 
exploits  were  marked  for  their  skill  and  daring. 

Before  the  Mowe  had  returned  to  port,  another  vessel, 
the  Greif,  essayed,  on  February  29,  1916,  to  repeat  the  ex- 
ploits of  the  Mowe.  Also  disguised  as  a  tramp  steamer,  she 
carried  7-inch  guns  and  flew  the  colors  of  Norway.  Her 
career  of  depredation  on  the  high  seas  was  soon  brought 
to  an  end  for  she  was  overhauled  by  the  British  auxiliary 
cruiser,  the  Alcantara,  formerly  a  Royal  Mail  ship.  Upon 
being  hailed,  the  Greif  dropped  her  false  bulwarks,  firing 
at  a  range  of  1,000  yards.  She  also  discharged  two  torpe- 
does, one  of  which  reached  its  mark  rendering  the  Alcan- 
tara helpless.  The  Andes,  another  British  auxiliary  cruiser, 
and  the  light  cruiser  Comus,  came  to  the  assistance  of  the 
helpless  ship  and  soon  destroyed  the  Greif  by  gunfire,  the 
Alcantara  sinking  in  the  meanwhile. 

This  was  the  last  German  endeavor  to  establish  a  reign 
of  terror  on  the  seas  by  commerce-raiders.  The  vigilance 
of  the  British  fleet,  and  the  fact  that  the  German  fleet  could 
not  support  the  cruisers,  determined  the  German  Admiralty 
to  resort  to  the  extra-legal  mode  of  unlimited  submarine 
warfare,  with  results  that  have  already  been  indicated. 

Another  phase  of  this  campaign  developed  during  the 
latter  half  of  1916.     This  was  an  effort  to  impress  public 


428  The  Great  War 

opinion  in  America  by  showing  the  range  and  possibilities 
of  the  new  underwater  craft  produced  by  Germany.  The 
first  of  these  psychological  enterprises  was  that  of  the  sub- 
marine merchantman,  the  Deutschla?id,  which  arrived  at 
Baltimore,  July  9,  1916,  remaining  there  and  discharging 
her  cargo  of  dyestuffs  in  spite  of  the  protests  of  the 
Entente  Powers.  The  Deutschland  was  the  forerunner, 
according  to  German  reports,  of  a  fleet  of  monster  cargo- 
carrying  submarines  under  process  of  construction,  destined 
to  defy  the  British  blockade.  The  Deutschland  made  only 
one  other  voyage  to  American  waters,  arriving  at  New 
London,  Connecticut,  November  1,  1916,  sailing  again  No- 
vember 17, 1916.  The  great  fleet  of  blockade  runners  never 
materialized.  The  Bremen,  the  sister  ship  of  the  Deutsch- 
land, and  probably  the  only  other  one  built,  was  either 
captured  by  the  British  or  never  attempted  the  voyage. 

A  still  more  flagrant  attempt  to  intimidate  public  opinion 
in  America  was  the  visit  of  the  U-53,  commanded  by  Cap- 
tain Hans  Rose,  to  the  waters  of  Narragansett  Bay. 

On  Saturday  afternoon,  October  7, 1916,  the  report  spread 
like  wildfire  throughout  the  city  of  Newport,  Rhode  Island, 
that  a  German  submarine  of  the  largest  type  was  in  the  harbor 
and  anchored  almost  within  a  stone's  throw  of  the  Torpedo 
Station,  one  of  the  most  important  munitions  factories  of 
the  American  navy.  The  German  ensign  flying  over  the 
long,  low  craft,  with  its  castle-shaped  conning-tower,  soon 
assured  the  crowds  gathered  at  the  water-front  that  the  re- 
port was  only  too  true.  After  paying  formal  visits  to  Rear- 
admiral  Knight,  commanding  the  Second  Naval  District, 
and  Rear-admiral  Gleaves,  in  command  of  the  Destroyer 
Flotilla,  Captain  Rose  departed  with  his  vessel  at  sunset. 

The  mission  of  the  U-53,  however,  was  but  partly  ful- 
filled, for  on  Monday  morning  the  American  public  was 
amazed  to  read  that  she  had  sunk  five  ships  almost  within 


The  Battle  of  Jutland  429 

sight  of  the  coast.  These  vessels,  two  of  which  belonged 
to  neutral  powers,  Holland  and  Norway,  were  encountered 
on  the  ocean  highway  passing  Nantucket  Light. 

On  receiving  news  of  these  events,  Rear-admiral  Knight, 
who  was  in  close  touch  with  Washington,  dispatched  the 
whole  destroyer  flotilla  to  the  scene  of  operations,  thereby 
saving  the  lives  of  216  victims  of  Germany's  inhumane 
methods  of  warfare.  A  peculiarly  flagrant  example  of  this 
was  the  sinking  of  the  Red  Star  liner,  Stephano.  The 
British  asserted  that  the  act  of  Germany  of  setting  164 
people  adrift,  forty  miles  from  land,  was  in  direct  contraven- 
tion of  her  pledge  to  take  precautions  for  the  safety  of  non- 
combatants.  The  following  account  of  the  affair  is  taken 
from  the  statement  of  Captain  Clifton  Smith  of  the  Stephano: 

"  We  were  about  three  miles  east  of  the  Nantucket  Lightship  and  about 
42  miles  from  the  mainland  when  I  first  saw  the  submarine.  This  was 
at  5.55  p.  m.  I  was  on  the  bridge.  The  weather  was  somewhat  hazy 
and  it  was  a  little  dark,  but  I  could  make  her  out  plainly.  She  was  about 
half  a  mile  away,  and  was  lying  next  a  fairly  large  ship,  which  was  appar- 
ently a  supply  ship. 

"She  fired  a  shot  across  our  bows  and  I  slowed  down.  There  were 
four  such  shots  fired  by  her  altogether,  about  two  minutes  apart.  None 
of  them  hit  us.  There  were  two  American  destroyers  near  by  about  this 
time.  I  ordered  the  boats  lowered,  and  prepared  to  abandon  the  ship. 
There  were  97  passengers  and  67  crew,  and  we  used  six  out  of  eight  boats. 
While  we  were  doing  this  the  submarine  went  under  the  lee  of  the  Stephano. 
I  could  not  see  much  of  her,  but  could  tell  by  her  lights  that  she  was  going 
along  by  the  side  of  the  ship. 

«  When  we  were  in  the  boats  it  was  dark,  but  we  saw  the  submarine 
leave  the  Stephano  and  go  off  about  a  mile  and  a  half  and  sink  a  freighter. 
We  could  not  make  out  what  vessel  it  was  or  whether  her  crew  left,  but 
we  saw  her  sink. 

"Then  the  submarine  returned  to  the  Stephano.  She  fired  thirty  shots 
into  the  hull  of  the  vessel,  but  they  apparently  did  little  harm.  They  did 
not  even  put  the  dynamo  out  of  commission,  and  the  vessel  remained  fully 
lighted.  Then  the  submarine  drew  off  and  fired  one  torpedo.  The 
Stephano  went  down  in  seven  minutes  after  being  hit.  We  were  later 
picked  up  by  the  destroyer." 


430  The  Great  War 

This  was  the  last  effort  of  Germany  to  invade  American 
waters,  ami,  in  spite  of  a  temporary  panic  in  shipping,  the 
usual  sailings  were  soon  resumed.  It  is  characteristic  of 
Germany's  nearsighted  policy  and  bad  psychological  direc- 
tion that  her  raid  in  the  neutral  waters  of  the  United  States 
instead  of  producing  the  desired  effect  of  keeping  America 
out  of  the  war,  had  precisely  the  contrary  effect  and  was  a 
contributory  influence  towards  the  participation  of  America 
therein.  There  is  no  question  but  that  Captain  Hans 
Rose's  visit  to  Newport  was  the  immediate  cause  of  trans- 
forming a  great  number  of  hitherto  "neutral"  Americans 
into  ardent  advocates  of  the  assertion  of  international  rights 
backed  by  all  the  powers  of  the  American  Republic.  All 
efforts  to  modify  an  intolerable  condition  by  peaceful  means 
had  failed  and  the  people  of  the  United  States  at  last  realized 
that  but  one  solution  remained — that  of  military  force. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

The  United  States  and  the  European  War 

American  national  traits  and  traditional  foreign  policy.  The  repercussion 
of  the  European  war.  American  beneficence.  The  conflict  of  opinions 
and  the  predominance  of  pro- Ally  sentiment.  The  exportation  of  munitions 
and  Teutonic  intrigues  and  propaganda ;  the  New  York  World  revelation, 
August  15,  1915;  the  Archibald  affair  and  the  recall  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Ambassador,  Dr.  Dumba.  Questions  of  naval  warfare ;  the  under- 
lying principles  of  international  law  and  the  Declaration  of  London.  The 
conduct  of  the  Allies  in  regard  to  neutral  commerce ;  American  protests. 
The  governmental  control  of  the  distribution  and  consumption  of  cereals 
established  in  Germany,  February  1,  1915.  The  Allies  henceforth  treat 
cereals  as  contraband.  Germany  creates  a  war  zone  in  the  waters  around  the 
British  Isles,  February  18th.  Retaliatory  measures  of  the  Allies  for  the  pur- 
pose of  establishing  a  virtual  blockade  of  Germany,  March  1 5th.  The  United 
States  contests  the  legality  of  these  measures.  Dangerous  questions  created 
by  the  nature  of  the  submarine  as  a  commerce-destroyer.  Sinking  of  the 
Lusitania,  May  7,  1915,  and  the  subsequent  discussion.  Conflicting  ten- 
dencies in  Germany  and  resignation  of  von  Tirpitz.  The  Channel  steamer 
Sussex  torpedoed,  March  24,  1916.  American  note  to  Germany,  April  18th, 
and  Germany's  promise  to  restrict  submarine  activity,  May  4th.  Transatlan- 
tic voyages  of  submarines.  Ominous  indications  in  Germany.  President 
Wilson's  request  for  statement  of  war  aims  of  the  belligerents,  December 
18th;  his  speech  in  the  Senate,  January  22,  1917.  Germany  announces 
unrestricted  submarine  warfare,  January  31st ;  severance  of  diplomatic  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  Germany,  February  3d.  President 
Wilson's  address  to  joint  session  of  Congress  and  declaration  of  war  by 
the  United  States  on  April  2d.  American  military  preparations.  The 
expansion  of  the  regular  army.  The  National  Guard  taken  into  the  Federal 
service.  The  Selective  Draft  Law.  Registration  and  the  Local  Draft 
Boards.  The  thirty-two  cantonments.  Officers'  training  camps.  Army 
Ordnance  Department.  Military  aeronautics.  Arrival  of  General  Pershing 
and  staff  in  France,  June  13,  1917. 

The  emotional  storm  created  by  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
in  Europe  burst  in  the  United  States  upon  a  population 
presenting  the  sharp  contrast  between  the  older  native 
stock  and  the  conglomerate  product  of  more  recent  immi- 
gration. The  former  element,  comparatively  homoge- 
neous in  sentiment  and  mental  habits,  cherishing  for  the 
most  part  middle-class  ideals,  was  still  singularly  responsive 

431 


432  The  Great  War 

to  its  puritanical  traditions,  and  instinctively  regarded  society 
from  the  individualistic  and  capitalistic  point  of  view,  while 
the  newcomers,  notwithstanding  their  great  variety  of  origin 
and  nationality,  exhibited  to  a  great  extent  a  similarity  of 
collectivistic  tendencies  in  thought  and  feeling. 

The  native  temperament  and  attitude  are  our  first  con- 
sideration. 

The  revered  founders  of  the  Republic  had  adopted  the 
principle  of  non-interference  in  the  affairs  of  the  Old 
World  as  the  basis  of  foreign  policy  and  their  successors 
adhered  unswervingly  to  this  doctrine,  even  after  the  de- 
velopment of  the  nation's  strength  and  prestige  had  made 
the  observance  of  it  less  imperative.  The  typical  Amer- 
ican of  the  older  stock  had  been  accustomed  to  associate 
the  foreigner  and  immigrant  with  the  rudest  tasks  of  un- 
skilled labor.  The  traditional  policy  of  isolation  and  the 
feeling  of  evident  superiority  to  the  foreigners  usually  en- 
countered, together  with  the  sense  of  assurance  inherited 
from  the  pioneer  period,  pride  in  splendid  material  achieve- 
ments, and  concern  for  the  survival  of  the  type  combined 
to  create  a  smug,  exclusive  spirit  which  regarded  the  out- 
side world  with  condescension  often  mingled  with  suspicion. 

As  a  result,  the  United  States  was  the  most  eccentric  of 
the  greater  powers.  Many  practices  of  life  common  to 
the  other  civilized  lands  were  strange  to  American  society. 
Until  recently  the  teaching  of  geography  and  history  in 
American  schools  and  colleges  had  been  superficial  or  even 
misleading  and  inaccurate  and  the  vast  current  of  American 
travel  in  Europe  had  only  partly  dispelled  the  widespread 
ignorance  and  indifference  in  respect  to  the  contemporary 
life  and  conditions  of  the  other  most  important  peoples  of 
the  globe.  It  was  the  natural  ideal  of  patriotism  to  assimi- 
late and  unify  the  heterogeneous  elements  of  the  popula- 
tion.   But  it  was  necessary,  if  the  mission  of  the  Great  War 


Petrograd 


Diagram  showing  area  in  which  the  Germans  stated,  in  their  note  of  January  31,   191  7,  that  they 
would  carry  on  unrestricted  submarine  operations. 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War  433 

in  breaking  down  barriers  and  creating  an  association  of  all 
nations  was  to  be  accomplished,  that  the  United  States  as  a 
people  should  be  drawn  from  their  solitary  course,  should 
join  in  humanity's  great  struggle  by  the  side  of  other  en- 
lightened peoples,  and  should  make  their  spiritual  qualities 
felt  in  the  great  forum  of  the  world. 

The  American  public  more  and  more  absorbed  by  the 
increasing  tension  of  the  last  days  of  July,  1914,  was  thrown 
into  a  spasm  of  excitement  by  the  tidings  that  the  great 
catastrophe  had  taken  place.  Their  bewildered  imagina- 
tion sought  relief  in  the  thought  of  the  broad  expanse  of 
ocean  separating  the  United  States  from  the  vast  confla- 
gration. Yet,  with  the  ties  of  blood,  the  facilities  of  com- 
munication, and  the  intimate  relations  of  commerce  and 
civilization,  it  was  idle  to  dream  of  immunity  from  the 
effects  of  the  great  convulsion.  Many  of  the  phenomena 
produced  by  the  repercussion  of  the  European  crisis  on 
the  United  States  were  only  of  passing  importance  and 
need  not  detain  us.  But  a  striking  indication  of  the  soli- 
darity of  human  interests  was  the  almost  unprecedented 
financial  situation  resulting  from  the  frenzied  unloading  by 
European  holders  of  American  securities  on  the  American 
market,  after  the  European  exchanges  had  been  closed, 
which  made  it  necessary  to  close  the  New  York  Stock 
Exchange  on  July  31st  for  the  first  time  in  forty  years. 

The  President  officially  proclaimed  the  neutrality  of  the 
United  States  on  August  4th,  but  the  armed  clash  in 
Europe  immediately  provoked  an  acute  conflict  of  senti- 
ment and  opinion  in  a  people  which  had  sprung  from  the 
life  of  the  older  continent  and  contained  within  its  borders 
numerous  representatives  of  all  the  warring  nations. 

American  sympathy  was  quickly  aroused  by  the  pathetic 
situation  of  the  innocent  victims  of  the  conflict  and  soon 
found  practical  expression  in  the  work  of  relief  committees. 


434  The  Great  War 

The  Commission  for  Relief  in  Belgium  was  created  by 
the  American  and  Spanish  Ambassadors  at  London  and 
Ministers  at  Brussels,  the  American  Ambassador  at  Ber- 
lin, and  the  American  Minister  at  The  Hague,  and  an 
American,  Mr.  Herbert  C.  Hoover,  won  a  world-wide 
reputation  as  its  chairman.  That  this  Commission  might 
act  as  the  intermediary  for  the  transmission  and  distribution 
of  food  consigned  to  the  Belgian  population,  Great  Britain 
agreed  to  permit  the  passage  of  the  shipments  through  the 
North  Sea,  and  Holland,  the  exportation  of  the  food  com- 
modities to  Belgium,  while  Germany  pledged  itself  not  to 
requisition  the  supplies.  The  headquarters  of  this  Com- 
mission was  in  London  and  its  activity  extended  to  all  the 
neutral  countries.  Its  chief  function  was  the  organization 
of  transportation,  and  it  acted  as  the  trustee  of  two  funds, 
one  supplied  by  donors  in  various  countries  for  the  trans- 
portation of  donated  food  supplies,  the  other  provided  by 
the  Belgians  themselves  for  the  purchase  of  food  supplies. 
The  Commission  included  the  Comite  National  de  Secours 
et  d'Alimentation,  created  by  Belgian  business  men  for  the 
distribution  of  the  food  supplies  throughout  their  country, 
and  subsequently  the  Comite  d'Alimentation  du  Nord  de  la 
France,  organized  for  the  same  function  in  the  occupied 
region  of  France,  as  well  as  the  affiliated  commissions  in 
Spain,  Italy,  and  the  United  States.  The  latter,  whose  office 
was  at  71  Broadway,  New  York,  organized  or  associated  with 
itself  local  relief  committees  to  the  number  of  more  than 
1,000,  and  by  the  close  of  1914  it  had  established  a  ser- 
vice of  thirty-one  steamers  between  American  ports  and 
Rotterdam. 

The  Belgian  Relief  Fund  was  inaugurated  on  Septem- 
ber 10,  1914,  for  collecting  cash,  as  well  as  food  and  other 
supplies,  and  forwarding  them  to  the  needy  Belgians. 
Particular    forms    of   need   in  Western   Europe    and   the 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War   435 

suffering  created  by  the  devastation  of  Poland,  Galicia,  Ser- 
bia, Armenia,  and  Syria  called  into  existence  a  great  number 
of  similar  organizations. 

The  devoted  efforts  of  individual  Americans,  whose  ini- 
tiative and  administrative  talent  have  been  an  indispensable 
factor  in  the  success  of  the  Commission  for  the  Relief  of 
Belgium,  deserve  the  highest  praise.  But  the  erroneous 
conception,  sometimes  encouraged  by  thoughtless  utter- 
ances of  the  press  or  public  speakers,  that  Belgium  was 
mainly  fed  by  the  liberality  of  the  United  States  should 
receive  emphatic  contradiction. 

The  food  distributed  in  Belgium  was  largely  bought  and 
paid  for  by  the  Belgians  themselves.  The  total  funds  en- 
trusted to  the  Commission  down  to  October  31,  1916, 
amounted  to  $201,782,079.  It  had  imported  into  Belgium 
and  the  occupied  districts  of  France  food  valued  at  $179,- 
658,916.  The  British  and  French  governments  had  ad- 
vanced to  the  Belgian  government  $108,121,358  for  relief 
in  Belgium,  and  French  institutions  had  loaned  the  com- 
munes in  northern  France  $66,155,501  for  the  assistance  of 
the  destitute.  Down  to  the  close  of  1916  about  60%  of  the 
disbursements  of  the  Commission  had  been  for  purchasing 
supplies  in  the  United  States,  on  which  the  profit  to  Amer- 
icans was  estimated  at  $30,000,000.  The  total  of  American 
subscriptions  in  cash,  food,  and  clothing  for  the  relief  of 
Belgium  to  October  31,  1916,  were  $8,747,138  as  compared 
with  $13,689,670  in  Great  Britain.  Tasmania  had  given 
$6.53,  the  United  States,  $.09,  per  head  of  their  respective 
populations  down  to  the  close  of  the  same  year. 

During  the  present  critical  period  in  the  life  of  the  great 
American  Commonwealth,  the  nation  has  been  fortunate 
in  the  leadership  of  a  chief  magistrate  whose  policy,  in- 
spired by  lofty  ideals  and  unusual  intellectual  vision,  was 
sustained  with  courage  and  consistency.     The  reader  may 


436  The  Great  War 

be  spared  a  formal  digression  on  the  previous  career  of  a 
statesman  whose  name  has  become  a  household  word  to 
millions  everywhere  who  yearn  and  pray  for  the  coming 
of  a  new  age  of  international  peace  and  justice.  It  will  be 
sufficient  to  recall  that  Woodrow  Wilson  was  born  of 
Scotch-Irish  stock  at  Staunton,  Virginia,  December  28, 
1856,  graduated  from  Princeton  University  in  1879,  and 
received  his  doctor's  degree  at  Johns  Hopkins  University 
in  1885;  that  the  merits  of  his  thesis  on  Congressional 
Government  earned  him  an  appointment  as  associate  pro- 
fessor of  history  and  political  economy  at  Bryn  Mawr 
College  the  same  year  and  later  one  as  professor  of  these 
branches  at  the  Wesleyan  University;  that  in  recognition 
of  his  treatise  on  The  State  he  was  called  in  1890  to  the 
chair  of  jurisprudence  and  political  economy  at  Princeton 
University  and  was  elected  president  of  the  same  institu- 
tion in  1902,  the  year  of  the  publication  of  his  most  com- 
prehensive work,  the  History  of  the  American  People;  that 
he  was  elected  Governor  of  New  Jersey  in  1910  and  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  on  November  6,  1912;  and  that 
his  conduct  has  ever  been  characterized  by  independence 
and  determination. 

From  the  first,  President  Wilson  was  guided  by  the  con- 
viction that  the  United  States  would  best  serve  the  interests 
of  humanity  by  maintaining  strict  neutrality  in  the  Euro- 
pean conflict  with  an  attitude  of  friendly  sympathy  for  all 
the  belligerents.  As  official  head  of  one  of  the  powers 
signatory  to  The  Hague  Conference,  in  accordance  with 
Article  III  of  The  Hague  Convention,  he  offered  his  ser- 
vices as  mediator  in  the  cause  of  European  peace  by  a 
message  cabled  to  the  rulers  of  Great  Britain,  France,  Ger- 
many, Austria-Hungary,  and  Russia  on  August  5,  1914,  but 
without  effect.  The  American  diplomatic  representatives 
undertook  the  protection  of  German  and  Austro-Hungarian 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War   437 

interests  in  London,  Petrograd,  and  Tokio;  British,  Japa- 
nese, and  Serbian  interests  in  Berlin;  British,  French,  and 
Japanese  interests  in  Vienna;  and  German,  Austro-Hun- 
garian,  British,  Serbian,  and  Japanese  interests  in  Brussels. 

President  Wilson's  attitude  was  clearly  expressed  in  an 
address  on  April  20,  1915,  in  which  he  declared: 

"We  are  the  mediating  nation  of  the  world.  We  are 
compounded  of  the  nations  of  the  world;  we  mediate  their 
blood,  we  mediate  their  traditions,  we  mediate  their  senti- 
ments, their  tastes,  their  passions;  we  are  ourselves  com- 
pounded of  those  things.  We  are  therefore  able  to 
understand  them  in  the  compound,  not  separately,  as  parti- 
sans, but  unitedly  as  knowing  and  comprehending  and 
embodying  them  all.  It  is  in  that  sense  that  I  mean  that 
America  is  a  mediating  nation." 

It  was  a  tremendous  conversion  from  this  attitude  of 
sympathetic  detachment  to  one  of  determined  interven- 
tion in  the  struggle,  a  revolution  of  epochal  importance 
for  the  whole  world. 

The  cause  of  each  of  the  warring  groups  in  Europe 
found  passionate  support  among  the  millions  of  European 
birth  living  in  the  United  States.  German  agencies  were 
soon  conducting  a  vigorous  and  well-organized  propaganda 
for  mobilizing  German- American  sentiment  and  spreading 
the  Teutonic  doctrine  of  the  causes  and  moral  issues  of 
the  Great  War.  Some  prominent  scientists  and  men  of 
letters,  inspired  by  German  scholarship,  thoroughness,  and 
efficiency,  or  by  academic  associations,  appealed  to  the 
American  public  with  great  earnestness  in  favor  of  the 
Central  Powers.  Other  authorities,  espousing  the  Allied 
cause,  challenged  with  equal  fervor  the  arguments  of  the 
first  group,  and  the  controversial  literature,  which  was 
widely  circulated,  together  with  the  diplomatic  correspond- 
ence as  published  by  the  different  belligerents,  was  read 


438  The  Great  War 

with  close  attention  and  contributed  largely  to  the  forma- 
tion of  public  opinion. 

Affinity  of  blood,  traditions,  and  civilization,  and  the 
similarity  of  democratic  ideals  predisposed  a  large  part  of 
the  American  people  to  favor  the  Entente.  The  public  was 
deeply  stirred  by  the  ruthless  invasion  of  Belgium  in  fla- 
grant disregard  of  every  principle  of  right  and  justice  and 
by  the  subsequent  reports  of  the  inhuman  conduct  of  the 
invaders  of  that  unhappy  country. 

The  conviction  was  gradually  formed  in  the  intelligence 
of  the  most  representative  part  of  the  American  democracy 
that  autocracy  in  the  Central  Empires,  its  views  distorted 
by  extravagant  medieval  conceits,  supported  by  a  privileged 
military  caste  and  an  insatiable  class  of  large  capitalists, 
regarding  war  as  the  supreme  source  of  profit  and  glory, 
had  deliberately  prepared  for  a  struggle  of  aggrandize- 
ment; that  Austria-Hungary  had  sent  the  ultimatum  to 
Serbia  with  the  full  knowledge  and  consent,  if  not  at  the 
suggestion,  of  the  German  government;  and  that  the  Ger- 
man people  had  been  beguiled  into  believing  that  they 
were  victims  of  an  unprovoked  attack  and  that  their  con- 
sequent struggle  in  self-defense  would  be  short  and  vic- 
torious. The  conviction  was  even  more  firmly  held  by  a 
majority  of  Americans  that  Germany's  alleged  grievances 
against  Belgium  were  unfounded  and  that  the  invasion  of 
that  country  without  just  cause  was  one  of  the  greatest 
crimes  in  history.  But  the  American  public  generally  was 
far  from  assuming  that  its  own  peace  and  prosperity  were 
threatened  by  German  brutality  and  contempt  for  all  moral 
obligation,  or  that  the  necessity  would  ever  arise  for  Amer- 
ican intervention  in  a  conflict  between  European  Powers. 

With  the  failure  in  the  early  stages  of  the  war  to  con- 
vince the  American  people  generally  of  the  righteousness 
of  the  Teutonic  cause,  the  German  agencies  for  propaganda 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War   439 

in  the  United  States  turned  their  attention  to  the  exportation 
of  war  supplies  to  the  Allies  and  appealed  on  this  question 
with  some  success,  on  moral  and  humanitarian  grounds,  to 
the  pacifistic  sentiment  throughout  the  country. 

The  command  of  the  sea  by  the  Allied  navies  secured 
for  the  nations  of  the  Entente  exclusive  access  to  the 
potentially  abundant  sources  of  war  material  and  muni- 
tions in  the  United  States.  Before  the  war  had  been  in 
progress  many  months  the  German  public  was  stirred  to 
resentment  by  the  reports  of  vast  quantities  of  such  sup- 
plies shipped  from  American  ports  to  their  opponents,  and 
the  view  was  even  expressed  in  Germany  that  without  this 
traffic  the  conflict  might  have  been  brought  to  a  victorious 
termination  by  the  Central  Empires  within  a  comparatively 
short  time.  In  reality,  the  volume  of  the  exportation  of  war 
materials  from  the  United  States  was  practically  negligible 
during  the  first  few  months  of  the  war,  but  it  reached  the 
value  of  $350,000,000  for  the  entire  fiscal  year  ending  June 
30,  1915,  and  subsequently  rose  vastly  higher. 

The  Central  Empires  could  not  consistently  demand  the 
abolishment  of  international  traffic  in  arms  and  munitions 
on  principle,  in  view  of  their  own  exportation  of  the  same 
class  of  articles  during  the  South  African,  Russo-Japanese, 
and  recent  Balkan  Wars,  but  their  general  attitude  in  the 
existing  situation  was  that  the  United  States  should  adopt 
what  they  regarded  as  a  higher  conception  of  neutrality 
and  place  both  groups  of  contestants  on  an  equal  footing 
by  suppressing  a  source  of  advantage  from  which  only  one 
group  could  benefit.  It  was  argued  that  the  existing  policy 
of  the  United  States  was  juristically  right  but  morally  wrong. 

In  general,  however,  the  suppression  of  international 
traffic  in  arms  and  munitions  would  be  contrary  to  the 
interests  of  a  non-militaristic  country  like  the  United  States, 
since  in  case  of  war  it  would  assure  a  fatal  preponderance 


4-10  The  Great  War 

to  the  militarist  state  which  devoted  a  large  part  of  its  ener- 
gies in  time  of  peace  to  the  organization  of  its  war  indus- 
tries and  the  accumulation  of  war  supplies. 

In  his  memorial  of  April  11,  1915,  the  German  Am- 
bassador at  Washington,  referred  to  the  "enormous  new 
industry  of  war  materials  of  every  kind,"  which,  "in  con- 
tradiction with  the  real  spirit  of  neutrality"  was  being  built 
up  in  the  United  States,  and  added: 

"If  the  American  people  desire  to  observe  strict  neu- 
trality, they  will  find  the  means  to  stop  the  exclusive  ex- 
portation of  arms  to  one  side." 

With  the  failure  of  the  agitation  for  securing  the  passage 
by  Congress  of  embargo  legislation  on  the  trade  in  arms 
and  munitions,  German  zealots  adopted  more  drastic  meas- 
ures, forming  intrigues  and  plots  on  American  soil  for 
provoking  unrest  and  disorder,  with  the  official  cognizance 
and  encouragement  of  the  German  and  Austro-Hungarian 
authorities. 

The  country  was  astounded  by  the  revelation  made  by 
the  New  York  World,  August  15,  1915,  of  the  contents  of 
a  series  of  letters  contained  in  a  portfolio  taken  from  Dr. 
Heinrich  F.  Albert,  financial  adviser  to  the  German  Em- 
bassy, in  the  New  York  Elevated,  on  July  31st.  These 
letters,  which  had  been  addressed  to  Dr.  Albert,  furnished 
the  details  of  an  elaborate  scheme  for  influencing  the  press, 
financing  professional  lecturers,  publishing  books,  provok- 
ing strikes  in  munitions  factories,  and  crippling  shipping 
along  the  Atlantic  seaboard  by  promoting  a  general  strike 
of  the  longshoremen. 

Even  more  sensational  was  the  discovery  resulting  from 
the  detention  of  Mr.  James  F.  J.  Archibald,  an  American 
journalist,  when  the  steamship  Rotterdam  coming  from 
New  York  touched  at  Falmouth,  England,  on  August 
30,  1915.     Among  his  belongings  there  were  documents 


.b-jfrin'-J    ni   »3  tin  J    -)i\i    to    bifb-ni   rjbrn:ffiui<>  > 


Suilt 

1 

on  the  trade  in 
lore  drastic  n 

CKNERAL   JOHN    JOSKPH    PFRSHINCJ 

Commander-in-cniet  of  the   United  States  forces  in   Fiance. 


ram  Dr. 
to  the  German  1 
ed,  on  July  31st.     Th 
Dr.  Albert,  furnished 
the  press, 
•  ■    - 

by  promotin 

torn 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War   441 

bearing  the  signatures  of  Count  Bernstorfr*,  Dr.  Konstantin 
Theodor  Dumba,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador  to 
the  United  States,  and  Captain  von  Papen,  German  Mili- 
tary Attache  in  Washington,  showing  that  Mr.  Archibald 
had  undertaken  to  misuse  the  privilege  accorded  an  Amer- 
ican passport  by  serving  as  secret  courier  between  the  Ger- 
man and  Austro-Hungarian  Embassies  and  the  Foreign 
Offices  of  the  Central  Powers. 

In  one  of  the  letters  Dr.  Dumba  warmly  recommended 
a  proposal  for  fomenting  strikes  in  the  plants  of  the  Beth- 
lehem Steel  Company  and  others  in  the  Middle  West. 

"It  is  my  impression,"  said  Dr.  Dumba,  "that  we  can 
disorganize  and  hold  up  for  months,  if  not  entirely  prevent, 
the  manufacture  of  munitions  in  Bethlehem  and  the  Mid- 
dle West,  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  German  Military 
Attache,  is  of  great  importance  and  amply  outweighs  the 
comparatively  small  expenditure  of  money  involved." 

Trustworthy  German  and  Austro-Hungarian  workmen 
were  to  be  sent  to  Bethlehem  to  work  in  the  munition 
plants  and  operate  secretly  among  their  fellow-workmen, 
spreading  agitation  and  arranging  for  popular  meetings. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Embassy  in  Washington  was 
evidently  a  center  for  intrigues  and  the  United  States  de- 
manded that  Dr.  Dumba  should  be  recalled  on  the  ground 
that  he  had  been  guilty  of  a  breach  of  diplomatic  propriety. 

In  spite  of  indignation  at  the  inhuman  acts  committed 
by  the  Central  Powers,  irritation  at  the  impudence  of  the 
German  and  Austro-Hungarian  official  agents  in  America, 
and  widespread  sympathy  for  the  Allies,  it  was  evident  that 
the  United  States  would  only  be  drawn  into  the  struggle 
by  the  violation  of  her  rights  as  a  neutral  on  the  sea. 

As  issues  of  the  greatest  importance  for  the  whole  world 
depended  on  the  maritime  complications  in  which  the 
interests  of  the  United  States  became  inevitably  involved, 


442  The  Great  War 

it  is  essential  to  have  a  clear  grasp  of  the  fundamental 
principles  upon  which  discussion  turned.  A  brief  review 
of  some  of  the  main  elements  of  the  international  law  of 
n\  ar  at  sea  ma\ .  therefore,  not  he  out  of  place,  even  though 
it  involves  an  element  of  repetition. 

The  international  law  of  war  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Great  War  recognized  a  fundamental  distinction  between 
the  rights  of  private  property  on  land  and  those  at  sea. 
Private  property  on  land,  whether  of  neutral  or  enemy 
ow  nership,  was  held  to  be  inviolable,  except  so  far  as  the 
necessities  of  the  actual  military  operations  required.  But 
privately  owned  vessels  of  the  enemy  were  generally  sub- 
ject to  capture,  or,  if  it  were  impossible  to  retain  them  as 
prizes,  they  could  be  sunk  or  otherwise  destroyed,  although 
in  this  case  obvious  principles  of  humanity  required  that 
the  lives  of  the  passengers  and  crews  should  be  safeguarded. 

As  peaceful  intercourse  is  the  normal  relationship  of 
human  society,  the  neutral  might  reasonably  claim  the 
utmost  consideration  from  the  belligerents  in  his  pursuits 
upon  the  high  seas,  which  belong  to  the  human  race  in 
common,  and  international  law  had  aimed  at  guaranteeing 
the  general  right  of  non-belligerents  to  trade  with  the 
contestants,  insofar  as  their  commercial  operations  did  not 
afford  direct  help  in  war.  The  Declaration  of  Paris  in 
1856  provided  that  a  neutral  flag  covered  enemy  goods  and 
that  neutral  goods  were  even  immune  from  seizure  when 
conveyed  under  the  enemy  flag. 

But  neutral  commerce  was  not  free  to  contribute  directly 
to  the  military  operations  of  a  belligerent,  either  by  supply- 
ing him  with  munitions  or  material  of  war  or  by  neutraliz- 
ing the  effect  of  a  blockade  by  replenishing  the  supplies  of 
the  blockaded  forces. 

Articles  which  were  intended  primarily  for  warlike  pur- 
poses were  known  as  contraband  and  were  liable  to  capture 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War  443 

on  the  high  seas  when  destined  for  enemy  territory.  In 
addition  to  absolute  contraband  there  were  many  articles 
which  could  be  equally  used  for  warlike  or  peaceful  pur- 
poses and  were  therefore  called  conditional  contraband. 
These  were  liable  to  capture  only  when  destined  for  the 
armed  forces  of  the  enemy.  The  list  of  articles  classed  as 
contraband  has  varied  considerably  from  time  to  time.  A 
tentative  list  of  absolute  contraband  was  formulated  at  The 
Hague  in  1907  and  adopted  by  the  International  Naval 
Conference  in  the  Declaration  of  London,  February  26, 
1909.  The  same  document  contained  a  list  of  conditional 
contraband  which  included  fuel,  foodstuffs,  and  clothing. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Great  War  the  different  bellig- 
erents published  lists  of  the  articles  which  they  would 
regard  as  absolute  and  conditional  contraband  respectively, 
but  the  subsequent  repeated  extensions  in  the  range  of 
contraband  in  consequence  of  the  advance  of  military 
science  restricted  more  and  more  the  scope  of  neutral 
commerce  and  created  a  feeling  of  bitterness  and  injustice 
among  the  neutral  trading  nations. 

While  the  law  of  contraband  authorized  the  seizure  of 
certain  articles  wherever  encountered  on  the  high  seas, 
when  destined  for  the  enemy,  the  right  of  blockade  im- 
plied the  obstruction  of  all  communication  with  the  enemy 
coast.  The  Declaration  of  Paris  prescribed  that  blockades, 
in  order  to  be  binding,  must  be  effective,  or  in  other  words, 
they  must  be  maintained  by  forces  sufficient  really  to  pre- 
vent access  to  the  enemy  coast.  In  case  an  effective  block- 
ade existed,  the  blockading  power  was  authorized  to  seize 
any  vessel  attempting,  or,  as  some  held,  intending,  to  run 
the  blockade. 

According  to  the  doctrine  of  "  continuous  voyage,"  the 
transportation  of  goods  from  the  original  port  of  shipment 
to  the  point  of  delivery  in  the  enemy  territory  is  regarded 


444  The  Great  War 

as  a  single  journey.  This  doctrine  was  advanced  by  the 
Federal  authorities  in  the  American  Civil  War  to  justify 
the  seizure  on  the  high  seas  of  goods  which  were  ulti- 
mately intended  for  enemy  territory,  even  though  they 
\\  ere  rirst  to  be  discharged  in  a  neutral  port.  This  doctrine 
has  been  variously  held  to  apply  only  to  contraband  or  to 
non-contraband  as  well  in  an  attempt  to  elude  a  blockade. 

The  London  Conference  agreed  that  the  doctrine  of 
"continuous  voyage"  should  apply  to  absolute  contraband, 
as  stated  in  article  30  of  the  Declaration  of  London,  as 
follows: 

"Absolute  contraband  is  liable  to  capture  if  it  is  shown 
to  be  destined  to  territory  belonging  to  or  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  or  to  the  armed  forces  of  the  enemy.  It  is  imma- 
terial whether  the  carriage  of  the  goods  is  direct  or  entails 
either  transhipment  or  transport  over  land." 

The  same  document  exempted  conditional  contraband 
from  application  of  the  doctrine  of  the  "continuous  voy- 
age," but  the  British  proclamation  of  August  21,  1914, 
rejected  this  reservation. 

The  rights  of  contraband  and  blockade  implied  the 
practice  of  visiting  and  searching  merchant  vessels  on  the 
high  seas  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  their  nationality, 
whether  they  carried  contraband,  whether  they  intended 
to  commit  or  had  committed  a  breach  of  blockade,  or 
whether  they  were  engaged  in  the  service  of  the  enemy. 

On  August  6,  1914,  the  United  States  proposed  to  the 
belligerents  that  the  Declaration  of  London  be  accepted 
by  all  for  the  duration  of  the  war,  but  the  Allies  agreed 
only  "to  adopt  generally  the  rules  of  the  declaration  subject 
to  certain  modifications  and  additions."  The  British  and 
French  governments  rejected  the  lists  of  contraband  and 
free  goods  contained  in  the  Declaration  and  applied  the 
doctrine  of  the  "continuous  voyage"  to  conditional  as  well 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War  445 

as  absolute  contraband,  in  case  the  goods  were  consigned 
"to  order,"  or  if  the  papers  did  not  show  a  consignee  of  the 
goods,  or  if  they  showed  a  consignee  in  enemy  territory. 

The  great  problem  for  the  Allies  in  their  operations 
against  German  trade  was  to  discover  and  deal  with  the 
cargoes  shipped  to  neutral  ports  in  Scandinavia,  Holland, 
and  (at  first)  Italy,  but  with  ultimate  destination  in  Germany. 

According  to  the  principles  accepted  by  themselves,  as 
mentioned  above,  the  Allies  could  seize  all  articles  of  ab- 
solute contraband,  if  it  could  be  proved  that  they  were 
destined  for  enemy  territory,  and  articles  of  conditional 
contraband,  if  it  could  be  proved  that  they  were  destined 
for  the  enemy  government  or  armed  forces,  while  articles 
of  conditional  contraband,  unless  proved  to  be  destined  for 
the  enemy  government  or  armed  forces,  non-contraband 
goods,  and  German  exports  (unless  carried  in  enemy  ships) 
were  not  subject  to  seizure. 

As  every  means  was  used  to  conceal  the  enemy  destina- 
tion of  goods  conveyed  in  neutral  ships  to  neutral  ports, 
the  British  government  established  a  Contraband  Commit- 
tee, whose  duty  it  was  to  collect  all  available  evidence  for 
the  real  destination  of  sea-borne  goods.  The  former  prac- 
tice of  relying  solely  on  the  evidence  obtained  from  an 
inspection  of  a  ship's  papers  and  cargo  by  boarding  officers 
in  their  visits  to  vessels  on  the  high  seas  was  found  to  be 
generally  unsatisfactory,  and  instead,  nearly  every  vessel 
bound  from  overseas  to  Scandinavian  or  Dutch  ports  was 
examined  on  its  way  in  a  British  port  and  every  item  in  its 
cargo  was  considered  in  the  light  of  all  the  information 
which  had  been  collected. 

For  greater  convenience  in  exercising  supervision  over 
the  overseas  commerce  of  neutrals,  the  British  government 
eventually  entered  into  agreements  with  representative 
associations  of  merchants  in  some  of  the  neutral  countries, 


446  The  Great  War 

the  hitter  guaranteeing  that  articles  consigned  to  them 
would  not  reach  the  enemy  in  any  form,  while  the  British 
government  undertook  in  return  not  to  interfere  with 
shipments  to  these  societies.  Such  agreements,  either  gen- 
eral in  scope  or  limited  to  certain  specified  articles,  were 
made  with  hodies  of  merchants  in  the  Netherlands,  Swe- 
den, Norway,  Denmark,  and  Switzerland. 

But  the  conduct  of  the  Allied  naval  authorities  soon  gave 
rise  to  bitter  complaints  on  the  part  of  the  shipping  interests 
of  the  United  States  and  other  neutral  powers.  On  De- 
cember 26th  the  American  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Bryan, 
sent  a  strong  note  of  protest  through  the  hands  of  Ambas- 
sador Page  to  the  British  Foreign  Office,  calling  attention 
to  the  fact  that  many  American  vessels  destined  for  neutral 
ports  had  been  stopped  on  the  high  seas,  taken  to  British 
ports,  and  sometimes  detained  for  weeks. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  replied  in  a  conciliatory  tone  on  Jan- 
uary 7,  1915,  declaring  that  Great  Britain  had  not  wished 
to  interfere  with  the  bo?ia  fide  trade  of  the  United  States 
with  neutral  countries,  but  quoting  statistics  to  show  that 
the  phenomenal  increase  of  American  exportation  in  cer- 
tain lines,  as  rubber  and  cotton,  to  the  countries  in  ques- 
tion, left  no  doubt  as  to  the  ultimate  destination  of  a  large 
part  of  the  commodities  imported.  He  promised  that  food- 
stuffs would  not  be  seized  without  the  presumption  that 
they  were  intended  for  the  enemy  forces. 

But  the  establishment  of  official  control  in  Germany  of 
the  distribution  and  consumption  of  all  cereals  on  Feb- 
ruary 1,  1915  (announced  January  26th),  was  the  professed 
motive  for  Great  Britain's  declaration  of  February  2d  that 
all  shipments  of  foodstuffs  to  Germany  would  thereafter 
be  subject  to  seizure  as  contraband,  since  it  would  be 
impossible  to  distinguish  between  the  supplies  of  the  civil- 
ian population  and  those  of  the  army. 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War   447 

This  was  followed  by  Germany's  epochal  decree  on  the 
4th,  as  a  retaliatory  measure  for  alleged  violations  of  inter- 
national law  by  Great  Britain  and  her  allies,  establishing  a 
war  zone  around  the  British  Isles,  effective  from  the  18th, 
within  which  Germany  would  destroy  all  enemy  merchant 
vessels  encountered,  inevitably  jeopardizing  the  persons 
and  the  cargoes  which  they  carried.  Neutral  vessels  were 
warned  that  they  exposed  themselves  to  danger  by  enter- 
ing the  war  zone,  in  consequence,  as  it  was  alleged,  of  the 
deceptive  use  of  neutral  flags  by  British  vessels. 

About  the  middle  of  March,  Great  Britain  and  France 
put  into  effect  a  system  of  reprisals  which  amounted  prac- 
tically to  a  blockade  of  Germany,  although  to  avoid  need- 
less complications  this  term  was  intentionally  avoided.  It 
was  now  the  purpose  of  the  Allies  to  intercept  all  the  over- 
seas trade  of  Germany,  although  the  measures  adopted  did 
not  enjoin  the  confiscation  of  ships  or  of  cargoes,  excepting 
contraband. 

In  a  note  to  the  British  government  on  March  30th,  the 
Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States,  Mr.  Bryan,  called 
attention  to  the  irregular  character  of  the  Allied  blockade. 
While  the  United  States  might  admit  that  the  form  of  close 
blockade  with  its  cordon  of  ships  in  the  immediate  offing 
of  the  blockaded  ports  was  no  longer  practicable  with  the 
present  conditions  of  naval  warfare,  the  use  of  mines,  sub- 
marines, and  aircraft,  it  insisted  that  the  form  of  effective 
blockade  adopted  must  accord  "with  the  spirit  and  princi- 
ples of  the  essence  of  the  rules  of  war."  The  extension  of 
the  blockade  to  neutral  ports  by  virtue  of  the  theory  of 
"continuous  voyage"  was  particularly  objectionable. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  replying  for  Great  Britain  contended 
that  there  was  precedent  for  British  conduct  in  the  posi- 
tion taken  by  the  United  States  in  the  Civil  War,  when 
the  Federal  government,  fearing  that  the  vigilance  of  its 


448  The  Great  War 

Reel  before  the  Confederate  ports  would  he  rendered  in- 
effective by  overseas  traffic  with  the  South  through  neutral 
ports  of  access,  took  immediate  steps  to  suppress  such  traffic. 

In  the  present  situation  the  United  States  maintained  that 
of  goods  shipped  to  neutral  ports  only  contraband  should 
be  liable  to  seizure.  The  Declaration  of  London  had  not 
recognized  the  theory  of  "continuous  voyage"  as  a  legiti- 
mate means  of  enforcing  a  blockade,  and  the  United  States 
courts  in  the  Civil  War  seem  to  have  applied  the  theory  of 
"continuous  voyage"  to  contraband  only,  and  not  to  block- 
ade. For  example,  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  ren- 
dered the  following  decision  in  the  case  of  the  cargo  (partly 
contraband)  of  the  British  vessel  Peter/wff  bound  for  Mata- 
moras,  Mexico: 

"The  trade  of  neutrals  with  belligerents  in  articles  not 
contraband  is  absolutely  free  unless  interrupted  by  block- 
ade; the  conveyance  by  neutrals  to  belligerents  of  contra- 
band articles  is  always  unlawful  and  such  articles  may  always 
be  seized  during  transit  by  sea.  Hence,  while  articles  not 
contraband  might  be  sent  to  Matamoras  and  beyond  to  the 
rebel  regions,  where  the  communications  were  not  inter- 
rupted by  blockade,  articles  of  a  contraband  character, 
destined  in  fact  to  a  state  in  rebellion  or  for  the  use  of  the 
rebel  military  forces,  were  liable  to  capture  though  pri- 
marily destined  for  Matamoras." 

The  discussion  was  prolonged  for  many  months  in  an 
ineffectual  correspondence  between  the  two  governments, 
until  the  American  claims  were  emphatically  summed  up 
in  a  note  delivered  to  the  British  Foreign  Office  through 
the  American  Embassy  in  London  on  November  5,  1915. 

This  communication  pointed  out  that  the  delays  imposed 
upon  the  cargoes  of  American  ships  destined  for  neutral 
ports  had  become  increasingly  vexatious.  Instead  of  act- 
ing on  the  basis  of  such  evidence  as  could  be  obtained  by 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War   449 

examination  at  sea,  the  British  authorities  often  detained 
vessels  in  port  on  mere  suspicion,  awaiting  evidence  from 
extraneous  sources  to  justify  the  institution  of  prize  court 
proceedings,  and  thereby  causing  loss,  delay,  and  expenses 
to  the  owners,  which  were  practically  destroying  much  of 
the  export  trade  of  the  United  States  to  the  neutral  countries 
in  Europe.  British  suspicions  created  by  the  comparative 
values  of  American  exportation  to  certain  neutral  countries, 
then  and  before  the  war,  were  unjustifiable,  because  the 
increased  prices  of  the  commodities  were  not  taken  into 
consideration  and  British  exports  to  the  same  countries  had 
likewise  increased.  The  United  States  claimed  the  right 
to  sell  goods  into  the  common  stock  of  neutral  countries 
without  respect  to  the  ultimate  disposition  of  the  goods 
thus  sold.  It  maintained,  moreover,  that  the  blockade  was 
illegal,  that  it  was  not  applied  impartially  to  ships  of  all 
nations,  and  that  its  extension  to  the  commerce  of  neutral 
ports  was  unjustifiable.  It  protested  against  the  application 
of  the  doctrine  of  "continuous  voyage"  in  support  of  a 
blockade;  and  to  the  British  contention  that  redress  for 
grievances  should  be  sought  in  the  British  Prize  Courts,  it 
objected  that  these  tribunals  were  bound  in  their  procedure, 
not  by  international  law,  but  by  the  same  municipal  regu- 
lations which  were  in  dispute.  It  declared,  in  short,  that 
the  United  States  could  not  "submit  to  the  curtailment  of 
its  neutral  rights  by  these  measures,  which  are  admittedly 
retaliatory,  and  therefore  illegal  in  conception  and  nature, 
and  intended  to  punish  the  enemies  of  Great  Britain  for 
alleged  illegalities  on  their  part." 

The  British  Foreign  Office  made  no  formal  reply  until 
April  24,  1916,  when  it  declared  that  "new  devices  for 
despatching  goods  to  the  enemy  must  be  met  by  new 
methods  for  applying  the  fundamental  and  acknowledged 
principle   of   the   right   to   intercept   such  trade."      The 


450  THE  Great  War 

conditions  of  modern  navigation  had  made  it  impossi- 
ble to  exercise  satisfactorily  the  right  of  search  on  the 
high  seas.  The  size  of  modern  ships  made  it  much  more 
difficult  to  discover  contraband  in  the  cargoes.  The  con- 
ditions had  made  the  old  rules  of  Prize  Court  procedure 
obsolete. 

"International  law,"  according  to  the  British  memoran- 
dum, "only  requires  that  the  practice  in  the  Prize  Courts 
of  the  belligerent  nation  should  afford  a  fair  hearing  to  all 
claims  put  forward  by  neutrals,  and  should  enable  the  courts 
to  arrive  at  a  just  conclusion  upon  the  evidence.  Subject  to 
that  condition,  each  nation  may  regulate  the  practice  to  be 
followed  in  its  Prize  Courts."  The  British  note  explained 
that  facilities  for  the  rapid  transmission  of  supplementary 
information  as  to  the  final  disposition  of  cargoes  by  fast 
mails  and  cables  made  it  unnecessary  for  shippers  to  give 
final  directions  in  the  ship's  papers,  so  that  the  latter  had 
ceased  to  be  a  safe  and  satisfactory  guide  in  the  matter.  As 
evidence  against  the  claim  that  the  burdens  and  annoyances 
of  British  Prize  Court  procedure  were  destroying  much  of 
the  export  trade  of  the  United  States  to  neutral  countries, 
American  statistics  were  cited,  showing  that  the  exports  of 
the  United  States  to  the  Scandinavian  countries  and  Holland 
had  risen  from  $97,480,000  in  the  first  seven  months  of  1913 
to  $234,960,000  for  the  corresponding  months  of  1915. 
Some  of  the  ports  in  these  neutral  countries  were  the 
main  avenues  by  which  supplies  had  reached  the  enemy 
from  all  parts  of  the  world  and  in  the  case  of  goods  con- 
signed to  these  ports  the  ship's  papers  offered  no  sugges- 
tions as  to  the  ultimate  destination. 

The  British  Foreign  Office  denied  that  the  retaliatory 
character  of  the  British  measures  made  them  illegal,  since 
they  did  not  conflict  with  any  general  principle  of  inter- 
national law,  humanity,  or  civilization.     To  the  complaint 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War  451 

that  British  Prize  Courts  were  not  qualified  to  grant  redress 
to  Americans  for  the  alleged  grievances,  it  replied  that 
these  courts  were  entitled,  if  satisfied  that  an  order  or 
instruction  issued  by  the  British  government  to  its  naval 
forces  was  inconsistent  with  international  law,  to  decline 
to  enforce  it.  The  Allied  governments  would  gladly  con- 
sider any  suggestions  that  would  alleviate  the  situation  of 
neutrals  without  impairing  the  substantial  effectiveness  of 
the  measures  in  force. 

The  questions  at  issue  with  Great  Britain  involved  only 
rights  of  property,  which  could  eventually  be  adjusted  by 
arbitration,  in  accordance  with  the  arbitration  treaty  re- 
cently signed.  But  the  questions  at  issue  with  Germany 
involved  the  lives  of  innocent  men,  women,  and  children, 
which  could  not  be  compensated  for  like  material  losses. 
Besides,  there  was  no  treaty  of  arbitration  between  the 
United  States  and  Germany. 

The  German  threat  in  the  announcement  of  February 
4,  1915,  depended  for  its  execution  on  the  submarine, 
which  by  its  very  nature  was  unsuited  to  act  as  a  com- 
merce-destroyer, if  bound  by  the  requirements  of  inter- 
national law  and  of  humanity.  While  equipped  with  a 
terribly  effective  weapon  for  offense  in  the  torpedo,  the 
submarine  was  so  frail  and  so  weak  defensively,  that  a 
merchant  vessel  might  destroy  it  by  the  fire  of  a  light 
gun  or  by  ramming.  These  conditions  impelled  the  sub- 
marine commander  to  attack  suddenly  and  unexpectedly, 
without  waiting  to  verify  the  character  and  destination  of 
a  suspected  vessel  or  to  warn  the  passengers  or  crew.  The 
capacity  of  a  submarine,  moreover,  was  so  limited  that  it 
could  neither  detach  a  prize  crew  to  man  a  captured  vessel 
nor  take  the  passengers  and  crew  on  board  itself.  It  had  to 
destroy  its  victim,  leaving  the  persons  on  board  to  seek 
safety  as  best  they  could  in  small  boats. 


452  The  Great  War 

The  United  States  government,  alive  at  once  to  the  im- 
minence of  complications,  notified  Germany  on  February 
10th  that  it  would  regard  the  destruction  of  an  American 
vessel  on  the  "high  seas  as  an  indefensible  violation  of 
neutral  rights,  which  it  would  be  very  hard  to  reconcile 
with  the  friendly  relations"  then  existing  between  the  two 
governments.  The  supposition  that  ships  of  a  belligerent 
power  were  using  neutral  flags  was  held  by  the  American 
government  to  create  no  just  presumption  that  all  ships 
traversing  the  proscribed  area  were  subject  to  the  same 
suspicion.  In  the  case  of  the  destruction  of  an  American 
vessel,  the  note  declared  that  the  Imperial  German  gov- 
ernment could  "readily  appreciate  that  the  government  of 
the  United  States  would  be  constrained  to  hold  the  Im- 
perial German  government  to  a  strict  accountability  for 
such  acts  of  their  naval  authorities,  and  to  take  any  steps 
it  might  be  necessary  to  take  to  safeguard  American  lives 
and  property,  and  to  secure  to  American  citizens  the  full 
enjoyment  of  their  acknowledged  rights  on  the  high  seas." 

The  whole  submarine  controversy  grew  out  of  a  funda- 
mental conflict  of  ideas,  the  German  assumption  that  the 
inherent  disabilities  of  the  submarine  should  turn  to  the 
disadvantage  of  non-combatants  as  opposed  to  the  Amer- 
ican contention  that  these  disabilities  should  react  to  the 
disadvantage  of  the  craft  itself. 

In  a  note  of  February  16th  the  German  government 
repudiated  all  responsibility  for  the  safety  of  neutral  ships 
entering  the  war  zone  around  the  British  Isles,  announced 
that  mines  would  be  laid  in  these  waters,  and  suggested 
that  if  the  United  States  would  persuade  Great  Britain  to 
withdraw  her  decree  regarding  foodstuffs  and  abide  by  the 
Declaration  of  London,  Germany  would  spare  British  ship- 
ping. Mr.  Bryan,  whose  supreme  concern  throughout  was 
to  safeguard  the  neutrality  of  the  United  States,  proposed 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War   453 

in  effect  to  the  British  and  German  governments  on  the  20th 
that  foodstuffs  for  the  sole  use  of  non-combatants  be  allowed 
to  enter  Germany,  while  German  submarine  commanders 
should  in  turn  observe  the  customary  rules  of  visit  and  search. 
But  the  proposed  compromise  led  to  no  practical  results. 

The  American  government's  apprehensions  at  Germany's 
lawless  policy  were  soon  realized.  A  series  of  offenses,  in- 
volving American  lives  and  property,  the  torpedoing  by  a 
German  submarine  of  the  British  steamer  Falaba,  March 
28th,  with  the  loss  of  one  American  life,  the  attack  on  the 
American  vessel  Cushing  by  a  German  aeroplane,  April 
28th,  and  the  attack  on  the  American  steamer  Gulflight  by 
a  German  submarine,  May  1st,  when  two  American  mem- 
bers of  the  crew  were  drowned,  foreshadowed  the  great 
climax  of  ruthlessness,  the  tragedy  at  which  the  imagina- 
tion of  mankind  will  be  stirred  as  long  as  the  memory  of 
the  Great  War  endures.  The  American  nation  was  stag- 
gered at  the  report  that  the  Lusitania  had  been  sunk  by  a 
German  submarine  off  the  Old  Head  of  Kinsale,  the  south- 
eastern point  of  Ireland,  on  May  7th,  with  the  loss  of  1,152 
lives,  including  114  Americans.  Bewilderment  was  fol- 
lowed by  a  sharp  reaction  of  feeling,  though  public  opin- 
ion was  variously  affected.  The  prevailing  impression  was 
one  of  intense  indignation  and  the  government  was  show- 
ered with  demands  for  prompt  and  vigorous  action.  A 
notice  from  the  German  Embassy  in  Washington  appear- 
ing in  the  press  on  the  morning  of  the  departure  of  the 
Lusitania  from  New  York,  May  1st,  warning  Americans 
of  the  danger  of  travelling  on  British  vessels  through  the 
war  zone,  was  naturally  regarded  as  an  indication  that  the 
outrage  had  been  expressly  planned  and  anticipated. 

The  New  York  Times  declared:  "From  our  Depart- 
ment of  State  there  must  go  to  the  Imperial  German 
government  at  Berlin  a  demand  that  the  Germans  shall  no 


454  The  Great  War 

longer  make  war  like  savages  drunk  with  blood,  that  they 
shall  cease  to  seek  the  attainment  of  their  ends  by  the 
assassination  of  non-combatants  and  neutrals.  In  the  his- 
tory of  wars  there  is  no  single  deed  comparable  in  its 
inhumanity  and  its  horror  to  the  destruction  without  warn- 
ing by  German  torpedoes  of  the  great  steamship  Lusitania 
with  more  than  1,800  souls  on  board,  and  among  them 
more  than  one  hundred  Americans.  Our  demand  must 
be  made  and  it  will  be  heeded  unless  Germany  in  her 
madness  would  have  it  understood  that  she  is  at  war  with 
the  whole  civilized  world." 

But  there  was  an  important  element  among  the  Amer- 
ican people  in  whom  anxiety  for  the  danger  to  American 
neutrality  outweighed  indignation  at  Germany's  ruthless 
conduct,  while  still  others  condoned  the  destruction  of  the 
Lusitania  or  openly  upheld  the  German  point  of  view. 

While  sorrow  was  expressed  in  Germany  at  the  death  of 
so  many  non-combatants,  the  public  applauded  the  sinking 
of  the  Lusitania  by  the  sole  means  available,  on  the  ground 
that  the  vessel  carried  a  large  cargo  of  munitions  and  other 
material  of  war  and  that  she  was  armed  with  guns.  The 
sinking  of  the  Lusitania  was  regarded  as  legitimate  warfare 
and  the  attendant  destruction  of  non-combatants,  while  un- 
fortunate, was  held  to  be  no  more  inhuman  than  the  losses 
unintentionally  inflicted  on  the  civilian  population  of  fortified 
towns  under  bombardment.  The  Germans  argued  that  to 
admit  special  immunity  for  enemy  vessels  carrying  passen- 
gers would  sanction  the  practice,  already  imputed  to  the 
British,  of  deliberately  using  passengers  as  a  protection  for 
shipments  of  war  material. 

In  a  communication  of  May  10th  the  German  govern- 
ment expressed  its  sympathy  for  the  loss  of  American  lives 
on  board  the  Lusitania,  but  at  the  same  time  asserted  that 
the  responsibility  rested  upon  the  British  government. 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War  455 

With  the  grave  situation  and  his  own  immense  responsi- 
bility before  him,  the  President  of  the  United  States  studied 
in  private  the  problem  confronting  the  government. 
Earnestness  and  self-possession  characterized  his  attitude 
and  the  conduct  of  the  administration  under  his  direction. 
He  wished  to  deal  moderately  but  firmly  with  Germany, 
appeasing  popular  resentment  at  home  and  forestalling  any 
passionate  outburst  that  might  impel  the  government  to 
inconsiderate  action. 

As  a  whole  the  country  was  adverse  to  a  hostile  policy, 
but  the  president's  warning  of  holding  Germany  to  a 
"strict  accountability"  seemed  to  leave  no  alternative  to 
drastic  action,  in  case  Germany  were  recalcitrant.  Feel- 
ing was  very  tense  when  the  cabinet  met  to  consider  the 
situation. 

After  a  protracted  deliberation  the  American  note  of 
protest,  to  which  reference  has  already  been  made  in  a 
previous  chapter,  received  its  definite  form  and  was  dis- 
patched to  Ambassador  Gerard  in  Berlin  for  transmission 
to  the  German  government  on  May  13th.  It  pointed  out 
that  a  grave  situation  had  been  created,  calling  for  a  clear 
understanding.  The  American  government  had  followed 
the  acts  of  German  naval  warfare  "with  growing  concern, 
distrust,  and  amazement." 

The  attitude  of  the  United  States  government  was  ex- 
pressed with  studied  precision: 

"It  assumes  .  .  .  that  the  Imperial  (German)  gov- 
ernment accept,  as  of  course,  the  rule  that  the  lives  of 
non-combatants,  whether  they  be  of  neutral  citizenship 
or  citizens  of  one  of  the  nations  at  war,  cannot  lawfully  or 
rightfully  be  put  in  jeopardy  by  the  capture  or  destruction 
of  an  unarmed  merchantman,  and  recognize  also,  as  all 
other  nations  do,  the  obligation  to  take  the  usual  precau- 
tion of  visit  and  search.     .     .     ." 


456  The  Great  War 

An  opportunity  was  suggested  for  the  German  govern- 
ment to  disavow  the  destruction  of  the  Lusitania  by  the 
assumption  of  the  American  government  expressed  in  the 
note  that  the  German  naval  commanders  in  committing 
these  acts  of  lawlessness  did  so  under  a  misapprehension 
of  their  orders. 

The  note  closed  with  the  statement: 

"The  Imperial  German  government  will  not  expect  the 
government  of  the  United  States  to  omit  any  word  or  act 
necessary  to  the  performance  of  its  sacred  duty  of  main- 
taining the  rights  of  the  United  States  and  its  citizens  and 
of  safeguarding  their  free  exercise  and  enjoyment." 

The  reply  of  the  German  government  on  May  28th  was 
merely  an  effort  at  evasion.  Avoiding  the  cardinal  points 
at  issue  the  German  government  sought  to  establish  its  own 
conception  of  an  adequate  basis  for  discussion.  It  claimed 
that  the  American  government  was  not  properly  informed 
as  to  the  real  character  of  the  Lusita?iia  and  proceeded  to 
enlighten  it  by  declaring  that  the  ill-fated  steamship  was  in 
reality  an  auxiliary  cruiser  of  the  British  navy,  armed  and 
manned  by  gunners,  and  that  the  British  government  had 
advised  British  merchantmen  to  destroy  hostile  submarines 
by  ramming  them.  It  was  impossible,  therefore,  for  Ger- 
man war  craft  to  regard  British  merchantmen  as  unde- 
fended or  to  observe  the  customary  prize  regulations.  It 
was  claimed,  furthermore,  that  the  rapid  sinking  of  the 
Lusitania  was  due  to  the  explosion  of  the  ammunition  on 
board.  The  German  government  withheld  its  final  deci- 
sion awaiting  the  views  of  the  United  States  government 
on  the  aspects  of  the  case  as  thus  presented.  The  note 
contained  no  reference  to  reparation  or  guarantees  for  the 
future. 

The  British  ambassador  at  Washington  as  well  as  the  port 
officials  at  New  York  denied  that  the  Lusitania  was  armed. 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War  457 

A  second  American  note,  June  9th,  reiterated  the  prin- 
ciples expressed  in  the  first,  demanding  a  disavowal  by  tiie 
German  government  of  the  destruction  of  the  Lusitavia 
together  with  the  undertaking  that  attacks  on  unresisting 
non-combatants  should  cease. 

The  note  intimated  that  the  German  government's  state- 
ments about  the  Lusitania  were  an  implication  of  remiss- 
ness on  the  part  of  the  American  government,  since,  if 
they  had  been  true,  it  would  have  been  the  duty  of  the 
American  authorities  to  deny  the  vessel  clearance  papers 
at  New  York. 

"But  the  sinking  of  passenger  ships,"  the  note  asserted, 
"involves  principles  of  humanity  which  throw  into  the 
background  any  special  circumstances  of  detail  that  may 
be  thought  to  affect  the  cases;  principles  which  lift  it,  as 
the  Imperial  German  government  will  no  doubt  be  quick 
to  recognize  and  acknowledge,  out  of  the  class  of  ordinary 
subjects  of  diplomatic  discussion  or  of  international  con- 
troversy. Whatever  be  the  other  facts  regarding  the  Lusi- 
tania, the  principal  fact  is  that  a  great  steamer,  primarily 
and  chiefly  used  for  the  conveyance  of  passengers,  and 
carrying  more  than  a  thousand  souls  who  had  no  part  or 
lot  in  the  conduct  of  the  war,  was  torpedoed  and  sunk 
without  as  much  as  a  challenge  or  a  warning,  and  that 
men,  women,  and  children  were  sent  to  their  death  in  cir- 
cumstances unparalleled  in  modern  warfare.  The  fact  that 
more  than  a  hundred  American  citizens  were  among  those 
who  perished  made  it  the  duty  of  the  government  of  the 
United  States  to  speak  of  these  things  and  once  more, 
with  solemn  emphasis,  to  call  the  attention  of  the  Imperial 
German  government  to  the  grave  responsibility  which  the 
government  of  the  United  States  conceives  that  it  has  in- 
curred in  this  tragic  occurrence,  and  to  the  indisputable 
principle  upon  which  that  responsibility  rests." 


458  The  Great  War 

"The  government  of  the  United  States  is  contending  for 
something  much  greater  than  the  mere  rights  of  property 
or  privileges  of  commerce.  It  is  contending  for  nothing 
less  high  and  sacred  than  the  rights  of  humanity,  which 
c\  ery  government  honors  itself  in  respecting  and  which  no 
government  is  justified  in  resigning  on  behalf  of  those 
under  its  care  and  authority.  Only  her  actual  resistance  to 
capture  or  refusal  to  stop  when  ordered  to  do  so  for  the 
purpose  of  visit  could  have  afforded  the  commander  of  the 
submarine  any  justification  for  so  much  as  putting  the  lives 
of  those  on  board  the  ship  in  jeopardy." 

Rather  than  sign  this  note,  which  had  been  drawn  up 
by  the  president,  Mr.  Bryan  resigned  as  Secretary  of  State 
the  day  before  it  was  sent.  He  disagreed  with  the  presi- 
dent as  to  the  tone  to  be  adopted  towards  Germany,  main- 
taining in  particular  that  the  pending  question  should  be 
settled  by  an  international  commission  and  that  Americans 
should  be  warned  against  travelling  on  the  ships  of  bel- 
ligerents or  on  those  carrying  munitions. 

Again  on  July  8th  the  German  government  sent  an  eva- 
sive reply,  containing  chiefly  an  indictment  of  Great  Britain 
for  obliterating  all  distinction  between  merchantmen  and 
war  vessels. 

In  spite  of  the  clearness  of  the  American  demands,  the 
negotiations  thus  far  had  reached  no  tangible  results.  A 
feeling  of  uneasiness  and  dissatisfaction  pervaded  the  coun- 
try. The  dilatory  methods  of  the  German  government, 
its  attempts  to  confuse  the  real  issue,  called  for  a  more 
peremptory  tone.  Berlin  was  informed  on  July  21st  that 
its  reply  had  been  unsatisfactory.  In  particular  the  United 
States  deprecated  the  deflection  of  the  discussion  to  the 
conduct  of  third  parties: 

"The  Imperial  German  government  will  readily  under- 
stand that  the   government  of  the  United  States  cannot 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War  459 

discuss  the  policy  of  the  government  of  Great  Britain 
with  regard  to  neutral  trade  except  with  that  government 
itself,  and  that  it  must  regard  the  conduct  of  other  bellig- 
erent governments  as  irrelevant  to  any  discussion  with  the 
Imperial  German  government  of  what  this  government 
regards  as  a  grave  and  unjustifiable  violation  of  the  rights 
of  American  citizens  by  German  naval  commanders." 

In  restating  its  demands  the  American  government  de- 
clared that  friendship  itself  prompted  "it  to  say  to  the 
Imperial  government  that  a  repetition  by  the  commanders 
of  the  German  naval  vessels  of  acts  in  contravention  of 
these  rights  must  be  regarded  by  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  when  they  affect  American  citizens,  as  being 
deliberately  unfriendly." 

But  before  Germany  had  replied,  an  event  occurred 
which  seemed  to  be  a  wilful  defiance  of  the  United  States. 
The  White  Star  steamship  Arabic,  leaving  Liverpool  on 
August  18th,  was  torpedoed  the  next  morning  close  to  the 
scene  of  the  Lusiiania  disaster  and  sank  in  eleven  minutes 
with  two  Americans  among  the  victims. 

In  reality,  this  sudden  aggravation  brought  the  German 
government  face  to  face  with  the  danger  of  a  break  and 
the  necessity  of  some  conciliatory  steps  and  was  followed 
by  a  gradual  alleviation  of  the  situation.  Ambassador  von 
Bernstorff  asked  for  a  suspension  of  judgment  until  exact 
information  could  be  obtained  and  on  September  1st  handed 
Mr.  Lansing,  who  had  succeeded  Mr.  Bryan  as  American 
Secretary  of  State,  a  memorandum  to  the  effect  that  Ger- 
man submarines  would  in  future  not  sink  liners  without 
warning  or  without  ensuring  the  safety  of  non-combatants, 
unless  the  liners  tried  to  escape  or  offered  resistance. 

On  the  7th  the  German  Foreign  Office  submitted  a 
memorandum  to  Ambassador  Gerard  stating  that  the  sub- 
marine commander  who  torpedoed  the  Arabic  acted  under 


460  The  Great  War 

a  conviction,  based  on  the  course  of  the  steamship,  that  the 
latter  intended  to  ram  him,  hut  declining  to  acknowledge 
any  obligation  to  grant  indemnity,  even  in  case  the  com- 
mander of  the  submarine  were  mistaken. 

The  German  government  took  a  final  step  on  October 
5th  when  Count  von  Bernstorff  delivered  a  note  with  the 
statement  that  the  orders  issued  to  the  commanders  of 
German  submarines  had  been  made  so  stringent  that  the 
recurrence  of  incidents  similar  to  the  Arabic  case  was  con- 
sidered out  of  the  question  and  that  the  Imperial  govern- 
ment regretted  and  disavowed  the  attack  on  the  Arabic  and 
was  prepared  to  pay  indemnity  for  the  American  lives  lost. 

It  was  announced  on  January  10,  1916,  that  Count  von 
Bernstorff  was  sending  to  the  German  Foreign  Office  for 
its  approval  a  tentative  agreement  on  the  Lusitania  case,  by 
which  Germany  offered  indemnity  but  neither  disavowed 
the  sinking  nor  admitted  its  illegality.  This  was  naturally 
unsatisfactory  to  the  United  States. 

The  resignation,  at  the  beginning  of  March,  of  Grand- 
admiral  von  Tirpitz,  who  was  so  closely  identified  with  the 
submarine  campaign,  although  welcomed  as  a  victory  for 
the  moderate  element  in  the  German  government,  was 
followed  on  March  24th  by  the  submarine  attack  on  the 
unarmed  French  channel  steamer  Sussex,  plying  between 
Folkestone  and  Dieppe,  in  flagrant  violation  of  the  prom- 
ises made  to  the  United  States.  Three  Americans  were 
injured  and  the  whole  submarine  question  was  brought 
back  to  an  acute  stage. 

The  German  government  tried  to  gain  time  by  casting 
doubt  on  the  cause  of  the  disaster.  But  after  trustworthy 
investigation  had  removed  all  doubt  as  to  the  main  facts 
and  the  culpability  of  a  German  submarine,  Secretary  Lan- 
sing directed  a  note  to  Germany  on  April  18,  1916,  with 
the  following  statement: 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War  461 

"  If  the  Imperial  (German)  government  should  not  now, 
without  delay,  proclaim  and  make  effective  renunciation  of 
its  present  methods  of  submarine  warfare  against  passenger 
and  cargo  ships,  the  United  States  government  can  have 
no  choice  but  to  sever  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Ger- 
man government  altogether." 

In  an  address  to  Congress  the  next  day  President  Wilson 
renewed  his  denunciation  of  submarine  warfare,  declaring 
that  it  could  not  "be  carried  on  without  the  most  palpable 
violation  of  the  dictates  alike  of  right  and  humanity,"  and 
that  the  "use  of  the  submarine  for  the  destruction  of  the 
enemy's  commerce  is  incompatible  with  the  principles  of 
humanity,  the  long-established  and  incontrovertible  rights 
of  neutrals  and  the  sacred  immunities  of  non-combatants." 
He  regarded  it  as  his  duty  to  inform  Germany  that  unless 
the  Imperial  German  government  should  immediately  de- 
clare and  effect  an  abandonment  of  its  present  methods  of 
warfare  against  passenger  and  freight  vessels,  the  govern- 
ment could  have  no  choice  but  to  sever  diplomatic  relations 
with  the  government  of  the  German  Empire  altogether." 

The  German  reply  to  Secretary  Lansing's  note,  on  May 
4th,  marks  a  distinct  though  transient  stage  in  the  course 
of  the  submarine  controversy.  The  German  government 
affirmed  that  submarine  operations  involving  neutral  vessels 
had  been  regularly  conducted  in  accordance  with  the  rules 
of  international  law,  in  spite  of  accidental  exceptions,  and 
protested  its  willingness  to  return  entirely  to  the  principles 
recognized  before  the  war,  provided  their  opponents  would 
do  the  same.  Although  the  German  people  were  under 
the  impression  that  the  government  of  the  United  States, 
while  demanding  that  Germany,  who  was  struggling  for 
existence,  should  restrain  the  use  of  her  effective  weapon, 
confined  itself  to  protests  against  the  illegal  methods  em- 
ployed by  Germany's  enemies,  the  German  government, 


462  The  Great  War 

wishing  to  prevent  the  submarine  question  from  threaten- 
ing peaceful  relations  hetween  the  two  countries,  made  the 
further  concession  in  the  following  terms: 

"The  German  government,  guided  by  this  idea,  notifies 
the  government  of  the  United  States  that  the  German 
naval  forces  receive  the  following  orders  for  submarine 
warfare  in  accordance  with  the  general  principles  of  visit, 
search,  and  destruction  of  merchant  vessels  recognized  by 
International  Law.  Such  vessels,  both  within  and  without 
the  area  declared  as  a  naval  war  zone,  shall  not  be  sunk 
without  warning  and  without  saving  human  lives,  unless 
the  ship  attempts  to  escape  or  offer  resistance."  The  note 
expressed  the  hope  that  the  two  governments  might  now 
cooperate  in  efforts  to  restore  the  freedom  of  the  seas 
during  the  war  as  suggested  in  the  American  note  pre- 
sented on  July  23,  1915,  and  the  confident  expectation  of 
the  German  government  that  the  United  States  would 
now  demand  that  the  British  government  forthwith  ob- 
serve the  rules  of  International  Law  universally  recognized 
before  the  war.  It  added,  however,  that  in  case  the  steps 
taken  by  the  government  of  the  United  States  did  not 
attain  the  desired  object,  the  German  government  would 
be  "facing  a  new  situation  in  which  it  must  reserve  for 
itself  complete  liberty  of  decision." 

In  its  reply  on  the  28th,  the  United  States  government 
expressed  its  satisfaction  at  Germany's  abandonment  of  the 
submarine  policy  which  had  menaced  the  good  relations 
of  the  two  countries;  and  to  preclude  any  inference  that 
the  United  States  might  admit  a  limiting  condition  in  Ger- 
many's adhesion,  the  following  was  added: 

"The  government  of  the  United  States  feels  it  necessary 
to  state  that  it  takes  it  for  granted  that  Germany  does  not 
intend  to  imply  that  the  maintenance  of  the  newly-an- 
nounced policy  is  in  any  way  contingent  upon  the  course 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War  463 

or  result  of  diplomatic  negotiations  between  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  and  any  other  belligerent  gov- 
ernment, notwithstanding  the  fact  that  certain  passages  in 
the  Imperial  government's  note  of  the  4th  inst.  might 
appear  to  be  susceptible  of  that  construction. 

"In  order,  however,  to  avoid  any  misunderstanding,  the 
government  of  the  United  States  notifies  the  Imperial  gov- 
ernment that  it  cannot  for  a  moment  entertain,  much  less 
discuss,  the  suggestion  that  respect  by  the  German  naval 
authorities  for  the  rights  of  citizens  of  the  United  States 
upon  the  high  seas  should  in  any  way,  or  in  the  slightest 
degree,  be  made  contingent  upon  the  conduct  of  any  other 
government  as  affecting  the  rights  of  neutrals  and  non- 
combatants.  The  responsibility  in  such  cases  is  single,  not 
joint;  absolute,  not  relative." 

Great  interest  was  aroused  in  the  summer  of  1916  by 
the  first  crossing  of  the  Atlantic  by  a  submarine,  effected 
by  the  German  cargo-carrier  submarine  Deutschland.  The 
accomplishment  of  the  return  voyage  by  the  arrival  of 
this  vessel  at  Bremen  with  a  cargo  of  rubber  and  metal 
on  August  23d  was  celebrated  throughout  Germany  as  the 
defeat  of  the  British  blockade.  The  same  craft  made 
a  second  voyage  in  the  autumn.  Still  more  sensational 
was  the  appearance  of  the  German  naval  submarine  U-53 
at  Newport,  Rhode  Island,  October  7,  1916.  Departing 
after  a  few  hours,  she  sank  one  Dutch,  one  Norwegian, 
and  three  British  vessels  the  next  day  off  Nantucket,  ter- 
rorizing shipping  along  the  Atlantic  seaboard  of  the  United 
States. 

This  performance  was  doubtless  intended  as  a  demon- 
stration for  the  benefit  of  the  American  government  and 
soon  there  were  indications  of  an  increasing  agitation  in 
Germany  for  unrestricted  submarine  operations,  in  spite  of 
the  attitude  which  the  United  States  had  taken.    Even  von 


464  The  Great  War 

Bethmann-]  [ollweg  declared  before  the  Reichstag  on  Sep- 
tember 28,  L916: 

"A  German  statesman  who  would  hesitate  to  use  against 
Britain  every  available  instrument  of  battle  that  would  really 
shorten  the  war  should  be  hanged." 

From  the  general  course  of  events  and  information  re- 
ceived through  various  channels  it  became  evident  to 
President  Wilson  and  his  advisers  towards  the  end  of  the 
year  that  unless  the  Central  Powers  could  obtain  imme- 
diate peace  by  negotiation,  they  would  adopt  the  most 
desperate  means  for  wresting  the  victory  and  resume  un- 
restricted submarine  warfare,  and  that  a  crisis  impended 
which  might  influence  decisively  the  policy  of  the  United 
States.  Wishing,  therefore,  to  obtain  a  definite  basis  for 
eventual  decisions  of  the  greatest  importance,  the  president 
despatched  on  December  18th  an  identic  note  to  the  gov- 
ernments of  the  different  warring  nations,  requesting  them 
to  state  more  definitely  than  had  yet  been  stated  the  terms 
upon  which  they  would  consent  to  make  peace. 

The  Central  Powers  returned  an  evasive  answer,  merely 
offering,  with  an  assumed  air  of  magnanimity  and  for- 
bearance, to  meet  their  antagonists  in  conference  for  dis- 
cussing the  basis  of  peace.  The  powers  of  the  Entente 
expressed  themselves  in  general  terms,  yet  much  more 
definitely,  describing  the  nature  of  the  arrangements,  guar- 
antees, and  acts  of  reparation,  which  they  regarded  as  in- 
dispensable conditions  of  a  satisfactory  settlement. 

On  January  22,  1917,  President  Wilson  delivered  before 
the  Senate  an  address  which  may  well  become  a  historical 
document  of  transcendent  importance,  in  which  he  revealed 
his  lofty  aspirations  for  a  concert  of  the  powers  to  guarantee 
justice  and  peace  throughout  the  world.  This  he  regarded 
as  an  enterprise  in  which  it  would  be  the  duty  of  the  United 
States  to  take  part,  and  therefore  he  felt  that  the  government 


,vr^ 


bout "to  violate,  any  regula- 

by  the  President,,  or  any 
jilted  States,,   or  of  the 
hereof;   will  be  subject 
t  by.^he   United  States  Marshal, 
r  such  other   officer  as   the   Pred- 
ate, and.  to  confinement  in  such 
rison,    jail,  military  canp,   or 
detention  at;   cay  K    directed  ti- 
the reculationfi  herein  contained 
tp  air  land  and  water,   continental  or 
the   jurisdiction   of  the   United 

1  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and 
e  United  States  to  be  arfixed. 

Done    at   the  City  of  ffashincton. 
this     Sisi;  ~jt~~  day  of  April, 
)        in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one 
/     thousand  nine  hundred  and 
/   seventeen,  and  of  the   inde- 
*  pendence  of  the   United  States 

the  one  hundred  and  forty- 
first. 


War  Proclamation  of  the  United  States.  The  formal  declaration  of  -ivar  -ivith  Ger- 
many, bearing  the  seal  of  the  United  States  and  signed  by  President  Wilson  and  Secretary 
of  State  Lansing. 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War  465 

ought  "to  formulate  the  conditions  upon  which  it  would 
feel  justified  in  asking  our  people  to  approve  its  formal 
and  solemn  adherence  to  a  League  for  Peace."  The  con- 
ditions were  substantially  as  follows: 

.  The  terms  upon  which  the  world  war  would  be  con- 
cluded must  be  such  as  to  create  a  peace  worth  guarantee- 
ing and  preserving  by  means  of  the  proposed  universal 
league  and  covenant. 

Such  a  peace  must  be  "a  peace  without  victory,"  not  "a 
peace  forced  upon  the  loser,  a  victor's  terms  imposed  upon 
the  vanquished,"  which  "would  be  accepted  in  humiliation, 
under  duress,  at  an  intolerable  sacrifice,  and  would  leave  a 
sting,  a  resentment,  a  bitter  memory  upon  which  the 
terms  of  peace  would  rest,  not  permanently,  but  only  as 
upon  quicksand." 

The  peace  must  rest  on  a  basis  of  equality  and  a  com- 
mon participation  in  a  common  benefit.  It  must  rest  on 
an  equality  between  all  nations,  large  and  small,  powerful 
and  weak.  It  must  recognize  "the  principle  that  govern- 
ments derive  all  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed,  and  that  no  right  anywhere  exists  to  hand 
peoples  about  from  sovereignty  to  sovereignty  as  if  they 
were  property."  The  necessity  for  establishing  a  united, 
independent,  and  autonomous  Poland  was  cited  as  a  self- 
evident  illustration  of  this  principle. 

As  far  as  practical,  every  great  people  should  be  assured 
a  direct  outlet  to  the  great  highways  of  the  sea,  and  where 
this  cannot  be  obtained  by  cession  of  territory,  it  should  be 
done  by  the  neutralization  of  direct  rights  of  way. 

"The  freedom  of  the  seas,"  he  declared,  "is  the  sine  qua 
non  of  peace,  equality,  and  cooperation." 

There  should  be  a  systematic  limitation  of  naval  and 
military  armaments  and  of  all  programmes  of  military 
preparation. 


466  The  Great  War 

He  believed  that  in  voicing  these  aspirations  he  was 
Speaking  for  liberals  and  friends  of  humanity  in  every 
nation  and  that  the  participation  of  the  United  States  in  a 
league  of  nations  guaranteeing  peace  upon  such  terms 
would  be  a  natural  consummation  of  this  country's  policies, 
the  fulfilment  of  all  that  the  American  people  had  pro- 
fessed or  striven  for. 

"These,"  he  said,  "are  American  principles,  American 
policies.  We  could  stand  for  no  others.  And  they  are 
also  the  principles  and  policies  of  forward-looking  men 
and  women  everywhere,  of  every  modern  nation,  of  every 
enlightened  community.  They  are  the  principles  of  man- 
kind and  must  prevail." 

On  January  31st  Count  BernstorfT  presented  a  note  of 
the  German  government  to  the  Secretary  of  State  with- 
drawing the  German  pledge  of  May  4,  1916,  and  announc- 
ing Germany's  purpose  of  intensifying  and  rendering  more 
ruthless  the  operations  of  its  submarines  at  sea  in  the  man- 
ner against  which  the  government  of  the  United  States  had 
protested  from  the  first.  The  indignation  created  by  this 
virtual  challenge  was  aggravated  by  the  shamelessly  per- 
fidious attitude  revealed  in  the  German  Chancellor's  state- 
ment before  the  Reichstag  that  only  lack  of  sufficient 
submarines  had  prevented  the  earlier  adoption  of  this 
ruthless  policy.  Germany  had  apparently  maneuvered  to 
hold  the  United  States  aloof  by  delusive  promises  until  she 
was  confident  that  the  extent  of  her  equipment  in  these 
stealthy  engines  of  destruction  would  enable  her  to  sweep 
the  seas  and  defy  still  another  great  power  with  impunity. 

The  relations  between  the  two  governments  had  now 
reached  an  abrupt  and  unavoidable  conflict  in  which 
further  diplomatic  communication  was  useless.  Accord- 
ingly* the  German  Ambassador  in  Washington  received 
his  passports  on  February  3d  and  on  the  same  day  the 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War  467 

president,  addressing  a  joint  session  of  the  two  Houses  of 
Congress,  announced  the  complete  severance  of  relations 
with  Germany,  saying  that,  in  view  of  the  new  situation, 
he  had  felt  it  necessary  to  take  the  steps  which  he  had 
threatened  in  such  circumstances,  although  the  act  was  not 
equivalent  to  war. 

"We  are  sincere  friends  of  the  German  people,"  he  de- 
clared, "and  earnestly  desire  to  remain  at  peace  with  the 
government  which  speaks  for  them.    .    .    . 

"But  if  American  ships  and  American  lives  should  in 
fact  be  sacrificed  by  their  naval  commanders,  in  heedless 
contravention  of  the  just  and  reasonable  understandings  of 
international  law  and  the  obvious  dictates  of  humanity,  I 
shall  take  the  liberty  of  coming  again  before  Congress  to 
ask  that  authority  be  given  to  me  to  use  any  means  that 
may  be  necessary  for  the  protection  of  our  seamen  and 
our  people  in  the  prosecution  of  their  peaceful,  legitimate 
errands  on  the  high  seas." 

In  spite  of  the  president's  solemn  warning  and  its  endorse- 
ment by  the  Senate,  the  German  government  conducted 
the  negotiations  opened  through  the  Swiss  Legation  in 
Washington  in  a  characteristically  temporizing  spirit,  per- 
sistently avoiding  the  main  issue.  On  February  26th  the 
president  again  addressed  Congress,  pointing  out  that  Ger- 
many had  practically  placed  an  embargo  on  American  ship- 
ping and  asking  authority  to  arm  American  merchant 
vessels  for  defense.  This  proposal  was  accepted  by  a  vote 
of  403  to  13  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  but  its  pas- 
sage was  obstructed  by  a  group  of  pacifists  in  the  Senate, 
until  the  session  of  Congress  ended  automatically  on  March 
4th.  However,  an  executive  order  for  placing  armed  guards 
on  American  merchant  ships  was  issued  on  March  12th. 

In  the  meantime,  the  Laconia  had  been  sunk  with  the 
loss  of  eight  Americans  on  February  26th.     A  sensation 


468  The  Great  War 

was  created  by  the  publication  on  March  1st  of  an  inter- 
cepted despatch  of  January  19th  from  Herr  Zimmermann, 
the  German  Under-Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  to  the 
German  Minister  in  Mexico,  instructing  the  latter,  in  view 
of  the  intended  repudiation  of  the  Sussex  pledge,  to  pro- 
pose an  alliance  to  the  Mexican  government,  in  the  event 
of  war  between  Germany  and  the  United  States,  offering 
the  restitution  of  Texas,  New  Mexico,  and  Arizona  to 
Mexico  as  a  reward  for  the  latter's  cooperation,  and  at  the 
same  time  suggesting  that  efforts  might  be  made  to  bring 
Japan  into  partnership  with  Mexico  and  Germany  against 
the  United  States. 

President  Wilson  had  declared  that  only  actual  overt  acts 
would  convince  him  of  Germany's  hostile  purpose.  These 
now  came  in  quick  succession.  The  Vigilancia  was  sunk 
with  the  loss  of  five  Americans  on  March  16th;  the  de- 
struction of  the  City  of  Memphis  and  of  the  Illinois  followed 
the  next  day;  the  loss  of  the  Healdto?i  on  the  21st  involved 
seven  American  lives;  and  that  of  the  Aztec  on  April  1st, 
twenty-eight. 

The  American  people  realized  at  last  the  inevitable  neces- 
sity for  war.  They  awoke  from  the  cherished  dream  of 
isolation  in  a  world  where  human  ingenuity  had  conquered 
space.  The  self-imposed  reserve  of  neutrality  was  swept 
aside  and  national  feeling  revelled  in  the  new-born  con- 
sciousness of  identity  of  interest  and  purpose  with  the  free 
peoples  of  Western  Europe. 

In  the  words  of  the  official  statement:  "Judging  the  Ger- 
man government  now  in  the  light  of  our  own  experience 
through  the  long  and  patient  years  of  our  honest  attempt  to 
keep  the  peace,  we  could  see  the  Great  Autocracy  and  read 
her  record  throughout  the  war.  And  we  found  that  record 
damnable.  Beginning  long  before  the  war  in  Prussian  op- 
position to  every  effort  that  was  made  by  other  nations  and 


mm 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War   469 

our  own  to  do  away  with  warfare,  the  story  of  the  Autoc- 
racy has  been  one  of  vast  preparations  for  war  combined 
with  an  attitude  of  arrogant  intolerance  toward  all  other 
points  of  view,  all  other  systems  of  government,  all  other 
hopes  and  dreams  of  men.  With  a  fanatical  faith  in  the 
destiny  of  German  kultur  as  the  system  that  must  rule  the 
world,  the  Imperial  government's  actions  have  through 
years  of  boasting,  double  dealing,  and  deceit  tended  toward 
aggression  upon  the  rights  of  others.  And  if  there  still  be 
any  doubt  as  to  which  nation  began  this  war,  there  can 
be  no  uncertainty  as  to  which  one  was  most  prepared, 
most  exultant  at  the  chance,  and  ready  instantly  to  march 
upon  other  nations — even  those  who  had  given  no  offense. 
The  wholesale  depredations  and  hideous  atrocities  in  Bel- 
gium and  in  Serbia  were  doubtless  part  and  parcel  with  the 
Imperial  government's  purpose  to  terrorize  small  nations 
into  abject  submission  for  generations  to  come.  But  in 
this  the  Autocracy  has  been  blind.  For  its  record  in 
those  countries,  and  in  Poland  and  in  northern  France,  has 
given  not  only  to  the  Allies  but  to  liberal  peoples  through- 
out the  world  the  conviction  that  this  menace  to  human 
liberties  everywhere  must  be  utterly  shorn  of  its  power 
to  harm." 

The  president  addressed  the  memorable  joint  session  of 
Congress  on  April  2d.  He  declared  that  he  had  been  dis- 
appointed in  his  hope  that  a  state  of  armed  neutrality  would 
suffice  for  the  defense  of  American  rights  against  lawless 
violence  at  sea.  Germany  denied  the  right  of  neutrals  to 
use  arms  in  their  own  defense  within  the  proscribed  areas 
of  the  sea  and  might  very  likely  treat  armed  guards  on 
American  merchant  ships  as  pirates.  Thus  the  United 
States  had  to  choose  between  war  and  submission.  With  full 
appreciation  of  the  gravity  of  the  step  he  advised  that  Con- 
gress declare  "the  recent  course  of  the  Imperial  German 


470  The  Great  War 

government  to  be  in  fact  nothing  less  than  war  against  the 
government  and  people  of  the  United  States;  that  it  for- 
mally accept  the  status  of  belligerent  which  has  thus  been 
thrust  upon  it;  and  that  it  take  immediate  steps  not  only  to 
put  the  country  in  a  more  thorough  state  of  defense,  but 
also  to  exert  all  its  power  and  employ  all  its  resources  to 
bring  the  government  of  the  German  Empire  to  terms 
and  end  the  war." 

This,  he  explained,  would  involve  the  utmost  coopera- 
tion with  the  governments  then  at  war  with  Germany,  the 
extension  to  them  of  the  most  liberal  financial  credits,  the 
organization  and  mobilization  of  all  the  material  resources 
of  the  country,  the  immediate  full  equipment  of  the  navy, 
the  immediate  addition  to  the  armed  forces  of  the  United 
States  of  at  least  500,000  men  with  additional  increments  of 
equal  force  as  soon  as  needed  and  as  they  could  be  handled 
in  training. 

The  president  declared  that  he  still  had  the  same  things 
in  mind  as  when  he  addressed  the  Senate  on  January  22d, 
"to  vindicate  the  principles  of  peace  and  justice  in  the  life 
of  the  world  as  against  selfish  and  autocratic  power,  and  to 
set  up  among  the  really  free  and  self-governed  peoples  of 
the  world  such  a  concert  of  purpose  and  of  action  as  will 
henceforth  insure  the  observance  of  those  principles." 
The  world  had  reached  "the  beginning  of  an  age  in  which 
it  will  be  insisted  that  the  same  standards  of  conduct  and 
of  responsibility  for  wrong  done  shall  be  observed  among 
nations  and  their  governments  that  are  observed  among  the 
individual  citizens  of  civilized  states." 

The  United  States  had  no  quarrel  with  the  German 
people,  as  the  war  had  not  been  launched  with  their  ap- 
proval, but  "was  determined  upon  as  wars  used  to  be  deter- 
mined upon  in  the  old,  unhappy  days  when  peoples  were 
nowhere  consulted  by  their  rulers  and  wars  were  provoked 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War   471 

and  waged  in  the  interests  of  dynasties  or  of  little  groups 
of  ambitious  men  who  were  accustomed  to  use  their  fellow- 
men  as  pawns  and  tools." 

"A  steadfast  concert  for  peace,"  he  declared,  "can  never 
be  maintained  except  by  a  partnership  of  democratic 
nations.  No  autocratic  government  could  be  trusted  to 
keep  faith  within  it  or  observe  its  covenants.  It  must  be 
a  league  of  honor,  a  partnership  of  opinion.  Intrigue 
would  eat  its  vitals  away;  the  plottings  of  inner  circles 
who  could  plan  what  they  would,  and  render  account  to 
no  one,  would  be  a  corruption  seated  at  its  very  heart. 
Only  free  peoples  can  hold  their  purpose  and  their  honor 
steady  to  a  common  end  and  prefer  the  interests  of  man- 
kind to  any  narrow  interest  of  their  own." 

"One  of  the  things,"  he  continued,  "that  have  served  to 
convince  us  that  the  Prussian  autocracy  was  not  and  could 
never  be  our  friend  is  that  from  the  very  outset  of  the 
present  war  it  has  filled  our  unsuspecting  communities  and 
even  our  offices  of  government  with  spies  and  set  criminal 
intrigues  everywhere  afoot  against  our  national  unity  of 
counsel,  our  peace  within  and  without,  our  industries  and 
our  commerce." 

The  United  States  was  now  about  to  accept  gage  of 
battle  with  the  natural  foe  to  liberty  and  was  ready,  if 
necessary,  to  spend  the  whole  force  of  the  nation  to  check 
and  nullify  its  pretensions  and  power. 

"We  are  glad,"  said  the  president,  "now  that  we  see  the 
facts  with  no  veil  of  false  pretence  about  them,  to  fight 
thus  for  the  ultimate  peace  of  the  world  and  for  the  libera- 
tion of  its  peoples,  the  German  peoples  included:  for  the 
rights  of  nations  great  and  small  and  the  privileges  of  men 
everywhere  to  choose  their  way  of  life  and  of  obedience. 
The  world  must  be  made  safe  for  democracy.  Its  peace 
must  be  planted  upon  the  tested  foundations  of  political 


472  The  Great  War 

liberty.  We  have  no  selfish  ends  to  serve.  We  desire  no 
conquest,  DO  dominion.  We  seek  no  indemnities  for  our- 
selves,  no  material  compensation  for  the  sacrifices  we  shall 
freely  make.  We  are  but  one  of  the  champions  of  the 
rights  of  mankind.  We  shall  be  satisfied  when  those  rights 
have  been  made  as  secure  as  the  faith  and  the  freedom  of 
nations  can  make  them." 

The  president  explained  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  gov- 
ernment had  avowed  its  unqualified  acceptance  of  the  law- 
less submarine  warfare  of  the  German  government,  so  that 
it  was  impossible  for  the  American  government  to  receive 
Count  Tarnowsky,  the  ambassador  recently  accredited  by 
Austria-Hungary  to  the  United  States.  But  as  Austria- 
Hungary  had  not  actually  engaged  in  warfare  on  the  seas 
against  citizens  of  the  United  States,  the  question  of  Amer- 
ican relations  with  it  was  for  the  time  postponed. 
The  address  closed  with  the  following  words: 
"It  is  a  fearful  thing  to  lead  this  great,  peaceful  people 
into  war,  into  the  most  terrible  and  disastrous  of  all  wars, 
civilization  itself  seeming  to  be  in  the  balance.  But  the 
right  is  more  precious  than  peace,  and  we  shall  fight  for 
the  things  which  we  have  always  carried  nearest  our  hearts, 
— for  democracy,  for  the  right  of  those  who  submit  to 
authority  to  have  a  voice  in  their  own  governments,  for 
the  rights  and  liberties  of  small  nations,  for  a  universal 
dominion  of  right  by  such  a  concert  of  free  peoples  as 
shall  bring  peace  and  safety  to  all  nations  and  make  the 
world  itself  at  last  free.  To  such  a  task  we  can  dedicate 
our  lives  and  our  fortunes,  everything  that  we  are  and 
everything  that  we  have,  with  the  pride  of  those  who 
know  that  the  day  has  come  when  America  is  privileged 
to  spend  her  blood  and  her  might  for  the  principles  that 
gave  her  birth  and  happiness  and  the  peace  which  she  has 
treasured.     God  helping  her,  she  can  do  no  other." 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War   473 

In  vain  Senator  Stone,  chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations,  and  a  small  group  of  German  sym- 
pathizers or  convinced  pacifists  opposed  the  presidential 
policy.  A  resolution  declaring  that  a  state  of  war  ex- 
isted with  Germany  passed  the  Senate  on  April  4th  by 
a  vote  of  82  to  6.  Discussion  in  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives brought  out  the  instinctive  repugnance  of  a 
comparatively  small  minority  to  a  course  that  violated  their 
deep-seated  prepossessions.  But  obsolete  and  superficial 
arguments  were  of  no  avail  against  the  overwhelming  tide 
of  Destiny. 

In  the  early  hours  of  April  6th  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives by  a  vote  of  373  to  50  passed  the  joint  resolution 
already  adopted  by  the  Senate: 

"Whereas  the  Imperial  German  Government  has  com- 
mitted repeated  acts  of  war  against  the  Government  and 
people  of  the  United  States  of  America:  Therefore  be  it 

"Resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives 
of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled, 
That  the  state  of  war  between  the  United  States  and  the 
Imperial  German  Government  which  has  thus  been  thrust 
upon  the  United  States  is  hereby  formally  declared;  and 
that  the  President  be,  and  he  is  hereby,  authorized  and 
directed  to  employ  the  entire  naval  and  military  forces  of 
the  United  States  and  the  resources  of  the  Government  to 
carry  on  war  against  the  Imperial  German  Government; 
and  to  bring  the  conflict  to  a  successful  termination  all  the 
resources  of  the  country  are  hereby  pledged  by  the  Con- 
gress of  the  United  States."  On  the  afternoon  of  the  same 
day  the  president  signed  the  resolution  and  issued  a  procla- 
mation that  a  state  of  war  existed  between  the  United 
States  and  Germany.  Austria-Hungary  and  Turkey  sev- 
ered diplomatic  relations  with  the  United  States  on  April 
9th  and  21st  respectively. 


474  The  Great  War 

Practically  nothing  had  been  done  since  the  severance 
of  relations  with  Germany  to  put  the  resources  of  the 
country  on  8  warlike  basis.  But  the  immediate  inaugura- 
tion of  mammoth  warlike  preparations  after  the  declaration 
of  hostilities  quickly  dispelled  the  notion  that  the  United 
States  might  confine  itself  to  a  limited  liability  participation 
in  the  struggle.  Congress  was  confronted  by  an  enormous 
task  of  special  legislation.  The  most  important  measure 
was  the  bill  "to  increase  temporarily  the  military  establish- 
ment of  the  United  States"  by  compulsory  service,  com- 
monly called  the  Selective  Draft  Bill. 

At  the  beginning  of  April,  1917,  the  Regular  Army  of 
the  United  States  contained  5,960  officers  and  127,151  en- 
listed men,  and  the  strength  of  the  National  Guard,  or 
militia,  was  174,008.  The  purpose  of  the  Selective  Draft 
Bill  was  to  authorize  the  president  to  increase  the  Regular 
Army  and  the  National  Guard  to  their  maximum  war 
strength  of  293,000  and  400,000  respectively,  by  voluntary 
enlistment,  if  possible,  and  to  create  in  succession  by  selec- 
tive draft  two  forces,  each  of  500,000  men,  later  called  the 
National  Army.  All  male  citizens  and  intended  citizens 
between  the  ages  of  twenty-one  and  thirty  inclusive  were 
to  be  made  subject  to  draft  and  to  be  required  to  register 
for  eventual  enlistment.  This  drastic  measure  was  adopted 
by  both  Houses  of  Congress  on  April  28th  and  the  president 
officially  proclaimed  the  registration  on  May  18th. 

The  registration,  which  took  place  on  June  5th,  resulted 
in  a  total  enrollment  of  9,586,508  names.  For  enlistment 
purposes  the  country  was  divided  into  4,557  districts  and 
in  each  an  exemption  board  was  created  for  the  examina- 
tion and  exemption,  discharge,  or  acceptance  for  military 
service  of  the  persons  summoned.  It  was  found  necessary 
to  add  187,000  to  the  quota  of  the  first  levy  under  the 
selective   draft   to   supplement  the  voluntary  enlistments 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War  475 

in  the  National  Guard,  making  the  total  number  called 
687,000.  The  quota  to  be  levied  from  each  state  and  terri- 
tory and  from  the  District  of  Columbia  was  determined  in 
proportion  to  the  population.  Numbers  were  drawn  at 
Washington  on  July  20th  to  establish  the  order  in  which 
individuals  would  be  summoned  before  the  local  boards 
by  their  serial  numbers  in  the  different  districts. 

It  was  decided  to  call  for  examination,  in  the  order  of 
the  numbers  thus  established,  twice  the  actual  number  of 
men  at  that  time  required  for  service,  in  other  words,  a  total 
of  1,374,000,  so  as  to  make  sure  of  obtaining  the  necessary 
number  of  available  recruits. 

According  to  the  general  plan  of  organization,  the  Regu- 
lars, with  the  National  Guard,  formed  sixteen  divisions, 
while  the  National  Army  made  up  another  series  of  sixteen 
divisions.  The  construction  of  sixteen  huge  cantonments 
or  concentration  camps  for  the  eventual  training  of  the 
divisions  of  the  National  Army  was  undertaken  with  the 
utmost  expedition.  Each  cantonment  was  a  complete  town 
with  streets,  waterworks,  sewerage  system,  and  lighting 
plant.  The  National  Guard,  taken  into  the  federal  service 
on  August  5th,  was  concentrated  in  sixteen  training  camps, 
which  were  subsequently  transformed  into  regulation  can- 
tonments by  the  erection  of  wooden  barracks. 

A  training  course  for  providing  officers  of  the  National 
Army  started  May  15th  in  sixteen  camps  corresponding 
with  the  sixteen  territorial  divisions  of  the  new  force 
and  closed  August  15th,  when  27,341  candidates  received 
commissions. 

For  the  present  we  can  only  foreshadow  the  remark- 
able development  in  the  organization  of  the  technical  staff 
of  the  army  by  observing  that  during  the  first  year  of  the 
war  the  Army  Ordnance  Department  grew  from  ninety- 
seven  to  about  5,000  officers. 


476  The  Great  War 

Complete  aviation  training  was  instituted  at  once  in  the 
United  States.  It  was  believed  that,  while  this  country 
should  make  an  enormous  effort  in  this  arm,  the  most 
effective  service  could  be  rendered  by  turning  out  as  soon 
as  possible  a  vast  number  of  machines  of  a  standard  type. 

in  while,  at  the  request  of  the  Allies,  the  government 
decided  to  send  a  preliminary  expeditionary  force  abroad 
as  soon  as  possible,  and  Major-general  John  J.  Pershing 
was  selected  as  its,  leader.  The  first  commander  to  lead 
American  troops  on  European  battlefields  had  graduated 
from  West  Point  and  entered  the  Regular  Army  as  second 
lieutenant  of  cavalry  in  1886.  His  first  experience  in  the 
rield  was  gained  in  Indian  warfare.  After  service  during 
the  Spanish  War  in  Cuba  he  was  sent  to  the  Philippines, 
becoming  captain  in  the  Regular  Army  in  1901.  As  a  re- 
ward for  unusual  valor  in  warfare  against  the  Moros,  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  promoted  him  over  862  senior  officers  to  the 
rank  of  brigadier-general  in  1906.  After  the  final  subjection 
of  the  Moros,  General  Pershing  returned  to  the  United 
States  in  1913  and  received  the  command  of  the  8th  brigade 
of  the  Regular  Army  with  headquarters  at  El  Paso,  Texas. 
He  was  entrusted  with  command  of  the  punitive  expedi- 
tion into  Mexico  following  the  raiding  of  Columbus,  New 
Mexico,  by  Villa,  and,  after  performing  this  task  to  the 
entire  satisfaction  of  the  president,  he  succeeded  Major- 
general  Funston,  upon  the  latter's  death,  as  commander  of 
all  the  forces  on  the  Mexican  border.  From  this  post  he 
was  called  to  take  charge  of  the  American  Expeditionary 
Force  soon  to  embark  for  France. 

Accompanied  by  his  staff  of  fifty-three  officers  and  146 
enlisted  men,  General  Pershing  landed  in  Liverpool  from 
the  White  Star  steamship  Baltic  on  June  8th  and  was 
received  in  England  with  every  mark  of  honor.  After  a 
few  days  spent  in  conference  with  the  military  and  civilian 


American  troops  in  London  passing  in  review  before  King  George.      With  thi  king  art 
z>ueen  Mary  and  Field-marshal  Lord  French. 


The  United  States  and  the  European  War  477 

chiefs  in  London,  he  proceeded  to  France  on  the  13th, 
where  a  stirring  reception  awaited  him  in  Paris.  A  group 
of  distinguished  statesmen  and  officers,  including  Marshal 
Joffre,  M.  Viviani,  M.  Painleve,  Minister  of  War,  and 
Generals  Foch  and  Dubail,  escorted  him  from  the  Gare 
du  Nord  to  his  temporary  headquarters  at  the  Hotel  de 
Crillon,  fronting  the  Place  de  la  Concorde.  Next  morning 
General  Pershing  paid  a  solemn  visit  to  the  tomb  of  the 
Great  Napoleon  at  the  Invalides  and  was  escorted  later  with 
military  honors  to  the  Elysee  Palace,  where  the  President 
and  Madame  Poincare  gave  a  state  luncheon  in  his  honor. 

General  Pershing's  program  of  official  courtesies  ended 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  15th  with  a  visit  to  the  last  resting 
place  of  the  Marquis  de  Lafayette.  Accompanied  by  a 
group  of  staff  officers  he  was  received  at  the  Picpus  Ceme- 
tery by  the  Marquis  and  the  Count  de  Chambrun,  descend- 
ants of  Lafayette,  who  led  him  to  the  tomb.  Replying 
briefly  to  the  greeting  of  the  Marquis,  General  Pershing 
expressed  the  great  pleasure  of  every  American  in  visiting 
the  tomb  of  one  who  had  done  so  much  for  the  United 
States  to  pay  a  tribute  of  devotion  sealing  the  friendship 
of  the  two  countries.  The  officers  stood  at  salute  while 
the  wreath  brought  by  General  Pershing  was  laid  upon  the 
tomb.  The  words,  "  Lafayette,  we  are  here ! "  express  the 
fervent  satisfaction  of  a  grateful  people. 

The  first  contingent  of  the  American  Expeditionary 
Forces  transported  overseas  consisted  of  an  army  division, 
nine  engineer  regiments,  and  a  force  of  the  marine  corps. 
Their  departure  was  veiled  in  secrecy  and  the  first  public 
intimation  of  their  movement  was  news  that  the  transports 
had  been  reported  at  a  French  port,  June  26,  1917.  After 
debarkation  the  troops  were  immediately  conveyed  to  the 
base  camps  which  had  been  selected  for  their  intensive 
training  in  the  latest  methods  of  warfare. 


478  The  Great  War 

The  United  States  was  now  committed  by  fact  as  well 
as  formal  resolution  to  its  first  great  military  enterprise 
abroad.  Americans  felt  that  the  Russian  revolution  ami 
the  overthrow  of  the  Tsar's  government  with  its  proverbial 
tyranny  and  abuses  had  happened  providentially  to  clear 
the  higher  issues  of  the  war  and  remove  the  final  barrier 
to  a  full  and  hearty  comradeship  in  aim  and  sentiment  with 
the  Allies.  Now,  with  the  passing  of  American  uncer- 
tainty, constraint,  and  perplexity,  the  soul  of  the  nation 
responded  to  the  joyous  conviction  that  the  United  States 
had  taken  its  stand  in  the  great  conflict  for  the  defense  of 
liberty  and  righteousness  and  all  the  noblest  ideals,  beside 
the  nations  who  had  been  the  torchbearers  of  civilization 
throughout  the  centuries,  whose  venerable  past  had  be- 
come the  common  treasure  of  humanity. 

With  the  effective  intervention  of  the  Great  Republic  of 
the  West,  the  struggle  entered  its  supreme  stage.  To  the 
Allies,  who,  through  the  months  of  gloom,  had  clung  with 
heroic  fortitude  to  their  faith  in  ultimate  victory,  this  was 
like  the  first  radiance  of  dawn,  piercing  the  night  and 
heralding  the  glorious  break  of  day.  By  slow  and  toil- 
some effort  they  had  prepared  and  strengthened  their 
resources.  Perilous  situations,  terrible  trials  still  lay  be- 
fore them.  But  all  the  eventual  elements  of  success  were 
now  at  hand,  thanks  partly  to  the  madness  of  the  enemy. 
By  intricate  and  mysterious  processes,  Destiny  had  elabo- 
rated the  combination  which  would  finally  produce  the 
victory  of  right  and  the  Triumph  of  Democracy. 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE 

DATE  PAGE 

1866.  The   Kingdom  of  Greece  guaranteed   by  Great    Britain, 

France,  and  Russia 170 

1867.  June  8.  Francis  Joseph  crowned  King  of  Hungary  .  .  212 
1 88 1.  Prince  Charles  I  assumed  kingship  of  Roumania  .  .  .  159 
1888.  June  15.  William  II  acceded  to  the  throne  of  Germany  399 
1905.  August  30.  First  German  submarine  launched  .  .  .  383 
1910.      Venizelos  became  premier  of  Greece 162 

191 3.  March  18.      George  I,  King  of  Greece,  assassinated    .      .      158 

May  20.      Crete  annexed  to  Greece 163 

May   20.     Treaty  of  London   adjusting   Balkan   matters 

signed 163 

1 914.  February   13.      Territorial   disputes   between    Greece    and 

Turkey  adjusted 163 

July  31.  New  York  Stock  Exchange  closed  ....  433 
August  4.      President  Wilson  proclaimed  the  neutrality  of 

the  United  States 433 

August  5.      The  President  tendered  mediatory  services  to 

the  European  belligerents 436 

August  6.     The  United  States  proposed  to  the  belligerents 
that  the  Declaration  of  London  be  accepted  for  the 

period  of  the  war 444 

August  20.      Great  Britain  extended  her  blockade  to  neu- 
tral ports     374,444 

September.  Germany  issued  her  first  war  loan  .  .  .  193,  206 
September  10.  Belgian  Relief  Fund  inaugurated  .  .  .  434 
October    II.      Ferdinand   I   succeeded    to   the    throne   of 

Roumania 159 

October  29.      Turkey  declared  war 79 

November.      First  British  war  loan  issued 193 

November  3.      British  and  French  battleships  bombarded 

outer  forts  of  the  Dardanelles 79,  89 

479 


480  The  Great  War 

DATF,  PAOI 

1914.  November  18.      A  British  submarine  entered  the  Strait  of 

Dardanelles 89 

November  20.      Russian  forces  began  invasion  of  Asiatic 

Turkey 322 

November  21.      British  forces  occupied  Basra    .      .      .      .  316 
November  25.      British  War  Council  organized       ...  79 
December   17.       British    protectorate    over   Egypt    estab- 
lished       330 

December  26.     Secretary  Bryan  protested  to  Great  Britain 

against  her  interference  with  neutral  shipping    .      .      .  446 

19 1 5.  January.      British  reinforcements  sent  to  the  continent      .  9 
January.      London  Stock  Exchange  reopened      ....  189 
January  2.     Russia  asked  that  Great  Britain  make  a  demon- 
stration against  Turkey 81 

January   8-14.       Operations    in    the   Aisne    sector   (Sois- 

sons) 3,  4 

January  13.      The  British  War  Council  decided  on  naval 

operations  against  Turkey 82 

January  17.  Turkish  forces  routed  in  Transcaucasia  .  .  323 
January  24.  Naval  engagement  of  Dogger  Bank  .  .  75,  370 
January    26.       Germany    commandeered     all     flour     and 

grain 204,  373,  446 

January  28.      The  Wm.  P.  Frye  destroyed  by  the  cruiser 

Prinz  Eitel  Friedrich 390 

February.      The  Canadian  Division  arrived  in  Flanders     .  9 

February.      Bulgaria  received  large  advances  from  German 

bankers 166 

February  1—4.      Campaign  against  Warsaw  ....       35,  36 
February  2.      Great  Britain  declared  contraband  all  food- 
stuffs for  Germany 373,446 

February  3-4.  The  Turks  defeated  at  the  Suez  Canal  .  331 
February   4.      Germany    began    indiscriminate    submarine 

warfare 376,  386,  447,  453 

February  7—14.  Second  battle  at  the  Masurian  Lakes  .  37-40 
February  10.      France  enacted  law  for  issue  of  National 

Defense  Bills 202 

February  1  o.    Secretary  Bryan  warned  Germany  against  con- 
sequences of  unrestricted  submarine  warfare  .    376,  387,452 
February   15.      Cooperation   with  the   Entente  Allies  ap- 
proved by  the  Greek  chamber 164 

February  16.      British   military  expedition   ordered  to  the 

Dardanelles 102 


Chronological  Table  481 

DATE  PAGE 

1 91 5.  February  16.  Germany  refused  to  desist  from  submarine 
warfare  except  on  Great  Britain's  relaxing  the  block- 
ade 388,452 

February  16-March  1 1.  Great  French  offensive  in  Cham- 
pagne      3,  6-7 

February  19.  British  and  French  fleets  attacked  the  Dar- 
danelles forts 90-91 

February  20.    Australian  and  New  Zealand  (Anzacs)  forces 

ordered  to  the  Dardanelles    .  103 

February  20.  Secretary  Bryan  sent  a  mediatory  note  to 
Great  Britain  and  Germany  on  the  blockade  regu- 
lations     387,453 

February  25.      British  and  French  fleets  renewed  attack  on 

the  Dardanelles  forts 02 

February  27.      Germany  issued  her  second  war  loan    .      .      207 

March.      Great    Britain   took   control    of   plants    for   the 

manufacture  of  munitions 190 

March  1.     Turkish  forts  bombarded  by  British  ships  within 

the  Dardanelles no 

March  3.      British  Naval  Division  sent  to  the  Dardanelles      103 

March  6.  Venizelos  resigned  from  the  Greek  premier- 
ship  165 

March  7.  The  Allied  fleets  within  the  Dardanelles  at- 
tacked Turkish  forts  at  the  Narrows 95 

March  10.      British  captured  Neuve  Chapelle     .      .    11-12,189 

March  10.  The  Prinz  Eitel  Friedrich  interned  in  Nor- 
folk harbor iq0 

March  12.      General  Sir  Ian  Hamilton  named  commander 

of  the  Dardanelles  military  expedition 103 

March  15.  The  British  blockade  of  the  North  Sea  de- 
fined        072 

March  1 5.    Great  Britain  proclaimed  retaliatory  naval  policy 

as  to  the  capture  of  vessels  carrying  enemy  goods     .377,  447 

March  18.      Final  and  unsuccessful  Allied  naval  attack  at 

the  Dardanelles 97-101,  105 

March  22.      Peremysl  surrendered  to  the  Russians .      .      .        52 

March  28.  The  Falaba  destroyed  by  a  German  sub- 
marine  389,  453 

March   28.      Bulgaria   declared   her   policy   to   be   one   of 

self-interest 16- 
March  30.     Secretary  Bryan  protested  against  the  Allies' 

form  of  blockade  of  Germany 447 


482  The  Great  War 

DATE  PAOB 

i c> i  5 .      April  5— II.       The  French  captured  Lcs  Eparges     .      .  3,  14-16 
April  1  1.      The  German  Ambassador  impugned  the  "strict 

neutrality"  of  the  United  States 440 

April  12.  The  Turks  defeated  in  Mesopotamia  .  .  .  316 
April  22-May  27.  Second  battle  of  Ypres  .  .  3,  17-24,  189 
April  24.      British  military  expedition   to  the   Dardanelles 

sailed  from  Mudros 103 

April  25.      The  Germans  invaded  Courland 66 

April   25—26.      British  forces   landed  on   Gallipoli   Penin- 
sula   103,  109,  1  10 

April  28.      Great  German  drive  in  Galicia  opened  ...        66 
April  28.    The  Gushing  destroyed  by  a  German  aeroplane  .  390,453 
May  1.      Furious  night  attack  by  the  Turks  on  the  Gal- 
lipoli Peninsula 114 

May  1.      The  tanker  Gulflight  torpedoed 39°>453 

May  1.      Audacious  warning  against  passage  on  the  Lusi- 
tania  advertised    in   American   press   by   the   German 

Ambassador 39°>453 

May  7.      The  Lusitania,  with  1,978  persons  aboard,  tor- 
pedoed   389>453 

May  9-June  13.  Battle  of  Festubert  (Artois)  .  3,26,30,31-32 
May  10.      Germany  repudiated  responsibility  for  the  Lusi- 

tania  disaster 454 

May  12.      The  French  took  Carency 28 

May  13.     The  United  States  Secretary  of  State  protested 
the  rights  of  American  citizens  to  freedom  of  travel 
without  danger  from  illegal  methods  of  warfare  .      .  391,  455 
May  16.      Teutonic  attack  on  Peremysl  opened       ...        72 
May  21.     The  French  gained  Heights  of  Notre  Dame  de 

Lorette 30 

May  23.     Van  occupied  by  the  Russians 326 

May  23.      Italy  entered  the  war 256,  370 

May  28.      Germany  evasively   replied   to   protest   of  the 

United  States  as  to  submarine  warfare 456 

June.      Second  British  war  loan  issued 193 

June  2.      Peremysl  captured  by  the  Teutonic  forces     .      .        72 

June  8.      Secretary  Bryan  resigned 458 

June   13.      Elections    in    Greece   endorsed  the    policy   of 

Venizelos 165 

June  20.  The  Teutonic  armies  captured  Lemberg  .  .  74 
June  23.      The  Social  Democrats  of  Germany  demanded 

that  peace  negotiations  be  immediately  opened  .      .      .      209 


Chronological  Table  483 

DATE  PAGE 

19 1 5.      June  27.     The  Italians  gained  a  bridge-head  on  the  Isonzo  257 

July  2.      Munitions  Bill  enacted  in  Great  Britain    .      .      .  190 

July  15.      Great  strike  of  coal  miners  in  South  Wales      .  191 

July  15-16.      Teutonic  offensive  against  Poland  resumed  .  132 
July  17.      Bulgarian  treaty  with  the  Central  Powers  said 

to  have  been  signed 168 

July  20.     The  Russians  retreated  to  the  Vistula      .      .      .  134 
July  21.      Third  note  of  the  Secretary  of  State   sent   to 

Germany  in  the  Lusitania  case 392,458 

August.      The   Teutonic    forces    concentrated   along   the 

Serbian  frontier 172 

August  1.      The  Germans  captured  Mitau 135 

August  4.      Teutonic  forces  entered  Warsaw     .      .      .      .  136 

August  4.      Ivangorod  fortress  surrendered  to  the  Austrians  136 
August   6-10.       Allied    attack   began    against    Sari    Bahr 

Ridge  (Gallipoli  Peninsula) 120—122 

August  7.      British  reinforcements  landed  at  Suvla  Bay     .  124 
August  9.     Bulgaria  declared  the  terms  on  which  she  would 

join  the  Allies 167 

August  10.      Bulgaria  received  further  advances  from  Ger- 
man bankers 168 

August    10-17.       German     naval     defeat     in     Gulf    of 

Riga       ............    140-141,  371 

August  15.      National  Register  taken  in  Great  Britain      .  192 
August    15.       The    New   York    World   exposed    diabolic 

schemes  of  German  agents  against  America      .      .      .  440 
August  16.      The  anti-Venizelos  Cabinet  resigned  .      .      .  166 
August  17.      Fortress    of  Kovno   captured    by   the    Ger- 
mans        139 

August  19.      Fortress  of  Novo  Georgievsk  taken   by  the 

Germans 139 

August  19.     The  Arabic  sunk  by  a  German  submarine  .  392,  459 

August  21.      Great  battle  on  Gallipoli  Peninsula     .      .      .  125 

August  21.      Italy  declared  war  against  Turkey      .      .      .  259 

August  23.      Kovel  captured  by  the  Teutonic  forces    .      .  149 

August  23.      Venizelos  again  became  premier  of  Greece  .  169 

August  23.     Turco-Bulgarian  agreement  concluded     .      .  169 

August  25.      Brest-Litovsk  evacuated  by  the  Russians     .  141 

August  26.      Fortress  of  Olita  evacuated  by  the  Russians  140 
August  30.      Officials  of  the   German  and  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Embassies  at  Washington  exposed  as  intriguers 

against  the  United  States 441 


484  The  Great  War 

DATE  PAGE 

1(^15.      August    {I.      Lutsk  captured  by  Teutonic  forces     .      .      .  149 

September    1.      Anglo-French    loan    placed    in   the    United 

States 195 

September  1.      Brody  taken  by  Teutonic  forces       .      .      .  149 
September  3.      Fortress  of  Grodno  abandoned  by  the  Rus- 
sians         140 

September  4.      Germany's  third  war  loan  issued       .      .      .  207 
September  5.      The  Tsar  assumed  command  of  the  Rus- 
sian armies 141 

September  8.      Dubno  captured  by  Teutonic  forces      .      .  149 
September  13.     The  Austro-German   forces  driven  back 

to  the  Strypa  line 150 

September  16.      The  Russian  Duma  prorogued  .      .      .      .  213 

September  18.      Vilna  evacuated  by  the  Russians     .      .      .  144 
September  1 9.     Bombardment  of  Belgrade  began  by  Austro- 

Hungarians 175 

September  21.      Bulgaria  mobilized  her  army      .      .      .  169,  171 
September   21.      Greece    inquired    of  France   and    Great 

Britain  as  to  their  intention  to  support  Serbia    .      .      .  169 

September  23.    Great  Allied  offensive  in  Champagne  opened  221 
September   24.       Greece    began    the    mobilization    of   her 

forces 169 

September  24.    The  British  Foreign  Secretary  warned  Bul- 
garia against  her  aggressive  action       172 

September  25.  The  French  stormed  La  Main  ....  229 
September  29.  Fierce  battle  at  Vimy  Heights  .  .  .  .  227 
September  29.  British  forces  occupied  Kut-el-Amara  .  317 
October.  Italy  declared  war  against  Bulgaria  ....  259 
October  2.  Greece  protested  against  the  use  of  her  terri- 
tory by  a  Franco-British  force 169 

October  3.      Russia  delivered  an  ultimatum  to  Bulgaria     .  172 
October  5.      Venizelos  resigned  the  premiership  of  Greece 

under  pressure  of  the  king's  opposition   .....  170 
October   5.      Ambassador   Bernstorff  officially   disavowed 

the  attack  on  the  Arabic 460 

October  5-8.     British  and  French  troops  landed  at  Salonica 

for  the  relief  of  Serbia 183 

October  8.      Belgrade  evacuated  by  the  Serbians      .      .      .  176 

October  11.      Bulgarian  troops  entered  Serbia    ....  17b 
October  19.      Greece  refused  to  intervene  on  behalf  of 

Serbia 171 

October  22.      Uskub  captured  by  the  Bulgarians     .      .      .  176 


Chronological  Table  485 

DATE  PAGE 

1915.  October  23.      The  Germans  forced  the  Danube  at  Orsova  177 
October  28.     The  Serbians  retired  on  the  northern  battle- 
front      179 

November  6.      Nish  captured  by  the  Bulgarians       .      .      .      177 

November  10.  The  Ancona  sunk  by  an  Austrian  sub- 
marine    393 

November  15.      Further  protest  made  by  the  United  States 

to  Great  Britain  as  to  neutral  shipping  rights    .      .      .     448 

November  16.  Mitrovitza  abandoned  by  the  Serbian  gov- 
ernment and  military  staff 180 

December  2—12.      The  Allied  forces  retired  from  Serbian 

territory 183 

December  7.     The  Turks  began  attacks  on  the  British  at 

Kut-el-Amara 319 

December  21.     Italian  forces  occupied  Durazzo     .      .      .      182 

December   24— January   16,   19 1 6.      Russian   offensive   in 

Bukovina 156 

December  30.      The  Persia  sunk  by  a  German  submarine      393 

1916.  January.      The  Russians  occupied  Hamadan       ....      327 
January  8-9.     The  Gallipoli  Peninsula  evacuated  by  Allied 

forces 185 

January  11.  The  Russian  campaign  opened  in  Armenia  .  326 
January  19.  The  Austro-Hungarians  occupied  Cetinje  .  182 
January  23.  Austro-Hungarian  forces  entered  Scutari  .  182 
January  27.      Military  (Compulsory)  Service  Act  adopted 

in  Great  Britain 192,  196 

February  16.  The  Russians  captured  Erzerum  .  .  .  326 
February  21.  Germany  opened  her  attack  against  Ver- 
dun      236-239,  241 

February  25.  The  Germans  captured  Fort  Douaumont  .  244 
March.     Germany   summoned   naval    reservists   to   active 

duty 401 

March  2.     The  Germans  began  their  artack  on  Verdun  on 

the  west 247 

March  4.  Germany's  fourth  war  loan  issued  ....  207 
March  5.     The  German  raider  Mowe  returned  to  Wilhelm- 

shaven 368 

March  1 5-16.    Von  Tirpitz  resigned  as  Minister  of  Marine 

and  High-admiral  of  Germany  ....  210,402,460 
March  24.     The  French  steamer  Sussex  sunk  by  a  German 

submarine 393,460 

March  27-28.     First  Allied  War  Council  convened  at  Paris      268 


486  The  Great  War 

DATI  PAGE 

1916.     April  3.     The  Germans  repulsed  on  Hill  304    ....  249 

April  9.     Supreme  German  attack  on  Verdun    ....  250 
April  1 1.     The  Germans  reached  the  village  of  Vaux  .  248,  249 

April  18.      Trebizond  occupied  by  the  Russians      .      .      .  326 
April  18.     Germany  is  notified  that  the  United  State-swill 
sever   diplomatic    relations    unless   existing   submarine 

methods  are  renounced 461 

April  20.      Germany  attempted  to  land  arms  in  Ireland  to 

aid  Sinn  Finn  uprising 197 

April  21.      Sir  Robert  Casement  arrested  in   Ireland  as  a 

German  agent 197 

April  24.      Sinn  Finn  insurrection  broke  out  in  Dublin      .  197 
April  24.      A  German  squadron  bombarded  Lowestoft  and 

Yarmouth 402 

April  29.     General  Townshend  surrendered  Kut-el-Amara 

after  five-months'  siege 320 

May  3.      Hill  304  captured  by  the  Germans       .      .      .      .  251 
May  4.      The  German  government  reservedly  promised  to 

adopt  legal  methods  in  submarine  warfare     ....  462 
May  14.      Austria-Hungary  launched  great  offensive  from 

the  Trentino 260,  263 

May  20-21.      Le  Mort  Homme  taken  by  the  Germans    .  252 
May  25.     Compulsory  military  service  in  Great  Britain  ex- 
tended to  include  married  men 270 

Mav  31.      Naval  battle  of  Jutland 407-418 

June  3.      Russians  opened  offensive  under  Brussilofr    .      .  286 
June  4.      Lord  Kitchener  died  in  the  sinking  of  the  Hamp- 
shire off  the  Orkneys  .      .          198,425 

June  6.      Fort  Vaux  captured  by  the  Germans  .      .      .      .  253 

June  6.      Lutsk  taken  by  the  Russians 286 

June  8.      The  British  opened  pacific  blockade  of  Greece  .  300 

June  9.      Dubno  taken  by  the  Russians 286-287 

June  9.      Arabia  declared  its  independence  of  Turkey  .      .  332 
June  9.      Second  note  sent  by  the  United  States  to  Ger- 
many concerning  ruthless  submarine  warfare     .      .      .  457 
June  14-17.      Economic  Conference  of  Entente  Powers 

held  at  Paris 269 

June  18.      The   Italians  defeated  the  Austro-Hungarians 

•  on  the  Sette  Communi  plateau 264 

June  23.      Last  great  battle  for  Verdun 253 

June  29.      Sir  Roger  Casement,  convicted  of  treason,  exe- 
cuted in  the  Tower  of  London 198 


Chronological  Table  487 

DATE  PAGE 

19 1 6.      July.      Members  of  the  Independent  Party  in  Hungary  de- 
clared in  favor  of  a  negotiated  peace  .      .      .  v  .      .      .      212 
July  I.      Offensive  launched  by  the  Allies  in  Picardy  .      .      274 

July  5.      The  British  captured  La  Boisselle 273 

July  6.      Lloyd  George  assumed  duties  of  British  Secretary 

of  War 198 

July  8.      Further  evasive  reply  made  by  Germany  respect- 
ing the  Lusitania's  destruction 458 

July  9.     The  submarine  merchantman  Deutschland  reached 

Baltimore 428,463 

July   14.      Allied    troops   celebrated   the    French    national 

holiday  in  Paris 276 

July  15.      Second  stage  of  the  Picardy  offensive  opened     .      277 
July  21.     The   United  States  notified   Germany  that  its 
reply  as  to  submarine  warfare  was  "unsatisfactory" 

and  warned  that  government 458 

July  23-26.      Pozieres  taken  by  the  British 277 

July  25.      Erzingan  taken  by  the  Russians 327 

July  28.      Brody  captured  by  the  Russians 289 

July  28.      Captain  Charles  Fryatt  executed  by  Germany  .      383 
July  28.      The   United    States   repudiated   Germany's   re- 
servation as  to  the  action  of  her  submarines      .      .      .     462 
August.      Austria-Hungary  launched  great  offensive  on  the 

Isonzo 258 

August  1.      Italy  launched  offensive  against  Gorizia     .      .      265 
August  2.      Von  Hindenburg  assumed  supreme  command 

of  the  Teutonic  forces  in  the  East 290 

August  3.      The  Turks  disastrously  defeated  at  the  Suez 

Canal 332 

August  9.      The  Italians  captured  Gorizia 266 

August  17.      Bulgaria  began  offensive  on  the  Macedonian 

front 300 

August    27.       Roumania    declared    war    against    Austria- 
Hungary     296 

August  28.      Germany  declared  war  against  Roumania      .      296 
August  28.      Italy  declared  war  against  Germany    .      .      .      206 
August  29.     Von  Hindenburg  appointed  Chief  of  the  Ger- 
man General  Staff 211 

August  30-Septembcr  3.      Great  battle  won  by  the  Rus- 
sians near  Mariampol 304 

September.      Germany's  fifth  war  loan  issued      ....      207 
September  1.      Bulgaria  declared  war  against  Roumania    .      296 


488  The  Great  War 

DATE  PAOI 

1916.     September   1.      Hu^ar-German-Turkish    invasion    of   the 

Dobrudscha  began 302 

September  1.  Ambassador  Bernstorff  notified  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  that  German  submarine  ruthlessncss 
would  be  modified 459 

September  9.      Silistria  evacuated  by  the  Roumanians  .      .      303 

September  14.      Greece  voluntarily  surrendered  Kavala  to 

the  Bulgarians 300 

September    14.      The    Italians    opened    offensive    on    the 

Isonzo  front 350 

September  28.  Von  Bethmann-Hollweg  declared  in  favor 
of  unrestricted  use  of  all  available  instruments  of 
battle 464 


October  7.      The   German   submarine   U-jj   anchored 


in 


Newport  harbor 428,  463 

October  8.      British  Red  Star  liner  Stephana  and  four  other 

ships  torpedoed  off  Nantucket  Light 429,463 

October  23.      Costanza  occupied  by  the  Bulgar-German- 

Turkish  army  under  von  Mackensen 307 

October  24.      Last  attack  at  Verdun  commenced  by  the 

French 336 

October  24-25.  Fort  Douaumont  captured  by  the  French  336 
November  1.      The  Deutschland  made  second  entry  into  an 

American  port 428,  463 

November  21.  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  I  died  .  .  .  212 
November   21.      Archduke    Charles   Francis    succeeded    as 

Emperor  of  Austria  and  King  of  Hungary  .  .  .  .  213 
December  5.  Von  Mackensen  occupied  Bucharest  .  .  309 
December  12.  The  Chancellor  announced  in  the  Reich- 
stag that  Germany  had  made  peace  proposals  .  .  .  211 
December  15.     The  French  opened  successful  attack  from 

Poivre  Hill 337 

December  18.     President  Wilson  requested  the  belligerents 

to  state  the  terms  on  which  peace  could  be  made  .  .  464 
December  29.  The  charlatan  Rasputin  assassinated  .  .  355 
191 7.      January  22.     The  President  addressed  the  Senate  on  the 

conditions  of  a  League  for  Peace 465 

January  31.      Germany  withdrew  her  pledge  (of  May  4, 

1 91 6)  of  legal  submarine  warfare 464 

February  3.      The   German   Ambassador   at  Washington 

given  his  passports 466 

February  23.     The  British  captured  Kut-el-Amara     .      .      328 


Chronological  Table  489 

date  page 

191 7.     February  26.      The  Laconia  sunk 467 

February  26.     The  President  asked  Congress  for  power 

to  arm  merchant  vessels 467 

March  1.      The  "Zimmermann"  note  made  public,  dis- 
closing intrigues  against  the  United  States  in  Mexico 

and  Japan 468 

March  11.      The  British  occupied  Bagdad 328 

March  11.     Revolutionary  demonstration  in  Petrograd  .  356-357 
March   12.       Executive    order    authorized   armed    guards 

placed  on  American  merchant  ships 467 

March  16.      Nicholas  II  abdicated  as  Tsar  of  Russia  .      .  358 

March  16.      Liberal  ministry  formed  in  Russia  ....  358 

March  16.      The  Vigilancia  sunk 468 

March  17.      The  City  of  Memphis  and  the  Illinois  sunk     .  468 

March  17.      Bapaume  occupied  by  the  British    ....  340 

March  17.      Roye  occupied  by  the  French 340 

March  18.      The  British  occupied  Peronne 340 

March  18.      Noyon  occupied  by  the  French      ....  340 

March  21.      The  Healdton  sunk 468 

March  27.     First  Battle  of  Gaza 333 

April  1.      The  Aztec  sunk 468 

April  2.     The  President  asked  Congress  to  declare  that  a 

state  of  war  existed  with  Germany 468—469 

April  2.      President  Wilson  announced  to  Congress  that 
the  government  had  declined  to  receive  the  Austro- 

Hungarian  ambassador  accredited  to  Washington  .      .  472 
April  6.      The   President  proclaimed  that  a  state  of  war 
existed  with  Germany  (the  resolution  was  passed  on 
April  4th  by  the  Senate  and  on  the  6th  by  the  House 

of  Representatives) 473 

April   9.      Austria-Hungary    severed    diplomatic    relations 

with  the  United  States 473 

April  9-10.      The  British  captured  Vimy  Ridge      .      .      .  342 
April  13.      All-Russian  Congress  of  Soviets  convened  at 

Petrograd  favored  conditional  continuation  of  the  war  362 

April  16.      Second  Battle  of  the  Aisne 345 

April  17-19.      Second  Battle  of  Gaza 334 

April  21.      Turkey  severed  diplomatic  relations  with  the 

United  States 473 

April  28.      Selective  Service  Bill  passed  by  Congress    .      .  474 
May  12.      The  Italians  opened  campaign  on  east  of  the 

Isonzo  River 351 


490 


The  Great  War 


DAT!  PAGE 

1917.  May    15.      Officers'     Training    Camps    for    the    National 

Armv  established 475 

M.i\    1  S.      Registration  for  military  eligibles  proclaimed  by 

President  Wilson 474 

M.i\    i(<.      Tin-  Russian  government  declared  against  "an- 
nexations and  indemnities" 363 

,lav  23.      The  Italians  launched  operations  on  the  Carso  .      35  1 
line  5.      First  registration  made  under  the  Selective  Draft 

Bill 474 

une  S.      General  Pershing  and  his  staff  landed  in  Liver- 
pool from  the  Baltic 476 

une  14.      General  Pershing  and  his  staff  received  by  the 

President  of  the  French  Republic 477 

une  17.      The  British  captured  Messines  Ridge     .      .  347-348 
une    26.      United    States    Expeditionary    Force    reached 

France 477 

uly  20.      Tarnopol  taken  by  the  Teutons 316 

uly  20.      Numbers  of  first  draftees  under  Selective  Draft 

Bill  drawn  at  Washington 475 

19 1 8.  March  21.      Maritime  losses  and  ship  construction,  191  5- 

19 1 7,  published  by  Great  Britain 397 


INDEX 

Of  some  of  the  subjects  presented  in  this  volume  vary- 
ing phases  appear  in  other  volumes  of  this  work 
and  the  Indexes  to  all  may  be  profitably  consulted. 


Aa,  The,  135,  154. 

Ablain-St.  Nazaire,  25,  28,  30,  31. 

Aeroplanes,  British  superiority  over  Ger- 
mans in,  341. 

Aisne,  The,  operations  in  sector  of,  Jan- 
uary 8-14,  1915,  3,  4;  Second  Battle 
of,  345-347- 

Albania,  Greek  claims  to  cause  revolu- 
tion, 163;  Germany  offers  part  of  to 
Bulgaria,  1685  Serbian  refugees  reach, 
182. 

Alderson,  Major-general  Edwin  A.  H.,  in 
command  of  the  Canadian  division  in 
Flanders,  9. 

Alexander,  Crown  Prince  of  Serbia,  in 
command  of  army  in  Macedonia,  300. 

Alexeieff,  General  Michael  V.,  in  com- 
mand of  the  Ninth  Russian  Army,  34; 
succeeds  Russky,  62;  command  of  in 
defense  of  Poland,  132;  military  record 
of,  142;  appointed  Chief  of  Russian 
General  Staff,  142,  144;  advises  abdi- 
cation of  the  Tsar,  358;  retires  from 
chief  command  of  the  Russians,  364. 

Allenby,  General  Sir  Edmund,  in  com- 
mand of  Third  British  Army,  341. 

Amade,  General  d',  in  command  of  the 
French  forces  on  Gallipoli,  108. 

Ancona,  The,  torpedoed  by  an  Austrian 
submarine,  393. 

Anzacs,  The,  in  the  Gallipoli  campaign, 
109;  landing  and  first  attack  of,  109; 
capture  Lone  Pine,  120;  attack  posi- 
tion of  Sari  Bahr,  121-122,  123. 

Aosta,  Duke  of,  enters  Gorizia,  265,  266 ; 
in  command  of  Third  Italian  Army, 
350. 

Arabia  declares  its  independence  of  Tur- 
key, 332. 

Arabic,  The,  torpedoed,  392,  459. 


Arbuthnot,  Rear-admiral  R.  K.,  in  com- 
mand of  Britain's  First  Cruiser  Squad- 
ron, 406;  sinks  with  his  flagship  in 
Battle  of  Jutland,  414. 

Armenia,  Turkish  massacres  in,  3235  Rus- 
sian campaign  against,  326-327. 

Arnim,  General  von,  command  of  in  the 
West,  341. 

Arras,  French  attack  north  of,  255  Battle 

of,  341-343- 

Artois,  Allied  offensive  in,  1 9 1  5,  3 ;  great 
French  victory  in,  26-30;  French  suc- 
cesses in  September,  191 5,  226. 

Asquith,  Herbert  Henry,  192,  196,  198, 
199,   3  77- 

Austria-Hungary,  armed  forces  of  at  close 
of  1 9 1 4,  3 ;  position  of  annies  of  in  the 
East,  34;  forces  of  on  the  Carpathian 
front,  47,-  drives  the  Russians  from 
Bukovina,  48;  fails  to  dislodge  Rus- 
sians in  the  Carpathians,  49-50;  sur- 
renders the  fortress  of  Peremysl,  52; 
loses  positions  in  the  Carpathians,  53, 
56;  strength  and  positions  of  armies 
of  in  Galicia,  62,  63,  64;  operations 
of  in  Galicia,  66-74;  position  and 
strength  of  armies  of,  131,  155;  con- 
centrates forces  against  Serbia,  174; con- 
quers Montenegro,  182;  cessation  of 
parliamentary  functions  in  Austria,  212; 
opposition  of  the  Independents  in  Hun- 
gary, 212;  death  of  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph,  212;  physical  advantages  of 
over  Italy,  255;  plan  of  offensive  of 
against  Italy,  256;  forces  of  retire  before 
the  Italians,  257;  mountain  defenses  of, 
258;  delivers  unsuccessful  offensive  in 
the  region  of  Trent,  258 ;  great  offensive 
of  from  the  Trentino,  260;  positions  of 
1  Austro-Hungarian  armies  in  Trentino 
491 


The  Great  War 


repulsed   a!    Monte 

. 
luI  defeated  on  the  &  tte  Communi 
plateau,  1641  ii  defeated  on  Monte  Sabo- 

tino,  z(>(<;  and  at  Monte  San  Michele, 

western 

pin  of  the*  defeated 

in  the  Volhynian  sector,  2S6;  immense 

.   I  ..  rman  divisions 

■  ■  - ;   loses   Bukovina, 

rearranges  her  military  fo 

,  \<>n  Hindenburg  replaces 
Archduke  Frederick  in  command  on 
the  eastern  front,  290;  Roumania  de- 
clares «rai  against,  196;  driven  hack  by 
the  Roumanians  in  Transylvania,  298, 
1  fuses  to  protest  against  Turkey's 
atrocities  in  Armenia,  324;  armies  of 
hold  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Isonzo, 
350;  loses  stmng  positions  to  the  Italians, 
350;  forces  of  on  the  Italian  front,  351; 
is  defeated  on  the  Carso,  351;  position 
of  armies  of  in  Russia  in  19 17,  364; 
successes  in  final  campaign  in  Galicia, 
365,  366. 
Averescu,  General,  in  command  of  Rou- 
manian army,  299,  303,  306. 
Ayhner,  General,  commands  British  re- 
lieving force  at  Kut-el-Amara,  319,3  20. 

Bahuna  Pass, heroic  Serbian  defense  at,  178. 

Bagdad  taken  by  the  British,  328. 

Bailloud,  General,  succeeds  to  command 
of  the  French  in  Gallipoli,  117. 

Balkans,  The,  political  situation  in  Greece, 
159;  conflicting  interests  of  Greece,  Bul- 
garia, and  Turkey,  162,  163-165;  Ger- 
many's financial  hold  on  Bulgaria,  166, 
168,  172;  Bulgaria  plays  profitably, 
1  66- 1 68;  tha  treachery  of  King  Con- 
staniine,  168,  170;  Bulgaria  mobilizes 
her  army,  169;  Bulgaria  strips  off  the 
mask,  172;  the  Teutonic  alliance  makes 
war  on  Serbia,  172,  174-178;  collapse 
and  flight  of  the  Serbians,  178-182; 
British  and  French  forces  in,  182-183. 

Baluieff,  General,  284. 

Bapaume,    the    British     objective     in    the 
Picardy   offensive,   273;    taken   by  the 
British,  340. 
^27. 

Battle-planes,  service  of  in  the  Battle  of 
the  Somme,  274. 


Beatty,    Admiral   Sir    David,    commands 

Battle-Cruiser  Meet  in  Battle  ■>!  Jut- 
land, 405,  406. 

Belgian  Relief  Fund,    The,  434. 

Belgium,    participation    of    in    tin 

battle  of  Vpres,  18,  20,  23;    position  of 

army  of  in  September,  1915,220;  joins 
in  first  War  Council  of"  the  Allies, 
268. 

Belgrade,  evacuated  by  Serbians,  176. 

Below,  General  Otto  von,  command  of 
in  the  West,  270,  278,  341. 

Below,  General  Frit/,  von,  in  command  in 
East  Prussia,  37,  38;  in  the  campaign 
against  Poland,  129,  131,  132,  135, 
138,  150;  in  the  western  campaign  in 
1917,  345- 

Bernstorff,  Count  von,  as  German  Am- 
bassador publicly  warns  American  citi- 
zens against  sailing  on  the  Lusitania, 
390,  453;  impugns  "strict  neutrality " 
of  the  United  States,  440;  is  involved 
in  the  "Archibald"  intrigues,  441;  is 
handed  his  passports,  466. 

Beseler,  General  von,  139,  141. 

Beskid  (or  Volocz)  Pass,  The,  45,  49. 

Bethmann-Holweg,  Count  von,  on  Ger- 
many's peace  terms,  210;  his  "war- 
map"  basis  of  peace,  m;  advocates 
ruthless  warfare,  464. 

Bialystok,  capture  of  by  the  Teutons,  140. 

Bird  wood,  Lieutenant-general  Sir  William 
R.,  in  command  of  the  Anzacs  on  Gal- 
lipoli,  108. 

Blockade,  regulations  of  the,  371;  the 
Declaration  of  London  modified  as  to, 
372>  37  3  5  British  orders  in  Council 
extends  to  neutrals,  373-375,  377;  doc- 
trine of  "continuous  voyage,"  373,  443, 
444,  448-449;  Great  Britain's  defense 
of  the,  374,  379,  380,  446,  447,  449- 
451;  the  United  States  protests  against 
the,  374,  375,  3  78,  446,447-448;  mili- 
tary and  commercial,  378;  conditions 
favoring  the  British,  379-380;  tighten- 
ing of  against  Germany,  426,  447. 

Boehm-Ermolli,  General  von,  in  command 
of  operations  to  relieve  Peremysl,  48,  50; 
in  command  of  Austro-Hungarian  forces 
in  the  Galician  drive,  64,  68;  in  opera- 
tions against  Peremysl,  71,  72;  in  the 
Polish  campaign,  131,  134,  149;  >s  de- 
feated in  Volhynia,  286,  288,  289. 


Index 


493 


Bojadieff,  General,  in  command  of  a  Bul- 
garian army  against  Serbia,  175. 

Bojna,  General  Boroevic  von,  in  command 
of  Austro-Hungarian  forces  in  Galicia, 
64;  in  command  of  the  Fifth  Austro- 
Hungarian  Army  in  Italy,  261,  265. 

Bolsheviki,  The,  its  party  distinction,  359; 
Lenin  becomes  leader  of,  360. 

Bothmer,  General  Count  von,  in  the  Polish 
campaign,  149,  150;  in  command  along 
die  Strypa,  155,  156;  in  the  Volhynian 
campaign,  286,  289. 

Brest-Litovsk,  combined  operations  against, 
1405  evacuated  by  the  Russians,  141. 

Briand,  Aristide,  200,  201. 

Brody,  taken  by  the  Teutons,  149;  cap- 
tured by  the  Russians,  289. 

BrussilofF,  General,  in  command  of  the 
Russian  army  of  the  Carpathians,  34, 
46,  51 ;  saves  his  army  on  the  Biala,  68, 
69;  in  the  defense  of  Poland,  132;  de- 
feats Germans  at  the  Sereth,  150;  in 
command  of  Eighth  Russian  Army, 
156;  succeeds  Ivanoff  as  group  com- 
mander, 286;  plan  of  to  aid  Roumania, 
304;  advises  the  Tsar  to  abdicate,  358; 
succeeds  to  chief  command,  364;  his 
plan  of  1917  offensive,  364-365. 

Bryan,  Hon.  William  J.,  protests  against 
Great  Britain's  interference  with  neutral 
commerce,  374,  446,  447,  448;  warns 
Germany  as  to  her  methods  of  sub- 
marine warfare,  376,  386,  391,  392, 
452,  455;  proposes  admission  of  food- 
stuffs to  Germany,  387,  453;  resigns 
office  in  the  crisis  due  to  the  sinking  of 
the  Lushania,  450. 

Burian,  Count  Stephen,  44. 

Bucharest,  occupied  by  von  Mackensen's 
army,  309. 

Bug,  The,  128,  132,  148. 

Bukovina,  Russian  occupation  of,  35,  46; 
the  Teutons  drive  the  Russians  from, 
485  Russian  operations  against,  156; 
successes  in,  288;  gain  important  Passes 
in,  304. 

Bulgakoff,  General,  in  command  of  Twen- 
tieth Russian  Corps  in  East  Prussia,  41. 

Bulgaria,  dynastic  and  political  influences 
in,  158,  159,  160;  demands  of  as  price 
of  her  neutrality,  164;  leans  to  Central 
Powers,  166;  declared  policy  of,  167; 
Germany's    supposed    terms    to,    168; 


concludes  agreement  with  Turkey,  169; 
mobilizes  her  army,  169;  British  warn- 
ing and  Russian  ultimatum  to,  1  71-172; 
military  strength  of,  174;  concentrates 
forces  against  Serbia,  175;  advances 
swiftly  into  Serbia,  176;  takes  Nish, 
177;  motive  of  in  joining  Teutonic 
alliance,  186;  declares  war  on  Rou- 
mania, 296;  forces  of  on  the  Mace- 
donian front,  299;  occupies  Greek  town, 
300;  evacuates  Monastir,  302;  partici- 
pates in  invasion  of  the  Dobrudscha,  302; 
takes  Turkutai  and  Silistria,  303. 

Biilow,  General  von,  in  operations  on  the 
western  front,  26,  220. 

Butlar,  General  von,  commands  a  Ger- 
man corps  at  the  Masurian  Lakes,  40. 

Cadorna,  General  Count  Luigi,  in  com- 
mand of  the  Italian  armies,  257,  264; 
participates  in  first  Allied  War  Council, 
268;  plan  of  for  the  campaign  of  191 7, 

35i-  < 

Cambrai,  341. 

Camp  des  Romains,  14. 

Canadians,  The,  in  second  battle  of  Ypres, 
18;  gallantry  of,  20,  21,  22;  in  the 
battle  of  Festubert,  32. 

Capelle,  Admiral  von,  succeeds  as  chief 
of  the  German  Admiral  Staff,  402. 

Carency,  important  German  position  at, 
25;  the  French  capture,  27-28. 

Carpathians,  The,  defensive  value  and 
Passes  of,  45-46;  held  by  the  Russians, 
46 ;  the  Teutonic  forces  fail  to  drive  Rus- 
sians from,  49  ;  Russian  successes  in,  53. 

Carso  Plateau,  The,  operations  on,  351. 

Carson,  Sir  Edward,  196. 

Cary,  General  de  Langle  de,  command  of 
in  September,  19 15,  220;  captures  Mas- 
siges  Heights,  230. 

Casement,  Sir  Roger,   197-198. 

Castelnau,  General  de,  command  of  in 
September,  19 15,  220;  in  command  at 
Verdun,  244;  participates  in  first  Allied 
War  Council,  268;  in  command  of 
eastern  French  army,  344. 

Castelorizo,  163. 

Cetinje,  captured  by  the  Austro-Hun- 
garians,  182. 

Champagne,  French  offensive  in  in  spring 
of  191 5,  3,  6-7;  and  in  September, 
191 5,  227-230. 


494 


The  Great  War 


i  !  foeeph,  Archduke,  in  su- 

preme  command  ol  \  i  I  ro  Hungarian 
.unc,  i(>i;  in  com- 
mand "ii  the  eastern  front,  290. 

Charles  I,  King  of  Roumania,  159,  291. 

Chelm,  1 J3,  1  j6. 

Chemin-des-Dames,  the  French  gain,  346- 

J47" 
Chetwode,  Sir  Philip,  in  command  of  the 

lumn,"  333. 
Churchill,  Sir  Winston  S.,79,  80,  82,  101, 

•    19^.  394- 
Clemenceau,  Georges,  attacks  the  French 

ministry,  200. 
Cobbe,  Lieutenant-general   Sir  A.   S.,  in 

•  !  in  \U  opotamia,  327. 
I  dne,    King  of  Greece,    158;    his 

dislike  of  Venizelos,  162,165;  faithless 
treatment  of  Serbia  by,  168;  refuses  to 
support  his  government,  170;  dissolves 
parliament,  171. 

dnople-Bagdad  Railway,  The,  314. 
"Continuous   Voyage,"    doctrine    of   ex- 
tended  by  Great  Britain  and   France, 

J73>  444- 
Contraband,   rules  as  to,   371,  372,  442- 

443,  444;  Great  Britain  extends  list  to 

neutrals,  373-375,  446. 
Costanza   occupied    by  von   Mackensen's 

mixed  army,  307. 
Courland,  German  invasion  into,  66,  129, 

131,  135,  138,  140. 
Craonne,  taken  by  the  French,  346. 
Crete,  separation   of  from  Turkey,    162; 

annexed  by  Greece,  163. 
Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria,  army  command 

of   on    the   western    front,    220,    270, 

341. 
Crown  Prince  of  Germany,  Was  Verdun 

attacked  to  establish  military  reputation 

of  ?    231;    in    command    of   operations 

against    Verdun,    238;     front    held    in 

France  by  army  group  of,  344. 
Gushing,  The,  sunk  by  German  aeroplane, 

39°,  453- 
Czernowitz  captured  by  Teutonic  forces, 

48. 

Dankl,  General,  in  command  of  an  Austro- 
Hungarian  army  in  the  East,  34;  in  the 
Trentino,  261. 

Danube,  The,  the  Germans  force  the  pas- 
sage of,   1  -  - . 


Dardanelles,  The,  the  Strait  passed  in  1806 

and  1878,  S4;  fortifications  of,  86-87; 
efforts  of  Entente  Allies  to  force,  89. 
101, 125,  146;  proposed  cooperation  of 
Greece  with  the  Allies  at,  164-165. 

Declaration  of  London,  The,  368,  371, 
372,  373,  377,  ,378,  443.  444,  448. 

Declaration  oi  Paris,  The,  372,442,443, 
444,  448. 

Deutschland,  The,  submarine  merchant- 
man brings  cargo  to  America,  428,  463. 

Djemal  Pasha,  331,  333. 

DmitriefF,  General,  in  command  of  the 
army  of  the  Dunajec,  34;  in  (Jalicia, 
64;  retreats  from  the  Biala,  67. 

Dotxll,  Lieutenant-general  Sir  Charles,  in 
command  of  British  "Eastern  Force," 

333- 

Dobrudscha,  The,  acquired  by  Roumania, 
292;  plan  for  defense  of,  297,  298; 
attack  of  von  Mackensen  against,  302- 
303;  Costanza  occupied  by  the  Bulgar- 
German-Turkish  army,  307. 

Douai,  341,  343. 

Douaumont,  Fort,  captured  by  the  Ger- 
mans, 244;  the  Germans  repelled  on 
ridge  of,  249;  the  fort  regained  and 
again  lost  by  the  French,  253;  captured 
by  the  French,  336. 

Drina,  The,  177. 

Drocourt-Queant  line,  The,  341,  343. 

Dubail,  General,  command  of,  220. 

Dubno,  fortress  of,  148;  captured  by 
Teutonic  forces,  1 49 ;  retaken  by  the 
Russians,  15 1  j  again  captured  by  the 
Russians,  286-287. 

Dubois,  General,  command  of,  220. 

Dumba,  Dr.  Konstantin  T.,  recall  of 
requested  by  the  United  States  govern- 
ment, 441. 

D'Urbal,  General,  command  of,  220. 

Dvina,  The,  German  operations  on,  151- 

i5  5- 
Dvinsk,    unsuccessfully    attacked    by    the 
Teutons,  1  52-1  54. 

East  Prussia,  Russian  operations  against 
in  1915,  37-42- 

Economic  Conference  of  Allies  at  Paris, 
269. 

Egypt,  British  protectorate  over,  330;  im- 
portance of  to  British  Imperial  forces, 
330;  military  protection  of,  3  3 1 ;  Turkish 


Index 


495 


military  designs  against,  330,  331;  re- 
newed Turkish  campaign  against  de- 
feated, 332;  operations  to  the  Sinai 
desert  from,  332. 

Eichhorn,  Colonel-general  von,  38,  41,  42, 
131,  138,  139,  143,  284,  290. 

Einem,  General  von,  220. 

El  Arish  taken  by  the  British  forces,  332. 

Emden,  The,  370. 

Enver  Pasha,  on  the  defensive  strength  of 
the  Dardanelles,  9  3 ;  plan  of  to  seize 
Kars,  322;  instigator  of  Armenian  atro- 
cities, 324. 

Epirus,  163,  165,  168. 

Erzerum,  322,  326. 

Erzingan,  327. 

Esperey,  General  Franchet  d',  command 
of  in  September,  19 15,  220;  in  com- 
mand of  northern  French  army,  344. 

Essad  Pasha,  182. 

Eugene,  Archduke,  34,  47. 

Evan-Thomas,  Rear-admiral,  in  command 
of  Britain's  Fifth  Battle-Cruiser  Squad- 
ron off  Jutland,  406. 

Ewarts,  General,  in  command  of  the  army 
of  the  Nida,  345  defeats  Austrians  in 
southern  Poland,  70;  command  of  in 
defense  of  Poland,  132,  133,  134,  135, 
137,  140,  141,  142;  command  of  on 
eastern  front,  284;  advises  the  Tsar  to 
abdicate,  358. 

Eydtkuhnen,  the  Russians  defeated  at,  29. 

Falaba,  The,  torpedoed  by  a  German  sub- 
marine, 389. 

Falkenhayn,  General  Erich  von,  Chief  of 
the  German  General  Staff,  61-62;  plan 
of  Polish  campaign,  129,  132;  plan  of 
for  capture  of  Verdun,  237,  238;  in 
command  of  an  Austro-Hungarian  army 
in  Transylvania,  299,  302;  plan  of  to 
invade Roumania,  306;  advances  through 
the  Vulcan  Pass,  307;  captures  Filiasi, 
307;  pursues  the  Roumanians,  309; 
enters  Moldavia,  310. 

Fayolle,  General,  in  command  of  French 
forces  in  Picardy,  273;  brilliant  success 
of  south  of  the  Somme,  276;  succeeds 
to  command  of  French  central  army 
group,  346. 

Ferdinand  I,  Tsar  of  Bulgaria,  158. 

Ferdinand,  King  of  Roumania,  295, 
296. 


Festubert,   Allied  offensive  near  in  191 5, 

3»  3*- 

Flanders,  second  battle  of  Ypres,  17-24; 
Allied  offensive  in  in  September,  191 5, 
221;  in  1917,  347-349. 

Foch,  General,  in  chief  command  of 
French  forces  at  battle  of  Ypres,  22; 
operations  of  north  of  Arras,  2  6 ;  position 
of  army  of  in  September,  191 5,  220; 
succeeds  Petain  as  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  346. 

Fosse  8,  223,  224,  225. 

France,  armed  forces  of  at  close  of  1 9 1 4,  3 ; 
operations  in  the  Aisne  sector,  4,  5 ;  cap- 
tures German  positions  in  Champagne, 
6-7;  wins  the  heights  of  Les  Eparges, 
14-16;  participates  in  second  battle  of 
Ypres,  18,  19,  20,  23;  defeats  the 
Germans  north  of  Arras,  24-31;  Ex- 
peditionary Force  of  in  the  Gallipoli  cam- 
paign, 1 08;  in  operations  against  Krithia, 
113,  114,  116;  operation  of  in  Serbian 
defense,  183;  Greece  proposes  intern- 
ment of  forces  of,  184;  military  zone 
of  in  Greece,  184;  the  Chamber  causes 
reconstruction  of  the  government,  201; 
war  finance  of,  202-203;  positions  of 
armies  of  in  September,  1915,  220,  226; 
gains  western  slope  of  Vimy  Heights, 
227;  takes  La  Main,  229;  and  Mas- 
siges  Heights,  230;  position  of  forces 
of  at  Verdun,  239;  loses  important  point 
covering  Verdun,  241-244;  counter- 
offensive  of  under  Petain,  246;  loses 
ground  on  western  bank  of  the  Meuse, 
247 ;  repulses  Germans  in  attack  against 
Le  Mort  Homme,  248-250;  succeeds 
in  counter-attacks,  250;  loses  Hill  304, 
251-252;  and  Hill  295  (Le  Mort 
Homme),  252;  Fort  Vaux  lost  bv,  253; 
closing  struggle  of  against  the  Ger- 
man effort  to  take  Verdun,  253-254; 
joins  in  Allied  War  Council,  268; 
preparations  of  for  the  Picardy  offensive, 
273;  disposition  of  forces  of,  273;  open- 
ing successes  of  in  Battle  of  the  Somme, 
275;  great  gains  of  south  of  the  Somme, 
276;  breaks  the  German  third  posi- 
tion, 278;  advances  to  Coinbles,  278; 
gains  the  Bapaume-Peronne  road,  280; 
pierces  the  fourth  German  line,  281; 
forces  of  in  Macedonia,  300;  partici- 
pates   in    operations    against   Monastir, 


196 


THE  Great  War 


301;  plan  of  attack  of  at  Verdun,  336; 
Douaumonl  taken  by,  336;  wins 
Vau\  fori  and  village,   536-337;   and 
drives  the  Germani  to  their  ol 
don,  33-;  advance  of  in  spring  of  1917, 
340;  take   Rove  and  Noyon,  340;  posi- 
of  armies  of  in  the  West  in  19 17, 
344;  wins  positions  on  the  Aisne,  345- 
takes   Craonne,    346;    wins   the 
Chemin-des-Dames,  346-3475  losses  of 
in    1917    offensive,   347;    gains    of  in 
Flanders  in  the  summer  of  1917,  349; 
naval   protection  by  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean, 371. 

Francis  Ferdinand,  Archduke,  59. 

Frederick,  Archduke,  generalissimo  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  armies,  59;  partici- 
pates in  Galician  campaign,  66,  67; 
overcomes  Russian  resistance  on  the  San, 
-4;  in  command  on  the  eastern  front, 
155;  position  of  armies  of,  284,  286; 
relinquishes  chief  command,  290. 

French,  Field-marshal  Sir  John  D.  P., 
orders  attack  on  Neuve  Chapelle,  10; 
his  report  thereon,  13;  orders  with- 
drawal of  British  from  the  Ypres  salient, 
22;  confirms  General  Haig's  tactics,  32. 

Fryatt,  Captain  Charles,  executed  by  the 
Germans,  383. 

Gaba  Tepe,  109,  no. 

Gaede,  General  von,  command  of  on 
western  front,  220. 

Galicia,  Russian  occupation  of,  56,  57; 
Russian  forces  in,  62;  strength  and 
position  of  Teutonic  forces  in,  62,  63, 
64,  65;  German  plan  in,  66;  opera- 
tions from  the  Biala  to  the  San,  66-69; 
struggle  at  the  San  and  fall  of  Peremysl, 
71-72;  Stanislaw  captured  by  the  Teu- 
tonic forces,  72;  Russia  loses  greater 
part  of,  128,  129;  river  defensive  in 
east  of,  148;  campaign  of  191 7  in, 
364-366. 

Gallieni,  General,  becomes  French  Min- 
ister of  War,  201. 

Gallipoli  Peninsula,  topographical  char- 
acteristics of,  105-106  ;  Turkish  lines  of 
communication  on,  1 07  ;  the  plan  of  the 
Allies'  operations  on,  1 07 ;  Allied  forces 
in  campaign  on,  108;  the  difficulties  of 
landing,  109,  no,  111-112,114;  first 
conflict   between    the   Anzacs   and    the 


Turks,  109;  advance  of  the  Allies 
against  Krithia,  11  3-1  15,  116;  minor 
Allied  successes,  '17;  British  rein- 
forcements to,  11S;  operations  against 
Sari  Bain  Ridge,  119-122;  landing  of 
reinforcements  at  Suvla  Bay,  122;  final 
operations  on,  123-125;  losses  in  cam- 
paign on,  116,  122,  124,  125;  evacua- 
tion of  by  the  British  ami  French,  185. 

Gallwitz,  General  von,  in  the  Polish  cam- 
paign, 131,  133,  134,  136,  140,  143, 
144;  in  the  operations  against  Serbia, 
174,  175;  in  command  of  Second  Ger- 
man Army  in  Picardy,  278. 

Gas  attacks,  disastrous  effects  of  at  Ypres, 
19,  20,  21,  23,  24;  the  Allies  improve 
on  the  German  uses  of,  274. 

Gaza,  the  British  attempt  to  capture  by 
surprise,  333-334- 

Geddes,  Major-general  Sir  Eric,  chief  of 
British  army  transportation,  338. 

George,  David  Lloyd,  becomes  Minister 
of  Munitions,  190;  settles  South  Wales 
coal  miners'  strike,  191;  becomes  Secre- 
tary of  War,  198;  resigns  from  the 
cabinet,  199;  becomes  prime  minister, 
199;  participates  in  first  Allied  War 
Council,  268. 

Germany,  armed  forces  of  at  close  of  19 14 
and  their  location,  2-3 ;  is  driven  back  in 
Champagne,  6-7 ;  yields  ground  at  Neuve 
Chapelle,  10-13;  loses  the  heights  of  Les 
Eparges;  14-16;  loses  Hill  60  to  the 
British,  16;  and  regains  it,  16;  gains 
in  attack  on  the  British  at  Ypres,  17-24; 
defeated  by  the  French  in  Artois,  25-31; 
loses  ground  to  the  British  north  of  La 
Bassee,  31-32;  position  of  armies  of  in 
the  East  at  beginning  of  1915,  33,  34; 
fails  to  take  Warsaw,  35-36;  drives  the 
Russians  from  East  Prussia,  37-42;  gains 
positions  in  Russia,  42;  renews  cam- 
paign against  Warsaw,  43 ;  is  driven 
back  near  the  Narev,  44;  reinforces 
Austria-Hungary  in  the  Carpathians, 
47;  plan  of  for  offensive  in  Galicia,  48, 
66;  success  of  in  Bukovina,  48;  fails 
in  operations  in  the  Carpathians,  49-50; 
assumes  chief  control  of  Teutonic  forces, 
59;  strength  and  position  of  Teutonic 
armies  in  Galicia,  62,  63,  64,  65  ;  enters 
Courland,  66;  opens  attack  on  western 
Galicia,  66;  gains  Carpathian  positions, 


Index 


497 


68;  reaches  Peremysl,  69;  capture  of 
Peremysl,  72;  operations  against  Lem- 
berg,  73-74;  renews  operations  in  Po- 
land, 74;  plan  of  campaign  against 
Poland,  129;  position  and  strength  of 
armies  of,  131;  forces  the  Russians  to 
the  Vistula,  133;  and  to  the  Narev, 
134;  operations  of  in  Courland,  135, 
138;  troops  of  enter  Warsaw,  136;  the 
Narev  fortresses  gained,  138;  operations 
on  the  Niemen,  138-139;  operations 
against  Grodno,  1  39-14.0;  naval  defeat 
of  in  Gulf  of  Riga,  140-141;  captures 
Brest-Litovsk,  141;  takes  Vilna,  143- 
144;  is  defeated  in  her  eastward  march, 
146;  operations  in  the  southern  sector 
in  Volhynia,  149;  in  eastern  Galicia, 
150;  operations  of  on  the  Dvina,  151- 
155;  forces  of  on  the  eastern  front, 
I9I5>  I55  5  alleged  secret  treaty  of 
alliance  of  with  Bulgaria,  168;  partici- 
pation of  in  Bulgarian  affairs,  171;  in- 
terests of  in  the  destruction  of  Serbia, 
172-173;  concentrates  force  on  Serbian 
frontier,  174;  forces  the  passage  of  the 
Danube,  1 77 ;  promotes  outbreak  of 
Sinn  Feiners,  196-197;  economic  prob- 
lems of,  203,  204-205  ;  finance  and  war 
loans,  206-207;  Pan-Germanism  and 
its  opponents,  207-210;  makes  "war- 
map"  peace  proposals,  211-212;  west- 
ern positions  of  in  September,  19 15, 
216,  219-220;  loses  positions  in  Flan- 
ders, 224-225;  driven  back  on  Vimy 
Heights,  227;  preparatory  measures  of 
against  Verdun,  236-237,  238,  239; 
forces  of  engaged  at  Verdun,  240;  forces 
of  opposed  to  the  British  on  the  western 
front,  270;  position  of  forces  and  de- 
fensive systems  of,  271-272;  loses  Fri- 
court,  La  Boisselle,  and  Contalmaison, 
275-276;  is  driven  back  by  the  French 
near  Peronne,  276;  second  position  of 
shattered  by  the  British,  276;  evacuates 
Combles,  280;  and  retires  to  fourth  line 
of  defense,  280;  forces  of  in  the  cam- 
paign against  Roumania,  308;  refuses 
to  protest  to  Turkey  against  Armenian 
atrocities,  324;  supplies  commander  to 
the  second  unsuccessful  Turkish  attack 
on  the  Suez  Canal,  332  ;  forces  of  before 
Verdun  in  191 6,  336;  loses  Forts  Dou- 
aumont  and  Vaux,  336;  is  forced  back 


to  her  old  line,  337;  is  driven  up  the 
Ancre  by  the  British,  338-339;  strategic 
withdrawal  by,  339;  wanton  devasta- 
tion of  territory  by,  340;  driven  from 
Bapaume,  Roye,  Peronne,  and  Noyon, 
340;  new  positions  of  armies  of  in  the 
"West,  341 ;  driven  from  Vimy  Ridge, 
342;  employs  "  Strosstruppen/ '  343; 
increases  forces  on  the  western  front, 
343 ;  position  and  strength  of  armies 
of  in  Northern  France,  191 7,  344-345; 
loses  positions  on  the  Aisne,  345 ;  and 
on  Moronvilliers  Heights,  346;  and  the 
Chemin-des-Dames,  347;  losses  of  dur- 
ing Allied  offensive  of  191 7,  347;  is 
defeated  on  Messines  Ridge,  347-348; 
strengthens  hold  on  the  Flemish  coast, 
347;  intrigues  in  Russia,  364;  position 
of  armies  of  in  Russia  in  191 7,  364;  suc- 
cesses of  against  Russia  in  Galicia,  365- 
366;  naval  inferiority  of,  368-369;  naval 
strategy  of,  370;  her  Pacific  fleet  de- 
stroyed, 370;  commandeers  all  flour  and 
grain,  373;  establishes  war  zone  in 
waters  surrounding  Great  Britain,  376, 
447,  451;  defense  of  as  to  submarine 
warfare,  382;  submarine  force  of,  383; 
diplomatic  passages  of  with  the  United 
States  as  to  submarine  warfare,  388-389; 
submarine  offenses  against  the  United 
States,  385-393,  453,  459,  460,  467, 
468;  naval  aspirations  of  inspired  by 
William  II,  399-400;  bombards  British 
coast  towns,  402;  strategy  of  in  the 
Jutland  battle,  403,  421;  forces  of  and 
their  operations  therein,  405,  407-418; 
losses  of,  409,  410,  41 3,  415,  417,  419, 
420;  fleet  of,  425;  attempts  to  break 
the  blockade,  426;  merchant  submarine 
of  visits  United  States,  428,  463;  in- 
vades American  waters  with  U-jj,  429, 
46  3 ;  repudiates  responsibility  for  de- 
struction of  the  Lusitania,  454;  promises 
the  United  States  that  submarines  should 
operate  legally,  460,  461;  announces 
abandonment  of  pledge  and  the  resump- 
tion of  ruthless  submarine  warfare,  383, 
466;  ambassador  of  at  Washington 
given  his  passports,  466;  intrigues  with 
Mexico  against  the  United  States,  468. 
Goltz,  Marshal  von  der,  in  command  of 
Turkish  operations  in  Mesopotamia, 
319. 


498 


The  Great  War 


ic  importance  of,  1575  taken 

by  the  Italians,  265. 

Gorringe,  Lieutenant-general  Sir  G.  P., 
in  command  of  forces  to  relieve  Kut-el- 

Amani,  320. 

Gough,  General  Sir  Hubert,  in  command 
;  ifth  British  Army,  275.   341- 

Gouraud,  General,  succeeds  to  the  com- 
mand of  the  French  forces  in  Gallipoli, 
108,  1 17. 

Grandcourt,  captured  by  the  British,  338. 

Great  Britain,  armed  forces  of  at  close  of 
1914,  3;  augments  her  Continental 
forces,  9 ;  the  line  of  in  Flanders,  9, 
2 1 ;  commanders  of  on  the  western 
front,  9-10;  captures  Neuve  Chapelle, 
11-13;  captures  and  loses  Hill  60,  16; 
is  forced  back  at  Ypres,  17-24;  the 
new  line  of  in  Flanders,  22-23;  wms 
positions  near  Festubert,  31-32;  expe- 
ditionary force  of  in  the  Gallipoli  cam- 
paign, 108;  struggles  for  Krithia,  113, 
114,  116;  great  losses  of,  116;  sends 
reinforcements  to  Gallipoli,  118;  the 
operations  against  Sari  Bahr,  11 9-1 22; 
lands  further  reinforcements  atSuvlaBay, 
122,  124;  final  operations  on  Gallipoli, 
123-125;  losses  of  in  Gallipoli,  122, 
124, 125;  operations  of  in  defense  of  Ser- 
bia, 183;  Greece  proposes  internment  of 
forces  of,  1 84;  economic  provisions  made 
by,  188,  189;  Lloyd  George  becomes 
Minister  of  Munitions,  190;  a  National 
Register  for  national  service,  192;  Mili- 
tary Service  Act  enacted  by,  192,  269, 
270;  the  first  and  second  war  loans  of, 
193;  effects  financial  arrangements  with 
the  United  States,  195;  establishes  a  War 
Council,  196;  Sinn  Feiners  in  insurrec- 
tion, 196-198;  Lord  Kitchener  perishes 
at  sea,  198;  position  of  armies  of  in 
West  in  September,  1915,220;  offensive 
of  in  Flanders,  224;  Loos  captured  by, 
224-225 ;  joins  in  first  Allied  War  Coun- 
cil, 268;  participates  in  Economic  Con- 
ference of  the  Entente,  269;  forces  of 
on  the  continent  in  spring  of  191 6, 
270;  extends  her  fronts  in  Belgium  and 
France,  270;  preparations  of  for  the 
Picardy  offensive,  273;  disposition  of 
forces  of,  273;  begins  Picardy  offensive 
in  region  of  the  Ancre,  274;  takes  Fri- 
court,  275;  captures  La  Boisselle,  275; 


forces  the  Germans  to  their  second  posi- 
tion, 276;  takes  Pozieres,  277;  pushes 
successes  on  Thiepval-Morval  ridge, 
278;  makes  first  use  of  "tanks,"  279; 
takes  Courcelette  and  Martinpuich,  279; 
pushes  back  the  Germans  north  of 
Thiepval,  281;  takes  Beaumont  Hamel 
aud  Beaucourt,  281,  282;  forces  of  in 
Macedonia,  300;  participates  in  offensive 
against  Monastir,  301-302;  sends  expe- 
dition to  Mesopotamia,  315-316;  pushes 
up  the  Tigris,  317-318;  forces  of  re- 
pulsed at  Ctesiphon,  318;  and  retire  to 
Kut-el- Amara,  319;  sends  relief  force 
to  Kut-el- Amara,  319;  Kut-el-Amara 
forces  of  surrender,  320;  preparation  of 
for  the  new  offensive  in  Mesopotamia, 
327;  captures  Kut-el-Amara,  328;  takes 
Bagdad,  328;  pursues  Turkish  forces 
up  the  Tigris  and  defeats  them  at 
Ramadje,  329-330;  defeats  Turkish 
forces  at  Suee  Canal,  331;  second  Turk- 
ish expedition  against  the  Canal  de- 
stroyed by,  332;  forces  of  take  El 
Arish  and  Rafa,  332;  advance  to  the 
Wadi  Ghuzze  and  attack  Gaza,  333- 
334;  operations  of  between  the  Scarpe 
and  the  Ancre,  338;  drives  Germans 
back  in  upper  Ancre  valley,  338;  extends 
line  to  Roye,  339;  Bapaume  and  Pe- 
ronne  taken  by,  340;  new  positions  of 
armies  of,  341 ;  defeats  Germans  at 
Vimy,  342;  further  advance  of,  343; 
losses  of  in  191 7  offensive  in  the  West, 
347;  wins  the  Messines  Ridge,  347; 
gains  of  in  Flanders  in  the  summer  of 
19 1 7,  349;  aids  in  campaign  on  the 
Isonzo  front,  351;  blockade  of  Ger- 
many by,  368;  suppresses  German 
raiders,  368;  command  of  the  sea  by, 
369;  naval  strategy  of,  370;  blockade 
regulations  proclaimed  by,  371-373  5 
extends  blockade  to  neutrals,  373-375? 
measures  of  against  submarine  menace, 
393-396;  maritime  losses  of,  397;  coast 
towns  of  bombarded,  402;  strategical 
aims  of  in  the  Battle  of  Jutland,  403- 
404,  42 1 ;  forces  of  and  their  operations 
during  the  battle,  406-418;  losses  of  in 
the  battle,  408,  410,  412,  414,  415, 
419,  420;  fleet  of,  423-424. 
Greece,  dynastic  and  political  influences 
in,  158,  159,  160;  political  success  of 


Index 


499 


Venizelos,  1 61-162;  friction  between 
King  Constantine  and  Venizelos,  162; 
boundary  disputes,  163,  164;  negotiates 
terms  of  alliance  with  the  Entente  Allies, 
1 64-16  5 ;  parliamentary  election  in  favor 
Venizelos,  165;  German  offer  for  neu- 
trality of,  168;  defensive  treaty  of  with 
Serbia,  169;  mobilizes  her  army,  169; 
protests  against  Entente  forces  on  Greek 
territory,  169;  protectorate  rights  of  the 
Entente  Powers  in,  1 70 ;  Venizelos  again 
resigns  office,  170;  the  king  dissolves 
parliament,  171;  proposes  internment 
of  Entente  troops  in,  183;  assents  to 
Allied  military  zone  in,  184;  pro-Ger- 
man attitude  of,  299;  British  blockade 
of  and  Allied  ultimatum  to,  299-300; 
Bulgarian  troops  enter,  299;  Kavala 
surrendered  to  the  Bulgarians  by,  300. 

Greif,  The,  427. 

Grodno,  fortress  of,  139,  140. 

Gulflight,  The,  torpedoed,  390,  453. 

Gurkhas,  The,  121. 

Haeseler,  Marshal  von,  238. 

Haig,  General  Sir  Douglas,  in  command 
of  First  British  Army,  10,  13;  tactics 
of  in  attack  near  Festubert,  32;  posi- 
tion of  command  of  in  September,  191 5, 
220,  224;  succeeds  General  French  as 
Commander-in-Chief  in  France  and  Bel- 
gium, 270. 

Halicz,  taken  by  the  Russians,  365. 

Hamilton,  General  Sir  Ian  S.  M.,  in  chief 
command  of  British  forces  on  Gallipoli, 
108,  118,  119,  123,  124. 

Heeringen,  General  von,  command  of  on 
the  western  front,  220. 

Helfferich,  Carl,  206. 

Helles,  Cape,  109,  iio-m,  113,  116, 
124. 

Het  Sas,  seized  by  the  Germans,  20;  the 
French  make  gains  near,  22;  recovered 
by  the  Allies,  23. 

Hindenburg,  Field-marshal  von,  renews 
unsuccessful  campaign  against  Warsaw, 
35,  36;  defeats  Russians  at  the  Masu- 
rian Lakes,  37-40;  his  further  plans 
against  Warsaw,  42,  43;  estimate  of, 
60;  in  operations  against  Poland,  132, 
143,  148;  fails  in  his  operations  along 
the  Dvina,  1  51-154;  and  against  Riga, 
154-155;  appointed  Chief  of  the  General 


Staff,  211;  position  and  strength  of 
armies  on  eastern  front  under,  283,  284; 
assumes  supreme  command  of  Teutonic 
forces  in  the  East,  2 90;  defensive  strategy 
of  on  the  western  front,  339. 

"  Hindenburg' '  line,  The,  339;  Allied 
armies  face,  3405  new  line  in  rear  of, 
341. 

Hipper,  Admiral,  in  command  of  Ger- 
many's Battle-Cruiser  Fleet  in  Battle  of 
Jutland,  405. 

Hohenborn,  Major-general  Wild  von,  62. 

Hohenzollern  Redoubt,  The,  223,  224. 

Hood,  Rear-admiral,  in  command  of  Brit- 
ish Third  Battle-Cruiser  Squadron,  406; 
perishes  in  the  sinking  of  the  Invincible, 
412. 

Home,  General  Sir  Henry,  in  command 
of  First  British  Army,  341. 

Hotzendorff,  General  Conrad  von,  Austro- 
Hungarian  Chief  of  General  Staff,  256. 

Humbert,  General,  command  of  in  Sep- 
tember, 1 91 5,  220;  in  sector  of  Ver- 
dun, 237. 

Hungary,  Russian  advance  on,  34;  moun- 
tain defenses  of,  45-46;  the  Russians 
driven  from,  68. 

Hunter-Weston,  Major-general  Aylmer 
G.,  in  command  of  a  British  division  at 
Gallipoli,  108. 

Hussein  Kernel,  becomes  Sultan  of  Egypt, 
330. 

Imbros,  British  headquarters  at,  119,  122, 
163. 

Indian  troops,  in  battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle, 
11,  12;  in  the  battle  of  Ypres,  21,  22, 
24;  in  battle  of  Festubert,  32;  in  the 
Gallipoli  campaign,  121;  in  the  Flan- 
ders operations  in  September,  19 15,  222; 
in  the  campaign  in  Mesopotamia,  319. 

Ismail  Oglu  Tepe,  125. 

Isonzo,  The,  operations  on,  257,  258, 
265-266,  350. 

Italy,  territorial  differences  of  with  Greece, 
165;  weakness  of  frontier  of  towards 
Austria,  255-256;  Austria's  plan  of 
offensive  against,  256;  mobilization  of 
army  of,  256;  early  successful  opera- 
tions by,  257;  successes  on  the  Isonzo, 
257;  the  operations  of  the  Alpini,  258; 
repulses  the  Austro-Hungarians,  258; 
political  relations  of  with  Germany,  259; 


500 


The  Great  War 


tro-Hungarian  offensive  from  the 
rrentino  against,  260;  Italian  positions 
from  the  Adige  to  the  Val  Sugana,  262; 
checks  the  Austro  Hungarians,  263- 
2i,>4;  popular  unrest  in,  264;  launches 
offensive  against  Gorizia,  265;  defeats 
the  Austro-Hungarians  on  Monte  Sabo- 

tinoand  Monte  San  Michcle,  266  ;  takes 
Gorizia,  z66;  wins  the  western  part  of 
the  Carso,  266;  declares  war  against 
Germany,  266;  joins  in  rirst  War  Coun- 
cil of  the  Allies,  268;  participates  in 
Macedonian  campaign,  300;  offensive 
of  on  the  Isonzo  front,  350;  gains  of 
north  of  Gorizia,  351;  drives  the  Aus- 
trians  back  on  the  Carso,  351;  naval 
participation  of,  370;  loses  the  Benedetto 
Br  in,  371. 

Ivangorod,  fortress  of,  133;  taken  by  the 
Austro-Hungarians,  136. 

Ivanoff,  General,  in  command  of  southern 
Russian  army  group,  34,  62,  284; 
operations  of  in  Galicia,  71;  command 
of  in  defense  of  Poland,  132;  repels  the 
Germans  in  Galicia,  150;  regains  terri- 
tory in  Volhynia,  151. 

Jablonica  Pass,  The,  46,  48,  66. 

Japan,  participates  in  first  War  Council 
of  the  Allies,  268. 

Jaroslaw,  fortress  of  taken  by  the  Austro- 
Hungarians,  71. 

Jassy,  becomes  the  provisional  capital  of 
Roumania,  309. 

Jellicoe,  Admiral  Sir  John,  in  command 
of  the  British  Grand  Fleet,  405. 

Joffre,  General,  becomes  military  adviser 
to  the  French  War  Committee,  201; 
participates  in  first  Allied  War  Council, 
268;  present  at  opening  of  final  opera- 
tions at  Verdun,  336 

Johannisburg,the  Russians  driven  from,  39. 

Joseph  Ferdinand,  Archduke,  in  command 
of  Austro-Hungarian  forces  in  Galicia, 
63,  64;  in  operations  against  Poland, 
128,  131,  133,  137;  in  command  of 
Fourth  Austro-Hungarian  Army,  155, 
156;  group  command  of,  286;  is  re- 
placed, 290;  position  of  forces  of  in 
Russia  in  191  7,  364. 

Jutland,  Battle  of,  consideration  of  strategy 
in,  403-404,  421,  422;  the  German 
forces   in,  405;    the  British,   406;    the 


operations,  407-41 S;  estimate  of  the 
tactics  employed  in,  416,  421;  British 
losses  in,  408,  410,  412,  414,  41  5,  417, 
418,  419,  420;  German  losses  in,  409, 
410,  413,  415,  417,  419,  420. 

Kaledin,  General,  command  of,  286;  suc- 
cesses of  in  Volhynia,  286,  288. 

Karolyi,  Count  Michael,  212. 

K.ars,  Turkish  operations  against,  322- 
323. 

Katchanik  Pass,  heroic  defense  of  the 
Serbians  at,  178. 

Kavala,  forts  and  town  of  surrendered  to 
Bidgarians,  300. 

Kerensky,  Alexander,  member  of  the  pro- 
visional government  of  Russia,  357  ;  and 
of  new  government,  358;  vice-president 
of  the  Soviet,  360;  wins  support  for  the 
Provisional  Government,  361;  becomes 
minister  of  war,  362;  secures  support 
of  the  armies,  363. 

Kereves  Dere,  117. 

Kirchbach,  General  von,  replaces  von 
Pflanzer,  290;  in  the  campaign  against 
Roumania,  303. 

Kirlibaba  Pass,  taken  by  the  Russians,  35, 
46,  48. 

Kitchener,  Earl,  on  the  period  of  the  war, 
17;  is  relieved  of  staff  duties,  196; 
perishes  in  the  wrecking  of  the  cruiser 
Hampshire,  198,  425;  participates  in 
first  Allied  War  Council,  268. 

Kimpolung,  taken  by  the  Germans,  48. 

Koevess,  General  von,  in  the  Polish  cam- 
paign, 136;  in  command  in  the  Serbian 
campaign,  174,  175;  in  command  of 
Austro-Hungarian  army  in  the  Tren- 
tino,  26  1 ;  new  army  command  of,  290. 

Koja  Chemen  Tepe  (Hill  305),  119,  121. 

Kolomea,  captured  by  the  Teutons,  48. 

Korniloff,  General,  resigns  military  com- 
mand of  Petrograd,  362;  in  command 
of  the  Eighth  Army,  364;  his  tempo- 
rary successes  in  19 17,  365. 

Kovel,  149. 

Kovno,  fortress  of,  138}  captured  by  the 
Germans,  139,  140,  141. 

Kosch,  General,  40. 

Koziowa,  battle  at,  49. 

Kressenstein,  General  von,  in  command 
of  Turkish  forces  defeated  at  the  Suez 
Canal,  332;  and  of  those  at  Gaza,  333. 


Index 


501 


Krasnik,  128. 

Krasnystav,    occupied    by    the    Germans, 

133. 
Krithia,  113,  114,   116,  118. 
Kum  Kale,  112. 
Kuropatkin,  General,  in  command  on  the 

Russian  front,  284. 
Kusmanek,  General  von,  in  command  of 

fortress  of  Peremysl,  5 1 ;  surrenders  to 

the  Russians,  52. 
Kut-el-Amara,  captured  by  British  force, 

317;  invested  by  the  Turks,  319;  relief 

operations    by    British,    319-3205     the 

besieged  British  surrender,  3205  taken 

by  the  British,  328. 

La  Bassee,  British  offensive  north  of,  3 1-32. 

"Labyrinth,"  The,  German  fortification 
of,  25;  the  French  seize,  26-28. 

La  Boisselle,  captured  by  the  British,  275. 

Lacaze,  Admiral,  201. 

La  Fere,  340. 

Lake,  Lieutenant-general  Sir  Percy,  suc- 
ceeds to  command  of  Anglo-Indian 
forces  in  Mesopotamia,  319. 

La  Main,  heights  of  taken  by  the  French, 
229. 

Langemarck,  seized  by  the  Germans,  20. 

Lansing,  Robert,  Secretary  of  State,  459; 
warns  Germany  of  imminent  severance 
of  diplomatic  relations,  46 1 . 

Lauenstein,  General  von,  German  com- 
mander at  the  battle  of  the  Masurian 
Lakes,  39;  operations  of  in  Poland,  135, 
143;  in  the  operations  on  the  Dvina, 

Law,  Andrew  Bonar,  196,  199. 

Lebedevo,  146. 

Lechitsky,  General,  in  command  of  Rus- 
sian forces  in  Bukovina,  62;  in  the  de- 
fense of  Poland,  132,  149;  defeats  von 
Pflanzer  near  the  Sereth,  150;  his  offen- 
sive in  Bukovina,  1  56 ;  army  command 
of,  286;  defeats  Austro-Hungarians, 
287,  288,  289;  successful  operations 
of  in  Bukovina,  304;  reaches  right  wing 
of  Roumanians,  305 ;  takes  over  part  of 
the  Roumanian  front,  307. 

Lemberg,  Germanic  plan  for  recapture  of, 
48;  its  failure,  50;  captured  by  the 
Teutonic  allies,  74. 

Lemnos,  chief  base  of  the  Allied  Expedi- 
tionary Forces  to  Gallipoli,  108. 


Le  Mort  Homme  (Hill  295),  the  Germans 
fail  to  capture,  248-250;  falls  to  the 
Germans,  252. 

Lenin  (Vladimir  Ilyitch  Ulyanoff),  be- 
comes leader  of  the  Bolsheviki,  360, 
3625  demands  immediate  cessation  of 
hostilities,  362. 

Lens,  25;  Allied  efforts  against,  223,  225. 

Leopold,  Prince  of  Bavaria,  in  the  Polish 
campaign,  131,  132;  troops  of  enter 
Warsaw,  136;  pursues  Second  Russian 
Army  eastward,  137,  138,  148;  in  com- 
mand on  the  eastern  front,  155,  284, 
290;  position  of  army  group  of  in  Russia 
in  1917,  364. 

Lesch,  General,  in  command  of  Russian 
forces,  12S,  132,  288. 

Lida,  143,  144. 

Lille,  25. 

Linsingen,  General  von,  in  command  of  a 
Teutonic  army  on  the  Carpathian  front, 
47,  48 ;  fails  to  dislodge  the  Russians 
from  the  central  Carpathians,  49 ;  in  the 
Galician  campaign,  72;  in  operations 
against  Poland,  128,  131  j  succeeds 
Mackensen  in  the  East,  151;  assumes 
command  in  Volhynia,  287;  plan  of 
for  counter-attack,  288. 

Litzmann,  General,  German  commander 
in  East  Prussia,  38,  139. 

Lizerne,  German  success  near,  20 ;  retaken 
by  the  French,  22. 

Lomza,  fortress  of,  133,  138. 

Lone  Pine,  120. 

Loos,  captured  by  the  Allies,  224-225. 

Lowestoft,  bombarded  by  a  German  squad- 
ron, 402. 

Lublin,  133,  136. 

Ludendorff,  General  Erich  von,  chief  of 
von  Hindenburg's  staff,  61;  appointed 
Quartermaster  General,  211;  on  the 
eastern  front,  287. 

Lukov,  138. 

Lupkow  Pass,  The,  45 ;  in  control  of  the 
Russians,  46 ;  held  by  the  Austro-Hun- 
garians, 50;  Russian  successes  near,  53; 
control  of  gained  by  the  Teutons,  68. 

Lusitania,  The,  sunk  off  Ireland  by  a  Ger- 
man submarine,  389,  453. 

Lutsk,  fortress  of,  148;  captured  by  the 
Teutonic  forces,  1495  reoccupied  by 
the  Russians,  151;  again  captured  by  the 
Russians,  286. 


so: 


The  Great  War 


;  'rince,  member  <>t'  the  pro 
government  of  Ru    ia,  3575  prime  min- 
of  libera]  mil 
neral,  201. 
.  captured  by  the  Germans,  40. 

Macedonia,  Bulgarian  claims  to,  104,  167, 
in,  300;  Allied  offen- 
Monastir,  301-302. 

Mackensen,  General  von,  in  command  <>f 
German  forces  in  Poland,  34;  in  cam- 
again  :  W.i!  aw,  35-36;  opera- 
tions of  in  Galicia,  66-74;  'n  operations 
against  Poland,  128,  132,  133,  136, 
1373  against  Brest-Litovsk,  140;  trans- 
ferred to  the  Serbian  field,  151;  replaces 
Archduke  Frederick  in  the  East,  156; 
in  chief  command  in  operations  against 
Serbia,  174;  organizes  a  Bulgar-German- 
Turkish  force  against  the  Dobrudscha, 
302-303;  crosses  the  Danube,  308. 

Mahan,  Admiral,  369. 

Mangin,  General  Charles,  in  command  of 
a  corps  at  Verdun,  336;  in  command 
of  Sixth  French  Army,  344. 

Marshall,  Lieutenant-general  W.  R.,  in 
command  of  British  force  in  Mesopo- 
tamia, 328;  takes  Bagdad,  328. 

Marwitz,  General  von,  68,  72,  341. 

Massiges  Heights,  the  French  capture, 
230. 

Masurian  Lakes,  The,  the  Russians  de- 
feated at  in  1915,  37-40. 

Maude,  Lieutenant-general  Sir  Stanley,  in 
chief  command  in  Mesopotamia,  327; 
successes  against  Turks,  329. 

Maud'huy,  General,  in  command  of 
Tenth  French  Army,  10;  command 
of  in  September,  191  5,  220. 

Maximalists,  The,  doctrines  of,  359. 

Mazcl,  General,  in  command  of  the  Tenth 
French  Army,  344. 

Mecca,  occupied  by  revolting  Arabs,  332. 

Medina,  insurgent  Arabs  invest,  332. 

Mensheviki,  The,  doctrines  of,  359. 

Messines  Ridge,  great  defensive  position 
of,  347;  the  British  capture,  347-348. 

Mesopotamia,  campaign  in,  317-321,  327- 
330. 

Meuse,  The,  operations  in  the  sector  of 
(Les  Eparges),  14-16. 

Michael  Alexandrovitch,  Grand-duke,  is 
named  successor  to  Tsar  Nicholas,  358; 


pown    to   the    Provisional    Gov- 
ernment, j6  1 . 
Nficheler,  General,  in  command  <>t  French 
forces  in  the  Picardy  offensive,  273,  278; 

command  of  in   1917,   -,44. 
Miliukoll",  357;  member  of  the  proi 

government  ofRui  -ia,  358;  resignsthere- 

from,  362. 
Milne,  General,  in  command  of  British 

force  in  Macedonia,   300. 
Minimalists,  The,  doctrines  of,  359. 
Misse,  The,   1  54. 

Mitrovitza,  evacuated  by  the  Serbians,  180. 
Mitylene,  123. 

Mohn  Sound,  naval  engagement  in,  141. 
Molodetchno,   143,   144,  145. 
Monastir,  occupied  by  the  Bulgarians,  183  ; 

captured  by  Allied  troops,  302. 
Montenegro,  capital  of  captured  by  Austro- 

Hungarians,    182;    participates   in    first 

War  Council  of  Allies,  268. 
Monroe,  General  Sir  Charles,  220. 
Morto  Bay,  110,  112. 
Motor  vehicles,  critical  position  at  Verdun 

relieved  by,  245-246. 
Mount  Lovcen,  182. 

Monve,  The,  destructive  raids  of,  426-427. 
Murray,   Sir   Archibald,    Chief  of  British 

General  Staff,  196;  British  commander 

in  Egypt,  332. 

Narev,  The,  importance  of  as  a  defensive 
barrier,  43  ;  the  Russians  retreat  to,  133. 

Naval  operations,  in  the  Gulf  of  Riga,  141 ; 
Allied  attempt  to  force  the  Dardanelles, 
89-101;  the  British  blockade  of  Ger- 
many, 368;  destruction  of  German 
raiders,  368,  370,  427;  British  com- 
mand of  the  sea,  369-370;  the  Dogger 
Bank  operations,  370;  destruction  of 
the  German  Pacific  fleet,  370;  Italy's 
task  in  the  Adriatic,  371;  French  pro- 
tection of  the  Mediterranean,  371; 
Russo-British  control  of  the  Baltic,  371; 
Great  Britain's  blockade  regulations, 
371-380;  Germany  establishes  a  war 
zone  in  waters  surrounding  Great  Britain, 
376;   Battle  of  Jutland,  407-418. 

Navies,  expansion  of  Germany's  sea  power, 
399-400;  typical  vessels  of  British,  423- 
424;  of  German,  425. 

Neuve  Chapelle,  battle  of  in  19 15,  3,  n- 
13,  32. 


Index 


503 


Neuville-St.  Vaast,  the  French  take,  28. 

Nicholas,  Grand-duke,  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  Russian  armies,  34;  is  forced 
back  by  the  Teutons,  138;  appointed 
viceroy  in  the  Caucasus,  141 ;  commands 
Russian  forces  against  Armenia,  325; 
advises  the  Tsar  to  abdicate,  358. 

Nicholas,  King  of  Montenegro,  182. 

Nicolas,  Tsar  of  Russia,  assumes  personal 
command  of  his  armies,  141;  suspends 
the  Duma,  353;  leans  to  the  reactionary 
factions,  356;  returns  towards  Petrograd 
to  quell  popular  outbreak,  3575  yields 
too  late  to  liberal  elements  and  abdi- 
cates, 358. 

Niemen,  The,  operations  on,  138,  139. 

Nivelle,  General,  appointed  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  French  armies  in  the 
West,  201;  succeeds  Petain  at  Verdun, 
251;  commands  in  renewed  operations 
at  Verdun,  335,  336;  plan  of  campaign 
in  1 91 7  in  northern  France,  344;  is  re- 
placed by  Petain,  346. 

Nixon,  Lieutenant-general  Sir  John,  316, 
318,  319. 

Notre  Dame  de  Lorette,  French  take 
heights  of,  26-30. 

Novik,  Gregory  (Rasputin),  3  54-3  5  5. 

Novo  Georgievsk,  fortress  of,  138;  cap- 
tured by  the  Germans,  139. 

Noyon,  taken  by  the  French,  340. 

Olita,  fortress  of,  139,  140. 

Osovietz,  bombardment  of  fortress  of,  42; 

Germans  fail  to  take,  138. 
Ostroleka,    strategic    importance    of,    43, 

138. 

Palestine,  British  forces  reach,  332;  battle 
of  Gaza,  333,  334. 

Pashitch,  Nikolas,   179,  180. 

Pecori-Giraldi,  General,  in  command  of 
First  Italian  Army,  262. 

Peremysl,  held  by  the  Austro-Hungarians, 
47;  plan  to  raise  the  siege  of,  48,  505 
defenses  of,  50;  first  and  second  invest- 
ments of,  51;  surrendered  to  the  Rus- 
sians, 52;  German  forces  reach,  69} 
surrender  of  to  the  Teutonic  forces,  72. 

Pernau,  140. 

Peronne,  the  French  objective  in  the 
Picardy  offensive,  273;  taken  by  the 
British,  340. 


Pershing,  General  John  J.,  in  command 
of  United  States  Expeditionary  Force  to 
Europe,  476. 

Persia,  Turkish  and  Russian  troops  in, 
324;  German  intrigues  in,  324;  Tehe- 
ran taken  by  the  Russians,  325;  Allied 
influence  obtained  in,  3255  Hamadan 
taken  by  the  Russians,  327;  the  Rus- 
sians retreat  to,  329. 

Persia,  The,  sunk  by  a  German  subma- 
rine, 393. 

Petain,  General,  war  service  of  before 
Verdun  defense,  244;  checks  the  Ger- 
mans east  of  Verdun,  246  ;  successful 
defense  on  west  bank  of  the  Meuse, 
247-250;  is  promoted  group  commander, 
251;  at  Verdun,  336;  in  command  of 
Central  French  Army,  344;  succeeds 
to  command  of  French  armies  in  north 
and  northeast,  346. 

Peter,  King  of  Serbia,  182. 

Pflanzer,  General  von,  commands  an  army 
to  recover  Lemberg,  48  ;  drives  the  Rus- 
sians from  Bukovina,  48 ;  occupies 
Stanislaw,  48 ;  but  evacuates  it  next 
day,  50;  in  command  of  Austro-Hun- 
garian  forces  in  the  East,  64;  defeated 
in  southeast  Galicia,  70;  takes  Stanislaw, 
72 ;  in  the  operations  against  Poland, 
131,  149,  150;  defeat  of  by  the  Rus- 
sians, 287,  290. 

Pilkem,  seized  by  the  Germans,  20. 

Pinsk,  151. 

Plehve,  General,  in  command  of  the 
Twelfth  Russian  Army,  43;  in  the 
Polish  campaign,  132. 

Plumer,  Major-general  Sir  Herbert  C.  O., 
in  command  of  Fifth  British  Army 
Corps,  9;  command  of  in  September, 
1 91 5,  220;  in  command  of  Second 
British  Army,  341;  captures  Messines 
Ridge,  348. 

Poivre  Hill,  crest  of  won  by  the  French, 

337- 
Poland,  German  campaign  in,  February, 
I9I5>  35  5  trie  Teutonic  forces  renew 
operations  in,  74;  German  plan  of 
offensive  against,  1 29 ;  the  Russians 
retreat  to  the  Vistula,  132-133;  to  the 
Narev  and  the  Warsaw  line,  133-134; 
surrender  of  Ivangorod  and  Warsaw, 
136;  devastation  of  by  the  Russians  in 
retreat,  136;  they  fall  back  to  the  Bug, 


504 


The  Great  War 


r,     1 38  ]    tall      • 


. 


Portugal,  participates  in  t'n  t  Wai  (  oundl 

,    raid     of  and 

internment  in  Norfolk  harbor,  390. 

:    .      143,     I4S,     '49- 

Pruth,  The,   A  iana  defeated 

.  288. 

h3»  44»  ,S3- 
Puhallo,   General,    149,    155,    156,    286, 
290. 

jr,  General    William  P.,   in   com- 
mand of  the  Third  British  Corps,  9. 

Queant,  340,  341. 

Radom,  133. 

Rata,  taken  by  the  British  forces,  332. 

Rasputin  (Novik,  Gregory),  3 54-355- 

Rawlinson,  Major-general  Sir  Henry  S., 
command  of,  9;  in  the  Picardy  offen- 
sive, 273;  in  command  of  Fourth  British 
Army,  341. 

Riga,  German  naval  defeat  in  Gulf  of, 
140;  Teutonic  efforts  to  capture,  154- 

»55- 

River  Clyde,  The,  112. 

Robertson,  General,  participates  in  first 
Allied  War  Council,  268. 

Rodzianko,  President  of  the  Duma,  357. 

Rohr,  General  von,  in  command  of  Tenth 
Austro-Hungarian  Army,  261. 

Root,  Hon.  Elihu,  United  States  repre- 
sentative on  mission  to  Russia,  363. 

Roumania,  political  origin  of,  291 ;  chooses 
a  Hohenzollern  prince,  291;  independ- 
ence of  established,  291;  German  influ- 
ence on,  292;  popular  sentiment  favors 
Entente  Powers,  292;  opposition  of  to 
Austria-Hungary,  292-293;  economic 
importance  of,  293;  period  of  indecision 
of  as  to  her  part  in  the  Great  War,  295- 
296;  declares  war  against  Austria-Hun- 
gary, 296;  Germany  and  Bulgaria 
declare  war  against,  296;  military 
strength  of,  296;  plan  of  campaign  of, 
297-298;  positions  of  armies  of,  298; 
preliminary  successes  of  in  Transylvania, 
298-299;  the  Dobrudscha  invaded  by 
Bulgar-German-Turkish  army,  302- 
303;  plan  of  Russia  to  aid,  304;  forces 
of  repulsed  in  Transylvania,  305,  306; 


makes  stand  in  the  border  Passes,  306; 

furthei  I"    1    ol  in  th<  Dobi  ml  icha,  307; 

ot    mire    in    the   Dobrudscha, 

30-';  and  through  the  Vulcan  Pass,  307; 

defeat  in  the  Jiu  valley,  308;  and 

on    the    Aluta,    30S;    the    Danube    COn- 

trolled  by  the  enemy,  309;  Bucharest 
evacuated,  309;  armies  retire  eastward, 
310;  Braila  abandoned,  310;  armies  of 
withdrawn  for  reorganization,  310;  Ger- 
man exploitation  of,  31 1  j  parliamentary 
reforms,  312. 

Rovno,  fortress  of,  148;  Teutonic  opera- 
tions against,  149,  151. 

Rove,  taken  by  the  French,  340. 

Runciman,  Sir  Walter,  190. 

Russia,  position  and  commands  of  her 
armies  at  beginning  of  19 15,  34,  35; 
successfully  defends  Warsaw,  35-36; 
unsuccessful  offensive  of  in  East  Prussia, 
37-42;  new  German  efforts  against  War- 
saw, 43;  successfully  counter-attacks 
Germans  near  the  Narev,  44;  positions 
of  in  the  Carpathians,  46;  driven  from 
Bukovina,  48;  resists  the  Teutons  in 
the  Carpathians,  49-50;  captures  Pere- 
mysl,  52;  successfully  counter-attacks 
in  the  Carpathians,  53;  strength  of 
southern  army  group  of,  6  2, 64;  attacked 
in  western  Galicia,  66;  loses  control  of 
the  Carpathians,  68;  evacuates  Hun- 
gary, 68;  retreats  to  the  San,  68-69; 
defeats  von  Pflanzer's  and  von  Woyrsch's 
armies,  70;  defeated  on  the  San  and 
surrenders  Peremysl,  72;  losses  of  in 
the  Galician  campaign,  72;  retreats  to 
the  north  of  the  Dniester,  73,  operations 
about  Lemberg,  73-74;  equipment  and 
condition  of  armies  of,  130;  their  posi- 
tion and  strength,  132;  retreats  to  the 
Vistula,  132-133;  to  the  Narev  and  the 
Warsaw  line,  133-134,  135;  is  forced 
back  in  Courland,  135,  138;  abandons 
Warsaw,  136;  retreat  of  Second  Army 
of  to  the  Bug,  137,  138;  defeat  of  on 
theNiemen,  138, 139;  evacuates  Grodno, 
140;  defeats  German  fleet  in  Gulf  of 
Riga,  140-141;  the  Tsar  assumes  per- 
sonal command  of  all  Russian  forces, 
141;  defense  and  fall  of  Vilna,  143- 
144;  checks  the  Germans'  eastward 
march,  146;  armies  of  escape  eastward, 
147;    operations  in   Volhynia,    149;   in 


Index 


505 


Galicia,  150;  repels  the  Teutons  on 
the  Dvina,  151-155;  offensive  of  in 
Bukovina,  156;  popular  distrust  of  the 
government,  21 3-2 14;  participates  in  first 
War  Council  of  the  Allies,  268;  posi- 
tion of  forces  of,  284;  opens  offensive 
east  of  Vilna,  285;  line  of  south  of 
the  Pripet  to  the  Roumanian  border, 
286;  successes  of  in  Volhynia,  286, 
287;  in  Bukovina,  288;  captures  Brody, 
289;  takes  Stanislaw,  289;  crosses  the 
Zlota  Lipa,  289;  participates  in  cam- 
paign in  Macedonia,  300,  301 ;  plan  of 
to  cooperate  with  the  Roumanians,  304; 
forces  of  in  the  Dobrudscha,  307;  further 
forces  of  in  Roumania,  308;  takes  over 
Roumanian  last  defensive  line,  310; 
minor  successes  of  in  the  northern  sector 
and  in  Bukovina,  312;  Trancaucasia 
invaded  by  the  Turks,  322;  crosses 
Turkish  frontier,  322;  Turkish  forces 
reach  Kars  province,  322;  but  are  dis- 
astrously defeated,  323;  routs  Turks  at 
Tabriz,  324;  invades  Armenia,  325; 
captures  Erzerum,  326;  occupies  Tre- 
bizond  and  Van,  326;  Baiburt  and 
Erzingan  taken  by,  327;  routs  Turks 
at  Rayat,  327;  operations  of  in  western 
Persia,  327;  troops  of  reach  the  British 
on  the  Tigris,  327;  forces  of  retreat 
into  Persia,  329;  political  unrest  in  at 
close  of  1916,  353;  baneful  influence 
of  Rasputin,  354-355;  his  assassination, 
355;  reactionary  forces  in  power,  356; 
critical  food  conditions  in,  356;  revolu- 
tionary outbreak  in  Petrograd,  356-357; 
the  Tsar  urged  to  form  a  liberal  gov- 
ernment, 357;  the  Duma  assumes  con- 
stitutional authority,  357;  a  provisional 
government  formed,  357;  the  Tsar 
abdicates,  358;  new  ministry  in,  358; 
the  opposing  Socialistic  factions  in,  359; 
the  Council  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers' 
Delegates,  360;  the  liberal  ministry 
falls,  362;  a  coalition  cabinet  formed, 
363;  Allied  mission  visits,  363;  favors 
continuance  of  the  war,  363;  German 
intrigues  in,  364;  position  of  armies, 
191 7,  364;  the  campaign  in  Galicia, 
365;  collapse  of  armies  of,  366. 
Russky,  General,  in  command  of  northern 
Russian  army  group,  34,  142;  in  the 
operations  on  the  Dvina,  152. 


Sakharoff,  General,  in  command  of  the 
Eleventh  Russian  Army,  156;  army 
command  of,  286,  288,  289;  assumes 
command  of  Russo-Roumanian  forces 
in  the  Dobrudscha,  307;  retires  north- 
ward across  the  Danube,  310. 

Salonica,  Franco-British  expedition  lands 
at,  1 83  ;  occupation  of  by  Allied  forces, 
184. 

Sambor,  taken  by  the  Teutonic  forces,  72. 

Sari  Bahr,  119,  120-122. 

Sarny,  150,  151. 

Sarrail,  General,  in  command  of  French 
force  in  the  Balkans,  183;  of  the  French 
military  expedition  to  the  Dardanelles, 
200;  of  the  French  forces  in  Macedonia, 
300. 

Scheer,  Admiral,  succeeds  to  command  of 
the  German  High  Seas  Fleet,  402; 
Battle  Fleet  under  in  Battle  of  Jutland, 
405. 

Scheidemann,  Philipp,  209. 

Scherbacheff,  General  Dmitri  Gregorivitch, 
in  command  of  the  Russian  Seventh 
Army,  155;  army  command  of,  286, 
287,  289;  opens  attack  against  Halicz, 
304. 

Scholtz,  General  von,  in  Polish  campaign, 
H1*  *33>  !4°,  i43>  *44- 

Sedd-ul-Bahr,  109,  no,  111,  112,  113. 

Selivanoff,  General,  in  command  of  the 
Russian  forces  investing  Peremysl,  34, 
51-52. 

Serbia,  defensive  treaty  of  with  Greece, 
169;  a  barrier  to  Germany's  Near  East 
plans,  173;  importance  of  its  railway 
system,  173-174;  Teutonic  troops 
threaten,  174;  Teutonic  forces  invade, 
174;  strategic  and  military  disadvan- 
tages of,  175;  evacuation  of  Belgrade, 
176;  swift  advance  of  Bulgarians  in, 
176;  the  Germans  force  the  passage  of 
the  Danube,  177;  Austria-Hungary 
forces  the  passage  of  the  Drina,  177; 
armies  of  retreat,  177;  splendid  defense 
of  at  Katchanik  and  Babuna  Passes, 
1 78;  sufferings  of  civilians  and  army  in 
flight,  179-182;  escape  of  the  remnant 
through  Albania,  182;  Franco-British 
defense  of,  183;  participates  in  first  War 
Council  of  Allies,  268;  troops  of  in 
Macedonia,  300;  participates  in  offen- 
sive against  Monastir,  301-302. 


The  Great  War 


■    ••  Law,  in  United  Stati  ,  474. 
.   rhe,  14s.  •  5°- 
,  1  j8. 

I!  ,  line,  The,  339. 

.  i  Kiunil,   J7,  41. 

the  Roumanians  evacuate,  303. 
1  ,,  rmany  aids,  196;  revolu- 
tionary outbreak  of,  «  v 7 -  *  9 8 - 

Smith-Di  ral  Sir  Horace  L.,  in 

command  of  the  Second  British  Army, 
10. 

Smorgon,  i+'i. 

Socialists,  The,  attitude  of  in  Germany, 
ian  j  arties  "t",  359-360. 
.   conflict  near,  19 15,  3;  struggle 
fo]    Hill    132,  4. 

Somme,   The,  Battle  of,  272-282. 

Souchez,  2  5,  28,  31. 

Soviets,  The,  constitution  of,  360;  local 
institutions  of,  361;  Congress  of  favors 
continuance  of  the  war  conditionally, 
362;  attitude  towards  socialism  in  west- 
ern Europe,   363. 

St.  Julien,  taken  by  the  Germans,  21;  the 
British  unsuccessful  effort  at,  22. 

St    Mihiel,   14. 

St.   Quentin,  340. 

Stanislaw,  occupied  by  the  Teutonic  forces, 
48;  but  evacuated  the  next  day,  50; 
captured  by  Teutonic  forces,  72;  taken 
by  the  Russians,  289. 

Steenstraate,  seized  by  the  Germans,  20; 
recaptured  by  the  Allies,  23. 

Stephano,  The,  sunk  by  U-jj  off  Nan- 
tucket Light,  429. 

Stokhod,  The,  288. 

Stoptord,  Lieutenant-general  Hon.  Sir  Fred- 
erick W.,  122,  123,  124. 

"Stosstruppen,"  The,  first  appearance  of, 
H  ■ 

Strautz,  General  von,  220. 

Strypa,  The,   148,  150,  289. 

"Sturmtruppen,"  The,  343. 

Styr,  The,  148,  288,  289. 

Submarines,  Germany  threatens  ruthless 
u,e  of,  376,  381,  382,452;  Germany's 
probable  strength  in,  383;  opposing 
opinions  as  to  value  of,  383;  Germany's 
offensive  by,  385-386;  the  United  States 
warns  Germany  against  illegal  operations 
of"»  387,  39',  39*.  452,  456,  457-458> 
459;  Germany's  confidence  in,  387; 
her  refusal  to  abandon  sinking  of  neutral 


i;  nau  leroua  operation! 
ofj  J89  393,  453.  459,  460,  467, 
4.68;  defensive  measures  oi  the  Allies 
against,  393-396;  comparative  failure 
ot  offensive  of,  397-398;  use  of  in  the 

battle  of  Jutland,  409  ;  the  DeutschlanJ 
and    the    U-JJ    enter    American     port  , 

42  S,  463. 

Sue/  Canal,  The,  defensive  value  of,  330; 
unsuccessful  Turkish  campaign  against, 

33',  33*- 
Suvla  Bay,  119,  120,  122,  123,  124,  125. 
Suwalki,  140. 

Tabriz,  taken  and  lost  by  the  Turks,  324. 

Talaat  Pasha,  instigates  Armenian  massa- 
cres, 324. 

"Tanks,"  The,  first  use  of,  279. 

Tarnopol,  taken  by  the  Teutons,  366. 

Tarnow,  captured  by  the  Teutons,  68. 

Tekke,  Cape,  109,  no-ni. 

Tenedos,  no,  163. 

Teodoroff,  General,  in  command  of  a 
Bulgarian  army  against  Serbia,  175. 

Terestchenko,  minister  of  finance  in  the 
provisional  government  of  Russia,  358; 
foreign  minister  in  the  reorganized  min- 
istry, 362. 

Tersztypnsky,  General  von,  replaces  Arch- 
duke Joseph  Ferdinand,  290. 

Thomas,  Albert,  participates  in  first  Allied 
War  Council,  268. 

Tigris,  The,  British  operations  on,  316- 
320,  327-330. 

Tirpitz,  Admiral  von,  resigns  from  Min- 
istry of  Marine,  210;  threatens  ruthless 
submarine  warfare,  375,  386;  earlier 
view  of  as  to  use  of  submarines,  383; 
ignores  hostile  attitude  of  the  United 
States,  393  ;  strategical  views  of,  40 1 ;  re- 
signs office  of  High  Admiral,  402,  460. 

Tisza,  Count  Stephen,  212. 

Townshend,  Major-general  C.  V.  F. ,  takes 
Kut-el-Amara,  317;  advances  towards 
Bagdad,  318;  is  defeated  at  Ctesiphon, 
318;  retires  to  Kut-el-Amara,  319;  is 
besieged  and  finally  surrenders,  3 1 9, 320. 

Transcaucasia,  importance  of  to  Turkey, 
321;   Russian  successes  in,  322-323. 

Transylvania,  Roumanian  operations  in, 
298-299. 

Trebizond,  occupied  by  the  Russians,  326. 

Tremblova,  150. 


Index 


507 


Trent,  strategic  importance  of,  260-261. 

Trieste,  Italian  offensive  against,  257,  266. 

Trotsky,  Leon,  abandons  Mensheviki  for 
the  Bolsheviki,  359. 

Turkey,  campaign  of  on  Gallipoli  Penin- 
sula, 109-125;  territorial  disputes  with 
Greece,  163,  164;  concludes  agreement 
with  Bulgaria,  169;  sends  reinforce- 
ments to  aid  of  Austro-Hungarians, 
289;  strategical  value  of  Asiatic  posses- 
sions of,  313;  German  influence  in, 
313-314;  importance  of  British  and 
Italian  bases  near  coast  of,  314;  procla- 
mation of  holy  war  by  fails,  315;  Ger- 
man aims  in  Asiatic  Turkey,  315; 
Anglo-Indian  policy  towards,  316; 
British  expedition  against  in  Mesopo- 
tamia, 316;  forces  of  retire  on  the 
Tigris,  317;  loses  Kut-el-Amara,  317; 
with  reinforcements  repulses  British  at 
Ctesiphon,  318;  invests  Kut-el-Amara, 
319;  operations  of  under  command  of 
Marshal  von  der  Goltz,  320;  recovers 
Kut-el-Amara,  320;  loses  in  campaign 
against  Transcaucasia,  322-323;  massa- 
cres by  forces  of  in  Armenia,  323; 
Tabriz  (Persia)  taken  and  lost  by,  324; 
position  and  strength  of  forces  of  in 
Armenia,  325;  loses  Erzerum  and  Van, 
326;  Baiburt  and  Erzingan,  327;  cap- 
tures Mush  and  Bitlis,  327;  but  is 
defeated  at  Rayat,  327;  renewed  British 
operations  against  in  Mesopotamia,  327; 
abandons  Kut-el-Amara,  328;  Bagdad 
taken  by  British,  328;  forces  of  retreat 
to  Kermanshah,  329;  defeated  at  Ram- 
adje,  330;  campaign  of  against  the  Suez 
Canal,  331;  Arabs  of  Hedjaz  revolt 
against,  331;  Arabia  proclaims  its  inde- 
pendence of,  332;  second  campaign  of 
against  the  Canal  destroyed,  332;  loses 
El  Arish  and  Rafa,  332;  successfully 
resists  British  at  Gaza,  333-334. 

U-JJ,  enters  Newport  harbor,  42S,  463; 
sinks  British  and  neutral  vessels  off"  the 
American  coast,  429,  463. 

Ulyanotf,  Vladimir  Ilyitch  (Lenin),  360, 
362. 

United  States,  The,  protests  against  British 
rules  as  to  contraband,  374-375,-  warns 
Germany  in  matter  of  submarine  war- 
fare, 376,  386,  452;  addresses  Germany 


and  Great  Britain  as  to  naval  conduct, 
387,  453;  attitude  of  in  the  submarine 
controversy,  388,  389,  452-463;  subma- 
rine outrages  against,  389-393,453,459, 
460;  insists  that  United  States  citizens' 
rights  of  travel  be  respected,  3  9 1,45  5;  re- 
lations of  with  Germany  severely  strained 
by  sinking  of  the  Arabic,  392,  459; 
further  U-boat  crimes  bring  relations 
with  Germany  to  a  breach,  393,  460- 
46 1 ;  the  German  submarine  Deutschland 
voyages  to,  428,  463;  visit  and  opera- 
tions of  the  U-jj  off"  coast  of,  428,  463 ; 
effect  of  traditional  isolation  of  in  world- 
affairs,  432;  official  neutrality  of  in  the 
Great  War  proclaimed,  43  3 ;  relief 
measures  promoted  by,  434;  President 
Wilson's  attitude  towards  the  belliger- 
ents, 436;  offers  mediation,  436;  Ger- 
many impugns  "strict  neutrality"  of, 
440;  dishonorable  activities  of  German 
officials  in,  440-441;  national  indigna- 
tion aroused  by  the  sinking  of  the  Lusi- 
tania,  45  3  ;  warns  Germany  against  the 
consequences  of  lawless  submarine  war- 
fare, 456,  457-458;  notifies  Germany 
that  a  repetition  of  lawless  naval  warfare 
would  be  regarded  as  "deliberately  un- 
friendly, 459;  refuses  to  assent  to  a 
conditional  abandonment  of  German 
submarine  methods,  462;  requests  the 
belligerents  to  state  possible  peace  terms 
definitely,  464;  President  Wilson  ad- 
dresses the  Senate  on  a  "League  for 
Peace,"  464-466;  hands  the  German 
ambassador  his  passports,  466;  refuses 
to  receive  Austro-Hungarian  ambassa- 
dor, 472;  declares  that  a  state  of  war 
exists  with  Germany,  473;  ante-war 
military  forces  of,  474;  enacts  large 
increase  of  armies,  474;  organization 
of  army  of,  475;  expeditionary  force 
sent  to  Europe  by,  476. 

Urbal,    General    d',   in   command   of  the 
Tenth  French  Army,  25. 

Uskub,  captured  by  the  Bulgarians,  176. 

Uszok  Pass,  The,  35,  45,  49,  50,  53,  69. 

Valona  (Avlona),  occupied  by  the  Italians, 

163,  164,  182. 
Van,  occupied  by  the  Russians,  326. 
Vaux,  village  of  captured  by  die  Germans, 

247;    and    abandoned,    337;    the    fort 


508 


The  Great  War 


taken,  153;  ami  abandoned  by  the 
Germans,  j 

Verdun,  considerations  making  urgent  Ger- 
man capture  of,  133-236,  23S;  the 
.n  plan  t<>r  capture  of,  237-238; 
h  forces  and  their  position  at, 
■i  fora  ■  in  attack  against, 
240;  German  gains  at,  241-244;  Petain 
arrests  the  enemy  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Meuse,  245;  Germany  attacks  on 
147;  attack  on  Le  Mort 
Homme,  24S;  further  operations  on  the 
1,  24S,  249;  general  attack  against 
is  unsuccessful,  250;  Nivelle  succeeds 
Petain  at,  241  ;  the  Germans  capture 
Hill  304,  251;  and  Le  Mort  Homme, 
2^2;  counter-attack  on  the  east  of  the 
Meuse,  252;  capture  of  Fort  Vaux, 
253;  close  of  the  struggle  for,  253-254; 
renewed  operations  at  in  1916,  335; 
brilliant  French  successes  at,  337. 

Venizelos,  Eleutherios,  political  success  of, 
1 61-162;  friction  with  King  Constan- 
tine,  162;  favors  the  Allies,  164;  is 
thwarted  by  the  king,  1 64;  resigns  office, 
165;  is  endorsed  by  the  electors,  165; 
is  again  premier,  169;  seeks  Entente 
support  of  Serbia,  169;  resigns  office, 
170;  opposes  the  king's  ministry,  171. 

Vereczke,  or  Tucholka,  Pass,  The,  45,  49. 

Victor  Emmanuel,  King  of  Italy,  256,266. 

Vieprz,  The,  128,  137. 

Vileika,  taken  by  the  Germans,  143;  re- 
taken by  the  Russians,  146. 

Vilna,  German  plan  against,  129;  com- 
bined operations  against,  143,  144;  fall 
of,  144;  horrors  of  the  Russian  retreat 
from,  144-146. 

Vimy  Ridge,  western  slope  of  taken  by 
the  French,  227;  great  battle  of  won 
by  the  British,  342. 

Vindava,  The,  135. 

Visloka,  The,  67,  68,  69. 

Vistula,  The,  the  Russians  retreat  to,  133, 
134;  Teutonic  forces  cross,  135,  136; 
Russian  retreat  from,  137,  138. 

Viviani,  Rene,  200. 

Volhynia,  operations  in,  148-150,  151; 
Russians  defeat  Austro-Hungarians  in, 
287. 


Wadi  Ghuzze,  The,  333,  334. 

War  Council,  first  Allied,  268. 

Warsaw,  German  operations  against  in 
February,  191 5,  35-36;  von  Hinden« 
burg's  plan  of  attack  from  the  north, 
42;    the  Russians  abandon,   136,    137. 

Wilson,  President,  refuses  to  compromise 
the  neutrality  of  the  United  States,  380, 
459;  officially  proclaimed  neutrality  of 
the  United  States,  433;  resume  of  career 
of,  435-436;  offers  mediation  to  the 
belligerents,  436;  directs  critical  note 
to  Germany  on  the  issues  raised  by  the 
Lusitania,  458;  notifies  Congress  of 
strained  relations  with  Germany,  46 1 ; 
requests  the  belligerents  to  declare  defi- 
nitely terms  for  peace,  464;  addresses 
the  United  States  Senate  on  a  League 
for  Peace  and  terms  of  a  just  peace, 
464-465,  470;  advises  Congress  that 
diplomatic  relations  have  been  severed 
with  Germany,  467;  asks  authority  to 
arm  merchant  vessels,  467;  advises 
Congress  to  declare  a  state  of  war  exist- 
ing with  Germany,  469-470;  proclaims 
a  state  of  war,  473;  proclaims  national 
draft  registration,  474. 

Wirballen,  the  Russians  driven  from,  39. 

Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Delegates,  the 
Council  of  formed,  360. 

Woyrsch,  General,  in  command  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  army  in  the  East, 
34,  64,  284;  defeated  by  the  Russians 
in  southern  Poland,  70;  in  the  Polish 
campaign,  131,  1  33, 1  35, 136, 137,  140. 

Wiirttemberg,  Duke  of,  in  die  Second 
Battle  of  Ypres,  17;  command  of  on 
the  western  front,  219. 

Wyskow  Pass,  The,  45,  49. 

Yarmouth,     bombarded     by    a    German 

squadron,  402. 
Ypres,  Second  Battle  of,  191 5,  3,  17-24; 

Third  Battle  of,  348-349. 
Ypres- Yser  Canal,  The,  1 8. 

Zlota  Lipa,  The,  128,  148,  149,  150; 
crossed  by  the  Russians,  289;  the  Teu- 
tons defeated  near,  304. 

Zonnebeke,  occupied  by  the  Germans,  22. 


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